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ABSTRACT 
 
IDENTITY AND CHRIST: THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL AND SOTERIOLOGICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF RAIMON PANIKKAR‘S COSMOTHEANDRIC THEOLOGY 
 
 
 
By 
Michael J. Martocchio 
May 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by Gerald Boodoo, Ph.D. 
One of the most influential figures in recent theological reflection upon 
interreligious dialogue is Raimon Panikkar. Panikkar was an ordained Catholic priest 
who also practiced the Hindu and Buddhist faiths.  Panikkar lived a life of mystical faith 
in which his identity was simultaneously Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist, a phenomenon 
often called ‗multiple belonging‘.  However, this mystical unity is not merely an element 
of Panikkar‘s faith life, but it also essential to his theology.  In fact, it is mystical unity 
that underlies the very concept of identity in Panikkar‘s thought.  Identity is found 
through union.  It is in the realization of this unity that the concept of ‗Christ‘ comes into 
play.  Christ is the principle of this identifying unity, which is found throughout all of 
Reality.  Panikkar‘s overall theological vision can best be described by his own term: 
‗cosmotheandric‘, which describes this unity of all of reality in its three poles: the world 
(cosmos), God (Theos), and Human (Aner).  In this way, the very nature of Reality itself 
     
 
v 
is Trinitarian.  With this in mind, this dissertation seeks to deduce the ecclesiological and 
soteriological implications of this theological vision.  The key to understanding 
Panikkar‘s ecclesiology and soteriology is the interrelation of the concepts of ‗Christ‘ and 
‗identity‘. 
     
 
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
  
 I would like to thank Dr. Gerald Boodoo for his wisdom and guidance in the 
formation and completion of this project.  I would also like to thank Dr. Aimee Light and 
Dr. Sebastian Madathummuriyil for their insightful comments and advice.  Special thanks 
and gratitude are also due to Dr. George Worgul, the chair of the Theology Department 
and the entire Duquesne faculty, past and present.  Each of my teachers at Duquesne has, 
in a unique way, helped to form my theological understanding and inspired me through 
the years.  I would also like to thank all of my fellow graduate student and part time 
faculty colleagues who have enhanced my experiences over the years at Duquesne. 
I would also like to thank my wife Kristen, who has constantly been my source of 
strength and endurance.  I would also like to thank my daughter Francesca, who has 
brought so much joy to my life.  Thank you, as well, to my parents, my siblings and their 
families, and all of my friends and family who have given me their love and support.  
Finally, I would ultimately like to thank God and all of God‘s family who provided me 
with the opportunity to encounter the Divine in diverse ways that transcend my 
calculations. 
     
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
           Page 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..…iv  
Acknowledgment.………………………………………………………………………..vi 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….…..xi 
Chapter 1: Cosmotheandrism………………………………………………………….….1 
 1.1 Advaita and Trinity……………………………………………………….…..1 
 1.2 Reality and Trinity (Reality as Trinity)………………………………………6 
 1.3 Panikkar‘s Appropriation of Augustine…………………………………..….14 
 1.4 Panikkar on the Transcendence of the Father (Brahman)………..…………..20 
 1.5 The Son: The Ontological Expression of the Father…………………..……..25 
 1.6 The Spirit: The Unity of Silence and Expression………………...……..…...31 
 1.7 Jacques Dupuis: An Alternative Approach to the 
  Advaita-Trinity Relationship…………………………………………….40 
 1.8 Dupuis and Panikkar: A Contrast………………………...………………….46 
1.8.1 Panikkar‘s encounter between traditions is more radical and ‗risky‘  
 than that of Dupuis…………………………………………….…46 
1.8.2 Panikkar allows those religious traditions to encounter one another  
 on a level plane………………………………………………......48 
1.9 Conclusion……………...……………………………………………….…...49 
Chapter 2: Christ……………………………………………………………………....…50 
 2.1 The Evolving Worldview of Raimon Panikkar and the Resulting  
  Christology…………………………………………………………….....51 
     
 
viii 
 2.2 Christophany: Christ and the Humanum………………………………….…58 
2.3 The Question of the Uniqueness of Christ: A First Glance……………….…60 
2.4 Universality, Concreteness, and Christ………………………….……..…….63 
2.5 Christ the Tempiternal……………………………………………….….…...66 
2.6 Christ Enables Participation in the Divine, Trinitarian Life………….…..….68 
2.7 S. Mark Heim on the Incarnation………………….…………………….…...71 
2.8 Jacques Dupuis: A Helpful Dialogue Partner on Speaking of Christ Outside  
of Jesus………………………………………………………………...…73 
 2.9 Panikkar Accounts for the Connection between Christ and Jesus of  
  Nazareth………………………………………………………….………98 
 2.10 Conclusion………………………………………………………...………103 
Chapter 3: Identity……………………………………………………………………..105 
 3.1 East and West on Identity……………………………………………..…...105 
 3.2 Identity and Identification………………………………………………….111 
 3.3 The Humanum: One‘s Identity as a Human………………………………...116 
 3.4 Mythos and Logos…………………………………………………………..125 
 3.5 Myth and the Anthropological Level of Faith……………………………...131 
 3.6 A Philosophical Approach to Identity: Paul Ricoeur……………………….141 
3.7 Postcolonialism and Identity: Homi K. Bhabha……………………………149 
3.8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….……157 
Chapter 4: The Identity of Christ and Christian Identity………………………….……160 
 4.1 The Identity of Christ…………………………………………………….…160 
4.1.1 The Identity of Jesus of Nazareth………………………………...160 
     
 
ix 
  4.1.2 The Identity that the ‗Christophany‘ Reveals…………………….165 
4.2 Christian Identity…………………………………………………………...167 
 4.2.1 Christian Identity as Human Identity……………………………..167 
  4.2.2 Panikkar‘s Ontology of Perspectivism…………………...……….171 
  4.2.3 Christian Worship Mediates Christian Identity……………...…...175 
  4.2.4 A Universal Religious Experience?………………………...….…178 
  4.2.5 The Impossibility of Religious Epoché: Christian Identity 
Cannot Be Denied………………………………………..…….182 
  4.2.6 Intrareligious Dialogue………………………………………..…188 
  4.2.7 The Type of Pluralism that Christian Identity Must Embrace…...194 
  4.2.8 Critical Evaluation: Parallelism…………………………………..197 
4.2.9 A Unique Brand of Pluralism………………………………….....199 
4.2.10 Critique: Is Such a Pluralistic Outlook Possible?.…………..…..207 
4.2.11 Dialogue Fosters Growth………………………………………..219 
4.2.12 Unity is at the Root of Christian Identity………………………..225 
 4.3 True Christian Identity is Established Mystically…………………………228 
 4.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….248 
Chapter 5: Ecclesiological and Soteriological Implications……………………………250 
 5.1 Ecclesiology………………………………………………………………...250 
 5.2 Critical Evaluation: A Cosmic Christology Demands a Cosmic  
  Ecclesiology………………………………………………………….....253 
 5.3 Soteriology…………...……………………………………………………..259 
 5.4 Critical Evaluation: The Freedom of Salvation and its Institutional  
     
 
x 
  Implications……………………………………………………………..275 
 5.5 Realizing Salvific Identity………………………..………………………...279 
 5.6 S. Mark Heim on Salvation and the Possibility of Multiple 
  Religious Ends………………………………………………………….281 
 5.7 Critical Evaluation: Multiple Religious Ends or Multiple Human  
  Conditions? …………………………………………………………….288 
 5.8 Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus………………………………………………..297 
 5.9 Synthesis: Soteriology, Ecclesiology, and Identity…………………………304 
 5.10 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...307 
Conclusion………………………………………..………………………….…………310 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………….……...…315 
     
 
xi 
Introduction 
In Catholic theology since the latter half of the twentieth century, increasingly 
greater attention has been given to interreligious dialogue.  One of the great catalysts in 
this regard was the Second Vatican Council.  The attitude of openness that built up prior 
to the council, and which the council channeled marked a decisive shift in tone from the 
previous more ‗exclusivist‘ attitude that can even be found in Pius XII‘s inspirational 
Mystici Corporis Christi.  The Second Vatican Council thus sanctioned the dialogical 
work that many theologians, including our object of study, Raimon Panikkar, had already 
begun, and marked a significant turn in Catholic theology in general. 
This positive turn toward other traditions was doubtlessly inspired by the 
phenomenon of ‗globalization‘.  Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World, notes that ―One of the salient features of the modern world 
is the growing interdependence of men one on the other, a development promoted chiefly 
by modern technical advances.‖ 1  This increasing encounter and mutual reliance between 
peoples of various geographical and religious backgrounds has multiplied exponentially 
since the council, no doubt influenced this positive turn.  However, it is not simply the 
novelty of the milieu that lies at the root of this openness.  It is also the rediscovery of the 
historical roots of Christianity in both its Judaic and patristic forms that allowed the 
bishops gathered at the Second Vatican Council to find reason to reject the isolationism 
that has periodically plagued the Church throughout its history. 
The clearest articulation of this attitude of the council can be found in 1965‘s 
Nostra Aetate, the Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions.  
                                                        
1 Gaudium et Spes, 23. 
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Nostra Aetate envisions the existence of some kind of universal religious experience that 
cuts across the many geographical, cultural, and religious boundaries that humanity has 
established.  In it, the Bishops state, ―From ancient times down to the present, there is 
found among various peoples a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers 
over the course of things and over the events of human history; at times some indeed 
have come to the recognition of a Supreme Being, or even of a Father.‖2  They continue: 
Religions, however, that are bound up with an advanced culture have struggled to answer 
the same questions by means of more refined concepts and a more developed language. 
Thus in Hinduism, men contemplate the divine mystery and express it through an 
inexhaustible abundance of myths and through searching philosophical inquiry. They 
seek freedom from the anguish of our human condition either through ascetical practices 
or profound meditation or a flight to God with love and trust. Again, Buddhism, in its 
various forms, realizes the radical insufficiency of this changeable world; it teaches a way 
by which men, in a devout and confident spirit, may be able either to acquire the state of 
perfect liberation, or attain, by their own efforts or through higher help, supreme 
illumination. 
 Thus, while Nostra Aetate places particular stress on relations with Judaism and 
even Islam because of the Abrahamic roots they share with Christianity, it also sees both 
Hinduism and Buddhism as striving for knowledge of the same ‗divine mystery‘ that 
Christians seek.  Thus, the Bishops declare that the ―Catholic Church rejects nothing that 
is true and holy in these religions.‖3  Furthermore, they ―often reflect a ray of that Truth 
which enlightens all men.‖4 
                                                        
2 Nostra Aetate, 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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However, openness to the presence of such a ‗ray of truth‘ in other religious 
traditions is only a starting point for interreligious dialogue.  The questions that follow 
from this starting point revolve around the precise nature of this relationship between 
Christianity and other religious traditions, as well as the relationship between the truth 
claims that each posit.  It is to these types of questions that a great amount of theological 
thought in the area of interreligious dialogue has been devoted before, during, and after 
the Council. 
It is against this backdrop that Raimon Panikkar has developed his 
cosmotheandric theological vision.  Panikkar was born on November 3, 1918 in 
Barcelona.  He was ordained a Catholic priest in 1946.  Panikkar held three doctorates.  
His first doctorate, from Madrid University in 1946 was in philosophy.  He was ordained 
a Catholic priest in the same year.  His second doctorate was in chemistry also from 
Madrid University in 1958.  His third doctorate was in theology from Lateran University 
in Rome in 1961.
5
   He later served on the liturgical commission for the Second Vatican 
Council and attended the first Roman Synod under John XXIII.
6
  The first edition of his 
groundbreaking The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, which developed from his theology 
dissertation, was also released during the Council (1964). 
Even with a cursory glance at his work, it is plain to see that Panikkar‘s 
theological vision is quite peculiar.  In one sense, he holds to the pluralist notion that 
there are many religious traditions that have valid, salvific significance in their own right, 
                                                        
5 A brief biography of Panikkar can be found on the official website of the Fundació Vivarium Raimon 
Panikkar. See Fundació Vivarium Raimon Panikkar, http://www.raimon-
panikkar.org/english/biography.html (Accessed September 1, 2011). 
6 See editor‘s note on Raimon Panikkar, ―Can Theology Be Transcultural?‖  in Pluralism and Oppression: 
Theology in World Perspective (The Annual Volume of the College Theology Society 1988, Volume 34, ed. 
Paul Knitter (New York, NY: University Press of  America, Inc., 1991), 4. 
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not simply as ‗stepping stones‘ to Christianity.  On the other hand, unlike many other 
pluralists, Panikkar does not dilute the notion of truth in order to acknowledge its 
presence in other traditions.  Rather, he defines the truth of these religious traditions in a 
manner that Christians (maybe with some effort) can recognize.  As we shall see, the 
central truth that authentic religions reveal, according to Panikkar, is communion.  
Panikkar discusses communion in terms of ‗cosmotheandrism‘, a term we shall examine 
in our first chapter.   
‗Cosmotheandrism‘, the union between God, humanity, and the world, is rooted 
in the Christian concept of Trinity.  The Trinity for Panikkar, however, is not merely a 
term used to describe God.  Rather, the unity that is present in the Godhead radiates and 
enlivens all of reality.  Thus, everything, including the transcendent God, is bound up in a 
relationship of communion. As we shall see, this is the foundation of Panikkar‘s dialogue 
with traditions other than Christianity.  The most important interlocutor in this respect is 
the school of Advaita Vedanta within Hinduism.  The Advaitic tradition, according to 
Panikkar, recognizes in all of reality the same communion that Christians find in the 
Triune God and in which they seek to participate in eschatological hope. 
Much like the concept of Trinity, the term ‗Christ‘ receives significant extension 
in Panikkar‘s thought.  For Panikkar, the activity of ‗Christ‘ extends outside of the 
incarnation to the extent that there can be, to borrow the title from his most famous work, 
an ‗unknown Christ of Hinduism‘.  In our second chapter we shall examine Panikkar‘s 
Christology, to which he gives the appellation ‗christophany‘.  We shall find that what is 
essential for Panikkar is that ‗Christ‘ is revelatory and can be found wherever 
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cosmotheandric union is manifested and revealed.  ‗Christ‘, then is not the sole property 
of Christianity. 
This brings us to the concept of ‗identity‘, which, as we shall see in our third 
chapter, is a concept that Panikkar analyzes in multiple ways, both directly and indirectly.  
We argue in what follows that identity is a central category in Panikkar‘s thought.  For 
Panikkar, identity results from the interplay between self-designation and communal 
acceptance.  It is also best understood through unity and not differentiation.  It is only 
through understanding identity as Panikkar envisions it that we can begin to sketch the 
soteriology and ecclesiology for which Panikkar lays the foundation, and to which he 
frequently points.  Ecclesiology and soteriology are both bound up with the realization of 
one‘s identity. 
It is with this in mind that we proceed to our fourth chapter, in which we see 
where the terms ‗Christ‘ and ‗identity‘ converge in Panikkar‘s thought.  In this chapter, 
we examine both the identity of Christ and, in a broader sense, Christian identity.  For 
Panikkar, however, these terms are intimately related.  ‗Christ‘ extends beyond the 
boundaries of the Incarnation and is, ultimately, the principle of human identity.  The 
Christian, then, is one who is united with and, consequently, manifests Christ.  The 
Christian is a ‗christophany‘.  
Based upon these reflections, we proceed to our fifth and final chapter, in which 
we examine Panikkar‘s soteriological and ecclesiological statements and attempt to 
construct a more or less systematized synthesis thereof and follow these elements of 
Panikkar‘s theology further down the logical course that Panikkar has begun.  It is here 
that we betray our Christian inclination and perspective.  Our concern is with the 
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implications that Panikkar‘s thought have for Christianity and the identification of what 
we can learn from his intrareligious dialogue.  We should note that Panikkar himself does 
not develop these themes because they are distinctly Christian concerns.  But, from a 
Christian perspective, they are important themes and must be addressed in any complete 
theological system.
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Chapter 1 
Cosmotheandrism 
Raimon Panikkar‘s Trinitarian theology is the centerpiece of his entire theological 
project.  As we shall see, however, this Trinitarian worldview has undergone some 
evolution.   In Panikkar‘s thought, there has been an evolution from a focus on the Trinity 
as a characteristic of God to one on Trinity as a characteristic of all reality, which in 
Panikkar‘s terminology is called ‗cosmotheandrism‘.  This represents the full maturation 
of Panikkar‘s thought.  In the exposition below, we shall examine both his earlier thought 
and his later thought, often bridging the two.  As we shall see, Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
worldview cannot be understood without his earlier work on Trinity ‗qua God‘.  It is 
consequently the background against which all elements of his thought are to be 
analyzed.  Thus, before we proceed to discuss Panikkar‘s usage of terms such as ‗Christ‘ 
and ‗identity‘, we must locate these concepts within Panikkar‘s overall project.  
Therefore, let us begin with a discussion of Trinity. 
1.1 Advaita and Trinity 
For Panikkar, Trinitarian thought is an important locus of overlap between 
Christian thought and other great religious traditions of the world.  The most important of 
these is the Hindu Advaitic tradition.   The thought behind this dialogue of traditions, and 
which underlies Panikkar‘s theological project, is based on Panikkar‘s effort to wrestle 
with the problem of separating Christianity from Western culture.  Panikkar holds out 
hope that this can be done: ―I have been hoping for many years for a Second Council of 
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Jerusalem (whatever this might be) that would bring together not only Christians but 
exponents of the world‘s other human traditions.‖1 
At the root of this Trinitarian dialogue for Panikkar is his conviction that God in 
general, and a Trinitarian view of God in particular, is not the sole property of Western 
Christianity or even Christianity in general.  As Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen points out, ―a key 
insight for Panikkar is that Trinity, while a distinctively Christian way of speaking of 
cosmotheandrism, is not an exclusively Christian reality.‖2  Rather, Trinity is ―a concept 
that can be found in all religions, though taking various forms.‖3  Thus Trinity is an 
insight shared by several of the great traditions of the world.  For Panikkar, the Trinity is 
especially advantageous in the dialogue between religions because it is open to unity in 
difference.  The concept of the Trinity, then, may embrace the same mystery that is 
expressed in varying ways in other religious traditions.
4
  ―The Trinity, then, may be 
considered as a junction where the authentic spiritual dimensions of all religions meet.‖5 
Thanks in part to Panikkar‘s influence, this view is not uncommon in 
contemporary theology.  Several theologians who grapple with the relationship between 
Christianity and other world religions take a similar approach.  Many of these theologians 
are inspired directly by Panikkar‘s project.  For instance, Gavin D‘Costa, who criticizes 
the pluralism of theologians like John Hick and Paul Knitter, also sees Trinitarian 
theology as having the ability to cross traditional borders.  He dislikes the theologies of 
                                                        
1 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, Transl. Alfred DiLascia, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2004), 6.  See also Raimon Panikkar, A Dwelling Place for Wisdom, transl. Annemarie S. Kidder, 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993), 109. 
2 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2007), 337. 
3 Ibid., 339. 
4 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—Mystery, 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 42. 
5 Ibid., 42. 
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Hick and Knitter because they, in the final analysis, become just as rigid as the so-called 
exclusivists they criticize because they begin with their own exclusionary starting point, 
which D‘Costa identifies as modernity.  According to D‘Costa, ―logically speaking, if 
those who claim that theirs is the only true religious tradition should be naturally 
described as exclusivist, it is not clear to me why ‗pluralists‘ who also believe that theirs 
is the only true tradition should not equally be naturally described as exclusivists.‖6  
D‘Costa‘s thesis is that "Trinitarian exclusivism can acknowledge God's action within 
other traditions, without domesticating or obliterating their alterity, such that real 
conversation and engagement might occur."
7
 
Another theologian influenced by this aspect of Panikkar‘s thought is S. Mark 
Heim, who exhibits what he terms a theology of ‗multiple religious ends‘.  According to 
Heim, ―Christians can find validity in other religions because of the conviction that the 
Trinity represents a universal truth about the way the world and God actually are.‖8  Like 
D‘Costa, Heim sees the Trinity as a theological view that not only tolerates, but also 
anticipates religious diversity.  Heim, however, has in mind the diversity of religious 
goals, or ends.  He explains that ―from within a trinitarian perspective, specific 
differences need not be condemned, but alternative ways of integrating difference are 
regarded as penultimate at best in comparison with the trinitarian option.‖9 
 The form that this Trinitarian approach to the diversity of religions in the world 
takes in Panikkar‘s thought is set forth in his The Trinity and World Religions: Icon—
                                                        
6 Gavin D‘Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000), 46. 
7 Ibid., 47. 
8 S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 127. 
9 Ibid., 128. 
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Person—Mystery.10  In this small book, Panikkar sets forth his conviction that ―dualism 
and monism are equally false.‖11  This conviction is based on his appropriation of the 
advaitic tradition of Hinduism.  This advaitic tradition finds its roots in the 8
th
 century 
CE Hindu thinker Shankara.
12
  According to this tradition, the Upanishads reveal the 
advaita, ―the non-dual character of the Real, the impossibility of putting in dvanva, in a 
pair, God and the world.‖13  However, the two cannot be strictly identified either.  Thus, 
―God and the world are neither one nor two.‖14  This nondualist insight then, for 
Panikkar, is something akin to the Christian Trinitarian insight, which is based on the 
                                                        
10 See Raymond (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and World Religions: Icon—Person—Mystery, 
(Bangalore, India: The Christian Literature Society, 1970).   This work was published in the United States 
three years later as The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—Mystery.  See 
Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—Mystery, 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973).  We will follow the pagination of the latter in the references that 
follow. 
 
11 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—
Mystery, 36. 
12 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), 110. Panikkar calls Shankara ―the most 
illustrious philosopher of Avaita-Vedānta.‖ 
13 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—
Mystery, 36. 
14 Ibid.  While it is not our concern here, we should note that it can be questioned whether Panikkar is 
selectively interpreting the advaita Vedanta to fit his (Christian) theological agenda.  See, for instance, 
Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1997), 273-274. Dupuis does not agree that advaitic nondualism avoids monism. Thus, he distinguishes 
more clearly than Panikkar between Trinitarian and advaitic thought.  See Michael Comans, The Method of 
Early Advaita Vedanta: A Study of Gaudapada, Sankara, Suresvara, and Padmapada, (Delhi, India: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), 223-224.  Michael Comans points out that Shankara maintains distinctions, but 
they are secondary to the absolute oneness of all reality.  Thus, Shankara‘s Advaita is not simply a 
‗monistic theism‘.   Nonetheless, Shankara certainly places unity above distinctions.  In other words the 
Absolute unity precedes and grounds the creativity of Brahman (Ishvara) and is ultimately overcome when 
the self sees the world as Brahman (See Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4.5.15). Only unity is ultimate.  See 
also Ibid., 217-218. Toward this end, Shankara distinguishes between the absolute Brahman and the saguna 
Brahman (Brahman with attributes).  This latter term is connected to the Creator Lord, Ishvara.  However, 
the two are not exact equivalents (See Shankara‘s commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.2.2).  However, it should 
be noted that Panikkar‘s cosmotheandrism emphasizes union, not division.  It is not intended to 
compartmentalize reality, but to emphasize the unity of all that is.  See Raimon Panikkar, The 
Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 61.  Panikkar states, ―The 
cosmotheandric intuition is not a tripartite division among beings, but an insight into the threefold core of 
all that is, insofar as it is.‖  See Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 146.  While 
critiquing S. Mark Heim, Kärkkäinen points out that the intention behind the development of the doctrine 
of the Trinity was to emphasize unity.  Nonetheless, the doctrine of the Trinity still affirms diversity; 
distinctions do not ‗disappear‘. 
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Nicene conviction that the relationship between Father and Son is neither one of monism, 
nor one of dualism.
15
  Thus, the Hindu tradition shares, in its own unique way, a 
Trinitarian worldview with Christianity.  So, there is common ground between both 
traditions. 
It should be noted, however, that not all those who read his work believe that 
Panikkar‘s interpretation is completely faithful to the advaitic tradition.  Jyri Komulainen, 
for instance, expresses some doubts on Panikkar‘s definition of advaita, insisting that ―he 
interprets this crucial concept of Hindu philosophy in quite an idiosyncratic way, 
claiming that Advaitic intuition alludes to something that overcomes both monism and 
dualism.‖16  He continues: ―It could even be said that his conception has a certain bias 
that springs from his Christian background.‖17  Thus, Panikkar uses Advaita in a way that 
may not be recognizable to most vedantic thinkers.   From a Christian perspective, of 
course, this is not a serious problem, but if one is claiming (as Panikkar does) to do 
justice to the Hindu tradition as well, he/she must acknowledge any interpretive license 
that has been taken.  We shall see an alternative inculcation of Advaita Vedanta below as 
we look at Jacques Dupuis‘ theology of religious pluralism.18 
He notes that Panikkar has the tendency to ‗mystify‘ his theology, saying that ―it 
is rather clear that what Panikkar does with his ‗non-dualistic‘ is to shift his point of view 
                                                        
15 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 148-163. 
16 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, (Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 101. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See, for instance Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 273-274.  Dupuis 
is much more guarded in his usurpation of the concept of nondualism.  He is concerned that the nondualism 
found in the Advaita Vedanta leaves very little room for distinction; it is, in essence monism.  
Consequently, he speaks of the trinitatian insight as distinct from the advaitic insight because it accounts 
for both diversity and unity. 
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to another level, and thus, in a sense, to evade criticism.‖19  This, of course, is always a 
danger when one deals with the logic of transcendence.  Nonetheless, Komulainen calls 
the approach of Trinity and World Religions an ―example of creative Trinitarian 
thinking.‖20  He also points out that ―although Panikkar did not develop the line of 
Trinitarian thought presented in TWR [Trinity and World Religions], some fundamental 
theological decisions made in it could be seen in his Christology.‖21  We shall see this 
influence in greater detail as we delve deeper into Panikkar‘s Christology in Chapter 2. 
1.2 Reality and Trinity (Reality as Trinity) 
The most significant point of influence that the advaitic tradition bears on 
Panikkar‘s thought can be seen in his insistence that Trinity is not something that 
exclusively refers to God.  Rather, it describes the relationship of all of reality, in its three 
poles: the World (Cosmos), God (Theos), and Man (Aner).
22
  Hence, to describe this 
                                                        
19 Ibid., 102.  See also Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 344.  Here, Kärkkäinen 
also criticizes Panikkar for what he calls Panikkar‘s ―quite uncritical use of the advaitic principle.‖  It 
seems, however, that Kärkkäinen‘s dispute with Panikkar here is not the result of a criticism from a Hindu 
perspective, but rather, it is a criticism from a logical perspective.  Kärkkäinen says, ―It seems to me that an 
advaitic principle is called forth whenever serious logical or other intellectual problems are encountered.  
Resorting to either the advaitic or mystical principle can become an exercise in avoiding the core problem.‖  
Thus, whenever he finds himself in a logical ‗corner‘, Panikkar draws an exit by appealing to ‗mystery‘.  
This critique is quite valid.  It must be admitted that this is a frequent temptation in all of Trinitarian 
theology.  There is a ‗fine line‘ that one walks whenever one deals with transcendence.  However, if one is 
to really follow the ‗logic‘ of transcendence, one must be willing to carefully tread that path.  One must 
even be willing to err on the side of saying ‗too little‘ rather than destroying the transcendent by saying ‗too 
much‘. 
20 Ibid., 35. 
21 Ibid., 36. 
22 In what follows, we use the term human rather than ‗Man‘ as Panikkar does.  However, Panikkar‘s usage 
of the term ‗Man‘ ought not to be interpreted in a gender exclusive manner.  See Raimon Panikkar, The 
Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, ed. Scott Eastham  (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1993), 54-55.  Here, Panikkar explains his terminological preference.  He notes, ―In 
describing this intuition, the expression theanthropocosmic might sound more accurate, because anthrōpos 
refers to Man as a human being, i.e., as distinct from the Gods, while anēr tends to connote the male.‖  But, 
theandric connotes ―union of the human and the divine without confusion.‖  He also chooses 
‗cosmotheandrism‘ for more aesthetic reasons: ―Besides, the expression cosmotheandric is rather more 
euphonic than theanthropocosmic.‖ Nonetheless, he still uses the term uses ―theanthropocosmic‖ in the 
same work.  See Ibid., 127. 
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advaitic-trinitarian approach to reality, Panikkar coins a new term (something he does 
with some frequency): cosmotheandrism. 
In one of his most mature works, Christophany, Panikkar defines his own project 
as characterized by the desire to ―transcend abrahamic monotheism without damaging the 
legitimacy and validity of monotheistic religions.‖23 He sees cosmotheandrism as the 
solution.  He points out that, contrary to popular sentiments, Trinitarian thought is not 
monotheism.  If it were, it would result in Docetism.  Furthermore, along these lines, in a 
Trinitarian approach, God is not properly referred to as a substance.  This would result in 
tritheism.
24
  Rather, ―God is transcendent mystery immanent in us.‖25  So, Panikkar sees 
his thought as the logical outcome of Trinitarianism.  When this insight is extended 
beyond mere reference to God, it can be seen everywhere: 
It is worth recalling that the cosmotheandric vision of reality is an almost universal 
cultural invariant.  I know of no culture where heaven-earth-hell, past-present-future, 
Gods-Men-World, and pronouns I-you-it, and even the intellectual triad of yes, no and 
their embrace, are not found in one form or another.26 
 Panikkar‘s use of the term ‗cosmotheandric‘ marks this extension.  The 
relationship that Christians traditionally ascribe to the Trinitarian hypostases is at the 
foundation of all reality: 
In other words, in Panikkar‘s vision the Cosmotheandric principle expresses the 
fundamental structure of reality in terms of the intimate interaction of God, humankind, 
                                                        
23 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, xx. 
24 Ibid., 15. 
25 Ibid., 23. 
26 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 136-137. 
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and the world or cosmos.  There is no hierarchy, no dualism; one of the three does not 
dominate or take precedence.27 
While considering Panikkar‘s new term, Varghese Manimala points out: 
The coinage of the term and making use of it practically in all his recent writings shows 
the fact that he has been reflecting on this triple aspect for many years.  He has studied at 
length the ‗trinitarian‘ aspect of reality, and this aspect is close to his heart that we find a 
glimpse of this practically in all his writings.28 
Perhaps this influence is seen even in those works that were written before he 
coined the term, in which Trinitarian thought is frequently central.  Nonetheless, as we 
shall see below, this Trinitarian thought has undergone evolution from a ‗more 
traditional‘ emphasis on the interrelations of the hypostases of the Godhead to an 
emphasis on Trinity as a pattern or structure comprising all of reality.  Thus, as 
Kärkkäinen notes, Panikkar‘s Trinitarianism has a great deal of concrete application 
because ―for him Trinitarianism is not only a doctrine but also an underlying structure of 
all reality, including religions.‖29  This enables the above-mentioned openness to finding 
Trinitarian elements in religious traditions other than Christianity.   According to 
Kärkkäinen, ―The reason Trinitarian—cosmotheandric—language is appropriate even in 
a nonexclusive theology of religions is that it genuinely reflects the structure of reality.‖30 
He sees this as Panikkar‘s major accomplishment.  Kärkkäinen tells us: ―In my 
understanding, the main contribution is elevating the doctrine of the Trinity to a central 
                                                        
27 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 337.  See, for instance, Raimon Panikkar, The 
Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, ed. Scott Eastham  (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1993), 60.  Here, Panikkar states, ―The cosmotheandric principle could be formulated by 
saying that the divine, the human and the earthly-however we may prefer to call them-are the three 
irreducible dimensions which constitute the real, i.e., and reality inasmuch as it is real.‖ 
28 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, (New Delhi, India: Media House, 2009), 20. 
29 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 340. 
30 Ibid., 339. 
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place not only in Christian theology in general but in the theology of religions in 
particular.‖31  This is due to the fact that by making the Trinity central, Panikkar 
―genuinely wrestles with the ancient problem of one-and-many.‖32  Because he is dealing 
with an essential human problem, that is reconciling unity and diversity, Panikkar touches 
on something that is deeper than and at the root of any authentic religious tradition. 
So, as Manimala states, Panikkar ―holds that reality has a threefold structure; this 
triadic unity exists in all levels of the consciousness and reality.‖33  But as Manimala 
points out, ―one important aspect of this threefold reality is that they are no watertight 
compartments, but they interpenetrate and are interdependent.‖34  So, this structure of 
reality is characterized by perichoresis, circumincessio, or mutual indwelling, in the 
language of Christian theology
35
 and advaita, or nondualism, in the language of the Vedic 
tradition.  Thus, it is these two traditions that most greatly influence Panikkar‘s 
cosmotheandrism: 
The cosmotheandric vision has its most visible roots in Christianity and Hinduism.  In the 
former there is the theandrism, especially influential in the Orthodox Church, and 
according to which the divine and human wouldn‘t exist without each other.36 
                                                        
31 Ibid., 341. 
32 Ibid., 342. 
33 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 51. 
34 Ibid., 53.   
35 Another Christian term that Panikkar does not frequently use, but which will be important for our 
purposes is koinonia (communio, or communion). 
36 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 58.  Panikkar adds the cosmic dimension to 
‗theandrism‘ to highlight the dignity of all of creation along with that of humanity.  See Raimon Panikkar, 
The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 148.  Panikkar traces this dignity to 
both the Judeo-Christian and Hindu traditions, noting, ―The book of Deuteronomy, as the Vedas also do, 
speaks of your wife, your ox, your field and your slave all in the same breath.  We can read this either as 
degrading your slave to the level of your field, or as enhancing your ox to the level of your wife: everything 
is a hierogamy!—patriarchy notwithstanding.‖ 
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And ―the other root comes from the Indian soil: the Hindu notion of saccidānanda 
(sat-cit-ānanda).‖37  This notion refers to the state of nonduality that is sought in the 
advaitic tradition.  While Panikkar relies on these two traditions to express his 
cosmotheandric vision, as we shall see below, cosmotheandrism extends far beyond 
them.  Some commentators see the influence of Buddhism in Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
vision as well.  This should come as no surprise, given the closeness of Hindu and 
Buddhist traditions, as well as Panikkar‘s own interest in Buddhism. 
One such commentator is Jyri Komulainen.   Komulainen describes Panikkar‘s 
cosmotheandrism as his ‗ontology‘.  In articulating this ontology, Panikkar begins with 
the Christian concept of Trinity, which, as we have mentioned, is not limited to 
Christianity: 
Panikkar understands the Trinitarian character of his metaphysics to be a legitimate 
expansion of classical Trinitarian theology.  The Trinity cannot be monopolized by 
Christianity nor by Divinity for, according to the cosmotheandric vision, reality, as such, 
is Trinitarian.
38
 
According to Komulainen, the key to Panikkar‘s understanding of trinitarianism is 
‗relationality‘.39  It is Panikkar‘s ―relational ontology‖ that ―patently reveals the influence 
of Buddhism in his thinking.‖40  Komulainen points out that this relationality is connected 
to the Buddhist idea of pratītyasamutpāda or ―dependent origination,‖ the idea that all 
                                                        
37 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 58.  Saccidānanda is a compound word 
referring to being-consciousness-bliss. 
38 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 182. 
39 Ibid., 183. 
40 Ibid., 184. 
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reality is interrelated and interdependent.
41
  In this way, Panikkar‘s thought represents a 
move away from monotheism. ―In fact,‖ Komulainen tells us, ―he understands that it is 
the Trinitarian doctrine that has forced dispensation with the monotheistic understanding 
of God.‖42  As we have seen above, Panikkar insists that his new cosmotheandric 
metaphysic is the logical outcome of Trinitarian theology. 
 S. Mark Heim points out that Panikkar‘s project is an attempt to merge three 
distinct spiritualities: ‗iconolatry‘, personalism, and mysticism.43 Iconolatry is distinct 
from idolatry: 
Idolatry, understood as the transference to a creature of the adoration due to God alone, 
i.e. an adoration which stops short at the object, without going beyond it in an ongoing 
movement towards the Creator, the Transcendent, is without doubt the gravest of sins.  
But iconolatry which starts by adoring some object upon which has descended the glory 
of the Lord, and takes this object as a point of departure for a slow and arduous ascent 
towards God, cannot be condemned and rejected so easily.44 
 Thus, Iconolatry is the process by which God is worshiped through the starting 
point of some tangible object.  In personalism, however, God is worshiped in an 
interpersonal way, characterized by ―mutual giving.‖45  It involves relating to God in a 
way similar to how we relate to other humans.  Therefore, ―we call God a personal being 
because we ourselves are persons.  We consider God a Being because we ourselves are 
                                                        
41 Ibid., 185.  See Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 
60.  Panikkar states, ―I am not only saying that everything is directly or indirectly related to everything else: 
the radical relativity or pratītyasamutpāda of the buddhist tradition.  I am also stressing that this 
relationship is not only constitutive of the whole, but that it flashes forth, ever new and vital, in every spark 
of the real.‖ 
42 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 186. 
43 S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, 148. 
44 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—
Mystery, 16. 
45 Ibid., 22. 
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beings.‖46  However, we soon find that ―if God is a person he corresponds very poorly to 
man‘s own ideal of a person.‖47  This leads to the spirituality of mysticism, which is 
enamored with God‘s transcendence.  However, Panikkar cautions against a narrow 
conception of transcendence as something opposed to immanence, in which 
transcendence is envisioned as something exterior and immanence as something interior.  
Rather: 
Divine immanence, truly speaking, does not refer to a God who is, as it were, enclosed in 
our inner being, while at the same time irrevocably separated from us just like God in his 
transcendent or exterior aspect.  Nor can divine transcendence be reduced to the aspect of 
exteriority or even the ‗otherness‘ of God.  The authentic notion of transcendence 
surmounts all human barriers and situates God in the light inaccessible of which St Paul 
speaks, in the deep shadows of the Dionysian mystery-cult, on the other shore of the 
river, to use a phrase from the Upanișads or from the Buddha—in a word, beyond any 
‗real relationship‘.  Transcendence implies heterogeneity between God and man, and 
rejects any relatedness which is at the root of all religious anthropomorphism whether 
iconolatrous or personalist.  True divine transcendence does not stem from the so-called 
natural and rational order; wherefore, if one is not willing to go beyond that order, one is 
unable, speaking absolutely, either to say or think anything about the Absolute.48 
 Thus, the relationship with the transcendent is ultimately a relationship of silence.  
Apophatic mysticism testifies to this silence.  Nonetheless, all three of these experiences 
(iconolatry, personalism, and mysticism) are part of authentically human spirituality.  
They are different moments in a single, ongoing relationship.  As Heim points out, 
―Panikkar claims that only a Trinitarian concept of reality permits a synthesis of the three 
                                                        
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 27. 
48 Ibid., 31-32. 
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spiritualities, a reconciliation of their apparently irreducible concepts of the Absolute.‖49  
Thus, the cosmotheandric vision can reconcile not only various religious traditions, but 
also various spiritualities. 
This cosmotheandric relationship of nonduality is not without consequences.  For 
instance, Varghese Manimala insists that this means that ―life is a solidarity, we are all 
involved in the happenings of the universe, every action has universal repercussions as 
established by the theory of karma.‖50  This yields a new problematic for the ecologically 
minded.  As Manimala points out, ―the cosmos is falling apart, Man cannot solve the 
problems human ingenuity has created, and even God seems unable to stand up to his 
own claims.‖51  Furthermore, ―we are coming to the realization that the being of the earth 
is finite.‖52 
However, Panikkar gives an interesting warning that if ecology is seen merely as 
a scientific enterprise it is not a solution, but a continuation of the attitude of dominance 
and disregard that has caused the problem in the first place.  It is just a milder form of 
exploitation of the cosmos because ―the oikos is still dominated by the human logos.  In 
so many words, a new science, ecology, has appeared and has all the earmarks of 
becoming yet another tool for human mastery of the Earth.‖53  Thus, there is the same 
arrogance in the ecological problem-solving as there was in the problem-creation.  This is 
marked by the quest to dominate all by reason.  Only an attitude of mystery and wonder 
                                                        
49 S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, 149. 
50 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 29. 
51Ibid., 31. 
52 Ibid., 32. 
53 Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 43.  Panikkar is 
here playing on the etymology of ecology: oikos (home) and logos (reason). 
     
 
14 
can yield the kind of respect for the cosmos that is necessary to overcome the ecological 
crisis in which we find ourselves.  This attitude is cosmotheandrism. 
1.3 Panikkar’s Appropriation of Augustine 
There are several Augustinian themes embedded in much of Panikkar‘s theology, 
particularly within his view of the Trinity.  Most important among these is the interiority 
of the Trinity to each individual.  One of the concepts that is most frequently ascribed to 
Augustine is the idea that throughout creation, there are ‗traces of Trinity‘, or vestigia 
trinitatis.  According to Panikkar‘s theological outlook, in our cosmotheandric intuition, 
we see a vestigium trinitatis in each of us.
54
  Both Augustine and Panikkar find these 
traces all over creation, but most notably in the mind of humans. 
 Augustine, for instance, sees a vestigium trinitatis in the tripartite division of the 
memory, understanding, and will of one person: 
Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor 
three minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but 
one substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and substance, is so called 
in respect to itself; but it is called memory, relatively to something. And I should say the 
same also of understanding and of will, since they are called understanding and will 
relatively to something; but each in respect to itself is life, and mind, and essence. And 
hence these three are one, in that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever 
else they are severally called in respect to themselves, they are called also together, not 
plurally, but in the singular number. But they are three, in that wherein they are mutually 
referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to each, but also 
                                                        
54 Ibid., 147. 
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each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is each 
contained by each, but also all by each.55 
Varghese Manimala highlights this theme in Panikkar‘s writing.  On Panikkar‘s 
insistence that all of reality is Trinitarian (which we have called Panikkar‘s 
cosmotheandrism), Manimala also uses classic anthropology as an example of this 
Trinitarian permeation: 
The classic tripartite division of Man as body, soul and spirit (corpus, anima, spiritus) 
could be understood as another formulation of the same intuition.  But none of these three 
dimensions is to be individualized or particularized.56 
Manimala also points out that Panikkar‘s ―earliest writings‖ refer to Trinity 
―although this is not yet the ‗radical Trinity‘ of Panikkar‘s mature years.‖57  However, 
even in this early work, this Augustinian theme is latent.  For instance, in his philosophy 
dissertation, Panikkar insists that there is a ―vestige of the Trinity‖ in all creatures.58  In 
these early writings, Panikkar is much closer to Augustine‘s view, in which the cosmos 
bears the mark of its creator.  As Manimala indicates, ―this universe participates in the 
divine Trinity, but it is not Trinitarian in itself: the Trinity is the model and is primordial; 
the universe is the reflection that derives from it.‖59  In this way, the Western ―schism 
between God and the world‖ that ―lies at the very basis of Western religious awareness‖ 
limits the connection between Trinity and creation.
60
  However, we ought to point out 
that, in the general Christian theological outlook, it is the role of Christ to bridge this 
                                                        
55 Augustine of Hippo, De Trinitate (On the Trinity), transl. Arthur West Haddan, In A Select Library of  
the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Vol. III, ed. Philip Schaff  (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1887), X, 11, 18. 
56Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 53. 
57 Ibid., 62. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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abyss.  As we shall see, it is from this starting point that Panikkar sets out and 
differentiates himself from the classical tradition that he treasures.  Thus, Panikkar‘s 
―more recent writings‖ (from 1970‘s The Trinity and World Religions onwards) say all of 
reality is Trinitarian in nature.
61
 
 To conclude his work, Blessed Simplicity: The Monk as Universal Archetype, in 
which he discusses the ‗blessed simplicity‘ that is the centeredness of the mind of the 
monk as an intrinsic part of  all human spirituality, Panikkar insists that true ‗blessed 
simplicity‘ must also be a ‗harmonious complexity‘.62  In other words, the simple and the 
complex, the one and the many, are not, after all, incompatible: 
In the final analysis, simplicity and complexity are not dialectically opposed, because the 
ultimate structure of the universe does not need to be conceived as dialectical.  Their 
relation is dialogical.  They have meaning not in opposing and contradicting each other 
so as to generate some ―higher‖ synthetic amalgam, but as a mutually constitutive 
relation, so that the one does not make sense without the other and each mutually 
supports the other.63 
He continues, ―Simplicity is more than the absence of complexity.  It is merely 
‗monoplexity,‘ I would say, if the word were allowed.‖64  Thus, simplicity is not the 
reduction of all to a monolithic unity.  Rather, it is harmony and unity, or oneness.  
Panikkar insists that ―this oneness is not plurality, but it certainly is pluralistic.‖65  This 
form of monastic simplicity is the same as Trinitarian simplicity because ―the Trinity is 
neither one nor three, i.e., neither simplicity nor complexity.‖66   It is this Trinitarian 
                                                        
61 Ibid. 
62 Raimon Panikkar, Blessed Simplicity: The Monk as Universal Archetype, (New York, NY: Seabury, 
1982), 126. 
63 Ibid., 127.  Emphasis in the original. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 128. 
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outlook of all of reality that enables Panikkar to reconcile the seemingly disparate 
positions of various religious traditions, or even, in Blessed Simplicity, to reconcile 
classic monasticism with contemporary monasticism.  Toward this end, Panikkar makes 
reference to the concept of vestigia trinitatis: 
Every bit of reality has this Trinitarian imprint.  And thus human perfection does not 
consist in becoming one with the Son, or with the Father, or with the Spirit, but in fully 
entering into the life of that very Trinity without eliminating any of its constituents.67 
So, human perfection is Trinitarian relation.  Panikkar, naturally, connects this 
insight to the nondualism of the advaitic tradition: 
In advaitic parlance I would say that reality is neither one nor two, and so neither we nor 
the world can be brought under the total sway of the one or the two.  God and the world 
are, likewise, neither one (it goes against common sense) nor two (two what?—it would 
contradict the very conception of God).  Advaita—nondualism—is not monism.68 
Of course, as we have already mentioned ―it is not dualism either.‖69  Rather, 
―complexity and simplicity embrace in advaita, as well as in the Trinity.‖70  Thus, human 
spirituality finds its perfection in communion.  The Trinitarian ‗traces‘ in all of us lead us 
to Trinitarian life. 
Like Augustine‘s theological outlook (and the entire Western theistic tradition) 
the divine is ―the constitutive principle of all things‖ in Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
schema.
71
   This, of course is not without consequence.  For instance, ―God is more 
immanent to any creature than the creature‘s own identity, so that if we were to subtract 
                                                        
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid.129. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 49. 
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God from that creature, the latter would collapse into nothingness.‖72  Thus, Panikkar 
seeks to take Augustine‘s interior intimo meo et superior summo meo with the utmost 
seriousness.
73
  Manimala points out that we can think of God existing without creatures 
even though this God does not in fact exist.  Therefore, the fact ―that God ‗can be‘ 
(without creatures) is a phenomenological feature of God, not an ontological statement 
about him.‖74  Thus, God is in relation to human beings.  When we look at ourselves in 
self-reflection, we find an element of transcendence.  Each person ―discovers and senses 
an inbuilt more in his own being which at once belongs to and transcends his own private 
being.‖75  Manimala tells us that, for Panikkar, ―this ever more stands for the divine 
dimension.‖ In other words, this is where God is encountered.  It should also be noted 
that in a similar way, for Panikkar, the cosmos is also constitutive with regard to 
humanity because ―there is no Man without God or without World.‖76 
Additionally, as we shall see as we examine the Trinitarian relations in Panikkar‘s 
thought below, Augustine‘s influence can also be seen in Panikkar‘s assessment of the 
immanent Trinity.  Panikkar acknowledges this debt: 
The Nicene Creed, as also the Greek Fathers and even Tertullian, affirms that the 
‗substratum‘ of the Divinity resides in the Father.  It is only with Augustine that the 
Divinity as the substratum which imparts unity to the Trinity begins to be considered 
common to the three persons.77 
S. Mark Heim, among others, discusses this as at the root of the division between 
the Christian West and the Christian East: 
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It became common in the West to locate the principle of unity in a single divine 
substance or essence.  But in Eastern Christianity the principle of unity was associated 
with the first person, the Father.78 
Heim points out that this disagreement over the ‗locus‘ of divine unity is part of 
the theological struggle behind the ‗filioque‘ controversy.79  Ironically, for Panikkar, the 
discussion of something commonly shared between the three persons of the Trinity can 
help to serve as a bridge between East and West.  However, he does not have the 
Christian East in mind.  Rather, he sees a theological outlook of communion as a bridge 
between the Christian West and the Hindu and Buddhist East. 
It is perhaps most fitting that Augustine, who is often considered the father of 
Western Christianity, has such a central place in Panikkar‘s thought, which is an exercise 
in the dialogue of East and West.  This can be seen in Panikkar‘s most famous work, The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism.  While bringing his book to a close, Panikkar cites another 
Augustinian axiom, which probably best characterizes his Trinitarian theological outlook: 
Trinitas reducit dualitatem ad unitatem.
80
  In reflection upon this axiom, Panikkar 
elaborates on this Trinitarian unity: ―Ultimately, we have but one comment to make: that 
from which the World comes forth and to which it returns and by which it is sustained, 
that is Īśvara, the Christ.‖81  Thus, as we have already said, Panikkar sees the Trinity as a 
constitutive element of all reality.  As we shall see in Chapter 2, this principle of unity in 
all of reality is identified with Christ, which he here identifies with the Hindu 
personification of the divine, Īśvara.  However, we should note that he also reminds us 
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that ―it is also an incontrovertible fact that the Christ in whom Christians believe cannot 
be simply equated with the Īśvara of the Vedānta.‖82  Nonetheless, it is Christ that unites 
all reality. 
1.4 Panikkar on the Transcendence of the Father (Brahman) 
An important part of Panikkar‘s dialogue between Christianity and other religious 
traditions is his discussion of the immanent Trinity and the relations between the 
Trinitarian hypostases.  As with most Trinitarian discussions, Panikkar‘s schema begins 
with that relation that Christians call ‗the Father‘.  The Father is purely transcendent.  The 
Father is properly understood as that relation of which we cannot speak.  This silence is 
due to the fact that ―in the Father the apophatism (the kenosis or emptying) of Being is 
real and total.‖83  Thus, we cannot say anything about the Father ―in himself‖, that is 
about the Father‘s ―self.‖84  So, the only appropriate way to speak of the Father is to not 
speak at all.
85
 
In the interest of demonstrating the universal relevance of Trinitarian theology, 
Panikkar connects the Father to the Advaitic approach to Brahman.  When comparing the 
usage of the terms ‗Brahman‘ and ‗God‘ in the Eastern and Western traditions 
respectively, Panikkar brings forth this connection.  He insists that ―both names stand for 
the same ultimacy, yet they seem to connote distinct functions.‖86  For, instance, he sees 
‗Brahman‘ as the end of philosophical-theological inquiry.  This connotes some ‗reality‘ 
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at the limits of the intellect.  The term ‗God‘, while of course referring to the same 
‗thing‘, implies the end that is loved and adored.  Thus, the term ‗God‘ has a relational 
connotation, while the term ‗Brahman‘ has a more conceptual connotation.87  This 
relationality of the term ‗God‘ can be seen in the Western use of terms like ‗Father‘ as 
substitutes for the term ‗God‘.  Thus, Panikkar‘s treatment of ‗Father‘ is in close relation 
to his treatment of ‗Brahman‘.  Both are ways to name the unnamable.  Kärkkäinen 
describes Panikkar‘s approach, saying, ―For Panikkar, the Father is ‗Nothing‘.  What can 
be said about the Father is ‗nothing‘; this is the apophatic way, the way to approach the 
Absolute without name.‖88 
By ‗Nothing‘, Kärkkäinen here is referring to the fact that the Father, or Brahman, 
is ‗not-a-thing‘.  Hence, words are inadequate to express the fullness of the Divine.  In 
the interest of tying Trinitarian thought to a variety of religions, Panikkar also recognizes 
this reference to the transcendent in his treatment of Buddhism.  He insists that in the 6
th
 
century BCE, Buddhism made the ―fundamental option‖ to favor the Spirit over the 
Word.
89
  The opposite is the case in the West, where the Word was favored and 
expression and ‗saying‘ was favored over silence and ‗unsaying‘.  Unlike their European 
counterparts, the reformers behind Jainism and Buddhism ―claimed to establish an entire 
way of life with no reference to God.‖90 
This way of life is appropriate because ―God does not have a name because ‗he‘ is 
not.‖91  In other words, it is most appropriate not to speak of God because words can only 
express that which they can comprehend.  Human concepts cannot grasp the Divine 
                                                        
87 Ibid. 
88 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 339. 
89 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 259. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 260. 
     
 
22 
completely.  Therefore, since ‗existence‘ is a human concept, it is not an adequate way of 
speaking about God.  Hence God ‗is‘ not.  Panikkar notes that this is a step further than 
the biblical command to not take YHWH‘s name in vain.92  However, perhaps he 
exaggerates the difference between East and West here to make the point that the West 
has much to learn from the East.  In the interest of fairness, it should be noted that this is 
not a purely ‗Eastern‘ way of discussing the Divine.  The West has many fine examples 
of apophatic mystics who center themselves on this insight into transcendence.  These 
include John of the Cross, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and the anonymous author 
of the The Cloud of Unknowing, to name a few.  Nonetheless, Panikkar‘s insight into the 
Divine remains valid: 
To ask the name of God means to ask his identity, to enclose him in our categories, even 
if on says his name is secret and unknowable.  According to the Buddha God has no 
name because there is nothing that has this name.  There is not even any meaning in 
saying that God is identical to himself: Because he has no identity, he cannot be 
identified by a name.  The principle of identity would destroy him.  There can be no God 
identical to God—to himself.93 
Panikkar sees the Buddha as providing the key to understanding the silence that is 
appropriate to discourse on Divine existence: 
The Buddha does not answer by silence: He does not answer.  He remains silent and 
gives no hermeneutic of his silence but only of his refusal to answer.94 
He continues: 
What the Buddha does is to silence the question, to pacify the questioner by showing him 
that his question has no meaning.
95
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Thus, for Panikkar, ―the Buddhist apophasis is at once ontic and ontological.  
Silence is taken seriously, not as another form of expression or speech.‖96  This apophatic 
silence says nothing because there is nothing to say.  Only such a radical silence can 
approach Divine transcendence. 
An important aspect of this discussion is Panikkar‘s insistence on homological 
concept in various religious traditions.  Homology is not same as analogy, which claims 
two things have a third thing in common, which allows one to use the two with some 
degree of interchangability.  Homology, rather, is found where two things share the same 
function in different contexts.
97
  It is ―a kind of existential-functional analogy.‖98  For 
example, ‗Brahman‘ and ‗YHWH‘ are homologous concepts that refer to the same 
‗thing‘.  They are both ways to name the Divine in varying contexts.99  We can also say 
that Brahman and the Father are also homologous concepts, because, by referring to the 
‗same ultimacy‘, they serve the same function in their respective traditions.  The 
commonality is not in the symbols themselves, but, rather, in that reality which they 
indicate and embody.  So, the ‗Ultimate‘ has many valid names, such as God, Brahman, 
Nothingness, etc.  However, homology is not just a function of the Divine (or even the 
‗religious‘ for that matter).  For instance, Panikkar points out that the ‗gate to the 
Ultimate‘ also has many valid names, such as Death, Justification, Innocence, etc.100  So, 
ironically, there are many names for the unnamable! 
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 How is this possible?  This is only possible because of the second person of the 
Trinity.  S. Mark Heim points out regarding the relation of the first and second persons of 
the Trinity in Panikkar‘s thought that ―as the uncreated, unoriginated source, the first 
person of the Trinity is defined by a relation to the second person, and this relation is one 
of kenosis.‖101  In this way, ―The Father ―is not,‖ for even the being of the Father has 
been transmitted to the Son as gift.‖102 
Therefore, ―nothing, literally, can be said of the Father ‗in himself,‘ for in begetting the 
Son the Father gives up everything, ‗even the possibility of being expressed in a name 
that names him alone.‘‖103  Heim‘s assessment of Panikkar‘s Trinitarian thought is need 
of some elaboration.  As we shall see in our next section, there is mutuality in this 
relationship of Father and Son.  For Panikkar, the Father does not have ‗being‘ without 
the Son.  There is a mutual kenosis in that the Son also gives ‗being‘ to Father.  It is with 
the second person of the Trinity that Divine expression is enabled and we can speak, for 
instance, of God‘s existence.  An example of this can be seen in The Unknown Christ of 
Hinduism, where Panikkar equates the term ‗God‘ with the Hindu term ‗Īśvara‘, which 
elsewhere in the same work, he identifies with Christ.
104
  So, for Panikkar, ‗God‘ is 
properly a term for the second person of the Trinity, who brings the transcendent within 
the reach of the mind, that is, into human concepts.  So let us now turn to examine what 
Panikkar has to say about the second person of the Trinity. 
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1.5 The Son: The Ontological Expression of the Father 
For Panikkar, the Son is the ‗being‘ of the Father.  It is only with the Word that 
the unspeakable Father has ontological weight.  In Panikkar‘s words, ―the Father has no 
being the Son is his being.  The source of being is not being.‖105  He continues: ―It is the 
Son who acts, who creates.  Through him everything was made.  In him everything 
exists.‖106  Thus, we can only have a relationship with God in the Son; the Logos.107  The 
Father, Brahman, remains inaccessible without the Son. 
Thus for Panikkar, properly speaking, only the Son can be called ‗God‘ because 
only the Son can be called.
108
  In a way, as Panikkar himself points out, this contrasts 
with early Christian Trinitarian formulas, in which only the Father is properly called 
God.
109
  As S. Mark Heim shows, ―Panikkar strikes a new note by affirming that 
whenever we speak of the Father we are actually talking about the Son.‖110  In response 
to this, he raises what is perhaps a valid critique of Panikkar‘s thought in this regard: 
Panikkar supports his argument by appeal to much traditional language about the 
incarnation of the divine Word making visible the invisible God.  On the other hand, 
Panikkar‘s thesis would seem to imply that the incarnate Son‘s talk about God was in fact 
simply self-reference, which appears to be something of a Trinitarian short circuit.111 
Heim continues: 
Panikkar says humans can have a personal relation only with the Son, and that therefore 
in fact the God of theism is the Son.  It seems Panikkar is saying that the Father is God 
―without qualities‖ and the Son is God ―with qualities,‖ and it is the Son who is manifest 
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in Christ.  However, ―Christ‖ fundamentally means the link, the mediator between 
created and uncreated.112 
So, as we shall see, Heim‘s explanation Panikkar‘s use of the term ‗Christ‘ is 
correct.  ‗Christ‘ can be considered the ‗mediatorial link‘ between the God and world.113   
And, as we shall see in our later chapters, one of the difficulties in Panikkar‘s Christology 
is defining the character of the relationship between the historical Jesus of Nazareth, what 
he calls ‗Christ‘, and even, as Heim points out, the second person of the Trinity.  But, we 
shall examine this problem in a little more detail in our next chapter. 
For Panikkar, the Son, then, may go under other names, such as Isvara, Tathagata, 
Allah, and Yahweh.
114
  Heim gives us a helpful way to think of Panikkar‘s connection 
between Father and Son.  The Father is like Kant‘s ding an sich (thing in itself).  We do 
not directly relate to it.
115
  In other Kantian terms, the Father is like noumenon of the 
Divine and the Son is like the phenomenon of the divine.   Thus, Panikkar takes seriously 
the title of Logos for the Son.  The ‗Word‘ of the Father makes the Father palpable, 
visible, and, perhaps most importantly, understandable.  As Heim mentions in the citation 
above, this logic is seen in the Incarnation.  Heim describes the Son here as the meeting 
of Divine transcendence (Father) and Divine immanence (Spirit): 
The mediator (the Son, the Logos, God with qualities) connects these two: the divine 
transcendence we can ―know‖ only as emptiness and the divine immanence we can know 
only by identity.  Since we can know the mediator by direct devotion, by relation or 
perception, this offers a third way to know the one divine reality.116 
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Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen concurs with Heim‘s assessment and describes the 
relationship between Father and Son as one of kenōsis: ―In the incarnation, kenōsis, the 
Father gives himself totally to the Son.‖117   Thus, as we have already mentioned, there 
‗is‘ no ‗Father‘ in himself; his being is the Son.118  This understanding makes apophatic 
language clearer for the reader: 
That qualified sense makes it understandable when Panikkar says that there is in fact ―no 
God‖ in Christian theology in the generic sense of the term.  There is only ―the God of 
Jesus Christ‖; thus, the God of theism is always the ―Son,‖ the only one with whom 
human beings can establish a relationship.119 
However, it should be pointed out in response to the analysis of Heim and 
Kärkkäinen that this kenōsis is not only found in the Incarnation.  Rather, it is an essential 
characteristic of the relationship between Father and Son.  Nonetheless, the Incarnation 
manifests this relationship with the utmost clarity. Despite this relationship, in which the 
Son gives expression and ‗being‘ to the Father, precision is always a problem when 
discussing the Divine.  Many of the criticisms that can be levied on Panikkar‘s thought 
stem from this problem.   
For instance, Kärkkäinen has a minor criticism of Panikkar‘s Trinitarian theology 
based on his use of the term ‗person‘. Kärkkäinen points out that, following Panikkar‘s 
logic, the Son is really the only ―person‖ of the Trinity.   The problem is that when we 
use the term ―person‖ in Trinity, it is ―an equivocal term that has different meanings in 
each case.‖120  So, Kärkkäinen insists that it is not advisable to use the term ‗person‘ 
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when discussing the Trinity.
121
  However, we consider this a ‗minor‘ criticism because, 
while Kärkkäinen is correct, it does not seem that one will ever escape this problem when 
discussing the Divine.  Kärkkäinen‘s more serious criticism comes with regard to 
Panikkar‘s reading of John 14:6: 
Jesus said to him [Thomas], ‗I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to 
the Father except through me. 7If you know me, you will know my Father also. From 
now on you do know him and have seen him (Jn 14:6-7).‘ 
 Kärkkäinen‘s assesses Panikkar‘s take on this passage: 
 He reads this verse as meaning that only the Son exists.  In contrast to his interpretation, 
Christian theology has understood from this saying not that the Father does not exist, but 
that the only way to know the Father is through the Son sent by his Father.122 
 What Kärkkäinen and Heim seem to miss here in their criticism of Panikkar is 
that by categorizing something as ‗existing‘ (or even ‗not existing‘), we are necessarily 
subsuming that ‗thing‘ under a concept, a product of human language.  Ontology (the 
logos of ontos) and any –ology (the logos of anything) is the result of human cognitive 
grappling and reduction of the ‗thing‘ to a concept (including the term ‗thing‘ itself).  It is 
this that Panikkar has in mind when discussing the Father‘s lack of existence and the 
Son‘s presentation of the Father‘s ‗being‘.  There is an intrinsic limitation to human 
logos, reason.  Thus, Panikkar is here saying less about God and more about the scope of 
human cognition.  It is because of this limitation of language that Panikkar prioritizes 
mythos over logos, as we shall see in more detail in chapter 3. 
In Blessed Simplicity, based upon this insistence on the priority of mythos over 
logos, Panikkar discusses the importance of apophatic silence in the life of contemplation 
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of the monk.  In other words, this silence is supremely appropriate due to the limitation of 
human language and the refusal of the Divine to the chains of conceptualization.  He uses 
this apophatic silence to discuss the Trinitarian relation between Father and Son.  
Panikkar tells us: ―Silence is one.  Words are many.‖123  Another way he discusses this is 
in comparing Spirit (another Trinitarian relation, particularly connected with Divine 
immanence) and Word:  ―In trinitarian categories we could stress the attention the monk 
gives to the Spirit over the Word, without this implying absolute priority.‖124  He 
connects this to the concern with mythos and logos to which we have already alluded: 
―Expressed in philosophical categories, we are dealing with the priority of myth over the 
logos.‖125  Because of this priority, words are not, ultimately, the goal of true belief 
(orthodoxy).  Rather, it is something deeper.  For Panikkar, the measure of ―orthodoxy‖ 
does not consist of ―the correct formulation of doctrine.‖126  Rather, it is ―the authentic 
experience of the ‗glory of the truth‘.‖127  In other words, it is ―the other side of 
orthopraxis.‖128  Thus, in everyday life, words and actions are intimately bound together.  
The separation of word and deed results in a loss of integrity. 
In a similar way, Panikkar points to the intimate connection of silence and speech.  
He uses the prologue of John‘s Gospel (Jn 1:1ff ) as inspiration, saying, ―Authentic 
silence is not the repression of the word, but rather the nonreflexive consciousness of the 
very womb of the logos; yet this is true in such a manner that if the umbilical cord uniting 
the two is severed, both miscarry—the silence is dispelled and the word dies.‖129  For 
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Panikkar, ideally, the modern monk tries not to separate silence and logos.  Rather, he 
allows them to coexist in intimacy and ―fears that his life will be short-circuited if he 
isolates himself from the clamor of his fellow men who ask for bread, demand justice, 
and sing and dance to the sun, the moon, the seasons, or to the religious and civil events 
and festivities of their time.‖130  The silence of contemplation ought not to occlude one‘s 
sensibility to the voice of world.  Rather, it ought to help to center the mind and direct the 
will in response to this voice by locating the voice of God therein. 
The Word gives expression to the Silent Other.  In this relationship, the two are 
irreducible, just as silent joy is not the same as exclamatory song.  Yet, they are also 
inseparable, just as that joy inspires and is expressed in the song.  Nonetheless, ―The 
silence of the modern monk is not only at the beginning, holding fast to the very source 
of the word.‖131  Rather,  the ‗modern monk‘ ―tries to find the silence at the end of every 
word as well; he would like to let the exuberance of the world land again in the silence, 
so that the perichoresis, circumincessio or circular dynamism of the word might complete 
its return into silence.‖132 
 Thus, the two are intimately connected by mutual indwelling.  Nonetheless, it is 
the difference between silence and expression that distinguishes Father from Son, 
respectively: 
 Silence does not speak, does not bear witness, does not even hint—at anything—because 
ultimately silence is not.  In the beginning is the Word.  Silence is fully acosmic.  Silence 
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is the absence of logos.  Silence is not intelligible.  Silence does not hide itself, because 
there is nothing to hide.133 
 This distinction between Silence and the Word shows us the kenotic character of 
the relationship between Father and Son: 
Silence is not against the logos; it is simply prior to it.  The logos is the sacrifice of 
silence, its immolation in the word.  Silence is the Father, source and origin of the whole 
divinity, as I understand the Christian Trinity, but this is not just a Christian reflection.134 
This is an illustration of the seepage of Trinitarian ‗logic‘ from the Godhead to all 
of reality.   Silence and Expression, which represent the Father and Son respectively, also 
describe the poles of tension in the mystical life of the modern monk, who, for Panikkar 
need not be in monastery.  However, this discussion is incomplete without considering 
the immanent connection of silence and expression, Father and Son: the Spirit. 
1.6 The Spirit: The Unity of Silence and Expression 
In a way, we have already pre-empted our discussion of the Spirit in Panikkar‘s 
thought by mentioning above that the Spirit‘s role is that of unity.  Thus, the Spirit is 
―immanence.‖135  In the kenotic giving of the Father to the Son, the Spirit is the ―non-
exhaustion of the source in the generation of the Logos.‖136  In a very real way, the Spirit 
brings everything together, especially the Father and the Son.  Panikkar tells us that ―the 
Spirit is the communion between the Father and the Son.  The Spirit is immanent to 
Father and Son jointly.‖137 
Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen explains:  
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Applied to the ancient problem of unity and diversity in the Trinitarian God, the advaitic 
principle implies that the Father and Son are not two, but they are not one either; it is the 
Spirit who unites and distinguishes them.138 
Toward this end, the Spirit helps to explain how ‗nondualism‘ is distinct from 
monism: 
Both Trinitarian doctrine and advaita do desire to go beyond both monism and dualism.  
The Father and the Son are not two, but they are not one either: it is the Spirit who unites 
and distinguishes them.139 
In many ways, it is here that Panikkar further shows his indebtedness the 
Augustinian tradition of Western Christianity.  Augustine begins his treatment of the 
Holy Spirit in De Trinitate by pointing to the Spirit‘s role in the Trinity.  The Trinity is 
the mutual love between the Father and the Son: 
We have sufficiently spoken of the Father and of the Son, so far as was possible for us to 
see through this glass and in this enigma. We must now treat of the Holy Spirit, so far as 
by God‘s gift it is permitted to see Him. And the Holy Spirit, according to the Holy 
Scriptures, is neither of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but of both; and so 
intimates to us a mutual love, wherewith the Father and the Son reciprocally love one 
another.140 
 Augustine continues: 
Love, therefore, which is of God and is God, is specially the Holy Spirit, by whom the 
love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, by which love the whole Trinity dwells in us. 
And therefore most rightly is the Holy Spirit, although He is God, called also the gift of 
God.  And by that gift what else can properly be understood except love, which brings to 
God, and without which any other gift of God whatsoever does not bring to God?141 
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So, for Augustine, as for Panikkar, the Spirit is the principle of unity, not only in 
the Godhead, but also in us.  So, in Panikkar‘s theology, the Spirit is communio, 
koinonia. Therefore, as we have already mentioned above, for Panikkar, ―one cannot 
have ‗Personal relations‘ with the Spirit.‖142  Rather, ―one can only have a non-relational 
union with him.‖143  This union extends throughout all of creation.  It is the Spirit that 
makes this possible.  Panikkar explains ‗Advaitic love‘ in a way similar to the 
relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit, saying, ―I love you, my beloved, without any 
‗why‘ beyond or any ‗because‘ behind my love; I love you, simply, for in you I discover 
the Absolute—though not as an object, of course, but as the very subject loving in me.‖144 
 This ‗Advaitic love‘ unites all of reality.  It enables Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
vision.  Furthermore, this ‗Advaitic love‘, or the love of communio, is not an egoistic 
kind of love.  Rather, Advaitic love ―is neither for God‘s sake, as a foreign motivation for 
my love, nor—much less—for the ego‘s sake.‖145  Rather, it is a recognition of the 
cosmotheandric union that binds all of reality.  As such, it is undeniably binding.  In it, 
―every lover is taken up, wrapped in his love, overpowered by love.‖146  Even though it is 
found in all of creation, it is rooted in the Divine: 
It is a creative love, because—in theistic terms—it is the very love of God towards a 
person which makes that person to be.  An advaitin can love only if the Absolute loves; 
his love cannot be different.147 
This relational quality is at the core of the human person.  Panikkar insists that 
―the essence of person is relationship; my person is nothing but a relation with the I.‖148  
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Thus, this nondualistic experience is at the root of the human experience of the self.  
Consequently, various traditions have ways to express it: 
If I were to describe the supreme experience in my own personal, advaitic and Trinitarian 
words, I would say nothing.  Yet, if pressed to translate, I would say something like this: 
It is the experience of the thou, the realization of my-self as a thou: tat tvam asi, or again: 
filius meus es tu, or ecce ego quia vocasti me, or έζθε ού (to use the language of four 
traditions and to which one could add the experience underlying the nairātmyavāda).149 
 It is the presence of this Spirit of communion in all of reality that enables 
interreligious dialogue.  However, it is not sufficient to speak of an ―amorphous‖ spirit of 
truthfulness in all religions.
150
  Rather, we need to speak of the Spirit in confessional 
terms: 
Now we can say that if Christian Jesus as the culminating point of God‘s self-disclosure 
seems too specifically Christian a view to be accepted by a Hindu, then the Spirit of 
God—which Christians will consider the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of Christ, and which 
the Hindu will interpret as the Divine śakti penetrating everything and manifesting God, 
disclosing him in his immanence and being present in all his manifestations—this Spirit 
of God provides the real ground for an authentic religious communication and dialogue at 
a deep level.151 
 Using traditional terms allows different traditions to encounter one another in 
truth and sincerity, rather than in some redacted and eviscerated form.  In doing precisely 
this, Panikkar uses the Spirit to explain the lack of absolute egotism that we find in 
advaita: 
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The I has consciousness of its self as a you which, though it is not the I, identifies itself 
with the I.  This ―empty space‖ is the Spirit.  Certainly the Logos is ―equal‖ to the Father, 
the Logos is but the Logos of the Father, and the Father is ―equal‖ to the Son he has 
generated.  But precisely because there is no absolute egotistic consciousness but only 
consciousness of the thou, the I (whom we call Father) leaves ―space‖ to the Spirit as 
hiatus, a space between the Father and the Son.  The Spirit represents the advaita, the 
nondualism between the Father and the Son—hence they are neither two nor one.152 
Thus, the space of the Spirit allows non-dualism (advaita) to avoid the collapse 
into monism.  The Spirit keeps Father and Son united, but distinct.  According to 
Panikkar, we find ourselves in this non-dual space.  Therefore, ―the spirit is the 
dynamism of Life—in which we exist.‖153  The Spirit keeps all the members of reality 
united, but distinct.  Without the Spirit, there can be no Advaitic, Trinitarian, or 
cosmotheandric unity. 
Although, as we have briefly mentioned, he prioritizes mythos over logos, 
Panikkar does not desire to subordinate logos to pneuma.  Panikkar does, however see the 
Spirit as allowing us to transcend a narrow focus on the rational (logos).  The Spirit 
works as a ‗third eye‘, which allows us to be aware of and attend to the cosmotheandric 
character of reality.  Because of this, Panikkar even sees the Spirit working in figure of 
Jesus the Christ.
154
  Thus, the Spirit enables mystical abundance: 
Panikkar uses images, and paints pictures to say something more about the Spirit: The 
Father is the source of the river, the Son the river that flows from the source, and the 
Spirit the ocean in which the river ends.155 
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S. Mark Heim compares Panikkar‘s treatment of transcendence and immanence 
(Father and Spirit): 
For Panikkar true transcendence (the Father) cannot be revealed, for then it would not be 
transcendent.156 
He continues to point out that the Transcendent Father is revealed instead as 
emptiness, which we have already mentioned.  Heim compares this to the apophatic 
tradition, which he ties to Eastern Orthodoxy, although this seems to be an 
overgeneralization.
157
  Immanence itself, however, is also beyond the grasp of conceptual 
revelation: 
 Likewise, true immanence cannot be revealed: if we could separate out what is 
immanent, it would no longer be so.  To be immanent is to be truly united, present within 
another: an invisibility of identity.  For Panikkar, this is the case with the Spirit.158 
Thus, the Spirit is present as bond: 
The Holy Spirit is the ―we,‖ the bond of unity between Father and Son, the bond between 
the spirituality of emptiness and the spirituality of images.159 
Heim continues: 
The only connection we can have with the Spirit is that of non-relational union.  We 
don‘t pray to the Spirit; we are in the Spirit.
160
 
Thus, the Spirit is silent as the Father is silent.  Therefore, it would perhaps be 
appropriate to say that Panikkar sees the Son as making the Spirit‘s work explicit in the 
same way that the Son makes the Father explicit.  The Spirit, however, unites all to the 
Father. 
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Heim connects the Hindu the concept of Atman to the Spirit.
161
  After all, the Upanishads 
say that Atman is Brahman.
162
  Thus, the Spirit ―is a consciousness of identity with 
supreme reality.‖163  It is this unity that is central to Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric view of 
reality.  His central idea in this regard is that ―the Trinity is, indeed, the real mystery of 
Unity, for true unity is trinitarian.‖164 
Thus, according to Heim, Panikkar‘s Trinitarian schema is as follows: the Father 
as the transcendent; the Spirit as the immanent; the Son as the mediator that gives the 
divine expression.  But, this insight is not the sole property of Christianity.  Actually, it is 
not the property of anyone.  It cannot be held or kept by anyone.  Rather it is to be 
approached in wonder and awe.  For Panikkar: 
All the religions are striving (or should be) for a Trinitarian synthesis.  This synthesis 
would link a spirituality of the silent, empty God behind God (the Father who has given 
all to the Son, in Panikkar‘s terms), a spirituality of a personal deity (the son who 
manifests God), and a spirituality of mystical union, forgetful of all distinction (the Spirit 
as the bond between the two).  Panikkar can describe this synthesis poetically and at 
dazzling (if rather cloudy) length.165 
Despite the traditional Christian (even Augustinian-sounding) parentheticals in 
the above citation, Heim insists that Panikkar is similar to ―other Indian Christian 
theologians‖ who identify the Father with nirguna Brahman and Son with saguna 
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Brahman.
166
  However, ―he firmly resists the traditional Hindu priority for nirguna 
Brahman, and instead argues in favor of co-equality.‖167  Otherwise, in Trinitarian terms, 
Panikkar would be guilty of subordinationism. 
According to Heim, Panikkar distinguishes himself from these other theologians 
by attempting to discuss what in the West is called the ‗immanent Trinity‘: 
Panikkar‘s treatment of the Trinity is notable for its refusal to regard the personal and the 
relational as secondary, as only ―economic,‖ as is so natural for Advaita Vedanta to do, 
for instance.
168
 
This fits with a worldview that believes in a real unity between God, humans, and 
the world.  In such a worldview, insight into the Divine, no matter how limited and 
conditional, is, nonetheless, truly insightful.  The union of all reality makes revelation not 
only desirable, but truly possible.  Heim also compares Panikkar to Trinitarian 
theologians like Zizoulias and LaCugna.  Panikkar‘s view of relations between 
Trinitarian persons is also distinct from these thinkers: 
The simplest way to put this is to say that for Panikkar person and personal relation are 
one feature of the Trinity, but are not strictly to be applied to more than one of the three 
divine persons.  For these other theologians the most basic key to the Trinity is the 
―ontology of personhood,‖ the personal character of each of the three and of their 
relations with each other, all of which are mutually implied.  The Trinity is a communion 
of persons whose personhood is constituted by their communion with each other.169 
Thus, the distinction lies in Panikkar‘s use of personhood to describe the Son and 
his emphasis on inexpressibility of both Father and Spirit, although this inexpressibility 
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takes a different form for each.  For Panikkar, the Trinity brings all of these together so 
that they do not, in the final analysis (although Panikkar would rightly say that the Divine 
is never ‗finally analyzed‘), conflict with each other.  Neither do their corresponding 
spiritualities: 
Apophatism is the spirituality of the Father, monism the spirituality of the Spirit, and 
theism is the spirituality of the Son.  Christianity has a unique, universal witness to the 
religions in its testimony that Trinity is the only way in which these spiritualities can all 
be validated and integrated.170 
But Christianity needs other religions to fully realize this integration.  In fact, 
because of the Trinitarian dogma, Christianity is able to account for and anticipate other 
religious accounts of the Divine.  Trinity welcomes and encourages dialogue between 
traditions.  It makes this dialogue possible.  As we have shown, the Trinitarian dogma, 
for Panikkar, is at the center of reality.  Consequently, it is important to remember that, in 
Panikkar‘s estimation, the role of doctrine is not merely analytical: 
The Catholic meaning of a dogma is not a ‗truth‘ or a ‗formula‘ to which credence must 
be given; dogma is rather a means to bridle our intellect in order that our higher 
knowledge may reach, as far as it is possible here on earth, the unfathomable inner nature 
of Reality.171  
Thus, now that we have examined Panikkar‘s Trinitarian schema, we are almost 
ready to delve deeper into his Christology.   This foray into cosmotheandrism is 
necessary because, as Panikkar notes, ―within the Christian tradition this Christ is 
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incomprehensible without the Trinity.‖172  As we shall see in the next chapter, Christ 
reveals and manifests this cosmotheandrism.   
1.7 Jacques Dupuis: An Alternative Approach to the Advaita-Trinity Relationship 
Before embarking on the enterprise of examining Panikkar‘s Christology, 
however, we should take a moment to examine an alternative, but similar, approach to 
Trinitarian-Advaitic theology.   With this in mind, let us proceed to contrast Panikkar‘s 
approach with that of another prominent Christian theologian, Jacques Dupuis.  This is a 
worthwhile exercise because it will allow us to see that there are other ways to connect 
Trinity and Advaita that are not completely identical to Panikkar‘s project.  Like 
Panikkar, Dupuis finds a kinship between the Advaita Vedanta and Christian Trinitarian 
thought.  Dupuis, however, is sensitive to the fact that Hinduism is ―many-faceted and 
cannot be reduced to a monolithic entity.‖173  Thus what we may call ‗Ultimate Reality‘ 
can be seen as either non-personal or personal in different ―currents‖ of Hindu thought.174  
In similar fashion, the relationship between the world and this ‗Ultimate Reality‘ can be 
seen as either ―monism‖ or ―nonduality‖ (advaita) or dualism (dvaita).175  In this regard, 
unlike Panikkar, Dupuis identifies advaita, non-dualism, with monism.  As we have seen, 
Panikkar is unwilling to identify the two.  This, perhaps, is the source of the distinction 
between the approaches of Panikkar and Dupuis.  While admitting that bhakti theism is 
the most widespread current, like Panikkar, Dupuis wants to look at ―the most 
                                                        
172 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition,  28. 
173 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1997), 268. 
174 Ibid.  See, for instance, the concepts of nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman alluded to above. 
175 Ibid., 269. 
     
 
41 
challenging view for Christian mysticism,‖ which is the advaita experience found in the 
Upanishads and the Vedantic theologians.
176
 
Central to Dupuis‘ approach is the ―originality of Jesus‘ awareness of being one 
with God.‖177  Dupuis points out that, because of this awareness, many thinkers in neo-
Hinduism consider Jesus to be a jivanmukta, that is, ―a self-realized spirit.‖178  Therefore, 
―Jesus is imaged as one fully awake to his identity with the Brahman.‖179  Jesus‘ 
experience is a filial experience of God the Father, which, of course, is not unknown to 
Judaism (See Ex 4:22).
180
  However, what is essential for Dupuis is his insistence that 
Jesus‘ experience of ―Yahweh‘s parenthood‖ takes on ―new depth.‖181  Jesus‘ experience 
stands alone qualitatively: ―Its filial nature vis-à-vis God is unique in its kind and is of a 
distinct order: Jesus is the Son (Mk 3:11), the very Son of God (Mk 12:6), the Only-
Begotten (Jn 1:14).‖182 
Thus, according to Dupuis, Jesus experiences a kind of ―unique filiation.‖183  The 
―claim of unique filiation implies that between Yahweh-Father and Jesus-Son there is at 
once a distinction and a unity.‖184  He characterizes Jesus‘ relationship with the Divine as 
―an ‗I-Thou‘ relationship of Son with Father.‖185 This unity is not strict identity: 
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 Jesus is not the Father, but between him and his Father the communication of likeness 
and, indeed, the oneness are such that the call for expression in terms of a Father-Son 
relationship.186 
 This is the source of the Christian understanding of the supreme revelatory 
character of the Incarnation and several ‗absolute‘ Christian claims: 
Jesus not only addresses to human beings words received from God as the prophets did—
he is himself the Word of God made flesh.  The reason why God‘s self-revelation in 
Jesus is decisive and unsurpassed is that in his human consciousness Jesus experiences 
the mystery of the divine life which he personally shares.187 
It is important to understand that Dupuis does not want to discount the validity of 
other religious traditions.  He insists, however, that the revelation given in the Incarnation 
is ‗qualitatively‘ unique.  It is of a different kind than both those that have preceded it 
within the Judeo-Christian tradition and its revelatory counterparts in other traditions: 
In Jesus, then, the revelation of this mystery is qualitatively different, since in the biblical 
record he is himself the Son of God, who expresses himself and elucidates his divine 
parentage in human terms.  This revelation is central and normative for Christian faith, in 
the sense that no one is capable of communicating to human beings the mystery of God 
with greater depth than does the Son himself, who has become a human being.  Jesus 
brings the word because he is the Word.188 
Dupuis cautions us that ―even this revelation remains limited, incomplete, and 
imperfect.‖189  No human consciousness can completely comprehend Divine Mystery.  
Human words fail to completely encompass the Word.  After all, Jesus of Nazareth was 
limited to one particular idiom, Aramaic.
190
  Like Panikkar, Dupuis notes that in 
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Hinduism, the experience of advaita has a similar place to Jesus‘ self-awareness.191  
However, even ―at first glance‖ there is difference.192   Jesus seems to keep both 
distinction and unity between the Father and himself, whereas advaita statements like 
Aham brahamasmi (‗I am Brahman‘) seem to leave behind any distinction.193  For 
instance, Jesus‘ ―I‖ sayings point to Divine unity and distinction: 
The ―I‖ of Jesus‘ Gospel sayings, while it establishes the distinction from the ―Thou‖ of 
the Father, also implies unity with him.  Ultimately this ―I‖ does not mean, properly 
speaking, that a human person called Jesus is related to God as to a Father but rather that 
the Son-of-God-become-a-human-being is posited in relation with his Father.194 
 As we have mentioned, their analogue in the Advaitic tradition is found in 
statements like Aham brahamasmi: 
Applied to Jesus, the Aham brahamasmi then seems to correspond to Jesus‘ ―absolute‖ 
ego eimi in the Johannine Gospel (see Jn 8:24,28, 58; 13:19).195 
The question to be addressed, then, is how this ―oneness-in-distinction‖ of Jesus‘ 
human awareness which is at the root of Trinitarian doctrine relates to the concept of God 
behind advaita mysticism.
196
  In this tradition: 
The Nirguna Brahman, or the Absolute in itself, is conceived in terms of saccidananda 
(being-consciousness-bliss).  Being (sat), consciousness (cit), bliss (ananda) stand for 
three intrinsic perfections of the Absolute Brahman.197 
These three perfections are not found together in any text of the Upanishads.  The 
compound word, rather, comes from the Vedantic theological tradition.  Nonetheless, a 
three-in-one distinction-in-unity is posited, and, more to the point, divine attributes are 
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located, at least analogically, in humanity.  In Trinitarian thought, Christians use ―the 
same transcendental perfection‖ to describe the Godhead.198  Dupuis points, for example, 
to Augustine‘s psychological analogy of the Trinity, which we have already visited above 
through the lens of Panikkar‘s cosmotheandrism.199  Furthermore, both traditions possess 
a view of Ultimate Reality as unknown.
200
  Thus, while he see a qualitative uniqueness in 
Jesus Christ, Dupuis, like Panikkar, sees the basic Advaitic insight as rooted in the same 
reality as the Christian Trinitarian insight. 
In his theology of religions, Dupuis seeks to go beyond theological approaches 
that are forms of ―fulfillment theory‖ or forms of a ―theory of the presence of the mystery 
of Christ.‖201 Rather, Dupuis insists that the ―Trinitarian Christological model‖ is the 
―hermeneutical key‖ for his Christian theology of religions.202  By this, he means to say 
that there is a Trinitarian structure to all experiences of the Divine: 
Following this cue, it may be said that the divine Trinity is experiences, though hiddenly 
and ―anonymously,‖ wherever human beings allow the Divine Reality that impinges upon 
them to enter into their life.203 
Therefore, Dupuis, like Panikkar is insisting that wherever God is experienced, 
the Trinity is experienced.  While Dupuis sees the Christian Trinitarian tradition, centered 
on communion, as fulfilling the advaitic insight, he does not see this in imperial terms, 
whereby the dialogue between the Christian tradition and the Hindu tradition is really a 
monologue, in that the only side that can learn is the non-Christian side.  Rather, the 
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dialogue is really a dialogue.  This means that Christianity can learn much from other 
traditions, like Hinduism.  For instance, the unity with the Absolute that is sought in the 
Advaita Vedanta is viewed as a kind of ‗identity‘ (or maybe ‗nonidentity‘) with Brahman 
that is ―impersonal‖ because it is ―transpersonal.‖204  Taking this insight from the advaitic 
tradition can help to purify Christian theology: 
True, we have shown above that the Christian mystery of communion surpasses, by 
completing it, the Hindu mysticism of identification.  Nonetheless, the challenge 
presented by the latter forces Christians to cast off simplistic conceptualizations; to rid 
themselves of certain gross anthropomorphisms; in sum, to purify their own faith.205 
Thus, for Dupuis, the dialogue between traditions is mutual, but asymmetrical.
206
  
This is the main distinction between Dupuis‘ approach and Panikkar‘s approach.  Dupuis, 
like Panikkar sees the Holy Spirit as the ―mystery of the divine intimacy and interiority‖, 
the advaita of Father Son.
207
  However, he sees this reflection on the Spirit as an insight 
that Trinitarian thought offers to the Advaita Vedanta: 
God‘s being-together with human beings presupposes a radical mutual otherness; but the 
irruption of the spirit of God into history, be it the personal history of the human being or 
the history of the world, overcomes all distances without suppressing distinctions.
208
 
So, for Dupuis, as we have seen with Jesus‘ self-consciousness, the key to 
Christian Trinitarian thought is the unity with distinction.  This is manifested by the 
Spirit.  The Spirit extends this unity-in-difference to humanity.  We use the term 
‗communion‘ to denote it.  In this way, for Dupuis, Christian-Trinitarian thought 
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completes Advaitic-Hindu thought without nullifying its insights, particularly those that 
pertain to transcendence.  Thus, there is ‗incompleteness‘ on both sides of the dialogue: 
The religious traditions of the world convey different insights into the mystery of 
Ultimate Reality.  Incomplete as these may be, they nevertheless witness to a manifold 
self-manifestation of God to human beings in diverse faith-communities.209 
The various religious traditions of the world represent ―incomplete ‗faces‘ of the 
Divine Mystery.‖210  This incompleteness is not due to a limitation of the presence of 
God.  Rather, it is due to the supereminence of the Divine.  Thus, in the Incarnation is 
truly and uniquely encountered.  However, a finite human nature cannot exhaust the 
Divine nature.  The ‗incompleteness‘ is not due to some lack of revelation in the 
Incarnation, but to the intrinsic limitation of the idiom, that is, humanity. 
1.8 Dupuis and Panikkar: A Contrast 
 In many ways, Panikkar and Dupuis have very similar theological approaches.  
They both engage Christianity and Hinduism and truly value the traditions they are 
engaging.  They both find an intimate connection between the Trinitarian theology of 
Christianity and the advaitic insights of Hinduism.  However, there are a couple essential 
points of contrast between these two that can prove helpful for locating Panikkar‘s 
thought within the overall theological milieu of interreligious dialogue in the late 20
th
 and 
early 21
st
 century. 
1.8.1 Panikkar’s encounter between traditions is more radical and ‘risky’ than that of 
Dupuis 
In contrast to Dupuis‘ approach, Panikkar seems more willing to allow the 
traditions he is engaging to enlighten one another.  Dupuis, however, seems to be more 
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concerned with examining each tradition in its own context.  Dupuis identifies and 
compares the analogues that connect each tradition with the other.  However, Panikkar 
takes this analogy a step further and (loosely) identifies these analogues with each other.  
As we saw above, he prefers to speak of ‗homologues‘ rather than analogues.  
Consequently, he demonstrates greater comfort in using these homological terms 
interchangeably and, of course, even inventing a few new terms of his own.  It seems that 
this ‗extra step‘ that Panikkar takes puts him on a different and even, riskier plane than 
Dupuis. 
Panikkar is essentially experimenting with what happens when a person of faith 
fully accepts two or more traditions.   His entire project is based on this ‗intrareligious 
dialogue‘.  This project, then, of course, runs a few risks.  First, Panikkar risks redaction 
of each tradition to something unacceptable to many of the theologians within those 
traditions.  Secondly, he risks completely losing each tradition and finding himself 
creating something entirely new.  These are serious risks, and, as we shall see, most of 
the criticism that Panikkar receives centers around one of these two issues. 
Nonetheless, unless interreligious dialogue is simply to be an exercise in 
comparative religions, these risks must be taken.  In fact, as we shall see in our next 
chapter, Christianity has risked its own identity on such forays into ‗hybridity‘ from its 
inception.  One need only consider the extension of Christianity into the Greek world in 
the first century at the hands of the early Christians, especially Paul of Tarsus, to find an 
example of this openness.  Thus, Christianity has seldom taken ‗the safe road‘ in the 
encounter with other religious traditions.  Rather, it has risked all (even its own identity) 
to spread the Gospel. 
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1.8.2 Panikkar allows those religious traditions to encounter one another on a level 
plane 
 In his approach, Dupuis chooses to emphasize the role of the Incarnation as 
providing a qualitatively unique insight into the Divine.  This, as we have seen, is enabled 
by the ‗unique filial consciousness‘ of Jesus of Nazareth.  Panikkar, by contrast, while 
not denying any of Dupuis‘ claims, which are an integral part of traditional Christology, 
does not focus on the uniqueness of Christ or on the uniqueness of any elements of 
Hinduism either, for that matter.  Rather, Panikkar‘s point of emphasis is on the areas of 
overlap, which, Dupuis concurs, is exemplified in Trinitarian-Advaita connection.  
Panikkar, it bears repeating, does not wish to deny any element of the Christian tradition 
or of the Hindu tradition.  Quite to the contrary, Panikkar seeks to find the commonality 
that these traditions share.  As we look at the issues of ‗Christ‘ in our second chapter and 
‗identity‘ in our third chapter, we will see Panikkar insists that this commonality is part of 
what it means to be human.  However, unlike Dupuis, Panikkar consciously avoids any 
terms that connote any form of triumphalism of one tradition over another (particularly of 
the Western tradition over the Eastern tradition).  Thus, by contrasting Panikkar‘s thought 
with that of Dupuis, who shows great respect for the Hindu tradition, it is easier to see the 
novelty and radicality of Panikkar‘s dialogical approach.  This relationship between 
traditions will come into greater relief as we move forward into our second chapter and 
we begin to consider the intricacies of the relationship of particularity and universality, 
particularly in reference to Christ in Panikkar‘s thought. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
 Above, we have examined the cosmotheandric roots of Panikkar‘s thought.  We 
have glimpsed the evolution of Panikkar‘s Trinitarian theology from a more ‗traditional‘ 
focus on the interrelation of the divine hypostases to one on the interrelatedness and 
communion of all reality.  It is here that the nondualistic/Advaitic tradition of Hinduism 
finds common ground with Christian Trinitarian insight.  In many ways, this extension of 
the concept of Trinity to all of reality represents an extension of Augustine‘s 
apprehension of vestigia trinitatis within God‘s creation (particularly humanity).  This 
insight into the communion of all of reality in its three poles (the world, God, and 
humanity) inspires Panikkar to coin the term ‗cosmotheandrism‘ to describe this mystical 
connection. 
This understanding of Panikkar‘s cosmotheandrism can serve as a starting block 
from which we can examine other aspects of his theology.  For instance, as we have 
already said, without such an understanding of Panikkar‘s Advaitic-Trinitarian theology, 
one cannot understand the meaning of ‗Christ‘ in Panikkar‘s writing.  Thus, now that we 
have examined the cosmotheandric matrix of Panikkar‘s thought in some detail, let us 
now turn our attention to Panikkar‘s Christology.  Let us also momentarily leave our 
comparison between the theologies of Panikkar and Dupuis until after we have attempted 
to pinpoint Panikkar‘s understanding and usage of the term ‗Christ‘. 
     
 
50 
Chapter 2 
Christ 
Now that we have examined Panikkar‘s Trinitarian theology in some detail, we 
are ready to delve into some other aspects of his thought.  With this in mind, we shall 
take up our consideration of Panikkar‘s Christology.  Toward this end, we shall attempt 
to pinpoint exactly what Panikkar does and does not mean when he uses the term 
‗Christ.‘  As we shall see, this consideration is founded upon Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
worldview. In very much the same manner as Jacques Dupuis, whose thought we have 
already visited at the end of our first chapter, Panikkar‘s Trinitarian theology is intimately 
related to his Christology.
1
 
However, Panikkar‘s Christology is very much unlike Dupuis‘ Christology, which 
is rooted in Jesus the Christ‘s ‗unique filial consciousness‘.  For Panikkar, by contrast, 
‗Christ‘ refers to something that is shared across religions.  Christians simply use the 
term ‗Christ‘ to denote it.2  For this reason, Panikkar, while connecting Christianity and 
Hinduism, makes the claim that Christ is ―not only the ontological goal of Hinduism but 
also its true inspirer.‖3  It is no wonder then that, as Jyri Komulainen points out, ―the 
strongest association Panikkar‘s name evokes in the minds of most theologians is 
                                                        
1 Throughout the Christian tradition, there is an intimate connection between Trinitarian theology and 
Christology.  It cannot be forgotten that the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE had as its central concern the 
appropriate to talk about Jesus the Christ.  Thus, the so-called ‗Trinitarian controversy‘ was rooted in 
Christology. 
2 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised and 
Enlarged Edition, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), 5. 
3 Ibid., 2-3. 
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probably with cosmic Christology.‖4  After all, as we mentioned in our first chapter, 
Panikkar‘s most well-known work is The Unknown Christ of Hinduism. 
 Komulainen, however, has some reservations about Panikkar‘s Christology: 
My overall impression is that Christology is ultimately rather loosely related to other 
themes within his pluralistic thinking, for instance to his radical pluralism and 
cosmotheandric vision.5 
Komulainen insists that there are ―occasional accentuations that are, to some 
extent, inconsistent with his cosmotheandric metaphysics.‖6  As we shall see, this 
criticism is somewhat warranted.  We have already seen that even in Panikkar‘s treatment 
of the Trinity, there is the presence of what we can call an ‗unevenness‘, particularly as 
his thought has evolved over time.  This is due to his shift from Trinity as a Divine reality 
to Trinity as a characteristic of all of reality.  Thus, they are difficult to tie together with 
complete coherence, as we have attempted in the previous chapter.  Those who endeavor 
to read his Christological reflections face this same challenge.  Then, as Komulainen has 
pointed out, combining these two aspects of Panikkar‘s thought can present further 
challenges.   Perhaps, Panikkar is more of a mystic than a systematician.  Nonetheless, 
we must not allow mysticism to become mystification.  Thus, below, we shall endeavor 
to give an, at least relatively, systematic account of Panikkar‘s Christology. 
2.1 The Evolving Worldview of Raimon Panikkar and the Resulting Christology 
 As is the case with any thinker who is still actively ‗thinking‘, throughout his 
lifetime, Panikkar‘s thought underwent a great deal of evolution.  For example, before 
coining the term ‗cosmotheandrism‘, Panikkar preferred to speak in terms of 
                                                        
4 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, (Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 125. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 126. 
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‗theandrism‘.  In the same way that ‗cosmotheandrism‘ represents the unity between the 
poles of Cosmos, Theos, and Aner (World, God, and Man), it‘s terminological 
predecessor, ‗theandrism‘ denotes the unity between the poles of Theos and Aner (God 
and Man).  Panikkar himself describes the term as follows: 
Theandrism is the classical and traditional term for that intimate and complete unity 
which is realized paradigmatically in Christ between the divine and the human and which 
is the goal towards which everything here below tends—in Christ and the Spirit.7 
Thus, the two terms, ‗theandrism‘ and ‗cosmotheandrism‘ represent the same 
insight.  However, after reflection upon this mystery of communion, Panikkar realized 
that there is more to this communion than humanity and God.  The rest of the world is 
also part of this intimate bond.  What is interesting in the above-cited quotation is 
Panikkar‘s use of the term ‗Christ‘.  ‗Christ‘, for Panikkar here denotes the paradigmatic 
unity of the divine and the human.  At first sight, it would seem that he is referring, in 
traditional Christian parlance, to the Incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth.  However, when 
one takes a deeper look, even within the same work, this is not at all entirely clear.  For 
instance, Panikkar chooses to end The Trinity and World Religions by saying that ―Man 
is more than ‗man‘; he is a theandric mystery.‖8  So, it seems that, unlike Dupuis‘ work, 
in Panikkar‘s theology, consideration of uniqueness of Jesus‘ ‗filial consciousness‘ is not 
given or desired.  If anything, Jesus of Nazareth is a ‗paradigm‘ by which all of humanity 
(and maybe in his later thought, all of Reality) is to be understood.  Thus, it is not clear, 
even at this early stage in his thought (1971-1973), whether Panikkar wishes to 
exclusively connect the term ‗Christ‘ with the ‗Son‘, upon whom he spent a great deal of 
                                                        
7 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—Mystery, 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 71. 
8 Ibid., 82. 
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The Trinity and World Religions reflecting, or with Jesus of Nazareth.  In his later 
theology, we come to see that these terms are not synonymous.  ‗Christ‘ is a broader term 
than this.  
This is a dilemma that will continuously come up in our examination of 
Panikkar‘s Christology in this chapter and especially in our fourth chapter: What is the 
relationship between the reality that Panikkar calls ‗Christ‘ and the historical personage 
of Jesus of Nazareth?  We should note that this did not escape Panikkar‘s attention.  In 
his most mature work, Christophany, Panikkar admits that, in his thought, the 
relationship between his Trinitarian theology and the Christology of the Incarnation is 
―still weak.‖9 
 Jyri Komulainen tries to navigate the difficult waters of Panikkar‘s Christology, 
particularly as it is connected to the shift from ‗theandrism‘ to ‗cosmotheandrism‘ in 
Panikkar‘s metaphysic.  He points out that in his later thought ―Panikkar has not simply 
substituted ‗cosmotheandrism‘ for ‗theandrism‘.‖10  For instance, Panikkar went through 
a ―transitional stage‖ during which he used both terms.11  Komulainen calls Panikkar‘s 
early Christology ―Link Christology‖ because, in it, ―Christ is primarily an ontological 
‗link‘ between the relative and the absolute.‖12   This earlier work centers on 
‗theandrism‘, which is an element of every religion.13  In his concern for pluralism, 
Panikkar, in his own way, also reflects the concerns of traditional Christology: 
                                                        
9 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, Transl. Alfred DiLascia, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2004), 4. 
10 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 126. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 127. 
13 Ibid., 128. 
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By accentuating the role of Christ as the link between the absolute and the relative, i.e. 
between two mutually incompatible ontological categories, Panikkar re-asserts his 
interest in the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures of Christ.14 
His much later Christological reflection, by contrast, to which Panikkar gives the 
name ‗Christophany‘, on the other hand, ―highlights Christ as a ‗symbol‘ of reality.‖15 
Komulainen calls it ―Symbol Christology.‖16  This approach, while not a complete break 
or any form of negation of traditional Christology, is quite distinct from it.  In this later 
phase, ―Christ eventually becomes so abstract in Panikkar‘s thinking that he applies the 
philosophical term ‗the christic principle‘.‖17  Komulainen‘s concern is that Panikkar has 
universalized ‗Christ‘ so much that Christ no longer has any concrete, particular 
application. 
While this concern is valid, it does not seem that Panikkar‘s appraisal of ‗Christ‘ 
is as simple as this.  On the contrary, Panikkar‘s Christological reflections are difficult to 
‗nail down‘ because they oscillate between considerations of the universal and 
considerations of the particular, although he does tend to focus more on the universal 
pole.  In his thought, ‗Christ‘ reflects both poles.  According to S. Mark Heim, for 
Panikkar, in Christ, universality and particularity converge: 
In Panikkar‘s view Christians are right to understand all religious truth through the prism 
of the unique revelation in Christ.  But precisely because this universal claim is true, the 
very universality of the ―christic principle‖ it confesses means that all concrete, particular 
                                                        
14 Ibid., 129. 
15 Ibid., 127. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 130.  See Raimon Panikkar, The Silence of God: The Answer of Buddha, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1989), 105. See also Raimon Panikkar, A Dwelling Place for Wisdom, transl. Annemarie S. Kidder, 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993), 113. 
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―Christianness‖ stands in need of radical expansion and supplementation to approach the 
fullness of what it confesses.18 
He continues: 
We must seek to include the valid truth in all religions within out particular religion‘s 
defining framework, a framework which we must confess remains itself largely 
mysterious to us.  In this process, what is particular will become increasingly universal.19 
Panikkar‘s combination of universality and particularity in his Christological 
reflection has also been the cause of criticism for multiple fronts: 
He is sometimes criticized from a ―pluralistic‖ side for the Christian particularity of his 
framework.  And he is often accused from the more conservative Christian side of 
making of ―Trinity‖ something that comes unmoored from its specific formulations in 
Christian tradition, its specific roots in the historical Christ.  Panikkar believes that 
theological reflection and spiritual life can be stretched to cover this distance, remaining 
authentically rooted in concrete particularity at one end and touching true universality at 
the other.20 
 Possibly more to Panikkar‘s point, he does not see any distance between 
particularity and universality in the first place.  Nonetheless, both sets of concerns are 
valid.  For some pluralists, Panikkar is too concrete and particular.  For some Christian 
theologians, he is too abstract and universal: 
A radically evangelical, mission-oriented Christian may propose that we will hardly 
recognize the church once it has been rooted and has flourished in all the diverse 
―unreached‖ cultures of the world.  And a radically pluralistic, dialogue-oriented 
Christian may propose that we will hardly recognize the church once it has recognized 
                                                        
18 S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 149-150. 
19 Ibid., 150. 
20 Ibid. 
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and honored the validity in other religious traditions.  Panikkar seems to suggest that they 
may both be quite right, and about the same church!21 
 Panikkar seems to be most comfortable in bridging the gaps that arise between 
various schools of thought.  The dynamism between particularity and universality does 
not present a stumbling block to his theology.  Rather it enlivens and animates this 
theological reflection.  He sees a universal longing, present in all, for the Divine: 
There exists in each of us a desire for fullness and life, for happiness and the infinite, for 
truth and beauty that goes beyond religious and cultural contingencies.22 
 But the object of this takes a particular form: 
Note that I am not saying that Christ is the fullness of life but that this fullness, effective 
since the beginning, is one that the Christian tradition calls Jesus the Christ.23 
 This makes complete logical sense.  If there is a universal longing and desire for 
fullness, completeness, unity, communion, etc., this desire would remain only a desire if 
it had no concrete manifestation.  Thus, for Panikkar, ‗Christ‘ is the fulfillment of human 
desire. 
 This becomes especially explicit in the later stages of Panikkar‘s thought.  For 
instance, Jyri Komulainen insists that in the second, revised edition of The Unknown 
Christ of Hinduism, ―Panikkar‘s cosmic Christology and the ontological questions related 
to it‖ are crystallized.24  In this later thought, ―Panikkar stretches his idea of Christ as the 
ontological link to the extreme, which has made his Christology more and more 
christophanic in character over the course of time.‖25  In this later thought, Panikkar 
                                                        
21 Ibid., 150-151. 
22 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, xx. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 36. 
25 Ibid., 130. 
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prefers his neologism ‗christophany‘ to the term ‗Christology‘ for several reasons.  
Firstly, it moves away from emphasis on the logos, which, as we have already mentioned 
and will examine more thoroughly in the next chapter, is secondary to mythos.  
‗Christophany‘ refers to a manifestation of what we call Christ.  So, the emphasis is 
placed on what is revealed and not on the human reflection thereupon, although the two 
may not be as easily separable as Panikkar seems to presume.  By contrast with 
‗Christology‘, which can be understood more or less as rational reflection on Christ, 
particularly Jesus the Christ, ‗christophany‘ is an expanded concept that Panikkar uses 
refer to ―reality as a whole.‖26  In a way, for Panikkar, ―all beings can thus be seen as 
manifestations of the christic principle.‖27  Thus, ―the christic principle ultimately 
embraces all that exists, since existence is nothing more than Christophany.‖28 
So, Panikkar ―sees every being as a manifestation of Christ in its essence.‖29  
Here, we see the concern that characterizes much of Panikkar‘s later career: an 
accounting for reality as a whole, a metaphysic, what Komulainen refers to as Panikkar‘s 
ontology.  Thus, according to Komulainen, ―Panikkar‘s ontology is simply 
Christophany.‖30  It is important to understand that ‗Christophany‘, for Panikkar, 
represent the revelatory ‗showing forth‘ of that cosmotheandric unity that underlies all 
reality: 
However, it is essential to note here that, according to Panikkar‘s recent Christological 
thinking, Christ is the symbol that symbolizes nothing less than reality itself.  As such, 
Christ cannot be only theandric, but is more extensively cosmotheandric.  For this reason, 
                                                        
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 131. 
29 Ibid., 132. 
30 Ibid., 
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Panikkar can even say that he prefers ‗Christ‘ to ‗God‘, since the latter is more restricted 
as a symbol.31  
 Therefore, because of the deep roots of this unity, it is essential that we examine 
the relationship between Christology and anthropology in Panikkar‘s thought.  To do this, 
we must look at how what we call ‗Christ‘ is part of Panikkar‘s understanding of the 
human person, what he terms the humanum. 
2.2 Christophany: Christ and the Humanum 
As we have already mentioned, for Panikkar, ‗Christ‘ refers to something 
universal.  In other words, like the Trinity, Christ is not the sole property of Christianity.  
What Christians call ‗Christ‘ refers to the manifestation of cosmotheandric unity that 
underlies all of reality.  Thus, for Panikkar, Christ is not merely prepared for, but is 
actually present in other religions.
32
  In his analysis of Panikkar, Christopher Denny 
locates Panikkar‘s thought within George Lindbeck‘s "experiential-expressive" model of 
religious experience.
33
  This model is based on the insistence that different religious 
traditions are based on a common ―core experience.‖34 
However, for Panikkar, this experience that various religious traditions share goes 
deeper than this.  It is really something that all humans share.  Thus, it is part of the 
humanum.  As we have mentioned, in his most developed thought, found in 
Christophany, Panikkar describes this dimension of reality and refers to its manifestation 
as ‗christophany‘: 
                                                        
31 Ibid., 133. 
32 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, Transl. Phillip 
Berryman, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 56. 
33 Christopher Denny, ―Interreligious Reading and Self-Definition for Raimon Panikkar and Francis 
Clooney,‖ Journal of Ecumenical Studies 44:3 (June 2009): 411. 
34 Ibid., 412. 
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Christophany simply intends to offer an image of Christ that all people are capable of 
believing in, especially those contemporaries who, while wishing to remain open and 
tolerant, think they have no need of either diluting their ―Christianity‖ or of damaging 
their fidelity to Christ.35 
While the term ‗christophany‘ could be interpreted in a docetic manner, referring 
to some form of divine façade as opposed to the strong language of Incarnation, Panikkar 
intends it in the sense that phaneros has in Christian scripture, that is, as a manifestation 
of a truth, revelation.
36
  This truth is found everywhere, permeating all of reality.  This 
truth is none other than what Panikkar calls ‗cosmotheandrism‘.  Furthermore, he does 
not intend it as a replacement for Incarnational Christology, but rather as a rendering of 
the same insight in a manner that can be understood across religious boundaries.  It is 
also quite clear that Panikkar sees his path as treading new ground.  Consequently, he 
eschews conventional Christological labels: 
Today one hears talk of a christology ―from above‖ in opposition to a christology ―from 
below.‖  Here we must be careful.  Although labels have practical value, they always 
impose limitations on reality, which like a rainbow, shows no boundaries between colors.  
If someone were to classify this study, she might define it as a christology ―from 
within.‖37 
By entering ‗within‘ Christology, Panikkar is attempting to get to the mystical 
insight that is at the heart of the Incarnation.  This insight is cosmotheandric unity, 
communion, Trinity, advaita, etc.  Panikkar‘s particular goal is to present Christ to 
Buddhists and Hindus in a way they can understand, but also not in a way that makes the 
                                                        
35 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 9. 
36 Ibid., 10. 
37 Ibid., 84. 
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Christian feel ―betrayed.‖38  Therefore he prefers to refer to the Incarnation in revelatory 
terms, which also allows him to skirt the issue of exclusivism. 
Panikkar can avoid exclusivism because a ‗christophany‘ is a manifestation of the 
cosmotheandric character of all of reality.  But, for Panikkar there is a basic human desire 
to realize this unity that is found in all persons.  In this way, ―Christ represents an 
intimate and complete unity between the divine and the human.‖39  Thus, we are left with 
the question of Christian uniqueness and the absolute claims of Christianity that 
permeates much of the contemporary Christological debate and is not forgotten in 
Panikkar‘s theological enterprise, particularly the latter part thereof: 
Especially in his significantly revised version of The Unknown Christ of Hinduism in 
1981, he moved definitely toward a pluralistic version of Christology.  In that book he 
rejects all notions of Christianity‘s superiority over or fulfillment of other religions by 
arguing that the world and our subjective experience of the world have radically changed 
since the Christian doctrine concerning Christ was first formulated.40 
Thus, the Incarnation is a christophany.  We shall return to a consideration of the 
manner in which the christophanic Incarnation ‗radically changes‘ the world, or what 
Christians term soteriology, in our final chapter.  Let us turn now, however to the 
christophany of the Incarnation, particularly, its unique character. 
2.3 The Question of the Uniqueness of Christ: A First Glance 
 The question of uniqueness of Christ shall concern us in various ways throughout 
the remainder of our exploration of Panikkar‘s theology.  Let us take a moment to take a 
‗first glance‘ at how Panikkar deals with this pressing issue in Christology.  On the 
                                                        
38 Ibid., 13. 
39 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2007), 338. 
40 Ibid., 338. 
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relationship between the statements ‗Jesus is the Christ‘ and ‗Christ is Jesus‘, for 
instance, Panikkar declares: 
The Christian, however, cannot say that ‗Christ is only Jesus‘, philosophically, because 
the is does not need to mean is-only and, theologically, because in fact the risen Jesus is 
more (aliud, not alius) than the Jesus of Nazareth, which is only a practical identification, 
different from personal identity.41 
There is a lot packed into this small statement.  For Panikkar, it is correct to say 
that Jesus is the Christ.  However, it is incorrect to limit ‗Christ‘ to Jesus of Nazareth.  
Panikkar cites as an example the resurrected Jesus that transcends the so-called historical 
Jesus.  So, even in the Christian tradition, ‗Christ‘ is not limited to the historical presence 
of Jesus of Nazareth.  However, ‗Christ‘ is also not understood apart from this presence. 
While we shall examine the issue of ‗identification‘ and ‗identity‘ in our next chapter and 
attempt to relate this to Christ in our fourth chapter, suffice it to say that the connection of 
Christ to Jesus of Nazareth is not exclusive.  In other words, the Incarnation reveals the 
Logos, it does not circumscribe the Logos.  Elsewhere, Panikkar expresses the same 
sentiment differently by declaring that ―Christ is the Lord, but the Lord is neither only 
Jesus nor does my understanding exhaust the meaning of the word.‖42 
Here, as Varghese Manimala points out, ―the Christian mystery is to be sharply 
distinguished from the mystery of reality in general in that the transcendent Lord is 
believed to have disclosed himself by taking the initiative in revelation.‖43  In the 
‗Christian mystery‘ of the Incarnation, the Divine is revealed ―in finite terms.‖44  Thus, 
                                                        
41 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 14. 
42 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, (New York, NY, Paulist Press, 1978), 36. 
43 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, (New Delhi, India: Media House, 2009), 26. 
44 Ibid. 
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the Incarnation is a concretization of the ineffable.  But even so, this Incarnational 
concretization does not exhaust Christ.  The mystery that Christians call Christ extends 
beyond the Incarnation.  With this in mind, Panikkar sees any of the traditional Christian 
exclusive claims as references to Christ, not to Christianity in general.  Consequently: 
Christ is the only mediator, but he is not the monopoly of Christians and, in face, he is 
present and effective in any authentic religion, whatever the form or the name.  Christ is 
the symbol, which Christians call by this name, of the ever-transcending but equally ever-
humanly immanent Mystery.45 
  
                                                        
45 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, 36-37.  As many will note, using terms like 
‗symbol‘ can often cause confusion.  While Panikkar does not define the term ‗symbol‘ here, in his earlier 
Worship and Secular Man he gives a definition that can be used in a somewhat analogous form to 
understand his intention.  See Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1973), 20-21.  In this work, Panikkar draws a distinction between a ‗sign‘ and a ‗symbol‘, 
stating: ―Whereas the former is an epistemic device pointing to the ‗thing‘, the relationship between the 
symbol and the symbolized is a sui generis one.  The symbol is neither a substitute for the ‗thing‘ nor the 
‗thing in itself‘, but the thing as it appears, as it expresses itself, as it manifests itself.  This manifestation 
however is not the manifestation of some attribute or some effect of the ‗thing‘ but the primordial 
manifestation, the genuine epiphany of the thing, so that outside or beyond that manifestation there is 
nothing except a mental hypothesis.‖  For example, the body and the face are symbols of the self.  They do 
not substitute for the self.  Rather, they reveal the self.  While referencing Heidegger‘s concept of 
‗ontological difference‘ Panikkar refers to his own concept of ―symbolic difference‖ that exists ―between 
the symbol and the reality.‖  The two are distinct, yet inseparable.  It is the symbol that allows us to speak 
of the reality in the first place.  He insists that ―We cannot catch any being if we do not grasp its symbol, or 
rather if we do not discover the symbol of that reality which discloses itself only in its own and proper 
symbol.  There ‗is‘ no reality independent of its proper symbol.  There is no symbol if it is not the symbol 
of a reality.‖  This is similar to the role of the Son as giving ‗being‘ to the Father in Panikkar‘s Trinitarian 
schema. See, for instance, Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: 
Icon—Person—Mystery, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 48ff.  If these notions are taken together, 
the Son can be said to be the ‗symbol‘ of the Father, allowing the unspeakable to be spoken.  In a not-
unrelated (yet not-well-defined) manner in Panikkar‘s thought, Christ makes explicit the cosmotheandric 
unity of all of reality.  So, ‗symbol‘ seems to mean, for Panikkar, outward expression.  However, Panikkar 
is hardly universal in his usage of the term symbol to describe ‗Christ‘.  Thus, one should not reduce Christ 
to the ‗merely‘ symbolic.  Rather, it would be more precise to say that ‗Christ‘ functions symbolically.  The 
notion of ‗symbolic difference‘ may be the most difficult point to reconcile with Christological thought.  
Yet, while they share a common divine nature, the ‗Son‘ is not the ‗Father‘ nor is the ‗Father‘ the ‗Son‘.  
Therefore, if the ‗Son‘ or ‗Christ‘ is said to be the symbol of the Father this is less problematic than, for 
instance, speaking more generally of Jesus as the ‗symbol of God‘ as does Roger Haight.   See Roger 
Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999).‖  For more on ‗symbolic difference‘ 
see Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, ed. Scott 
Eastham  (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 49.  See also Francis X. D‘Sa, ―The Notion of God,‖ in The 
Intercultural Challenge of Raimon Panikkar, ed. Joseph Prabhu (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 38.  
D‘Sa explains, "Symbol, for Panikkar, is the thing itself in as much as it manifests itself.  The manifestation 
of the thing is not identical with the thing, but it is not separate either." 
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2.4 Universality, Concreteness, and Christ 
Often at issue in contemporary Christological reflections is the relationship 
between universality and concreteness (or particularity).  Interestingly enough, Panikkar 
seems to not regard this as a problematic.  The two need each other.  For instance, in his 
reflection on the nature of truth, Panikkar says: 
A private truth, within its sphere can hardly be called a value.  A private truth, like a 
private language, is a contradiction in terms, truth like language being fundamentally a 
matter of relationships.
46
 
 So, a truth, even a universal truth, must be concretely expressed to be considered 
a truth at all.  Truth only makes sense in context.  Truth lives in the tension between the 
universal and the particular.  Thus, the greatest Christian truth of all, the Incarnation, 
reflects this tension.
47
  For Panikkar, then, Christ (which is not distinct from, yet not 
limited to the Incarnation) also reflects this tension.  In the spirit of Panikkar‘s 
compounding of terms and consequent coinage of new terms, maybe we could talk about 
the uniticular or the partiversal, which neither universal nor particular.  Thus, Christ can 
be said to be an embodiment of ‗uniticularity‘ or ‗partiversality‘.  It is the communion 
that Christ reveals and that is at the basis of all reality that allows these seeming opposites 
to coexist without negating each other.  Without such communion, there is no 
communication, no language, and no truth: 
Communion means something more than just exchanging information.  In other words, 
unless the communication is religious there is no real human communion; unless there is 
                                                        
46 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, 62.  See also Ibid., 1-2.  The General thesis 
under which Panikkar is operating here is that ―only worship can prevent secularization from becoming 
inhuman, and only secularization can save worship from being meaningless.‖  Thus, worship is ―a universal 
value and not merely tied to a particular form of culture and religion‖ because ―worship is a constitutive 
human dimension.‖  Therefore, it must be meaningful even in a secularized society.  Values must be 
expressed in order to be shared.  Worship serves this function. 
47 See Ibid., 63. 
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communicatio in sacris (in the classical theological language) there is no communication, 
but only an exchange of goods or words or a simple acknowledgment of the presence of 
the other in order to have freedom to proceed further without obstacles.48 
This leads Panikkar to insist that action takes primacy over expression because 
without it, there would be no-thing to express.  Therefore, for Panikkar, there is no doubt 
that orthopraxis is more essential than orthodoxy.
49
  Union with the divine (and the 
cosmos) is the constitution and, at the same time, the primary goal of all reality.   This 
union, which can be manifested in many particular ways, or, in Panikkar‘s terms, by 
various ‗christophanies‘, is not reducible to its various theological expressions, which can 
be found in different traditions.  In fact, this union does not depend on concepts, thought, 
or expression at all: 
I submit that the moment it is accepted that the idea of a personal God can be 
meaningless to somebody and that at the same time the core of religion lies in orthodoxy, 
one is not only condemning all who do not think in this way, but one is making God a 
superfluous hypothesis negating by this very fact the fundamental divine function of 
being to be the ultimate and necessary ground of everything.  God can no longer be the 
foundation of thinking if I recognize the possibility of a real thinking which denies this 
very foundation.  A real God, the foundation of everything, including the thinking those 
who deny his existence, can obviously not be denied by any thinking and much less be 
made the starting point of a division among men.50 
 So, Panikkar sees the intrinsic limitations of the concept of God.  But, God is 
ultimately not a concept.  Panikkar explains that ―the Anselmian id quo magis cogitari 
nequit means here id sine quo cogitari nequit, having the immediate consequence that it 
                                                        
48 Ibid., 65. 
49 Ibid., 66. 
50 Ibid., 67. 
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is id quod cogitari nequit.‖51  In other words, Anselm‘s description of God as ‗that than 
which a greater cannot be thought‘ is also ‗that without which there cannot be thought‘.  
This means, however, that God is also ‗that which cannot be thought‘.  Panikkar is simply 
following the ‗logic‘ of transcendence here.  Thus God escapes the grasp of the concept.  
Consequently, as we shall see in our next chapter, there must be more than logos that 
inspires the human spiritual life.  At this point, suffice it to say that Panikkar ―would 
simply say that no idea of God can replace the myth of God and that only the latter can be 
a universal ground for those who live in that myth.‖52 
 Christ comes into this equation by bridging the gap between thought and 
unthought.  A Christophany manifests the interplay of transcendence and immanence that 
penetrates all of reality in cosmotheandric unity.  In other words, Christ brings 
transcendence into immanence.  Christ brings expression to the inexpressible.  The 
otherness of divinity is united to the similitude of humanity in communion.  All of reality 
is encompassed by and rooted in this communion. 
Today, Christians must honestly face the question of the universal relevance of 
Christian faith and how that relates to the particular revelation in the Incarnation.  On one 
hand, Christians can ―identify the Christian fact with historically existing Christianity.‖53  
Then, however, Christianity is simply one religion among others, which never transcends 
its own terrestrial boundaries.   On the other hand, ―the Christian mystery bears a 
universal message capable first of all of being understood, and then followed by any man 
regardless of his colour, culture, and religion.‖54  It is precisely this ‗universal message‘ 
                                                        
51 Ibid., 67-68. 
52 Ibid., 68. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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that is expressed in the ‗christophany‘ of the Incarnation, and in all ‗christophanies‘ for 
that matter.  However, to find expression, this universal truth must take on a particular 
form. 
2.5 Christ the Tempiternal 
As we have already mentioned, Panikkar‘s theology presents a new spin on the 
traditional understanding of Christ as mediator.  In many ways, Christ is found at the 
interstices of reality and is the principle that unites the seemingly disparate elements 
found therein.  And as we have also mentioned, Panikkar‘s mature thought refers to this 
union as cosmotheandrism.  His earlier thought, by contrast (but not discontinuously), 
emphasizes theandrism.  This arises out of the traditional Chalcedonian formulation of 
Jesus the Christ as truly divine and human: 
I may add without wishing to be polemic or discriminatory, that if the Christian message 
stands for anything it is for this experience of the theandric reality of every being, of 
which the revelation in Jesus Christ, real man and real God is the paradigm.55 
As we can see here, Panikkar does not completely separate Christ from Jesus of 
Nazareth.  He maintains that his theology is consistent with the Christological tradition.  
Jesus the Christ is paradigmatic for understanding the unity that lies at the heart of all 
reality, which his later thought calls cosmotheandrism.  As a paradigmatic representation 
of unity between the cosmos, God, and humanity, in Jesus Christ, we see that, in the final 
analysis, time and eternity are not polar opposites.  Christ is the union of temporality and 
eternity, and Jesus the Christ is the paradigmatic manifestation of this unity, which 
                                                        
55 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, 42. 
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Panikkar calls ‗tempiternity‘.56  Thus, Panikkar connects traditional concepts such as 
devotion and divine participation with the experience of what he calls ‗tempiternity‘: 
Tempiternity, as its very name would like to suggest, is neither eternity (an objectified 
notion belonging exclusively to God), nor temporality (a much too subjective concept 
and the monopoly of the human being).57 
 The ‗tempiternal‘ perhaps fulfills the human longing for fixity, while also 
realistically accounting for the fact that humans live in time: 
Any profound human experience occurs in time and yet is not bound to or by time.  It has 
no meaning to fix a mystical experience temporally, it is senseless to say ‗I love you for 
five minutes‘, it is incongruous to affirm that death is not real because it abolishes 
subjective time, it is incoherent to relate what is intrinsically an aesthetic experience to 
any time outside its own temporality, it is impossible to have any experience of time 
during an intellectual discovery of something which dawns on us for the first ‗time‘, and 
so on.58 
 Thus, time is not absolute.  Yet, time is very real and a necessary component of 
human experience.  In his seventh sūtra in Christophany, his most mature Christological 
work, Panikkar picks up this theme of the tempiternity by discussing Christ and 
historicity.  The particular sūtra that Panikkar is asserting states that ―the Incarnation as 
historical event is also inculturation.‖59 Thus, in the Incarnation, Christ enters a particular 
culture and is manifested therein.  The followers of Christ cannot escape historicity 
either:  
                                                        
56 ‗Tempiternity‘ is another of Panikkar‘s neologisms. 
57 Ibid., 44-45.  See table on Ibid., 45.  See also Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: 
Emerging Religious Consciousness, ed. Scott Eastham  (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 51. 
58 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, 45-46. 
59 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 173. 
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Christianity too is a cultural construct, inextricably bound to Western history and culture.  
No christology is universal, and one aspect of christophany consists in its being conscious 
of that fact in confronting the problem of Christ‘s identity.60 
Therefore, Christianity is an ―historical religion‖ and the Incarnation is an 
historical manifestation, but Christ is ―more (not less) than a historical reality.‖61  In 
contrast to traditional Christology, Panikkar‘s ―christophany does not limit itself to the 
identification of Christ but aims at reaching some understanding of his identity.‖62  One 
needs the ‗mystical vision‘ of ―the third eye‖ to accomplish this.63   One must look 
beyond the dichotomy of historicity and ahistoricity.  Consequently, it must be 
understood that the Incarnation is particular to a cultural context and can only be 
understood with reference to it, it is a form of divine inculturation.  But, it is also 
transformative of that culture.  The christophany of the Incarnation forever changes the 
outlook of those influenced by it.  It enables them to use this ‗third eye‘ to see the 
tempiternal character of cosmotheandric reality. 
2.6 Christ Enables Participation in the Divine, Trinitarian Life 
Consequently, there can be a variety of christophanies and a variety of divine 
names.  This causes Panikkar to ―distinguish experiential Christianness from cultural 
Christianity and doctrinal Christendom.‖64  Thus, there is a difference between, although 
not necessarily a complete separation of, being a Christian and Christian expression, 
orthopraxis and orthodoxy, if you will.  While this may sound like Karl Rahner‘s 
anonymous Christianity, Panikkar would not appreciate such a comparison, although it 
                                                        
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 174. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 175. 
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may not be altogether inaccurate.  We shall explore this issue further in the next couple of 
chapters. 
This issue of tempiternal unity, brings us to the question of what is meant by what 
Christians traditionally call divine participation.  In Christophany, Panikkar touches this 
topic by looking at the question of filiation in the context of his cosmotheandrism.  He 
points out that, if one follows the Pauline approach to filiation, there is a difference 
between Jesus the Christ‘s filiation and ours, based upon the Paul‘s distinction between 
natural and adopted filiation.  With this in mind, Panikkar asks the question of whether 
Jesus is God‘s natural son in his human nature as well as his divine.  The Pauline answer 
is that this is so as a gift of God.  It seems that God makes an ―exception‖ in Jesus‘ 
case.
65
  What then of us?  What is our relationship to the divine?  
To answer these questions, Panikkar looks to Paul‘s use of the term koinonia.  He 
also looks to a similar concept in the Petrine corpus, that is, divine participation: 
Thus he has given us, through these things, his precious and very great promises, so that 
through them you may escape from the corruption that is in the world because of lust, and 
may become participants in the divine nature (2Pt 1:4). 
The Petrine insistence on the human goal of participation in divine nature 
envisions something greater than Paul‘s language of ‗adopted heirs‘.66  No matter what 
phrase or expression is used, however, Panikkar stresses that what is being discussed is 
―real participation‖, not an illusion or appearance of unity.67  Thus, ―our divinization is as 
little docetic as the humanization of the Logos.‖68   Furthermore, ―Jesus is the natural son 
                                                        
65 Ibid., 94. 
66 Ibid., 94-95. 
67 Ibid., 96. 
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of God in a metaphorical sense.‖69 This is due to the fact that the language of filiation, in 
itself, is analogical.  But, there is, nonetheless, in the Pauline corpus, a difference 
between the analogy of Jesus‘ filiation and ours.  The metaphor being used for Jesus is 
from the nature of things, whereas adoptive filiation is a cultural reality or a ―juridical 
fiction‖ that does not put our filiation the ―same level‖ with his.  This leads to Panikkar‘s 
critique of monotheistic thought, of which he sees a welcome transgression in Trinitarian 
theology: 
Within a monotheistic context we cannot be God‘s real children.  It is important to avoid 
pantheism while at the same time we do not undervalue our filiation without reducing it 
to a natural necessity.  After all, the subtitle of this book is The Fullness of Man not 
―human fullness‖—we are more than ―human.‖  Conscious of this reality, theology 
introduced the concept of the supernatural, an idea that carried with it certain difficulties.  
The whole philosophical infrastructure must be thought out anew in a trinitarian 
direction.  It is Christ who makes it impossible to sustain both dualism and the abyss 
man-God.70 
Thus, the Pauline filiation imagery, while enlightening, does not fully capture the 
scope of the message of Jesus the Christ.  For instance, Jesus‘ radical statements of unity 
between himself and the Father stretch the limits of monotheistic concepts.  If one 
examines them ―from a monotheistic point of view, these ‗blasphemous‘ confessions 
seem to threaten the radical separation of the human from the divine.‖71 By contrast, 
―What we see here [in Jesus the Christ] is a bridge, a bridge we are capable of 
crossing.‖72  Thus, for Panikkar, ―the meaning of the confession ‗Christ is God the Son, 
the Logos‘ is that Christ is both symbol and substance of this nondualistic unity between 
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God and humanity.‖73  Thus Jesus is a christophany that reveals not only the divine, but 
also the truth of what it means to be human.  Panikkar‘s insistence here is consistence 
with the message of the Second Vatican Council‘s Gaudium et Spes.74  Panikkar, 
however finds this truth in the cosmotheandric structure of reality, described in chapter 
one.  Human relationality is rooted in this structure: ―relation is in fact the category of the 
Trinity—and advaita.‖75  This is what is revealed in Christ Jesus: the fullness of 
humanity. 
2.7 S. Mark Heim on the Incarnation 
Perhaps this is the opportune time to interject a bit of S. Mark Heim‘s take  on the 
uniqueness of the Incarnation because it can help us to understand Panikkar‘s use of the 
term ‗Christ‘ in a sense that  goes beyond the parameters of the Incarnation found in 
Jesus of Nazareth.  As Heim correctly points out, in the Christian theological tradition, 
Christology is the key to understanding salvation.  This is due to Jesus‘ full participation 
in divine life.
76
  The Incarnation enables communion between God and humanity: 
Through the web of communion from this single human point, God becomes a participant 
on the creature side of the creator/creature relation.  This means, for instance, that God 
also has a communion with the characteristic forms of alienation in these relations.77 
This solidarity with the alienated can be seen in Jesus‘ own experiences of 
abandonment and fear.  Panikkar‘s thought does contrast with Heim‘s here.  For 
Panikkar, the Incarnation is a clear manifestation of an already-present union between 
                                                        
73 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 338 . 
74 See Gaudium et Spes, 22.  Here the bishops of the council state, ―The truth is that only in the mystery of 
the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him 
Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the 
Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not 
surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their crown.‖ 
75 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 112. 
76 S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, 133. 
77 Ibid. 
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God and creation, a ‗christophany‘.  Thus, for Panikkar the Incarnation is not the 
beginning point, but a delectable fruit of the tree that has roots as deep as creation itself.  
The divine solidarity with human feelings of abandonment, etc. that is manifested in the 
Incarnation is the swelling of divine love that can relate to humanity because it, in fact, 
has never abandoned creation. 
Heim, while holding to the uniqueness of the Incarnation, does not see the 
Incarnation as the only source of divine revelation: 
If people object that one incarnation is too few, they may miss the point that the Christian 
doctrine of God does not limit the going out of God into creation to just one instance.  
God‘s living presence in the world has a complex variety.78 
 Panikkar, while not emphasizing the uniqueness of the Incarnation, does not deny 
it either.  Panikkar would, of course, whole-heartedly accept that the Incarnation is 
unique.  After all, all ‗christophanies‘ are unique outcroppings of the cosmotheandric 
unity that lies at the root of all of reality.  However, as Heim would agree, the uniqueness 
of the Incarnation does not place a limit on divine self-revelation.  For Heim, a 
Trinitarian theological outlook leads away from Christomonism because it does not see 
Jesus the Christ as the exclusive source of knowledge about God.   He insists that ―one 
way to put this is to say that what was revealed in the particularity of Jesus Christ has in 
fact not yet been fully specified.‖79  So, for Heim, there is still a fullness of revelation in 
the Incarnation, but there still remains more ―meaning‖ that can yet be uncovered.80  In a 
manner that is no doubt influenced by Panikkar, Heim asserts: 
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There is an ―unknown Christ‖ for Christianity, a Christ whose full dimensions and 
character are hidden from Christians and await the further particularization that can only 
come from additional contexts.81 
While Panikkar might phrase this slightly differently, preferring to hold the 
revelation that is Christ as being of interest not simply to Christians but to all, the point is 
very much the same.  The reality that can be called ‗Christ‘ is clearly, and Christians 
believe most clearly, revealed in Jesus of Nazareth.  Yet this reality is too great and too 
large to be exhausted by one particular manifestation.  It is intrinsically open to others. 
2.8 Jacques Dupuis: A Helpful Dialogue Partner on Speaking of Christ Outside of 
Jesus 
Perhaps this is the appropriate juncture to resume our dialogue with Jacques 
Dupuis by examining his treatment of the so-called Logos asarkos.  We have already 
visited some of Dupuis‘ thought in our first chapter.  Following the Second Vatican 
Council‘s Dei Verbum, Dupuis notes that Jesus Christ "completes and perfects" 
revelation, which means that "Jesus Christ is personally the fullness of revelation."
82
   
However, this supreme character of revelation in Jesus Christ, according to Dupuis, ought 
to be understood "qualitatively" not "quantitatively."
83
  This insistence that the ‗fullness‘ 
of God's revelation found in Jesus is ‗qualitative‘ and not ‗quantitative‘ is a key feature in 
Dupuis‘ thought.  Based upon this, Dupuis envisions a kind of mutuality between 
Christianity and other religions, but also an asymmetry.  Thus, there is room for a two-
way dialogue between religious traditions, but the Incarnation sets the Christian 
                                                        
81 Ibid., 141. 
82 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 129.  See Dei Verbum, 
4. 
83 Ibid. See Dei Verbum, 4. 
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revelation apart.
84
  While it is ‗full‘, ―this revelation is not ‗absolute‘; it necessarily 
remains limited.‖85  This is due to the intersection of Jesus‘ full humanity, which is, in 
itself, finite, and the incomprehensibility of God, the infinite.
86
  
For Dupuis, this leaves space for an ―open‖ theology of revelation.87  After all, in 
the Old Testament, God spoke to other nations and even has covenants with them by 
virtue of Adam and Noah.
88
  How is such an ‗open theology‘ to be understood when, as 
Dei Verbum states, after the Incarnation, there is no new public revelation?
89
  According 
to Dei Verbum: 
Then, after speaking in many and varied ways through the prophets, "now at last in these 
days God has spoken to us in His Son" (Heb. 1:1-2). For He sent His Son, the eternal 
Word, who enlightens all men, so that He might dwell among men and tell them of the 
innermost being of God (see John 1:1-18). Jesus Christ, therefore, the Word made flesh, 
was sent as "a man to men." He "speaks the words of God" (John 3;34), and completes 
the work of salvation which His Father gave Him to do (see John 5:36; John 17:4). To see 
Jesus is to see His Father (John 14:9). For this reason Jesus perfected revelation by 
fulfilling it through his whole work of making Himself present and manifesting Himself: 
through His words and deeds, His signs and wonders, but especially through His death 
and glorious resurrection from the dead and final sending of the Spirit of truth. Moreover 
He confirmed with divine testimony what revelation proclaimed, that God is with us to 
free us from the darkness of sin and death, and to raise us up to life eternal.90 
 Thus: 
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The Christian dispensation, therefore, as the new and definitive covenant, will never pass 
away and we now await no further new public revelation before the glorious 
manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ (see 1 Tim. 6:14 and Tit. 2:13).91 
It is the quality of the Incarnation that gives the ‗Christian dispensation‘ its unique 
character.  Thus, Dupuis claims that revelation takes place in a variety of ways 
throughout history.  Therefore, since ―revelation is progressive and differentiated,‖92 
terms like ‗Word of God‘, ‗inspiration‘, and ‗sacred scripture‘ are ―analogical concepts‖ 
that are applied in different ways at different stages of this process.
93
    Thus, there are 
different forms of revelation.  With this in mind, there is a reciprocal complementarity 
between biblical and nonbiblical revelation.
94
  This does not, however, mean that 
anything is missing from Christian revelation.
95
  Jesus is, qualitatively, the fullness of 
revelation, so there is a ―mutual ‗asymmetrical‘ complementarity‖ between the ‗Christian 
dispensation‘ and other religious traditions.96 
For Dupuis, Jesus' uniqueness is not absolute; rather, it is God's saving will that is 
absolute.
97
  So, Jesus is uniquely salvific, but, he is thus in such a way as to also be 
related to all other mediations of the divine.
98
  If they are true revelations of the divine, 
then they are compatible with his revelation.  Because of this relation, Dupuis 
intentionally avoids applying terms like ―absoluteness‖ to both Jesus Christ and 
Christianity because absoluteness is an attribute of the ―Ultimate Reality‖ and cannot be 
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94 Ibid., 135. 
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96 Ibid. 
97 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
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applied to any finite reality, including the ―human existence‖ of God incarnate.99  In other 
words, ―that Jesus Christ is ‗universal‘ Savior does not make him the ‗Absolute Savior‘—
who is God himself.‖100 
Dupuis strives to think of the character of Jesus‘ salvific efficacy in such a 
manner that combines both uniqueness and universality.  These two elements provide a 
mutual corrective.
101
  Dupuis sees Jesus Christ as having both a ―constitutive‖ uniqueness 
and universality that is neither relative nor absolute.
102
  By this, he means that the Christ 
event is the ―cause‖ of salvation of all.103 But such attributes must also be understood 
relationally.
104
  Among other saving figures, Jesus is the one ―human face‖ ―in whom 
God, while remaining unseen, is fully disclosed and revealed.‖105  So Jesus is one among 
many mediations of the divine, but among these, he has pride of place by virtue of the 
Incarnation.  This must not, however, be considered a disregard of the truth found in 
other religious traditions: 
A constant blemish of the pluralist paradigm consists in imagining that the only 
concretely possible alternative to its own standpoint is a dogmatic, exclusivist dismissal 
of other religions.  Such a black-or-white dilemma is neither biblically nor theologically 
warranted.  For the New Testament affirmation of Christ the man‘s uniqueness as ―the 
way‖ (Jn 14:6), the ―one mediator‖ (1 Tim 2:5), the ―one name‖ (Acts 4:12) in whom 
human beings may find salvation does not cancel out faith in the Logos asarkos of which 
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the Johannine Prologue speaks…, through whom all people may be saved and in whom 
all ways may converge.106 
With this statement, Dupuis sets forth his vision of the relationship between 
Christianity and other religious traditions.  This relationship is rooted in their sharing of a 
common Logos, the divine Logos.  This Logos is communicated through a variety of 
mediums.  The Christian dispensation is set apart because of its medium: the human 
nature of Jesus of Nazareth.  However, the Incarnation does not preclude the action of the 
Logos outside of its limits.
107
 
Nonetheless, for Dupuis, ―no revelation…either before or after Christ can either 
surpass or equal the one vouchsafed in Jesus Christ, the divine Son incarnate.‖108  Thus, 
the Incarnation is a unique medium of the revelation of the Logos, uniting the divine and 
the human inseparably.  Despite this uniqueness, there still remains ―room for an open 
theology of revelation and sacred scriptures.‖109  Dupuis explains how this is possible: 
Just as the human consciousness of Jesus as Son could not, by nature, exhaust the 
mystery of God, and therefore left his revelation of God incomplete, in like manner 
neither does or can the Christ-event exhaust God‘s saving power.110 
Furthermore, for Dupuis, there must also remain a certain ―distance‖ between 
Jesus, as ―God‘s human icon‖ and God (the Father).111  In other words, ―Jesus is not a 
substitute for God.‖112  Thus, the Christ-event is the ―universal sacrament‖ of God‘s 
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saving will.
113
  However, because of the above-mentioned distance, the Christ-event is 
not ―the only possible expression of that will.‖114  Thus, the divine Logos can act outside 
of the Incarnation: 
In terms of a Trinitarian Christology, this means that the saving action of God through the 
nonincarnate Logos (Logos asarkos), of whom the Prologue of John‘s Gospel states that 
he ―was the light that enlightens every human being by coming into the world‖ (Jn 1:9), 
endures after the incarnation of the Logos (Jn 1:14), even as God‘s saving action through 
the universal presence of the Spirit, both before and after the historical event of Jesus 
Christ, is real.115 
In this way, the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus of Nazareth remains a 
constitutively unique salvific act, but other saving figures can also be ―enlightened‖ by 
the Word or ―inspired‖ by the Spirit.116  Dupuis‘ unique contribution to Christology is 
this insistence on the action of the Logos asarkos.  However, Dupuis is careful to insist 
that this real divine action does not negate or render irrelevant the Incarnation.  In way 
that recovers much of the wisdom of the classical Antiochene school of Christology and 
an important facet of the Chalcedonian definition, Dupuis explains the distinction 
between the Logos ensarkos and the Logos asarkos: 
Admittedly, in the mystery of Jesus-the-Christ, the Word cannot be separated from the 
flesh it has assumed.  But, inseparable as the divine Word and Jesus‘ human existence 
may be, they nevertheless remain distinct.  While, then, the human action of the Logos 
ensarkos is the universal sacrament of God‘s saving action, it does not exhaust the action 
of the Logos.  A distinct action of the Logos asarkos endures—not, to be sure, as 
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constituting a distinct economy of salvation, parallel to that realized in the flesh of Christ, 
but as the expression of God‘s superabundant graciousness and absolute freedom.117 
In his later work Christianity and the Religions, Dupuis affirms that he wishes to 
avoid two erroneous tendencies he sees in a ‗Logocentric‘ theological paradigm.  This 
paradigm either regards the work of the Word outside of the Incarnation as a completely 
separate, parallel economy of salvation or retains a single economy of the Word that 
regards salvation as something understood and accomplished independently of the 
Incarnation.
118
  Thus, Dupuis follows the line of thought found in John Paul II‘s 
Redemptoris Missio, in which the pontiff insists that we cannot separate Jesus from the 
Logos.
119
 
Nonetheless, Dupuis insists that, without losing sight of this unity, we can still 
speak of an action of the Logos as distinct from the Incarnation.  Thus, he distinguishes 
the action of the ―Verbum incarnandum‖ or ―the Word-to-be-incarnate,‖ (before the 
incarnation) and the ―Verbum incarnatum,‖ or the Word incarnate.120  Dupuis points out 
that there is no reason to believe that this action outside the Incarnation does not persist 
                                                        
117 Ibid., 299. 
118 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 139. 
119 John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio, 6.  Here John Paul II insists: ―To introduce any sort of separation 
between the Word and Jesus Christ is contrary to the Christian faith. St. John clearly states that the Word, 
who "was in the beginning with God," is the very one who "became flesh" (Jn 1:2, 14). Jesus is the 
Incarnate Word-a single and indivisible person. One cannot separate Jesus from the Christ or speak of a 
"Jesus of history" who would differ from the "Christ of faith." The Church acknowledges and confesses 
Jesus as "the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Mt 16:16): Christ is none other than Jesus of Nazareth: he 
is the Word of God made man for the salvation of all.‖ John Paul II here exhibits the same concerns Dupuis 
articulates regarding the ‗Logocentric‘ theological paradigm seen above.  The pontiff reminds us here that 
―although it is legitimate and helpful to consider the various aspects of the mystery of Christ, we must 
never lose sight of its unity.‖  Dupuis, it seems, concurs with this sentiment.   See Jacques Dupuis, 
Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 139. 
120 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 140.  Dupuis, in 
reponse to his critics, avoid using the term Losog asarkos in this later work, yet the concept is similar.  
However, ‗incarnandum‘ implies avtivity of the Logos that is temporally (historically, economically) prior 
to the Incarnation.  This more precisely captures John‘s prologue.  He then expands this temporality by 
questioning whether there is a legitimate reason for limiting this activity to the time that precedes the 
Incarnation. 
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into the time after the Incarnation.  Dupuis‘ discussion of the ‗Verbum incarnandum‘ is 
rooted in the prologue of John‘s Gospel.  The fourth gospel begins with the activity of the 
Logos and does not describe the incarnation until the fourteenth verse.
121
  Thus, all of the 
following is the activity of the ‗Verbum incarnandum‘: 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He 
was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him, and without him 
not one thing came into being. What has come into being in him was life, and the life was 
the light of all people. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not 
overcome it.  
There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. He came as a witness to testify 
to the light, so that all might believe through him. He himself was not the light, but he 
came to testify to the light. The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into 
the world.  
He was in the world, and the world came into being through him; yet the world did not 
know him. He came to what was his own, and his own people did not accept him. But to 
all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of 
God, who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of 
God (Jn 1:1-13).  
Even the testimony of John the Baptist points toward the pre-incarnate action of 
the Logos.  The light of life comes into being through the ‗Verbum incarnandum‘.  In 
addition to its usage in the Johannine prologue, the idea of the action of the Logos outside 
the Incarnation is rooted in the conciliar developments of the later church.  Of particular 
importance among these is the Chalcedonian insistence up the two distinct, unconfused 
natures of Christ.
122
  In fact, to reduce and limit the Logos to the incarnation can result in 
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a form of what Dupuis calls ―inverse monophysitism,‖ in which the divine nature of 
Christ is reduced to a part of his human nature.
123
  Thus, it is important to remember that 
even after the Incarnation, the Word remains the Word and ―God remains God.‖124  
Therefore, just as Panikkar does not limit the action of God‘s self-revelation to the 
Incarnation, Dupuis does not limit the action of the Logos to that same event. 
 Dupuis also finds support for his thesis in several patristic theologians, most 
notably, in the ‗Logos spermatikos‘ doctrine of Justin Martyr.125  For Justin, all truth 
finds its source in the Logos.  Therefore, any time the philosophers of old (it is chiefly the 
philosophers treasured by his pagan interlocutors that Justin has in mind) stumbled upon 
any elements of the truth, it represents a ‗seed‘ of the full truth, sown by the Logos.126  
So, for Justin, the Logos acts outside of the Incarnation, and even outside of the Judeo-
Christian economy.  However, the ‗seed‘ of the truth sown by the Logos-sower, does not 
overtake the fullness of the Word encountered in the Incarnation.
127
 
                                                        
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 147.  See Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical 
Christophany, Revised and Enlarged Edition, 92.  Panikkar picks up the ‗seed‘ analogy: ―As for the 
analogy of seed and fruit, if ‗Christianity‘ is a name for the fullness of religion, for the realization of the 
theandric mystery, then Hinduism as a concrete religion may indeed give rise to it, in which case the seed-
fruit analogy would have a certain validity.‖ 
126 See Justin Martyr, First Apology, Transl. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, In The Ante-Nicene 
Fathers Vol. I The Apostolic Fathers, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Ed. Philip Schaff, (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1886), XLIV.  Justin states, ―And whatever both philosophers and poets 
have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things 
heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have 
enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all 
men; but they are charged with not accurately understanding [the truth] when they assert contradictories.‖ 
127 See Justin Martyr, Second Apology, Transl. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, In The Ante-
Nicene Fathers Vol. I The Apostolic Fathers, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Ed. Philip Schaff, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1886), XIII.  Justin says, ―For I myself, when I discovered the 
wicked disguise which the evil spirits had thrown around the divine doctrines of the Christians, to turn 
aside others from joining them, laughed both at those who framed these falsehoods, and at the disguise 
itself, and at popular opinion; and I confess that I both boast and with all my strength strive to be found a 
Christian; not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in 
all respects similar, as neither are those of the others, Stoics, and poets, and historians. For each man spoke 
well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic word, seeing what was related to it. But they who 
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Thus, for Justin, there is a distinction between the seed and the reality of the 
Word, itself.  Nonetheless, to use Justin‘s imagery, a seed has the potential to grow into 
the Word.  Furthermore, and more to the point, the philosophers possess their own 
authentic experience of the activity of the Logos, apart from the Incarnation.
128
  Toward 
this end, Dupuis highlights four major points in Justin‘s thought.129  First, there are three 
kinds of religious knowledge: the kind possessed by the nations, the kind that is the fruit 
of God‘s covenant with Israel, and Christian religious knowledge, rooted in the 
Incarnation.  Secondly, the Logos is the ‗unique source‘ of all of these kinds of religious 
knowledge.  Third, the difference between these lies in the fact that they represent various 
kinds of participation in the Logos.   And finally, any one who has known the Truth and 
lived righteously are all, in a way, Christians because they have partaken in the Logos.  
Thus, these three forms of religious knowledge are really all a piece of the same 
revelation of the Logos, celebrated in Christianity.  The Incarnation, then, represents the 
fullness of this differentiated revelation: 
The key to the whole system is in differentiated participation of the Logos: all people 
share in him, but while others have received from him partially (apo merous), we to 
whom the Logos revealed himself in his incarnation have been blessed with his complete 
manifestation.130 
                                                                                                                                                                     
contradict themselves on the more important points appear not to have possessed the heavenly wisdom, and 
the knowledge which cannot be spoken against. Whatever things were rightly said among all men, are the 
property of us Christians. For next to God, we worship and love the Word who is from the unbegotten and 
ineffable God, since also He became man for our sakes, that, becoming a partaker of our sufferings, He 
might also bring us healing. For all the writers were able to see realities darkly through the sowing of the 
implanted word that was in them.  For the seed and imitation imparted according to capacity is one thing, 
and quite another is the thing itself, of which there is the participation and imitation according to the grace 
which is from Him.‖ 
128 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 148-149. 
129 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 59. 
130 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless the ―seed of Logos‖ (sperma tou logou) is planted in them all by the 
―Logos-sower‖ (spermatikos logos).131  Dupuis points out that this is the insight that is at 
the root of Rahner‘s discussion of ‗anonymous Christianity‘.132 
Another patristic source for Dupuis is Irenaeus of Lyons.  For Irenaeus, the 
relationship of the Logos to the Father centers on visibility.  Thus, the ―revealing Logos‖ 
makes the Father visible.
133
  For Irenaeus, ―Visibile Patris Filius,‖ that is, ―the Son is the 
visible of the Father.‖134  It follows from this that ―all divine manifestations are Logos-
manifestations.‖135  The climax of these manifestations is found in the incarnation.  In 
this way, ―the historical Christ is a sacramental Logophany.‖136  Thus, the Incarnation 
holds a pride of place in the economy of divine manifestation.  For Irenaeus, in fact, the 
Incarnation universalizes this visibility.
137
  
 Dupuis completes his triad of patristic theologians emphasizing the activity of the 
Logos outside the Incarnation by reference to Clement of Alexandria.  According to 
Dupuis, Clement‘s contribution is emphasizing the word ―Logos‖ using it more for Christ 
than ―Son‖ which his predecessors used primarily. Clement essentially concurs with 
Irenaeus‘ vision of the Logos making the Father manifest.  The difference between 
Clement and the other two thinkers lies in Clement‘s insistence that there are two levels 
                                                        
131 Ibid. 
132 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 149.  See also Jacques 
Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 60. Here Dupuis points out, ―Christianity 
exists beyond its visible boundaries and prior to its historical appearing, but up to the incarnation, it is 
fragmentary, hidden, even mixed with error, and ambiguous.  It may be asked if this is not, but for the 
expression, the theology of ‗anonymous Christianity‘, even eighteen centuries before K. Rahner.‖ 
133 Ibid., 150. 
134 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 61. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., 66. 
137 Irenaeus of Lyons, The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, Transl. Armitage Robinson, (New 
York, NY: The Macmillan Co., 1920), 92.  Irenaeus says, ―And that He should become visible amongst 
us—for the Son of God became Son of man—and be found of us who before had no knowledge (of Him), 
the Word Himself says thus in Isaiah: I became manifest to them that sought me not; I was found of them 
that asked not for me. I said, Behold, here am I, to a race that called not on my name.‖  See Is 65:1. 
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of knowledge of the Father: one level that can be reached through human logos, reason 
and the other that is the gift of the divine Logos and otherwise inaccessible.
138
  Thus, for 
Clement, the human logos can get to "elementary knowledge of God" on its own, but the 
only "personal action of the Logos" reveals "God's secrets."
139
 For Clement, this activity 
of the Logos extends beyond the Judeo-Christian tradition into the pagan world, which 
possessed its own ‗prophets‘.140  Thus, for Clement, ―philosophy comes from God; it 
constitutes for the Greek world a divine economy, parallel, if not in all things equal, to 
the Jewish economy of the Law.‖141  This revelatory economy is ―a means of salvation‖ 
to the Greeks.
142
  Thus, unlike the much later neo-scholastic tradition, the insights of the 
Greek philosophical tradition are not seen in Clement‘s theological vision as merely a 
‗natural‘ form of knowledge of God as opposed to the ‗supernatural‘ economy found in 
Christianity.  Rather, they are gifts of the Logos. 
In this same way, Clement also explicitly affirms the truth found in both 
Buddhism and Hinduism.
143
  Using Pauline concepts, Clement portrays this pre-Christian 
distribution of the Word as a ‗schoolmaster‘, functioning in the same way as the Law for 
the people of Israel, preparing those that encounter it for the Christian dispensation.
144
  
This concept has been used in the later Christian tradition to disparage other religious 
traditions as mere ‗preparation for the Gospel‘ and not as ‗logophanies‘ in their own way.  
In the later western tradition, the sense of the ‗seeds of the Logos‘ in other 
traditions was lost, being reduced to natural human intellectual capacity, effectively 
                                                        
138 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 66. 
139 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 153. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 67. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, I, 15.  See Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From 
Confrontation to Dialogue, 153. 
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placing all non-Christian forms of knowledge of the divine in the realm of ‗natural 
theology‘.  For Catholics, this sensibility was not fully recovered until the Second 
Vatican Council.
145
 
As we have seen, for Dupuis, the presence of the Logos in other religious tradition 
does not conflict with or negate ―the unique salvific meaning of the historical event of 
Jesus Christ.‖146   The universal action of the Logos and the particular action of the 
Incarnation ―are neither identified nor separated; they remain, however, distinct.‖147  In 
this way, for Dupuis, the ‗Christ-event‘ remains "constitutive" of salvation.148  In the 
Incarnation, God is "once for always" (ephapax) inserted into human history and even 
personally united to each human.
149
  In the Incarnation, "the Word was undoubtedly 
manifested in Jesus Christ in the most complete way possible to conceive, and therefore 
in the way best adapted to our human nature."
150
 
However, while not all "Logophanies" are of the same value, those outside of the 
Incarnation are not merely "stepping stones" but are really and truly the "self-giving" of 
God.
151
  To demonstrate this, Dupuis points out that "from a Christian viewpoint, God—
and God alone—saves."152  Thus, it is important to remember that even in the New 
                                                        
145 See Ad Gentes, 11.  For instance, while discussing the missionary activity of Christians, the decree on 
the missionary activity of the Church, Ad Gentes, states, ―In order that they may be able to bear more 
fruitful witness to Christ, let them be joined to those men by esteem and love; let them acknowledge 
themselves to be members of the group of men among whom they live; let them share in cultural and social 
life by the various undertakings and enterprises of human living; let them be familiar with their national 
and religious traditions; let them gladly and reverently lay bare the seeds of the Word which lie hidden 
among their fellows.‖ 
146 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 156. 
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148 Ibid., 157. 
149 Ibid., 158. See Gaudium et Spes, 22. 
150 Ibid., 159. 
151 Ibid., 160. 
152 Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 306. 
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Testament, the "principal cause" of salvation is the Father.
153
   Consequently, "it is an 
abuse of language, then, to say that religions save or even that Christianity saves."
154
  
When it comes to the particulars, namely how these universal ‗Logophanies‘ relate to the 
divine plan laid out in the Incarnation, Dupuis suggests an approach of "theological 
apophatism."
155
 In the face of the incomprehensibility of the Divine Mystery, then, ―it 
behooves theology to be reserved and humble.‖156 
Following the 1997 publication of Toward a Christian Theology of Religious 
Pluralism, Dupuis drew the ire of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) 
because: 
his book contained notable ambiguities and difficulties on important doctrinal points, 
which could lead a reader to erroneous or harmful opinions. These points concerned the 
interpretation of the sole and universal salvific mediation of Christ, the unicity and 
completeness of Christ‘s revelation, the universal salvific action of the Holy Spirit, the 
orientation of all people to the Church, and the value and significance of the salvific 
function of other religions.157 
In the Postscript of 2002‘s Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to 
Dialogue, Dupuis reacts to the 2001 notification on his book, the theological approach of 
which, he connects to the CDF‘s 2000 Declaration Dominus Iesus.158   For Dupuis, the 
                                                        
153 Ibid.  See, for instance, Jn 3:16-17. 
154 Ibid.  Panikkar makes a similar claim.  See Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, 
(New York, NY, Paulist Press, 1978), 57.  Panikkar describes his ―conviction that the living and ultimately 
real Christ is not the kerygma of the Lord, but the Lord himself.  The naked Christ means also the 
‗dekerygmatized‘ Christ.‖  By ‗dekerygmatized Christ‘ it seems that Panikkar means Christ as pointing to 
cosmotheandric communion and not towards Christianity. 
155 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 162. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Notification on the Book Toward a Christian Theology of 
Religious Pluralism (Orbis Books: Maryknoll, NY, 1997) by Father Jacques Dupuis, S.J., January 24, 
2001, Preface. See 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20010124_dupuis_
en.html, (Accessed January 20, 2012). 
158 See Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue, 260. 
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CDF approach is not illegitimate, but "not necessarily exclusive," by which he means that 
it remains open to approaches such as the Trinitarian approach that he and Panikkar 
propose.
159
  He cautions that: 
Absolute and exclusive statements about Christ and Christianity, which would claim the 
exclusive possession of God's self-disclosure or of the means of salvation, would distort 
and contradict the Christian message and the Christian image.160 
This ‗message‘ is that of Trinitarian love.  Thus, "the plurality of religions, then, 
finds its ultimate source in a God who is Love and communication."
161
  He boldly 
cautions the CDF on the dangers of intimating a connotation that does not correspond to 
the fullness of the denotation of the faith: 
I am deeply convinced that the teaching church would do well, in keeping with its oft-
stated desire and claim to reproduce in its own life and practice the divine approach in the 
dialogue of salvation, to abstain from any ways of proposing the Christian faith which 
may imply insensitive or exclusivist evaluations of the others.162 
In essence, Dupuis is attempting to bridge two seemingly irreconcilable 
worldviews: one that regards Christ as uniquely salvifically efficacious and one that 
regards the possibility of salvation outside the so-called ‗Christian dispensation‘.  
Panikkar (perhaps prudently) steers clear of this controversy by speaking in a new way of 
Christ‘s activity in the world outside of Christianity, but avoiding any discussion of the 
unique salvific efficacy of the Incarnation.  Dupuis, in many ways does something 
similar.  However, as implied in his ‗friendly recommendation‘ to the CDF above, 
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Dupuis takes greater pains to demonstrate that this is a strain of thought that is really an 
integral part of Christian tradition already. 
Some other critics argue that Dupuis emphasizes universality to the detriment of 
particularity.  For instance, Nadia Delicata criticizes Dupuis for underemphasizing the 
particular actions of Christ, namely Christ‘s death and resurrection.163  Giving due 
attention to such particularities highlight the primacy of orthopraxis, which precedes and 
grounds orthodoxy.  It is through this activity, Delicata argues, that the divinity of Christ 
is revealed.
164
  While this does not seem to be Dupuis‘ intent, this oversight does lend a 
bit of deficiency to Dupuis‘ thought.  This critique is valid for Panikkar as well.  As we 
have seen, Panikkar strives to emphasize that the universal, cosmotheandric character of 
all of reality is only revealed through christophanic particularity.  Yet, in much the same 
way, he does not elaborate extensively on any particular christophany, including the 
Incarnation and the incarnate actions of Jesus the Christ.  Like its analogue in Dupuis‘ 
thought, this does not negate the validity of Panikkar‘s theology, but it does leave 
Panikkar‘s theological reader to desire ‗more‘. 
Jon Paul Sydnor similarly contends that Dupuis: 
seems to presume a highly incarnational Christology insofar as he advocates an implicit 
moral exemplar atonement theory. That is, throughout his work Dupuis suggests that 
salvation occurs through the encounter with agapic love. Nowhere does he imply that 
salvation also occurs through Christ's substitutionary atonement or satisfaction of human 
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indebtedness.  This implicit move is highly contentious and warrants explicit 
discussion.165 
Sydnor‘s contention might at first seem somewhat strange.  After all, many 
theologians today try to avoid espousing some form of Anselmian atonement theory.  
Yet, Sydnor‘s criticism points to a danger that is implicit in any Christology.  This danger 
is that of privileging some scriptural texts over others.  While privileging the texts that 
emphasize the salvific efficacy of the incarnation (See, for instance, Jn 1 and 2 Pt 1:3-4), 
we sometimes choose to ignore those that discuss salvation using ‗ransom‘ imagery (See, 
for instance, Mark 10:45; 1 Tim 5-6; Rom 6:23).  With the wide diversity of scriptural 
Christological images, we must realize that any systematization of Christology is also a 
reduction, not only of the incarnate reality that is Jesus the Christ, but also of the primary 
sources that provide us with information about Jesus Christ.  However, as we have seen, 
Dupuis‘ theology is well grounded in patristic thought.  And, given the above-mentioned 
variety of Christological images in scripture, it is inevitable that one will have to choose 
one or a few of these as a point of emphasis.  On a side note, we should also mention that, 
in this criticism of Dupuis, one catches a glimpse of another idea (perhaps peripheral to 
the critique itself) is also a quite valid contention: one of the dangers in any soteriology 
that emphasizes praxis is that of Pelagianism.  This danger is also present for Panikkar, 
and we will address it in our final chapter.   
 Sydnor does not take this route, however, yet he is critical of Dupuis‘ emphasis on 
agape.  Dupuis declares, ―The Gospel…requires that love be universal.‖166  He continues, 
―Love of God and of fellow humans go hand in hand; it is by that latter love that people 
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shall be judged.‖167  In response to this, Sydnor contends, ―The presentation is perhaps 
contradictory. Salvation is universal; those who are saved practise agape and by that 
practice shall be judged. But we notice that not all practise agape; therefore all are not 
saved. So salvation cannot be universal.‖168  What Sydnor is pointing to here is, at heart, 
a matter of semantic precision.  Salvation is extended to all and it is through agape that 
this offer of salvation is accepted.  However, it does not seem that Dupuis is insisting that 
all salvation is in fact universal, but that salvation can be universally accessible.  Dupuis 
is not advocating a doctrine of apokatastasis as a necessity, but rather a vision that sees 
apokatastasis as possible. 
 Like many theologians with a pluralist bent, Dupuis is frequently maligned for 
failing to give due respect to the differences between religious traditions.  Sydnor is 
concerned that Dupuis‘ focus on agape leads him to ―skirt over essential differences 
between the religions‖ and to try to ―find unity through ethical analysis.‖169   However, 
he contends, ―a religion is more than an ethic.‖170  He points to Dupuis‘ criticism of John 
Hick, in which Dupuis insists that the adherents of particular religious traditions may be 
offended to see their ―divine personae or impersonae reduced to manifestations of the 
Real an sich.‖171  With this in mind, Sydnor charges, ―But it is also doubtful that any 
divine personae or impersonae would want their religion, every aspect of which touches 
their being, reduced to ethics.‖172  This results in a religious tradition‘s ―reduction to one 
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172 Jon Paul Sydnor, ―Beyond the text: revisiting Jacques Dupuis' theology of religions,‖ 69. 
     
 
91 
of its parts.‖173  This leads Sydnor to conclude that, ―As soon as someone who adopts 
Dupuis' theology encounters another religion at a deep level (where the differences 
become both consequential and irreconcilable) Dupuis‘ framework will fall apart.‖174 
 However, it seems that Sydnor himself holds a reductionist view of agapic love. 
Agapic love is not merely an ethical notion. Scriptural texts such as the first Johannine 
epistle give a deeper view of agape: ―Beloved, let us love one another, because love is 
from God; everyone who loves is born of God and knows God. Whoever does not love 
does not know God, for God is love (1Jn 4:7-8).‖  In this view, the ethical imperative of 
agape that leads to orthopraxis is rooted in the nature of God.  In fact, this text has been 
frequently used as a basis for Trinitarian theology.  The relationship of agapic 
communion is what God is, and, consequently, salvation, which is a share in the Divine 
life, is also agapic.  Thus, it does not seem that Dupuis‘ emphasis on agapic love is, in the 
end, reductionist.  Rather, it is a concept that is pregnant with potential. 
 More importantly for the task at hand, one of the more frequent criticisms of 
Dupuis is aimed at his Christology, in particular his utilization of the notions the Logos 
asarkos and the Logos ensarkos, which we examined above.  Many critics are concerned 
that Dupuis divides the Logos into two separate entities.  This, of course, would have 
serious repercussions.  The most serious of these would be the fact that it would result in 
the positing of a fourth hypostasis in the Trinity.  Gerald O‘Collins defends his friend 
against this charge: 
Critics have alleged that he separates the Word of God and the man Jesus into two 
separate subjects, but they have never produced chapter and verse to back up this 
accusation. What Dupuis has consistently argued is that within the one person of Jesus 
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Christ we must distinguish the operations of his (uncreated) divine nature and his 
(created) human nature.  Here Dupuis lines up with Thomas Aquinas, who championed 
the oneness of Christ's person but also had to recognize that Christ's "divine nature 
infinitely transcends his human nature (divina natura in infinitum humanam excedit)" 
(Summa contra gentiles chap. 4, 35, 8).175 
O‘Collins reminds us here that Dupuis‘ theology is thoroughly Chalcedonian.  
Too often Chalcedon is interpreted as having an Alexandrian tone, emphasizing the unity 
of the two nature of Christ.  However, it often forgotten that the definition that was 
reached at Chalcedon represents a compromise between the Alexandrian and Antiochene 
schools.  While the two natures of Christ are inseparably united in the incarnation, they 
are also unconfused.   Thus, the human nature of Christ is completely human with all the 
limitations that entails.  O‘Collins explains that Dupuis ―is sensitive  to  the limits 
involved in  the historical  Incarnation of  the Son of God,  the  created character of  the 
humanity  he assumed, and  the specific quality of his  redemptive, human actions.‖176  
This, however, does not mean that Dupuis wants to simply ―reduce Christ to being one 
Savior among many.‖177  This, as we have seen, is the root of Dupuis‘ ‗mutual, but 
asymmetrical‘ dialogue.  Citing Avery Dulles, O‘Collins explains that our knowledge of 
the divine received through Jesus Christ is ―neither ‗absolute‘ nor ‗definitive‘.‖178 To 
―claim otherwise‘ is to ―ignore the way the language of revelation in the New Testament 
is strongly angled toward the future (e.g. 1 Corinthians 13:12; 1 John 3:2).‖179 
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 It is for this reason that Dupuis acknowledges the action of the Logos asarkos.  
However, because of the above-mentioned misunderstanding of this distinction as a 
bifurcation of the Logos and not a distinction in the acts of the Logos, Dupuis revises his 
language in his later work.  O‘Collins explains: 
In Toward a Christian Theology Dupuis distinguished the Logos asarkos (the Word of 
God in himself and not, or not yet incarnated) from the Logos ensarkos (the Word of God 
precisely as incarnated). Dupuis was surprised to find this distinction leading a few 
readers to conclude that he was ―doubling‖ the Logos, as if he were holding that there 
were four persons in God! To avoid such odd misunderstandings, in Christianity and the 
Religions he has dropped the terms asarkos and ensarkos. However, he continues to 
distinguish between the Word of God in se and the Word of God precisely as 
incarnated.180 
O'Collins here emphasizes the importance of making accurate ―terminological 
distinctions‖.181  After all, ―Those who fail ‗to watch their language‘‖ can wind up 
attributing ―an eternal, real (and not just an intentional) existence to the human being 
created and assumed by the Word of God at a certain point in the history of the world, as 
well as appearing to cast doubt upon the loving freedom of the Word of God in becoming 
incarnate for our salvation.‖182  Simply put, Dupuis‘ theological schema is characterized 
by intricate nuance.  Failure to attend to such nuances can lead to misinterpretation of his 
thought. 
O'Collins, Dupuis‘ advocate throughout his turmoil with Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, gives a thorough defense of Dupuis‘ theology, citing the fact that 
Dupuis ―has never maintained… a personal distinction between the eternal Word of God 
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and the historical Jesus of Nazareth.‖183  Rather, ―He has always upheld firmly that the 
Word of God and Jesus are personally identical.‖184  Simply claiming that the activity of 
the Word extends beyond the Incarnation does not imply that it is not the same Word that 
is active both in and beyond the Incarnation.  To interpret such a notion as such is to 
misunderstand the nature of the Incarnation.  It is for this reason that ―Dupuis insists on 
distinguishing (but never separating) the two natures of Christ and their respective 
operations.‖185 As we have already pointed out, this is the message of the Council of 
Chalcedon.  O‘Collins also cites the Third Council of Constantinople (of 680 or 681 CE), 
which ―distinguished not only between the two wills of Christ but also between the 
‗energies and operation‘ of the two natures,‖ to defend Dupuis.186  It is important to 
remember that ―before and after the Incarnation, the Word of God remains divinely 
present and active everywhere, and has not been somehow ―eclipsed‖ by the assumption 
of a human nature.‖187  Thus, failure to acknowledge Dupuis‘ distinction between the 
activity of the Logos ensarkos and asarkos threatens the integrity of both the divinity and 
the humanity of Christ. If there is no possible distinction between these activities, Christ 
becomes some amalgam of divinity and humanity that is actually neither of the two.  We 
must remember that Christ is both completely human and completely divine or else we 
miss the wisdom of the Christian tradition. 
 Along these same lines, O‘Collins points out that it is also incorrect to read 
Dupuis‘ distinction as implying that there are two different economies of salvation 
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operative in human history.
188
  This is one of the criticisms found in the ‗Notification‘ on 
Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith.  The ‗Notification‘ warns, ―It is therefore contrary to the Catholic 
faith not only to posit a separation between the Word and Jesus, or between the Word‘s 
salvific activity and that of Jesus, but also to maintain that there is a salvific activity of 
the Word as such in his divinity, independent of the humanity of the Incarnate Word.‖189 
Interestingly, however, (possibly due to O‘Collins‘ staunch advocacy for Dupuis), the 
‗Notification‘ never actually accuses Dupuis of making any such claims.  O‘Collins 
explains Dupuis‘ position, saying, ―All people are called to share finally in the one divine 
life of the Trinity, through the gracious activity (both human and divine) of the incarnate 
Son of God and the divine activity of the Holy Spirit.‖190 He also points out that, for 
Dupuis, the Word is not the only divine hypostasis that transcends superficially 
constructed boundaries.  For instance, ―he also emphasizes that the action of the Spirit is 
not confined to acting in and through the risen humanity of Christ. Before the 
Incarnation, the Spirit acted in a revelatory and salvific fashion.‖191 
 These criticisms of Dupuis are similar to the ones we have seen leveled against 
Panikkar.  The essential element to understand here is that both Panikkar and Dupuis are 
appealing to an important, but often underappreciated, facet of the Christian tradition.  
The activity of the logos outside (but never separate from) the Incarnation demonstrates 
the universality of God‘s salvific will.  The divine is not the sole property of Christians or 
Christianity (or anyone or anything, for that matter).  If one is attuned to the nuance of 
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Dupuis‘ Christology, then one can also appreciate Panikkar‘s christophanic theology 
because they share a common ground in the Christian tradition and a similar 
methodology. 
While their approaches are distinct, both Panikkar and Dupuis agree that the key 
to interreligious dialogue lies in emphasizing the unity of God‘s salvific economy.  
Dupuis, basing his approach on the Logophanic theologies of the Johannine Gospel, 
Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyons, and Clement of Alexandria, locates this salvific unity in 
the activity of the Logos, the same Logos that became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth.  
While he also uses the term ‗Christ‘ to speak of this divine activity outside of the 
Incarnation, it seems that Dupuis prefers the language of ‗Logos‘.192  To describe this 
same activity, Panikkar, on the other hand, does seem to prefer to use the term ‗Christ‘, 
which, as we have seen, for him, has a more universal scope than the Incarnation.  
Consequently, for Panikkar, ―whatever God does ad extra happens through Christ.‖193  
Therefore, he can speak of the ‗unknown‘ activity of Christ in Hinduism and Buddhism.  
Like Dupuis, Panikkar insists that this is not a novelty, but the essence of the Christian 
understanding of the activity of Christ.  Thus, he says, ―I am only reflecting the Christian 
tradition if I consider the symbol Christ as that symbol which ‗recapitulates‘ in itself the 
Real in its totality, created and uncreated.‖194  Dupuis, however, illustrates this 
connection with the Christian tradition much more overtly than Panikkar.  Dupuis‘ 
patristic sources, however, help us to locate Panikkar‘s thought within the Christian 
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tradition.  The  ―theology of history‖ proposed by Justin, Irenaeus, and Clement, by 
which all ―history becomes salvation history, inasmuch as through it God progressively 
manifests himself and communicates with humankind,‖ 195 which has been explicitly 
recalled by Dupuis, serves to support Panikkar‘s claim that Christ is active throughout 
history, even in the history other religious traditions.  Thus, for Panikkar (and for 
Dupuis), God‘s salvific activity throughout all of history is one.  Panikkar uses Hindu 
terminology to bring this forth, by saying that ―the presence of Christ in Hinduism in the 
above-mentioned sense makes of Hinduism, in the eyes of the Christian, not another 
dharma, but a part or stage of the sanātana dharma that Christianity also claims to be.‖196 
Nevertheless, Panikkar contrasts with Dupuis in two very important ways: (1) his 
terminological usage of the term ‗Christ‘ to refer to salvific activity outside of the 
Incarnation, which we have discussed, and, perhaps more glaringly, (2) his avoidance of 
any terms that may be construed as Christian triumphalism.  This becomes even more 
pronounced in Panikkar‘s later thought, as a comparison of the original version of The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism with the revised version thereof would reveal.  Dupuis 
believes, on the one hand, that reiterating Christian elements that might be construed by 
some as divisive, like the salvifically constitutive function of Jesus, does not hurt, but 
only helps interreligious dialogue.  He opposes any attempt to undermine this because, he 
insists, "to conceal differences and possible contradictions would amount to cheating and 
would actually end by depriving the dialogue of its object."
197
 This object can be 
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described as "understanding in difference."
198
  Thus, for Dupuis, the central issue in 
interreligious dialogue is honesty.  Therefore, we must openly and honestly face the 
issues that divide us. 
Panikkar, on the contrary, envisions such dialogue as centering on an authentic 
encounter of religious traditions with each other.  In this encounter, he recognizes the 
universal presence Christ.  Panikkar avoids any language that might seem like Christian 
triumphalism because, in his mind, real dialogue (intrareligious dialogue) also requires 
openness to mutual correction.  We will discuss this ‗intrareligious dialogue‘ in greater 
detail in our fourth chapter.  Furthermore, Panikkar sees no need to speak of Christianity 
in triumphalist terms because Christ is present throughout all of history.  It is the 
encounter with Christ that is salvific, not, per se, the encounter with Christianity, which is 
understood best as a means that makes this encounter with Christ possible.
199
 
2.9 Panikkar Accounts for the Connection between Christ and Jesus of Nazareth 
This universalizing of Christ does not always keep Panikkar clear of criticism.  
The delicate balance on the spectrum comprised by the poles of universality and 
particularity is often disputed, although, as we have seen above, for Panikkar this polarity 
is often a false one.  Gavin D‘Costa, who understands Panikkar‘s Christology in terms of 
a ‗Logos Christology‘, based upon the intrinsic connection it has with the thinkers that 
Dupuis‘ theology brings to explicit focus, finds Panikkar‘s universalizing tendency 
underwhelming: 
Others like Raimundo Panikkar have sought to rehabilitate a Logos Christology.  
However, Panikkar makes the Logos a universal revelation, of which Jesus Christ is one 
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instantiation, and then reads other revelations in like manner.  The prioritizing of the 
economy of salvation in the particularity of Adam and Eve and Jesus and Mary‘s history 
is bypassed, and the series of relations specified in the Conciliar documents is made 
subordinate to a higher controlling idea of ―Logos.‖200 
D‘Costa‘s very valid concern is that Panikkar‘s approach de-particularizes the 
salvific revelation found in the Incarnation, thereby relativizing it.  D‘Costa believes that 
the particularities that surround Jesus of Nazareth are an essential element of God‘s 
economy of salvation.  However, Panikkar, while discussing the tendency of many to 
articulate an understanding of Christology nearly exclusively in the context of a search 
for the ‗historical Jesus‘, discusses the irony that this Incarnational Christophany seems 
to constantly elude our conceptual grasp.  For example: 
The more we make Jesus a Jew—as a certain contemporary current wishes to do for the 
commendable reason of eradicating the Christian shame of anti-Semitism—the more 
clearly does his distancing himself from Jewish orthodoxy emerge.201 
Even discussion of the particularities of Jesus, which is often based upon 
reconstructed generalizations of common tendencies of the groups under which Jesus can 
be categorized, fails to grasp the individual Jesus.  Furthermore, limiting God‘s saving 
activity to the historically particular Jesus of Nazareth violates the very logic of the 
Incarnation itself.  The Incarnation is an extension of God‘s saving economy, not a 
limitation thereupon. 
But, D‘Costa is not the only critic of Panikkar‘s thought.  Like D‘Costa, Velti-
Matti Kärkkäinen sees Panikkar‘s ‗cosmic‘ Christology as problematic.  He asserts that 
―while there is not necessarily a compelling reason to make a total identification between 
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Jesus and Christ, neither is it possible to make the kind of separation that Panikkar‘s 1981 
[revised] edition of the Unknown Christ of Hinduism posits.‖202   He prefers, instead, the 
approach of the original 1964 edition, insisting that it is ―healthier theologically‖ because 
it ―still holds on to the uniqueness of Jesus when defining Christ, while not totally 
exhausting all that Christ is.‖203  Kärkkäinen explains: 
The main problem of the later approach is that he [Panikkar] expands the Christic 
principle—as he calls it—beyond the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, which has serious 
implications for the doctrine of the Trinity.  According to Christian theology, one does 
not have access to Christ, at least in the biblical-historical sense, apart from the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth.204 
Therefore, he ties Panikkar‘s approach to several other pluralistic theologies and 
their problems: 
Panikkar‘s Christology and thus Trinitarianism seems to share the typical weaknesses of 
―theocentric‖ approaches to the theology of religions, according to which the significance 
of Jesus is to be diminished in favor of the concept of God.205 
Furthermore, he sees this ‗cosmic‘ Christology of Panikkar as being in conflict 
with his Advaitic-Trinitarian approach: 
Especially in light of the fact that in Panikkar‘s Trinitarian doctrine the Son is the whole 
focus of deity, his pluralistically constructed Christology creates internal contradiction.  
Sometimes Panikkar seems to support his Christology with reference to the ―mystical‖ or 
―Mystery,‖ or to the idea of advaitism or nonduality, but the concrete meaning intended 
by this kind of appeal is vague.206 
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Thus, Kärkkäinen thinks that Panikkar‘s Trinitarianism is too christocentric.  On 
the contrary, ―in the Christian tradition the Son is not the focus.‖207  Rather, the Son is the 
way to the Father.  It seems, however, that this is exactly what Panikkar‘s Trinitarianism 
is all about: the Son making manifest the Unknown Father.    With regard to 
Kärkkäinen‘s other assertion that Panikkar‘s later thought is at odds with the Christian 
tradition because, in it, he asserts that you can have access to Christ outside of Jesus of 
Nazareth, one need only look at the elements of the tradition that Dupuis brings to 
explicit focus (John‘s Gospel, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyons, and Clement of 
Alexandria).  It seems, quite contrary to Kärkkäinen‘s analysis, that access to Christ 
outside of the Incarnation has been a part of Christianity since its early years. 
This access to Christ outside the Incarnation, furthermore, need not render the 
Incarnation meaningless.  While discussing how his unique approach (christophany) 
transcends traditional Christology, Panikkar takes pains to indicate that ―christophany 
does not contest the historicity of Jesus.‖208  Rather, ―it merely affirms that history is not 
the only dimension of the real and that Christ‘s reality is thus not exhausted with Jesus‘ 
historicity.‖209  Panikkar maintains that salvation comes through believing that ―Jesus is 
the Christ.‖210  This assertion, however, is not a theory or a concept; rather, it is a 
―confession‖ or ―an existential affirmation.‖211  Thus, ―Jesus is Christ, but Christ cannot 
be identified completely with Jesus of Nazareth.‖212  Panikkar uses example of 
iconography to help clarify this.  The icon manifests that of which it is an icon.  It is not 
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simply identified with that ‗original‘, yet it is not completely distinct from it either.213  
So, ―In Panikkar‘s thinking, Jesus does not exhaust the mystery of Christ.‖214 
This leads us into a discussion of the complex issues of identity.  As Jyri 
Komulainen insists, identity lies at the root of Panikkar‘s Christology: 
It seems that his Christology rests upon the following fundamental theological basis: the 
role of Jesus of Nazareth is confined to the background, and to providing a starting-point 
for Christian consciousness, whereas Christ holds the pivotal theological position.215 
Thus, according to Komulainen, Panikkar draws a clear ―distinction between the 
personal identification of Jesus of Nazareth and the personal identity of Christ.‖216  Only 
the latter constitutes Panikkar‘s Christology.217  It doesn‘t seem, however, that Panikkar‘s 
distinction is as rigid as Komulainen supposes.  Rather, as we have mentioned, Jesus can 
be identified with the Christ, yet Christ is not limited to Jesus of Nazareth.  This issue of 
Christ‘s identity in Panikkar is a complex one.  Consequently, we will resume this 
discussion in our fourth chapter, in which we will discuss both the identity of Christ and 
Christian identity.   
Another issue that we should raise is the contrast between the particularity of the 
term ‗Christ‘ itself and Panikkar‘s universalized usage.  ‗Christ‘ is derived from Χριζηος, 
the Greek translation of the Hebrew messiah, meaning ‗anointed‘.  This concept belongs 
to a particular context and can really only be understood as a part of the messianic 
expectations latent in first century Judaism.  Does Panikkar‘s universalization of this 
term, which is really an extension of what much of the later, particularly conciliar, 
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Christian tradition has done with it, further detach it from the context in which it derives 
meaning, effectively making it a meaningless term? 
For reasons such as this, it may be advisable to speak in terms similar to those that 
Dupuis uses: Logos asarkos, etc.  While Logos also has a particular context from which it 
derives meaning, within that context, it already has a universalized application.  As we 
have seen, this also has the benefit of being rooted in earlier proponents of the Christian 
tradition, such as Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, and Clement of Alexandria.  However, on the 
other hand, one could also argue that the purpose of the revelation of Christ Jesus is 
precisely to universalize the faith that was previously particularized in Israel.  Therefore, 
Panikkar‘s ‗cosmic‘ Christ is an entirely appropriate and faithful interpretation of the 
Christian tradition‘s use of the term ‗Christ‘. 
2.10 Conclusion 
For Panikkar, the term ‗Christ‘ denotes a principle that extends beyond the 
concrete manifestation of Jesus of Nazareth.  Christ, rather, represents the fulfillment of 
the universal longing communion that is found in all of reality.  As Panikkar‘s thought 
developed over time, the scope of the concept of ‗Christ‘ expanded.  What is essential for 
Panikkar and serves as the condition for the possibility of dialogue between religions is 
the universal presence and efficaciousness of Christ.  Christ is present wherever 
cosmotheandric union is present.  As we have seen, this union underlies all of reality for 
Panikkar.  Thus, this communion is always already present.  Yet, there are many and 
varied concrete expressions and manifestations of this unity, which as we shall see in our 
final chapter, tend toward the realization of this union (soteriology). 
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These manifestations are what Panikkar calls ‗christophanies‘.  It is important to 
note that, while the incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth is somewhat privileged in Panikkar‘s 
thought, in that he prefers to use the Christian terminology, this does not imply any 
exclusion or triumphalism.  So, Jesus is a christophany, but he need not be the only 
christophany.  A christophany manifests and effects the communion that is always 
already present, yet unrealized in all of reality.  Therefore, just as the Trinity is not the 
property of Christianity, neither is Christ.  Toward this end, Jacques Dupuis‘ work on the 
concept of the Logos asarkos helps to demonstrate that Panikkar‘s position is actually 
firmly within the Christian tradition in this regard.  In what follows, we shall leave these 
considerations momentarily and examine Panikkar‘s thoughts on the concept of identity.  
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Chapter 3 
Identity 
In our previous chapters, we have examined Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
worldview and his usage of the term ‗Christ‘.  We have seen the mystical unity that 
Panikkar recognizes as binding all of reality together.  We have also seen its explicit 
manifestation in various ‗Christophanies‘, with particular emphasis on the one we find in 
Jesus of Nazareth.  We shall return to examine some of the concerns that we have already 
raised regarding the identity of Christ in our next chapter.  But before we do so, let us 
first determine what the term ‗identity‘ itself means in Panikkar‘s thought. 
The issue of identity is central for much of the contemporary reflection on the 
dialogue between religions.  In his own faith experience, Panikkar blurs the lines that 
typically divide the dialogue partners in this conversation into ‗us‘ and ‗them‘.  In fact it 
is because of Panikkar and others who blur this line that the issue of identity is so central 
to interreligious dialogue.  However, for Panikkar, the issue of identity itself is aided by 
this dialogue.  Panikkar‘s starting point on this topic is his distinction between the 
‗differentiated identification‘ that is found in Western thought and ‗identifying identity‘ 
found in Eastern thought.  As we shall see, Panikkar seems to favor the Eastern view 
because he believes that it offers a corrective to the Western view.  Thus, like everything 
else in Panikkar‘s thought, his views on identity are the fruit of the mutual encounter of 
religious traditions. 
3.1 East and West on Identity 
Perhaps Panikkar‘s most essential reflection on the issue of identity can be found 
in a relatively short article that Panikkar contributed to the 2002 book Many Mansions? 
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Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity, entitled ―On Christian Identity: 
Who is a Christian?‖  Panikkar begins this article by quoting the Gospel of Matthew: 
―For whoever wishes to save one‘s own life will lose it; yet whoever loses one‘s own life 
for my sake will find it (Mt 16:25).‖1   His gloss on the text is to substitute the word 
―identity‖ for ―life.‖  Thus, the only way to save one‘s own identity is to lose it.  
Panikkar‘s idea of identity seems to center on the nonduality of cosmotheandrism.  It is 
rooted in advaitic-Trinitarian thought.  Therefore, identity is found in its highest form in 
mystical union.
2
  So, for Panikkar, unity is the source of identity. 
 The significance of this becomes clear when we compare various approaches to 
the issue of identity to each other.  For instance, one way of thinking of identity, 
philosophically-speaking, involves using the principle of non-contradiction.
3
  The law of 
non-contradiction basically tells us that two things are identical if there are no differences 
or distinctions between them.  In this view, identity is based on differentiation.
4
  Thus, I 
am me precisely because I am not you and vice versa.  It is this view that, as we have 
mentioned above, Panikkar recognizes as generally operative in the Western tradition. 
Another way of thinking of identity is what Panikkar refers to as the ‗principle of 
identity‘.5  This is the approach that Panikkar recognizes as setting the general tone of the 
Eastern tradition.  In contrast to the approach based on non-contradiction, this approach is 
based on unity, not on a lack of difference.  Thus, one is identified with that with which 
he or she (or even it) is identified.  So, for instance, a Buddhist is not to be identified as a 
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non-Christian (as what he or she is not).  Rather he or she is to be identified by that 
tradition with which he or she is united, Buddhism.  Thus, Panikkar urges the West to 
move behind the ―classificatory mania‖ that it has derived from the law of non-
contradiction.
6
  This obsession with classification must stop when we speak of identity 
precisely because one cannot classify identity.  After all the ‗classificator‘ cannot be 
classified, and identity belongs is the ‗classificator‘.  Thus, Panikkar wishes to move from 
a ‗categorical‘ approach to identity to a more ‗transcendental‘ one.  This Western need 
for certainty can be seen in Panikkar‘s assessment of infallibility: 
There is an obvious link between the post-Cartesian attitude that requires the security of 
rational knowledge and the felt need for infallibility—a need that culminated in the First 
Vatican council.  In a pre-Cartesian world, the infallibility proclaimed by the Council 
would scarcely make sense.  Thus the Orthodox church, which has not suffered the 
Cartesian impact, does not feel the need to declare its dogmas infallible because the need 
for an additional certainty is not felt.7 
This is an intriguing insight into the overall pattern of Western thought.  In the 
West, we are ‗hung up‘ with absolute certainty.  Cartesian doubt leaves everything in 
question but the cogito.  However, at the same time, in practice, we have been quite 
content to leave the speculative world of Descartes and rest assured that, for instance, the 
copy of Descartes‘ Meditations that I am reading does, in fact, really exist despite my 
inability to prove that existence with absolute certainty.  Descartes probably never 
actually doubted that he was jotting his Meditations down on a real sheet of paper, using 
a real pen with real ink, all of which actually existed even though he could not prove their 
existence absolutely.  Thus, we have uncovered an element of faith, by which we must all 
                                                        
6 Raimon Panikkar, "On Christian Identity: Who is a Christian?" 131, 
7 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 394. 
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abide in order to live functionally in the world.  This level of consciousness containing 
our presumptions is precisely what Panikkar refers to when he uses the term ‗myth‘, 
which we will discuss below.  It is for this reason that, as we shall see, the logos cannot 
exist without the mythos; it is in the realm of mythos that we come to believe that logos 
says or can say anything at all.  Thus, he concludes, ―Infallibility is the very expression of 
the Christian myth; but to spell it out weakens the myth.  The myth of infallibility is 
undermined by the logos of infallibility.‖8 
Thus, ―identification by differentiation…is typical of occidental Christianity and 
gives rise to its own problems.‖9  For instance, the Western Christian mind tends to be 
too exclusive in its approach to the other.
10
  This can even be seen in approaches that are 
typically considered inclusivist, such as Karl Rahner‘s concept of the ‗anonymous 
Christian‘, which is often criticized for its ‗one way‘ character and seeming disregard of 
the traditions of others.  Panikkar, points out that for this approach to be valid, there must 
be some form of conceptual quid pro quo: 
It is acceptable to Hindus to be ‗anonymous Christians‘, provided one also admits that 
Christians are ‗anonymous Hindus‘ (though this expression makes little sense in a 
tradition which takes polynomy for granted, ever since the famous ŗgvedic saying, ‗One 
is he whom the sages call by many names‘).11 
However, Western sensibility seems to be programmed to draw distinctions, many 
of which, like the concept of the ‗anonymous Christian‘, contain some kind of superiority 
claim.  Thus, to the classical Western mindset, Panikkar is on dangerous ground in 
                                                        
8 Ibid., 396. 
9 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised and 
Enlarged Edition, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), 13. 
10 Ibid., 15. 
11 Ibid., 13. See Rig Veda, 1.164.46. 
     
 
109 
proposing the Eastern unifying approach to identity as a corrective to the Western 
distinguishing approach thereto: 
Hence, when I maintain that Christ is real and effective, though hidden and unknown, in 
Hinduism, I allegedly violate the ‗sacred‘ Western canons used to identify Christ, since 
Christ is seen only in terms of differentiated identification instead of in terms of an 
identifying identity.12 
The approach to the Christian life that is informed by this Eastern approach to 
identity, then, would focus on identification with Christ rather then focusing upon the 
difference between Christ and the rest of us.  This helps us to further understand and 
contextualize Panikkar‘s Christology, which we examined in our previous chapter.  
Panikkar‘s overall theological project involves overcoming the individualism that 
pervades Western post-Enlightenment culture.  This approach to viewing the world 
through the lens of the ego is rooted in Cartesian thought and has been expanded by later 
thinkers in the Kantian, Husserlian, and Heideggerian traditions, among others.  
However, such an excessively individualistic worldview is unfathomable to an Eastern 
mind, even today: 
The purely individualistic attitude of nineteenth-century Europe is still unthinkable for 
the Indian people.  It is difficult to find in India a concept identical to that which we mean 
by ‗individual conscience‘.  In Hinduism, Man is still immersed in collective 
consciousness, he still has cosmic instincts which lead him through life with more 
certainty than a ‗modern‘ Man may possess through his own ‗private‘ reason.13 
However, Panikkar points out that the ―kaivalya ideal,‖ the ideal of detachment, is 
prevalent in the Hindu mind.
14
  ―But even there ‗isolation‘ implies universalization and 
                                                        
12 Ibid., 15. 
13 Ibid., 87. 
14 Ibid. 
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not ‗individualization‘.‖15  Thus, the goal is to become united with all and to move away 
from particularity.  This Eastern ‗universalization‘ involves unity-in-difference, 
consonant with Trinitarian thought in the West.  This contrasts with a ‗Western‘ view of 
‗universalization‘ that tends to seek unity that is accomplished by eradicating differences.   
This gives us some insight into Panikkar‘s own brand of pluralism, in which ―All 
attempts toward universalization [that destroy distinctions], so prevalent in Western 
culture as he sees it, are anathema to Panikkar.‖16  Thus, true dialogue should be based on 
the Trinitarian-Advaitic insight that suffuses Panikkar‘s cosmotheandrism.  Because of 
this, Panikkar uses the Trinitarian term ―perichoresis‖ to talk about ―diversity and 
complementarity‖ among religions.17  The same holds true for the identity of individuals.  
Therefore, the identities of others are connected to my own and do not threaten it.
18
  
Rather, I can only find my identity in union with others.  They are a part of who I am. 
Then, as we mentioned above, it is only in giving of oneself that one truly finds 
his/her identity.  However, Panikkar is perhaps too quick to label this an ―Eastern‖ 
insight.  For this kenotic openness to the world is also at the heart of Christianity in the 
West.  With this in mind, it is agape that is also at the heart of the mystical insight that 
makes explicit what Panikkar calls cosmotheandrism, and therefore, it is agape that is at 
the heart of any real dialogue (dialogical dialogue) between traditions.   Dialogue is not 
simply predicated on the willingness to receive; rather, dialogue also requires a 
willingness to give oneself and to be given completely.  This gift entails a risk.  In true 
                                                        
15 Ibid. 
16 Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2007), 341. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 67.  
Regarding the Eastern and Western conception of identity, Panikkar insists, ―I submit that the time has 
come to integrate these two principles.‖ 
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love (agape), one gives oneself at the peril of losing oneself.  But, it is only in giving 
oneself completely and wagering complete loss of self that one can hope to truly (and 
perhaps for the first time) find oneself.  Once a person comes to this understanding, he or 
she finds him or herself both changed and reaffirmed at the same time.  In other words, 
he or she finds identity. 
This identity transcends categories, even the categories of ‗same‘ and ‗different‘.  
In many ways, then, human identity is elusive and the human being is ‗unclassifiable‘: 
When I refuse to be called ―a human being,‖ or when I criticize evolutionistic thought, 
when I claim to be unique and, to that extent, unclassifiable, I am reacting against the 
invasion of the scientific mentality, which tends to obscure one of the most central of all 
human experiences: being a unique divine icon of reality, constitutively united with the 
Source of everything, a microcosm that mirrors the entire macrocosm.19 
It is this unclassifiable character of the human that fuels Panikkar‘s frequent use 
of the term ‗Man‘.  He does not intend to be sexist by referring to the human as ‗Man‘.  
Rather, he intends to communicate the enigmatic character of humanity. 
3.2 Identity and Identification 
With this in mind, in his third sūtra in Christophany, Panikkar asserts that ―the 
identity of Christ is not the same as his identification.‖20  Even if one can identify another 
person that person‘s identity can still escape one.21  In other words, identity is something 
that is not quantifiable.  It transcends the particularities of one‘s life and historical context 
and puts those particularities into perspective and gives them significance.  It is these 
particularities that are captured in what may be called ‗identification‘.  According to 
                                                        
19 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, Transl. Alfred DiLascia, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2004), 119. 
20 Ibid., 153. 
21 Ibid. 
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Panikkar, it is the confusion of these two closely related categories that has mired many 
traditional Christologies.  They have attempted to universalize the particulars of Jesus of 
Nazareth rather than discussing how Christ also transcends these: 
Too often christologies have concentrated on the identification of Jesus.  They have 
forgotten that identity is not an objectifiable category and have proceeded to project into 
different contexts the identity of Jesus Christ, which was discovered in a particular 
cultural situation.22 
But, Jesus is not the only one to whom this conflation applies.  This brings us 
back to Panikkar‘s article on Christian identity.  His thesis in this article is to overcome 
the dualism between who and what.   That is, he‘s trying to overcome a subject/object 
separation when talking about one‘s identity.23  This leads him on a peculiar path.  The 
problem of identity can be seen when people say that they accept Christ or accept Jesus‘ 
message, but reject Christianity.
24
   The question this generates is that of determining in 
what way these individuals are Christian (although the term ‗determining‘, as we shall 
see, is only half correct).  Because of the complexity of the issue, Panikkar emphasizes 
that the answer can only be ―relatively satisfactory.‖25  After all, as we have mentioned, 
identity is elusive. 
 So, what is so complex about identity?  Well, for Panikkar the complexity lies in 
the subject/object duality which he is trying to overcome.  One may describe oneself as a 
Christian but have no real affiliation with any Christian community.  The same can apply 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 154. 
23 Raimon Panikkar, "On Christian Identity: Who is a Christian?" 121. 
24 Ibid., 122. 
25 Ibid., 136. 
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to any other group.
26
  In fact, one may even be in poor standing with a particular 
community.  Also, on the other side, one may say that they are no longer ‗Catholic‘ or 
‗Christian‘ because they have some disagreement with official church authority, but 
others might still recognize them as Christian.  In others words, the central question 
regards what way we should relate ‗objective‘ and ‗subjective‘ criteria for Christian 
identity. 
 Panikkar insists that both are important.  Much like other thinkers such as Roger 
Haight, Panikkar draws a distinction between faith (a transcendent relationship) and 
belief (an intellectual conviction).
27
  This helps him to say that Christian identity ought 
not to be limited to holding the correct beliefs (orthodoxy) as has been done in the past.  
Rather, it goes beyond that.  This is why he claims that identity belongs not the rational 
sphere of logos, but to the non-objectifiable sphere of mythos, which we shall discuss 
below.
28
 
It is with this distinction in mind that Panikkar offhandedly mentions that early 
Christian creeds were not called ‗doctrine‘, but ―symbols‖.29 Since he connects it with the 
early creeds, he intends the term ‗symbol‘ in the sense that it was used in the early 
Church.  For Panikkar, it is not concepts that are ―thrown‖ together, but individuals, and 
all of reality. What is important, however, is that Panikkar is acknowledging the role that 
theological formulations of the church have served.  He is saying that they are primarily 
intended to unite.  They are about identity.  This is why, as we saw in our previous 
                                                        
26 Christianity is not special in this regard.  However, the central issue in both Panikkar‘s article and our 
project is Christian identity.  So, it is useful to continue this focus here, although we will really be 
discussing Christian identity in our next chapter. 
27 Ibid., 125.  See Roger Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999). 
28 Raimon Panikkar, "On Christian Identity: Who is a Christian?" 122. 
29 Ibid.  The etymological meaning of the word ―symbol‖ is ‗to put or throw together‘. 
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chapter, Panikkar never really seeks to abrogate the legitimacy of Christological doctrine, 
but rather seeks new ways to express Christ in the language of other religions. 
Therefore, for Panikkar, Christian identity cannot be limited to some objective 
criteria: doctrinal assertions or even baptism.  This is so because the Spirit cannot be 
stifled.
30
   Of course, does that mean that anyone can be a Christian if he/she says he/she 
is one?  In a way, yes it does.  But, the significance of this assertion can vary.  As we 
have begun to point out, Panikkar prefers to think of identity as consisting of two poles: 
subjective and objective.  These poles stand in tension: my self-definition and the 
acknowledgment of this by a group.  So, there is interplay between the two poles with 
identity lying somewhere in the middle. 
 Panikkar claims that one cannot meaningfully be described as a Christian if he/she 
does not explicitly claim this designation.  Thus, he finds Rahner‘s idea of the 
‗anonymous Christian‘ to be problematic in terms of identity, because it does not make 
much sense to identify someone in a way contrary to what he or she professes (although 
he acknowledges that one can use it if Christianity is defined as an ―ontological, 
metahistorical fact‖).31  Identity, then, must be something that is explicitly grasped by the 
one whose identity it is. 
 But, it is also not meaningful to talk about identity if there is no communal 
acceptance of it.  Panikkar compares this to having a private language.  Language is 
pointless if there is no one with whom to share it.  A private language serves no purpose 
because the purpose of language is to communicate something.  Identity is the same way.  
Identity unites one to others.  It does not isolate one.  Identity, then, is intrinsically 
                                                        
30 Ibid., 125-126. 
31 Ibid., 126-127. 
     
 
115 
relational.
32
 Interestingly, Panikkar points out that it is this pole of communal acceptance 
that kept Gandhi from claiming to be Christian.  He was moved by such teachings as 
those included in the Sermon on the Mount, but never wanted to be called a Christian 
because this may lead to misinterpretation, particularly by Christians.
33
 
 As we have mentioned, he refers to the typical Western approach to identity as 
being based in the law of non-contradiction.  That is, non-contradictory things are 
identical.  This leads to an emphasis on differentiation.  What he means here is that I am 
me, quite simply because I not you or this computer or this piece of paper or anything 
else.  This is contrasted with the alternate view (the view of the East) as one based on 
unity.  In this way, I am what/who I am because of what/whom with which I am united.  
This includes my affiliations and all my relations.  All of this aims at mystical unity.  In a 
2000 interview with Christian Century, Panikkar quite pointedly criticizes this Western 
tendency, saying ―Someone who is afraid of losing his or her identity has already lost 
it.‖34  The fear of losing who you are makes you forget who you were in the first place.  
In the same interview, Panikkar points out that for those in the Hindu tradition, 
everything can be taken from you but your identity.
35
 
 Inspired by this, without discarding the communal pole, Panikkar places the 
primacy of identity on the subjective pole.  For Panikkar, I cannot begin to understand 
you unless I try to understand how you understand yourself.
36
  There is a clear example 
of this mentality within Western thought, although Panikkar is correct that too often we 
                                                        
32 Ibid., 128. 
33 Ibid., 129. 
34 Raimon Panikkar, ―Eruption of Truth: An Interview With Raimon Panikkar,‖ Christian Century 117, no. 
23 (August 16-23, 2000): 834. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Raimon Panikkar, "On Christian Identity: Who is a Christian?"132. 
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in the West have worried about classifying others from without.  When one meets another 
for the first time, one of the first questions that is asked is ―what is your name?‖  In 
English, this question is asked in an ‗objective manner‘, but in most romance languages, 
this question is asked in the reflexive.  For instance, in Italian, you would ask ―come si 
chiama?‖ or ―come ti chiami?‖  Literally, one is asking, ―how do you call yourself?‖  
Thus, the person‘s self-perception is primary.  However, it is never detached from 
communal reflection.  After all, one must consistently use the same name or he or she can 
never be called by another.  In such a case, a name would serve no purpose. 
3.3 The Humanum: One’s Identity as a Human 
Identity for Panikkar, however, is not merely an individualized reality.  This 
would be an overemphasis on the law of non-contradiction.  Identity also contains a 
communal, and even universal, component.  The concept of ‗religion‘ helps us to identify 
this aspect of identity. Panikkar defines religion as ―the path Man follows in order to 
reach the purpose of life, or, shorter, religion is the way of salvation.‖37  Religion, then, is 
―a way to fulfillment—if we prefer.‖38  This means that there are three elements to 
religion: 1. A view of ‗Man‘ as he appears to be here and now; 2. A notion of end or 
―final station‖ for Man; and 3. A means of how to get from 1. to 2.39  But, in order to 
understand where ‗Man‘ is going, one must first uncover what ‗Man‘ is.  We have 
already mentioned that human nature, for Panikkar, is best understood as something 
elusive that can never be fully grasped.  However, that does not mean that there is 
nothing to be said on the matter. 
                                                        
37 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar,  The Intrareligious Dialogue, (New York, NY, Paulist Press, 1978), 78. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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The text of Panikkar‘s Blessed Simplicity was formulated using the transcripts and 
notes of a conference at which Panikkar was asked to speak on the topic of ―the monk as 
universal archetype.‖40  He begins to address this topic by pointing out that ―the phrase 
[‗the monk as universal archetype‘] is ambiguous…but its ambiguity is revealing.‖41  He 
insists that ―the symbol of the monk can only be communicated in fragments.‖42  Thus, 
―the universal archetype of the monk‖ must first be destroyed or ‗smashed‘ to see what is 
inside…―and within, we may discover emptiness.‖43 
However, by this, Panikkar does not mean that the topic he is addressing is not 
useful or does not communicate truth.  Rather, he means that the idea of the monk has to 
be dissected and rebuilt anew.  After all, Panikkar locates himself within the monastic 
tradition, but in a different sense than we are accustomed to discussing when considering 
monasticism.  He says, ―Since my early youth I have seen myself as a monk, but one 
without a monastery, or at least without walls other than those of the entire planet.‖44 
With this in mind and especially considering his non-monastic audience, Panikkar 
uses the idea of the monk as an ‗archetype‘ to speak of ―the monk in every one of us.‖45  
Thus, instead of examining past figures, Panikkar wishes to ―probe the transhistorical 
present.‖46  Panikkar makes a delicate distinction between a monk as an example and the 
monk as a manifestation of a monastic archetype.
47
  By this latter view, which reflects 
Panikkar‘s approach, to speak of ―the archetype of the monk‖ is to say that there is a 
                                                        
40 Raimon Panikkar, Blessed Simplicity: The Monk as Universal Archetype, (New York, NY: Seabury, 
1982), 5. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 7. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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―human‖ archetype that monks have ―reenacted in their own way.‖48  Thus, the monk can 
shed light on what it means to be human.  Furthermore, there is something ‗monastic‘ 
about humanity and ―we may have no other entrance into the archetype than to study or 
come to know the monk as archetype.‖49 
However, Panikkar is quick to point out that the monastic life is not for all.  
Humans should not all live within monasteries.  He declares, ―To be, then, quite specific: 
Is the monk a universal archetype; i.e., a universal model for human life?  No.  The monk 
is only one way of realizing a universal archetype.‖50  This leads to a kind of polarity 
when discussing ‗monkhood‘: 
On the one hand it is something special, difficult, even sometimes queer, with tinges of 
social and cultural nonconformity; on the other hand, it is something so very much 
human that it is ultimately claimed to be the vocation of every human being, what 
everybody should be or is called upon to be—in some say or other, sooner or later.51 
But, what is a monk? 
By monk, monachos, I understand that person who aspires to reach the ultimate goal of 
life with all his being by renouncing all that is not necessary to it, i.e., by concentrating 
on this one single and unique goal.
52
 
What makes the monk a monk is ekāgratā (Sanskrit for ―singlemindedness‖).53  
In this way, Panikkar chooses to focus on the ―archetype of the monk‖ in contrast to the 
assigned topic, ‗the monk as archetype‘.54  Thus, he asserts, ―The thesis I am defending is 
that the monk is the expression of an archetype which is a constitutive dimension of 
                                                        
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 8. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 9. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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human life.‖55  For Panikkar, as Jyri Komulainen notes, ―man is always homo religious‖ 
because humans possess a ―constitutive religious dimension.‖56  However, by speaking of 
this as ‗constitutive‘, Panikkar does not intend to posit a theory of human nature.  He 
continues to maintain the irreducibility of the person: 
The perfection of the human individual is not the fullness of human nature; it is not 
nature, but personhood; it is not the essence of humanity, but the incommunicable and 
unique existence of the person.57 
Thus, perfection can be realized by many in as many different ways.
58
 So, ―the 
perfect human nature does not exist, nor does it exist in a particular being.‖59  However, 
different people reach different degrees of actualizing their potentialities.  Thus, rather 
than choosing a formal Platonic view, Panikkar prefers the Aristotelian teleology of 
potency and act.  In contrast to this Platonic misconception that a perfect ‗nature‘ does 
exist or that there can be a ‗perfect Christian‘, he reiterates: ―In point of fact, a perfect 
human nature is a contradiction in terms.‖60  Thus: 
Each person will have his own way of realizing the perfection of ―humanity.‖  I shall call 
the humanum this core of humanness that can be realized in as many fashions as there are 
human beings.  Humanity is one; the humanum exists in the particular form of each and 
every individual person who realizes that fullness of being.  Even if this fullness is 
considered to be a merging with Brahman or a total annihilation, this could be called the 
humanum from the viewpoint of the human person.61 
                                                        
55 Ibid., 11. 
56 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, (Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 94. 
57 Raimon Panikkar,  Blessed Simplicity: The Monk as Universal Archetype, 12-13. 
58 Ibid., 13. 
59 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
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Therefore, for Panikkar each person realizes the humanum (Christ-ness?) in 
his/her own unique and particular way.  This is why for Panikkar, the monk cannot be the 
model for the realization of the humanum, but rather stands as a manifestation of the 
quest for realization, particularly in the monk‘s realization of the fact that it is a quest at 
all.  For Panikkar, as we have mentioned, ―religion is a path to the humanum, be it called 
salvation, liberation, or by whatever generic name.‖62  Panikkar‘s connection of the 
humanum to soteriology will play a very important role in our concluding chapter. 
 In Panikkar‘s view, this humanum, this core of what the human is, which cannot 
be exhausted by the category of ‗nature‘ has ―many aspects‖ and ―facets.‖63  It is for this 
reason that there is a diversity of religious traditions in the world.  It is also for this 
reason that these traditions, while different, do not necessarily negate each other.  To use 
the language we discussed above, the humanum, while identifiable, cannot be exhausted 
by identification.  It is part of identity.  The humanum, then, is incalculable.  However, as 
we have said, it can be identified (but not exhausted): 
My hypothesis is that monkhood, i.e., the archetype of which the monk is an expression, 
corresponds to one dimension of this humanum, so that every human being has 
potentially the possibility of realizing this dimension.64 
While Panikkar can refer to the ‗Monastery‘ as an institution65, ‗monkhood‘ is 
prior to and beyond this institutionalization.  To describe this humanum, Panikkar points 
to the metaphor of ―the center‖ found in both Eastern and Western traditions.66  He 
                                                        
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 14. 
65 It would be erroneous to conclude that Panikkar implies any pejorative connotation to the term 
institution.  Rather, he insists: ―Institutions are necessary, and the more human a need the more necessary 
the institution.‖ Blessed 15.  He is simply saying that there is something more basic (the humanum) that 
necessitates an institution. 
66 Ibid., 15. 
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asserts that ―inasmuch as we try to unify our lives around the center, all of us have 
something of the monk in us.‖67  However, even with this commonality, the distinction 
between the Eastern and Western views of ‗identity‘ hold strong here.  After all, to 
‗center‘ oneself is to touch one‘s identity.  So, while Eastern ideas of the ‗center‘ tend to 
see it as immanence and identify the self with this center, which is ‗no-thing‘ and 
‗emptiness‘, Western ideas of the ‗center‘ tend to view it as transcendence, ―exteriority,‖ 
―ultimate difference,‖ and something other than oneself to which one must relate in order 
to find oneself.
68
  However, Panikkar‘s distinction here can be exaggerated.  After all, we 
cannot forget about the kenosis we discussed in our first chapter.  It is in divine 
outpouring that the Ultimate emptiness of the East and the divine ‗fullness‘ (pleroma) of 
the West are reconciled.  Furthermore, as we have seen in our previous chapter, 
immanence and transcendence are not, in the final analysis, polar opposites.  Rather they 
need each other and are actually different facets of the same mystery. 
In one of his nine sutras in Blessed Simplicity, Panikkar points out that the monk 
is enamored with ―the memory of the Ultimate and the presence of its gate.‖69  This 
means that for the monk, ―in so many words, ontology is psychologized and psychology 
is ontologized.  Ontology is brought to mind, and psychology is given an ontological 
weight.‖70   
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The Ultimate and the gate to the Ultimate have many names.  The ‗Ultimate‘ can be 
called God, Brahman, Nothingness, etc. and the ‗gate to the Ultimate‘ can be called 
Death, Justification, Innocence, etc.
71
  In the monk‘s consciousness: 
The Ultimate is there not only as the goal of existence, but also in the mind and heart of 
the monk all the time.  Death is not only recognized and accepted, it is given a status of 
its own and allowed to dominate and condition all other human activities.72 
Therefore, because it is an institutionalization of this consciousness, 
―monasticism, as it were, institutionalizes the presence of death and the reality of the 
Absolute.‖73  This single-minded focus on the presence of the divine is the characteristic 
that makes the monk a monk (monachos).  Truly, ―it is the experience of the Ultimate, the 
reality of God, the Other Shore or whatever that magnetizes the monk and allows him to 
simplify his life.‖74  As Panikkar comments: 
Death may be considered the final stage of all human endeavors, even if ―afterwards‖ 
there is supposed to be something else.  Or it may be considered the real birth of 
authentic life.  This is the monastic attitude, and for this reason the act of dying is 
advanced in the monastic profession.75 
But this death is not only personal death.  Rather, it is ―the fate of everything.‖76 
All things give way to the Ultimate: 
Always we have known that to love God is to love one‘s neighbor, that to seek nirvāna is 
really to aid samsāra, that sublimation of a value represents a higher fruition of the value 
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renounced, that abandoning the world contributes to its salvation, etc., but the monk‘s 
concern is that he has only one life, and often he wonders how all this can be possible.77 
All of this is possible because of the union of all that underlies all of reality.  All 
things can yield to the Divine because the Divine is always ‗there‘.  It is this communion 
of all reality that lies at the heart of monasticism.  It is also this communion of all reality 
that lies at the heart of the incalculable humanum that the monk brings into relief.  The 
monk reveals cosmotheandrism to us. The monk is a christophany. 
 Panikkar‘s monastic reflection uncovers the archetype that is at the heart of the 
humanum.  This cosmotheandrism which lies at the root of all reality finds special 
articulation in the human person.  Unlike many in the post-Enlightenment tradition of 
Western thought, Panikkar tries to avoid reducing the human to the ego. Rather, he 
insists, ―The person is the complex of all the personal pronouns: a relation.‖78  He 
explains: 
The person is neither an individual nor an undifferentiated existence.  Precisely insofar as 
it is something ultimate, the person escapes every definition.  Person is relation because 
Being is relation.79 
Thus, the person is not isolated, but only finds his/her identity in communion.  
The ‗I‘ is not ontologically prior to the ‗you‘ nor is the ‗you‘ prior to the ‗I‘.  Rather, the 
mutuality of cosmotheandrism grounds them both.
80
  Varghese Manimala echoes 
Panikkar‘s trans-personal approach to identity by insisting that ―mankind needs to 
achieve not merely a collective existence, but has to move towards what is called a hyper-
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personal existence.‖81  In this way, ―personalization‖ involves love.82  Following Teilhard 
de Chardin and his ‗omega point‘ teleology, Manimala insists that ―universal love will 
vivify and make everything reach the stage of consummation.‖83  Thus, human beings 
reach fulfillment by realizing their identity, which can only be found in union with all of 
reality. 
For Manimala, the ―human being is a peculiar being trying to understand its own 
uniqueness.‖84  But, this uniqueness can only be realized in giving oneself to another.  It 
cannot be realized in isolation from others. After all, ―a person is a disclosure.  This 
disclosure takes place through his/her face.‖85  Consequently, ―a face is a message; a face 
speaks often unbeknown to the person.‖86  Therefore: 
The being of a person is never completed, final.  The status of a person is a status 
nascendi.  This becoming a person is in union with others; therefore solidarity becomes a 
need of every person.87 
Thus, the cosmotheandric self-fulfillment that is the deepest yearning of the 
humanum is only fully realized ethically.  Thus, as Manimala points out, in Panikkar‘s 
thought, ―the human being achieves fullness of being in fellowship, in care for others.‖88  
Mysticism and praxis are not opposites.  Rather, praxis is necessary for mystical union.  
As Manimala points out, ―in this sensitivity for the other one discovers one‘s own 
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meaning and purpose of existence.‖89  Thus, according to the logic of Panikkar‘s thought, 
elaborated upon by Manimala, identity is found in orthopraxis.  For Panikkar: 
Man is much more than a spectator or constructor of this world.  Above all he/she is an 
actor; fundamentally he/she enacts himself/herself through his/her capacity—not 
exhausted by his/her facere—to embrace his/her agere as well.  This activity is above all 
a praxis.  Human being is one who modifies the world through orthopraxis.90 
Thus, human identity is a complex notion.  The humanum has a necessary 
communal aspect.  As Manimala shows, the human being is ―basically a seeker, in search 
of truth and seeking meaning in life.‖91 But, this is a ―communitarian‖ quest not an 
individualistic one.
92
  Humans have an ―existential openness‖ toward a ―plus ultra.‖93  
Human identity can only be realized through transcendence.   The individual human must 
be open to the otherness of all of reality in order to realize the much deeper union that 
binds that reality together.  It is this openness to others and otherness, for instance, that 
makes interreligious dialogue a necessary part of the religious quest.
94
 
3.4 Mythos and Logos 
It is in the context of full human realization that Panikkar encourages the 
rediscovery of myth and its place in human life.  In Panikkar‘s assessment, ―rationality‖ 
should be ‗situated‘ in the ―total human—cosmotheandric—context.‖95  To achieve this, 
Panikkar insists that we should always strive to understand logos in the context of the 
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mythos.  Logos alone is unreliable.
96
  Manimala explains that, for Panikkar, ―myth is 
nontheoretical in its very meaning and essence.  It defies and challenges our fundamental 
categories of thought.‖97 In this sense, when assessed as a literary genre, myth is closer to 
poetry than to historical narrative.  Consequently, ―myth combines a theoretical element 
and an element of artistic creation.‖98  However, it is important to point out that while 
myth is frequently identified with a story, an element of a narrative, or a literary genre, 
Panikkar insists that mythos is what is behind the story.  In this sense, it is more like a 
worldview than a text (although even a worldview is the rationalization of a myth): 
This field demands a peculiar attitude: You cannot look directly at the source of light; 
you turn your back to it so that you may see—not the light, but the illuminated things.  
Light is invisible.  So too with the myth—myth here is not the object of discourse, but the 
expression of a sui generis form of consciousness.99  
Francis D‘Sa explains: 
There is a general tendency to reduce consciousness to the Logos, to equate 
consciousness with the Logos.  The underlying presupposition is that whatever we know 
can be thematized, explained and analyzed.  This rests on the belief that there is nothing 
in consciousness which cannot be put in words.  What is overlooked in the process is that 
the consciousness which puts the contents into words itself cannot be put in words.100 
Therefore, when we try to bring this non-rational (or pre-rational) element into the 
rational, we lose it.  In this way, ―the hermeneutic of a myth is no longer the myth, but its 
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logos.‖101  Like the light in the above-cited example, the myth is difficult to define and is 
even, in itself, elusive to reason.  Panikkar tells us, ―The myth is transparent like the light, 
and the mythical story—mythologumenon—is only the form, the garment in which the 
myth happens to be expressed, enwrapped, illumined.‖102  This creates some logical 
difficulties.  As Panikkar notes: 
I hear already the objection that I am contradicting myself by establishing the doctrine 
that we cannot rely on doctrines.  This is not so, on at least two counts.  First, because I 
am not saying that we should not rely on doctrines.  I am affirming that this reliance is 
shaky.103 
 He explains: 
We have a plurality of conflicting doctrines, and so doctrine is no criterion for 
supraindividual truth.104 
Doctrines, the result of rational analysis, are important, but they do not 
completely comprehend the realities that they purport to communicate.  Here, it seems 
also that Panikkar seems to be saying that divergences among human worldviews exist 
based on the human articulation thereof, but that the myths they express are either the 
same or reconcilable.
105
  This is consistent with his insistence that there is a 
cosmotheandric unity that grounds all of reality.  Because it cannot fully comprehend this 
mysterious communion of all, human reason is limited.  However, we should note that 
Panikkar also sees room for a plurality of myths. 
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Continuing his defense of the primacy of mythos, Panikkar follows this first point 
with a second: 
But secondly, I am not contradicting myself because I am not contending that the rational 
aspect of Man should not be rational.  I am affirming that rationality and even the logos 
are not the only aspects of the human being which constitutes its ―essence‖: what Man is.  
Man is also spirit, and the spirit is not subordinated to the logos; Man is also myth, and 
the myth is irreducible to the logos; Man is also body, and body is not reducible to the 
mind.106 
These elements of spirit and reason must coexist and cannot exist without each 
other.  Panikkar points out that the Christian Church has condemned subordinationism of 
this sort from an early time.
107
  However, Western thought follows the paradigm begun 
by Parmenides and expressed up to Husserl.  This paradigm states that there are two 
―ultimate pillars‖ for ―human orientation in the world—thinking (nous) and being 
(on).‖108  This means that ―thinking discovers but also conditions being.‖109  Nonetheless, 
―this paradigm is not universal.‖110  For instance: 
In India, the ultimate polarity, the yin/yang so to speak of the Indian effort at human 
orientation in reality, is not thinking and being, but being and wording.  Or rather, being 
and speaking: being and letting be; being and letting being escape.111 
In this view, ―there is no way to control the flow of reality.  Thinking is not the 
ultimate parameter.  Being is just…explosion!‖112  Thus, reality or existence transcends 
the expression thereof, even including the term ‗being‘ itself.  According to Panikkar, 
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―The myth you live is comprised of the ensemble of contexts you take for granted.‖113  
Therefore, ―myth represents the invisible horizon on which we project our notions of the 
real.‖114  Because of this, our myths make us each unique.115  Thus, mythos is an 
important component of identity, especially because it is at the root of logos: 
The ideology you follow is the demythicized part of the view you have of the world; it is 
the result of the passage from mythos to logos in life and personal reflexion; it is the more 
or less coherent ensemble of ideas that make up critical awareness, i.e. the doctrinal 
system that enables you to locate yourself rationally—ideologically—in the world at a 
particular time, in a particular place.116 
 It is in this context that Panikkar explains the function of symbol.  For Panikkar, 
symbol is ―the conscious passage from mythos to logos.‖117  He explains: 
Symbol here does not mean an epistemic sign, but an ontomythical reality that is 
precisely in the symbolizing.  A symbol is not a symbol of another (‗thing‘), but of itself, 
in the sense of the subjective genitive.  A symbol is the symbol of that which is precisely 
(symbolized) in the symbol, and which, thus, does not exist without its symbol.118 
Thus, religious symbols, for instance, function in this way to move mythos into 
logos with as little loss as possible. One could, for instance, understand sacraments in this 
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manner.
119
 Furthermore, ―the symbol encompasses and constitutively links the two poles 
of the real: the object and the subject.‖120  So, symbols unite (or ‗throw together‘, to use 
the etymology of symbolon) the self and what is not the self.  Symbols, then, play an 
important part in religious traditions by serving as means for the realization of 
cosmotheandric unity.   In this way, symbols function on their own without excessive 
elaboration.  After all, ―a symbol that requires interpretation is no longer a living 
symbol.‖121 
 So, symbols allow humans to touch mythos in a way that ordinary language 
cannot.  This is essential to human life because humans need myth: 
Now man cannot live without myths.  When the primordial myths are demythicized—and 
they are not yet, neither throughout the world nor even completely where they are most 
under attack—Man seeks others.122 
Thus, myths are so important that when they are eradicated through 
demythicization, we need to replace them with other myths.  Panikkar contends that this 
is dangerous.  For instance, he insists that we form our morality based upon myth.  In his 
discussion of the demythologization of the Adam and Eve story, he identifies a problem 
with demythicization: 
When the δαιωόνιον and the πνεσμα disappear, we must explain sin by natural, even 
rational, causes and this amounts to explaining it away.  Sin thereby becomes rational, 
even reasonable; at most it is an error.123 
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To counteract this reduction that takes place through the manufacture of 
replacement myths, Panikkar promotes ‗remythicization‘: 
We do not question the moral values we accept.  And this is ‗why we accept them, 
because we find them ultimate and thus without any further ‗why‘.  Just so, in today‘s 
world there are certain social values we do not discuss: justice, democracy, communal 
well-being, loyalty to one‘s own country and even national integrity, particularly in the 
case of young nations.  These values are rooted in humanity‘s collective consciousness.124 
Collective values such as these are to be defended in order to keep humanity from 
continuing to fall into the dangerous reduction to a self-centered ethos that has begun in 
the post-Enlightenment West.  In this way, if we wish to speak of any kind of ‗universal 
truth‘, mythos brings us much closer to it than logos. Panikkar explains, ―From a myth‘s 
ahistorical point of view, historical facts are only transitory examples—often deceptive 
and always partial—of a reality that is always transhistorical.‖125  The truth of the mythos 
is timeless. 
3.5 Myth and the Anthropological Level of Faith 
Because there is more to reality than that which is graspable by human reason, it 
is essential that humans are able to inculcate and ‗touch‘ this timeless truth.   In 
Panikkar‘s anthropology, it is faith that enables us to do so.  For Panikkar, ―faith is 
understood as that dimension in Man that corresponds to myth.‖126  Because it enables 
people to come in touch the cosmotheandric union of all reality, faith is a constitutive 
component of the humanum.  Because it brings one in touch with the humanum, faith is 
necessary component of one‘s identity.  One must understand oneself as a human if 
he/she is to begin to understand him/herself at all. Panikkar asserts, ―Faith is not a 
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superfluous luxury, but an anthropological dimension of the full human being on 
earth.‖127  Furthermore, Panikkar insists that ―by faith Man is distinguished from other 
beings.‖128  Thus, faith both ―unites‖ and constitutes humanity:129   
 Our thesis maintains that if creaturliness can be said to be simple relation to God, to the 
Source or whatever name we give the foundation of beings, faith is another name for the 
ontological relation to this absolute that characterizes Man, distinguishing him from all 
other creatures.130 
In the West since Descartes, we have seen humanity grounded in reason.  Faith, 
on the contrary, has been seen as something for the chosen few. This view reverses (or at 
least augments) that tendency.  Humanity, which is rational, is also, and more 
importantly, faithful.
131
  Since it is a constitutive element of the humanum, faith cannot 
be lost.  Panikkar asks, ―Does one really lose faith or is it simply an abandoning of 
certain beliefs?‖132 
 In this way, Panikkar distinguishes between faith and beliefs.  He states, ―Belief 
articulates the myth in which we believe without ‗believing‘ that we believe in it.‖133  It 
seems that by the term ‗in‘, Panikkar means ‗within‘.  We do not ‗believe‘ that we 
‗believe in‘ the myth because ‗belief‘ is an act of reason, logos.  However, belief is 
distinct from knowledge: 
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‗I believe in God‘, for instance is a cognitive statement when it stands for the expression 
of the act of believing (former case) and is a real belief only when I do not know what 
God is, i.e., when I do not know God as the object of my belief (latter case).  If you ask 
me if I believe in God, I cannot possibly respond, except when giving a rhetorical answer 
to a rhetorical question.  Otherwise, I simply do not know what you are asking: I do not 
know what you mean by ‗God‘ and so cannot answer whether I believe in this ‗God‘.  
The question about God either destroys itself because it does not know what it is asking 
for or dissolves the God we are asking about into something that is no longer God, but a 
sheer idol.  The God of belief is a symbol but not a concept.  In a way we believe only 
(what we ‗believe‘ to be) the unquestionable.134 
  This does not mean, however, that belief and knowledge exist in a relationship of 
superiority of one to the other: 
The fact that the believed is not the known does not subordinate the one to the other, but 
it relates knowledge and belief as different forms of consciousness without allowing the 
reduction of awareness to mere knowing (of object) or where believing (in myths).  This 
fact opens up an image of Man irreducible to mere logos or to sheer mythos.135 
Unlike knowledge, a belief is ―a particular crystallization of faith.‖136  The 
distinction between the two can be considered under the categories of particularity and 
universality: 
I consider faith, on the other hand, a universal phenomenon, a constitutive dimension of 
man and, we might add, his existential openness to the transcendent, that is, if we agree 
not necessarily to interpret this term along purely ontological lines.  If faith is a human 
dimension, it does not allow of any plurality.137 
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While commenting on Panikkar, Jacques Dupuis points to this distinction.  He 
explains that while faith is "a constitutive element of the human person" which indicates 
a basic religious experience at the heart of the humanum, belief is the particular 
"expression" of this in a situation.
138
  Dupuis points out that the content of faith is "the 
Mystery" or what Panikkar calls the "cosmotheandric reality."
139
  The content of beliefs, 
on the other hand, according to Dupuis, is comprised of the religious myths that 
concretely express faith.
140
  As Dupuis explains, it is these different beliefs that give us 
different religions.  However, because all true religious traditions share this underlying 
faith, ―all of these myths have equal value.‖141  Varghese Manimala elaborates: 
The life of religions may be summarized in a single word: belief.  Religion is a matter of 
belief, and belief is the overarching mythos that makes possible the various 
manifestations that constitute religion.  Therefore dialogue of religions must be a 
dialogue of beliefs; dialogue originates from belief and is about belief.142 
Thus, the religions of the world are comprised of beliefs, which are distinct from, 
yet not unrelated to, this anthropological level of faith.  Manimala explains, ―In 
philosophical terminology faith may be called an existential openness toward 
transcendence or simply as existential openness.‖143  This openness we call faith pulls us 
to constantly reach farther towards a ―plus ultra.‖144  Thus, it enables humanity to strive 
towards transcendence.  Faith pulls the individual out of isolation.  So, as Manimala 
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asserts, faith ―is that which makes him/her to go beyond (transcendence) and establish 
relationship.  Hence a human being is a relational being.‖145 
Humanity expresses this relationality of faith in belief.   Belief flows from faith.  
Panikkar says, ―The particular act of faith by which man responds to his faith is what I 
would like to call belief.‖146  Nonetheless, the two remain distinct yet interdependent.  
Panikkar explains, "Faith cannot be equated with belief, but faith always needs a belief to 
be faith.  Belief is not faith, but it must convey faith.  A disembodied faith is not faith."
147
  
He continues, "Faith finds expression in belief, and through it Men normally arrive at 
faith."
148
 Thus, the two have a symbiotic relationship.  They need each other and do not 
exist independently. 
Panikkar is not unique in positing such a distinction between belief and faith.  For 
instance, Roger Haight makes a similar point. Haight declares, "Faith in its primary sense 
is an intentional human response, reaction, act, or pervasive and operative attitude."
149
  
Like Panikkar, Haight insists that ―faith is not knowledge.‖150 Nonetheless, ―faith is 
cognitive.‖151  Haight draws this conclusion because the object of faith is transcendent 
and is therefore something that cannot be grasped by reason.  Haight, like Panikkar, 
maintains that beliefs express faith, but are distinct from faith.
152
  He explains, "Beliefs 
may change while faith at its deepest level remains constant, even as it is modified."
153
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However, what is distinct, or at least characteristic, for Panikkar‘s schema is that 
faith is one, that is, faith is one across all human boundaries.  This enables faith to be an 
essential component of one‘s identity, or at least of human identity, for Panikkar.  
Panikkar‘s view is different from Haight‘s in that, for Panikkar faith is not an act of 
cognition, but an anthropological stratum.  Therefore, because it is an aspect of the 
humanum, it is something that all humans share.  Panikkar and Haight provide similar 
descriptions of beliefs, yet their concepts of faith diverge slightly.  For Haight, belief is 
an act of rational analysis, while faith is an act of trust.  For Panikkar, beliefs are rooted 
in the aspect of the humanum known as faith and are rational crystallizations thereof.  It 
seems that Panikkar envisions faith as something that precedes and inspires action.  Thus, 
Panikkar‘s analysis seems to allow for a slightly more organic relationship between the 
two. 
Therefore, it is important to remember that for Panikkar, while beliefs vary across 
personal, communal, cultural, religious, temporal, etc. boundaries, faith remains constant: 
When cultural change or an encounter between religions robs the notions hitherto bound 
up with faith of their solidity and unmistakable correspondence to faith, naturally a crisis 
erupts.  But this is a crisis of belief, not faith.  Undoubtedly the bond between the two is 
intimate; it is in fact constitutive, since thought itself requires language, and belief is the 
language of faith.  Hence what begins as a crisis of belief turns into a crisis of faith, as a 
rule due to the intransigence of those who will tolerate no change because they do not 
distinguish between faith and belief.154 
This, however, does not mean that belief is the mere clothing of faith.  Against 
such a claim, Panikkar explains, "I cannot strip off my belief—insofar as it is a real 
belief, i.e., insofar as I believe in 'it' (or more simply said, I believe)-without touching and 
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even transforming my faith."
155
  Thus, the dynamic between faith and belief is not simply 
one-way.  While belief flows out of faith, the anthropological stratum of faith is 
something that is living.  It can be strengthened or weakened.  Furthermore, there is a 
similar symbiosis between belief and worship. For Panikkar, ―worship is an act giving 
expression to a belief.‖156  This expression is a necessary component in this relationship 
because it allows belief to be articulated; it gives belief an experiential outlet. 
In our first chapter we saw that, in Panikkar‘s Trinitarian schema, the Father does 
not have existence without the Son.  Something similar can be said about the relationship 
between faith and belief.  Panikkar asserts that "faith without belief does not exist—not 
for those who believe."
157
  Thus, faith, like the Father (or Brahman), is unutterable, 
outside the grasp of language.  Beliefs, rather, bring this unutterable into the reach of 
language and human cognition.  This explains the diversity of religious traditions in 
human history.  Thus, as Panikkar points out, there is a certain ‗relativity‘ in the beliefs 
comprising each of these traditions.  However: 
The relativity of beliefs does not mean their relativism.  Our human task is to establish a 
religious dialogue that, although it transcends the logos-and belief-does not neglect or 
ignore them.158 
Thus, there is something ‗more than‘ reason that several religious traditions 
share.
159
  Nonetheless, that does not mean that this ‗something‘ is unreasonable either.  
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For Panikkar, while beliefs are not interchangeable, they are "generally equivalent" 
because they have the same function: expressing human faith.
160
  To use a concept we 
visited in our first chapter, they are homological.  This homology enables what Panikkar 
calls "cross-fertilization," that is, the mutual enrichment that takes place when two or 
more traditions meet.
161
  Because of this, Panikkar declares, ―Faith is not a religion, but 
stands at the basis of all religion.‖162 
 Varghese Manimala elaborates on Panikkar‘s anthropology by saying, ―As 
historical, human being stands in a twofold openness: openness to other human beings 
(horizontal or immanent openness) and openness to the Transcendent.‖163  Manimala 
points out that this second openness to the Transcendent is what Panikkar calls ―Faith.‖164  
He also describes the elusiveness of this anthropological stratum of faith: 
Authentic faith, so it seems, cannot question itself.  Real faith is always unsatisfied with 
the answer; it is always a question so virgin that it does not even know there is an answer.  
Hence faith is a myth.165 
But, we cannot take cognizance of the myth or else it is gone.
166
  He continues: 
Mythic faith is good faith, but good faith does not recognize itself as mythic, nor will it 
claim to be.  Myth is not and cannot be the object of faith because it is by its very 
constitution the vehicle of faith.167 
Thus faith is animated by myth and expressed by belief.  While reflecting on 
Panikkar‘s insistence that faith is a fundamental religious dimension distinct from beliefs, 
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Jyri Komulainen uncovers an important aspect of Panikkar‘s unique brand of 
pluralism.
168
  He points out, ―Panikkar understands that language is one of the human 
invariants.‖169  By this, he means that there is a ―primordial language‖ hidden in spoken 
languages.
170
 Thus, he points out, ―A universal theory of religion would not be dissimilar 
to a universal language, which he discounts.‖171  Thus, the diversity of beliefs is to be 
expected, just as the diversity of language is to be expected.  However, the existence of 
beliefs in every human setting, like the existence of language in every human setting is 
also to be expected.  There is something universal that ‗needs‘ particular expression: 
faith.  At one‘s deepest core, identity flows from faith because openness to the 
transcendent is a basic characteristic of humanity itself. 
This universal ‗something‘ makes human beings what they are, it mediates human 
identity: 
 The Openness of faith is a constitutive openness.  It cannot be closed; it is infinite, 
neither limited nor limitable.  Faith is like a hole in the human being that is never filled, 
saturated, or turned into a kind of substantivity that would represent the supreme religious 
blasphemy and sever Man from any relation with the infinite.  Through this hole he 
reaches the infinite (cf. śūnyatā).172 
For Panikkar the human being (Panikkar uses the term ‗Man‘) ―is an inquiring 
being who desires, seeks, questions.‖173  This quest is an endless searching: 
The essence of faith seems to me to lie in the question rather than in the answer, in the 
inquisitive stance, in the desire rather than in the concrete response one gives.174 
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He continues by insisting that we are not isolated in this quest: 
Everybody ‗has‘ faith, every human being is endowed with this constitutive dimension; 
but no one is forced to live ex fide, out of faith or from faith.175 
 Thus, for Panikkar, the human being (or ‗Man‘) is homo quaerens.  To reprise a 
theme we introduced in our first chapter, Panikkar here echoes Augustine.  In one of the 
most famous phrases from his Confessions, Augustine begins his recollection by praying, 
―Thou movest us to delight in praising Thee; for Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and 
our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee.‖176  However, since God always 
transcends our grasp, the search always continues, even as ‗rest‘ in union with the divine.  
To have faith, then, is not to have all of the answers.  Rather, to have faith is to be ever 
open to transcendence.  This openness is something found in each of us that we are each 
capable of cultivating.  The restless search that Augustine describes, and to which 
Panikkar attests, is not simply a rational search for an infinite divine principle.  Rather, it 
is an existential search; it comes from the ‗heart‘ and affects the human being at his/her 
core.  It is the search for identity.  Faith, then, is a foundational component of the 
humanum; the human being is a being that is capable of faith. 
 Some may contend that this universalization of faith may be problematic.  After 
all, if faith is said to be everywhere, is there anything distinct about the so-called 
‗believer‘?  In many ways, this is the question of the relationship between the Church and 
the world.  We will elaborate on this in detail in both our fourth and fifth chapter.  
However, at this juncture, it may be helpful to point to Panikkar‘s reflection on 
secularization.  Panikkar, in his love for linguistics, takes an etymological approach, 
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saying, ―The saeculum is not simply the world, and certainly not the kosmos, but rather 
its temporal aspect: the aiôn.‖177  He continues, 
 ―Secular means, therefore, the temporal world, the temporal aspect of reality.‖178  
Therefore, he deduces, ―In a word, the process of secularization is connected with ever 
increasing importance being given to time and the temporal.‖179  For Panikkar, the 
purpose of secularization is not to force the sacred to yield to the profane and mundane, 
as many read it.  Rather, it is an invitation to uncover the sacred within the profane and 
mundane.  For this reason, he tells us that ―the sacred quality of secularism‖ is ―emerging 
in our days.‖180  He elaborates: 
In other words, what seems to be unique in the human constellation of the present kairos 
is the disruption of the equation sacred-non-temporal together with the positive value so 
far attached to it.  The temporal is seen today as positive and, in a way, sacred.181 
 Thus, faith, rather than pointing exclusively to particular contexts or, on the other 
extreme, discarding them altogether, animates these particular contexts and directs them 
to the underlying communion of all reality.  Faith, then, as a stratum of the humanum, 
enables human beings to realize this communion.  Faith points to the cosmotheandric 
unity of all reality.  Faith is an essential component of identity.  And, as we have seen, 
and will continue to see, identity is a complex reality. 
3.6 A Philosophical Approach to Identity: Paul Ricoeur 
Let us take a moment, then, to enhance Panikkar‘s reflections on identity with two 
contemporary approaches: one from the philosophical world and another from post-
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colonial thought.  Let us begin with Paul Ricoeur.   Ricoeur insists that personal identity 
―can be articulated only in the temporal dimension of human existence.‖182  Interestingly, 
Ricoeur sees the issue of identity as a juncture at which the Continental and Anglo-
American Schools of philosophical thought cross paths.
183
  To begin his reflection, 
Ricoeur distinguishes between two uses of the term ‗identity‘.  Identity can be understood 
under concept of ‗sameness‘, exhibited in the use of Latin idem.  However, identity can 
also be understood under the concept of ‗selfhood‘, following the Latin ipse.184  The two 
uses of ‗identity‘ are not interchangeable.  Ricoeur asserts, ―Selfhood, I have repeatedly 
affirmed, is not sameness.‖185 
According to Ricoeur, the question of personal identity circulates around the 
question of ―permanence in time.‖186  Ricoeur begins by pointing out that idem-identity is 
typically the way analytic philosophers approach the question of personal identity.  For 
thinkers who take this approach, relationality is the key to understanding identity.  
Ricoeur points out, ―Sameness is a concept of relation and a relation of relations.‖187  
Relationally-speaking, there are different aspects of idem-identity.  For instance, an 
important element of idem-identity is numerical identity.  In other words, there is one 
thing that is identical to itself.
188
  Another element of idem-identity is qualitative identity, 
in which there can be ―substitution without semantic loss, salva veritate.‖189  Amid 
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substitution, however, it is essential that there is uninterrupted continuity.
190
  The issue of 
permanence in time underlies this similitude and continuity.
191
  To illustrate this, Ricoeur 
points to a tool whose component parts are all gradually replaced over time.  Even though 
all of its components are different than they once were, the tool is the same tool.
192
  One 
could also point to the fact that all the cells in the human body gradually regenerate over 
time in such a way that eventually the ‗stuff‘ of our bodies is completely different than it 
once was, yet they are still the same bodies.  So, there is a relational character to identity, 
which is shown by the idea of structure.  As structure remains, identity is not lost.  But 
once the underlying structure changes the identity of sameness is no more.  Once one of 
the old components of the tool is removed from the tool, it is no longer identical to it.  
Once a cell in the human body dies and is lost, it is no longer part of the body. 
With this in mind, Ricoeur concludes, ―The entire problematic of personal 
identity will revolve around this search for a relational invariant, giving it the strong 
signification of permanence in time.‖193  This leads him to ask the central question of his 
reflection: 
Does the selfhood of the self imply a form of permanence in time which is not reducible 
to the determination of a substratum, not even in the relational sense which Kant assigns 
to the category of substance; in short, is there a form of permanence in time which is not 
simply the schema of the category of substance?194 
In other words: 
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Is there a form of permanence in time which can be connected to the question ―who?‖ 
inasmuch as it is irreducible to the question of ―what?‖?  Is there a form of permanence in 
time that is a reply to the question ―Who am I?‖?195 
What Ricoeur is asking here is whether we must reify the self to get at the 
permanence in time, which we call ‗identity‘.  Towards this end, Ricoeur finds two 
commonly used expressions or concepts that show two ‗non-substantial‘ models of 
permanence in time: ―character‖ and ―keeping one‘s word.‖196  He describes his goal in 
the following manner: 
The polarity I am going to examine suggests an intervention of narrative identity in the 
conceptual constitution of personal identity in the manner of a specific mediator between 
the pole of character, where idem and ipse tend to coincide, and the pole of self- 
maintenance, where selfhood frees itself from sameness.197 
At the outset of his reflection on character, Ricoeur defines ‗character‘, saying, 
―By ‗character‘ I understand the set of distinctive marks which permit the reidentification 
of a human individual as being the same.‖198  Character gives ―numerical identity and 
qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity and permanence in time.‖199  After 
discussing the variety of forms the term ‗character‘ has taken in his own thought, Ricoeur 
concludes, ―Character, I would say today, designates the set of lasting dispositions by 
which a person is recognized.‖200  It is important to note that for Ricoeur, ipse and idem 
are indistinguishable here.
201
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Ricoeur uses the concept of habit to discuss the temporal dimensions of character, 
pointing out that there are two ‗valences‘ of habit: ‗being formed‘ and ‗already 
possessed‘.202  Because of this temporal aspect of character, ―habit gives a history of 
character, but this is a history in which sedimentation tends to cover over the innovation 
which preceded it.‖203  So, it has temporal significance in being acquired, but this 
temporality is masked by the assessment that a habit has been acquired.  The term 
sedimentation here denotes a kind of ‗layering‘ of character.  It is almost an archeological 
image.  One must dig to find the past where character was built.  And it is difficult to see 
it as it is being built and set in stone.  Rather, it is much easier to see it ‗after the fact‘, as 
an artifact.  This ‗sedimentation‘ is essential for Ricoeur: 
It is this sedimentation which confers on character the sort of permanence in time that I 
am interpreting here as the overlapping of ipse by idem.  This overlapping, however, does 
not abolish the difference separating the two problematics: precisely as second nature, my 
character is me, myself, ipse; but this ipse announces itself as idem.204 
Thus, the habit becomes a ―trait‖ or a ―character trait‖ by which one is 
identified.
205
  In addition to these habits, there are also ―acquired identifications‖ that 
allows ―the other to enter into the composition of the same.‖206  Ricoeur explains: 
To a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made up of these 
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the 
community recognizes itself.207 
Thus, the identity of persons within community is made up of shared traits by 
which both outsiders and insiders can identify members of the community.  For instance, 
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heroes and values connect us with ―a ‗cause‘ above our own survival.‖208  This brings an 
aspect of loyalty and fidelity into one‘s character.209  Thus, as we have seen, Ricoeur‘s 
two aspects of identity are ultimately compatible: 
Here the two poles of identity accord with one another.  This proves that one cannot think 
the idem of the person through without considering the ipse, even when one entirely 
covers over the other.210 
This is true because character traits require stability.
211
  And: 
By means of this stability, borrowed from acquired habits and identifications—in other 
words, from dispositions—character assures at once numerical identity, qualitative 
identity, uninterrupted continuity across change, and finally, permanence in time which 
defines sameness.212 
Therefore, ―character is truly the ‗what‘ of the ‗who.‘‖213  Thus, there is an aspect 
of both idem- and ipse-identity at work here.  However, ipse and idem are not completely 
reducible to on another.
214
  This meeting of sameness and selfness in character formation 
points to history: 
The dialect of innovation and sedimentation, underlying the acquisition of a habit, and 
the equally rich dialectic of otherness and internalization, underlying the process of 
identification, are there to remind us that character has a history which it has contracted, 
one might say, in the twofold sense of the word ―contraction‖: abbreviation and 
affection.215 
Thus the formation of character requires narrative because character is formed 
over time 
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So, personal identity requires narrative identity.
216
  This brings Ricoeur to the model of 
‗keeping one‘s word‘.217  As we mentioned above, faithfulness to one‘s word is Ricoeur‘s 
other model for discussing permanence in time.  He explains the significance of this act 
for identity: 
Keeping one‘s word expresses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as character 
was, within the dimension of something in general but solely within the dimension of 
―who?‖218 
In other words, the action of keeping a promise requires a ‗who‘, a subject to keep 
this promise, an object of accountability. Ricoeur points out that this phenomenon 
presumes relationality, insisting, ―The continuity of character is one thing, the constancy 
of friendship is quite another.‖219  Thus, ―an interval of sense‖ is opened up between the 
poles of the ‗consistency‘ of character and ‗constancy‘ of self presumed in the promise.220  
Narrative fills this space by ‗oscillating‘ between the two limits of the poles.  Thus, one 
cannot have personal identity without narrative identity, which by combining sameness 
and selfness, gives permanence in time to the subject. 
Much like Panikkar‘s reflections on identity visited above, Ricoeur gives us a 
model of identity that is dipolar.  Ricoeur‘s poles, sameness and selfness are similar to 
Panikkar‘s poles, self and others.  While Panikkar‘s reflections on identity cast identity as 
an oscillation between self-designation and the appraisal of others (the community),  
Ricoeur‘s reflections on the same topic see personal identity as bound up with narrative 
identity, which represents a similar oscillation between sameness and self-possession.  
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Both sets of poles may be (cautiously) seen by the classical epistemological terms of 
subject (self) and object (sameness, communal acceptance), or better, subjectivity and 
objectification.  Both thinkers tell us that identity lies somewhere between these two 
poles.  It is essential to note that, because of this, both descriptions of identity are 
necessarily imprecise because of the irreducibility of one‘s identity to a mere concept 
(objectification).   
Ricoeur‘s main point is to demonstrate that through the question ‗who?‘ identity 
‗resists‘ reduction to sameness, a category of the question ‗what?‘.  Thus, he avoids 
reducing the living subject to an impersonal description.  While there is no completely 
neutral observation in identity, we do need both moments of dispossession and self-
possession to maintain selfhood.
221
  Therefore, answers to the questions ‗who‘ and ‗what‘ 
are both necessary components of identity.  For Ricoeur, identity is richly complex and 
cannot be reduced to a mere object.  The self cannot be reified and can only be found 
through narrative identity. 
Therefore, for Ricoeur, we need both idem and ipse identity for complete 
selfhood.  We can roughly tie idem-identity to the ‗Western‘ view of identity that 
Panikkar connects with the law of non-contradiction.  Ipse-identity may be closer to the 
‗Eastern‘ sense of identity as union, although it is distinct.  This element of identity is 
perhaps best understood as the subjectivity that makes this union (and communion) with 
others possible.  Furthermore, without this narrative aspect of identity, one cannot have 
the ability to learn and inculcate knowledge, both through logos or mythos.  Ricoeur 
points out that both aspects (idem and ipse) are necessary parts of the whole of identity, 
which can only be approached in the oscillation between these poles found in narrative 
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identity.  Perhaps, using Panikkar‘s East-West distinction, we can assert that both 
approaches are necessary.  After all, to generate meaning in the world, we must use the 
law of non-contradiction to distinguish between things.  For instance, Panikkar would not 
be able to discuss the mystical union of cosmotheandrism if there were not three distinct 
‗things‘ to unite.  This is the distinction pole of the unity-in-distinction that is the 
hallmark of Trinitarian thought.  The distinction-identity of the West makes the unity-
identity of the East possible and vice versa. 
3.7 Postcolonialism and Identity: Homi K. Bhabha 
Let us now turn to bring another approach to identity in dialogue with that of 
Panikkar: that of Postcolonialism.  Panikkar himself acknowledges coming from a 
postcolonial context.  For instance, he describes his own context as a ―neocolonialistic‖ 
situation.
222
  One of the best known writers in postcolonial thought is Homi K. Bhabha.  
Bhabha describes the term ‗postcolonial‘ as follows: 
If the jargon of our times—postmodernity, postcoloniality, postfeminism—has any 
meaning at all, it does not lie in the popular use of the ‗post‘ to indicate sequentiality—
after-feminism; or polarity—anti-modernism.  These terms that insistently gesture to the 
beyond, only embody its restless and revisionary energy if they transform the present into 
an expanded and ex-centric site of experience and empowerment.223 
In this way, just as the term ‗postmodern‘ points ‗beyond‘ modernity, so too does 
the term ‗postcolonial‘ point beyond the oppressive state of colonialism.  Postcolonialism 
goes beyond oppression to empowerment.  However, the postcolonial state of culture is 
steeped in ambiguity.  Just as after modernism, we cannot return to a state of premodern 
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naïveté, so too postcolonial culture cannot return to precolonial ‗native‘ culture.224  
Bhabha is enamored with the idea of ‗boundaries‘, which in the postcolonial milieu are 
often transgressed.  Following Heidegger, Bhabha describes a boundary as the place 
where ―something begins its presencing.‖225  So boundaries are, in a sense, generative, 
not limiting.  Bhabha poignantly uses the term ―hybridity‖ to refer to identity in cultures 
that find themselves in a postcolonial context.
226
  A ‗hybrid‘ is a new combination of 
things that belongs to neither of the categories from which it has sprung.  It is almost a 
Hegelian concept, except that it makes no claim to either superiority and progress or 
inferiority and regress.  Rather, it is simply different.  Postcolonial identity is neither that 
of the natives nor that of the oppressors, but is, rather, a tertium quid, a ‗third thing‘.  So, 
for instance, those in postcolonial India do not fit perfectly into the category of their 
Indian ancestors nor their British colonizers.  Rather, they are forever changed and 
impacted by the British occupation of the past.  Thus, the experience of ‗hybridity‘ is not 
necessarily a positive experience.  Another example can be in the experience of a person 
taken into slavery, whose identity has been forever forcibly altered.  For this reason, 
many descendents of slaves in North America cannot trace their family history back to 
their ancestor‘s native lands, but only back to the slave trade.  In the same way, the 
postcolonial has been forced into the ‗beyond‘ never to return to the ‗before‘.  Bhabha 
describes this situation: 
Being in the ‗beyond‘, then, is to inhabit an intervening space, as any dictionary will tell 
you.  But to dwell ‗in the beyond‘ is also, as I have shown, to be part of a revisionary 
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time, a return to the present to redescribe our cultural contemporaneity; to reinscribe our 
human, historic commonality; to touch the future on its hither side.227 
Bhabha describes this experience of displacement as ‗unhomeliness‘, a constant, 
lingering sensation of ‗not belonging‘.228  According to Bhabha, there is a ―third Space‖ 
or a new home, which is opened up by the ‗not this, not that‘ experience of hybridity.229  
To explore this more deeply, Bhabha follows the thought of Frantz Fanon.
230
  Fanon‘s 
thought is the product of dealing with racial division and identity as a psychoanalyst in 
French Algeria.
231
  In the postcolonial setting, Bhabha summarizes: 
Forms of social and psychic alienation and aggression—madness, self-hate, treason, 
violence—can never be acknowledged as determinate and constitute conditions of civil 
authority or as the ambivalent effects of the social instinct itself.232 
Rather, they are ignored and ―explained away.‖233  Thus, in many ways, one 
simply continues to reinforce the isolation and alienation of oppression within one‘s own 
psyche, without acknowledging its roots.  Bhabha illustrates this phenomenon of self-
splitting as follows: 
The representative figure of such a perversion, I want to suggest, is the image of post-
Enlightenment man tethered to, not confronted by, his dark reflection, the shadow of 
colonized man, that splits his presence, distorts his outline, breaches his boundaries, 
repeats his action at a distance, disturbs and divides the very time of his being.234 
Thus, identity, in a post-colonial context, is characterized by a kind of oscillation 
between the past and the present.  With regard to identity, Bhabha identifies three 
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conditions of the ―process of identification‖ that is conditioned by the ―analytic of 
desire.‖235  First, ―to exist is to be called into being in relation to an otherness, its look or 
locus.‖236  He explains: 
It is always in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is articulated: the 
phantasmic space of possession that no one subject can singly or fixedly occupy, and 
therefore permits the dream of the inversion of roles.237 
In other words, one identifies oneself by what one thinks one has that the other 
wants.  Secondly, ―the very place of identification, caught in the tension of demand and 
desire, is a space of splitting.‖238  This is the ‗difference‘ that sets one apart from the 
‗different‘.239  This would be exemplified by one of the ‗colonizers‘ declaring that one of 
the ‗colonized‘ is one of ‗us‘ and not one of ‗them‘ because he/she is a doctor or an 
intellectual, etc., which makes him/her different from ‗them‘ and one of ‗us‘.240  Bhabha 
explains: 
It is precisely in that ambivalent use of ‗different‘—to be different from those that are 
different makes you the same—that the Unconscious speaks of the form of otherness, the 
tethered shadow of deferral and displacement.  It is not the colonialist Self or the 
colonized Other, but the disturbing distance in-between that constitutes the figure of 
colonial otherness—the white man‘s artifice inscribed on the black man‘s body.241 
Thus, identity becomes severed from itself.  Thirdly, Bhabha points out that ―the 
question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-
fulfilling prophecy—it is always the production of an image of identity and the 
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transformation of the subject in assuming that image.‖242  So, identification ―is always the 
return of an image of identity that bears the mark of splitting in the Other place from 
which it comes.‖243  In this way, identification changes that which it identifies.  Thus, for 
Bhabha, the act of identification can be seen as an irreversible act of violence imposed on 
the Other from without. 
Bhabha sets out to examine the parameters of identification.  He points out, ―In 
the postcolonial text the problem of identity returns as a persistent questioning of the 
frame, the space of representation, where the image…is confronted with its difference, its 
Other.‖244  In order to analyze this ‗frame‘ of identity, following Roland Barthes, Bhabha 
defines identity as a ‗symbolic sign‘ consisting of an image based on resemblance.245  
Thus, resemblance marks the ―space‖ where this image of identity is ―inscribed.‖246  This 
categorization of identity based on resemblance is necessarily reductive.  It tames or 
ignores the uniqueness inherent in each individual and reduces it to categories like ‗us‘ 
and ‗them‘.  Therefore: 
Each time the encounter with identity occurs at the point at which something exceeds the 
frame of the image, it eludes the eye, evacuates the self as site of identity and autonomy 
and—most important—leaves a resistant trace, a stain of the subject, a sign of 
resistance.247 
Because of this, for instance, the complete image of the Other is invisible to the 
Western gaze.
248
 It is seen only as absence.  This is the postcolonial experience.  The 
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struggle inherent in this experience is characterized by the refusal to circumscribe identity 
to the categories imposed upon it.  Thus, Bhabha speaks of ‗double inscriptions‘:249 
The desire for the Other is doubled by the desire in language, which splits the difference 
between Self and Other so that both positions are partial; neither is sufficient unto itself.  
As I have just shown in the portrait of the missing person, the very question of 
identification only emerges in-between disavowal and designation.250 
Thus, identity is elusive and always escapes the categories imposed on it, even the 
categories of self and other.  One cannot say the Other is the Same, yet one can also 
recognize similarities that prevent the radicalization of alterity.  Because of this, Bhabha 
insists that ―identity is never a priori, nor a finished product; it is only ever the 
problematic process of access to an image of totality.‖251  There is always ‗more‘ that can 
never be completely accounted for conceptually.  These concepts and categories are at 
best only relatively adequate (and at worst violently oppressive).   Bhabha distinguishes 
between the image perceived in identification and identity itself, which is the cause of 
this splitting of the subject: 
For the image—as point of identification—marks the site of an ambivalence.   Its 
representation is always spatially split—it makes present something that is absent—and 
temporally deferred: it is the representation of a time that is always elsewhere, a 
repetition.252 
 In other words, the ‗image‘ or appearance of identity derives its efficaciousness 
from reference to other images.    In this way, identity is formed by locating the 
individual within, or, more precisely, between these other images.  Thus, this image is an 
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―appurtenance to authority and identity.‖253  Thus, true identity is distinct from identity 
perceived from without through ‗identification‘.  Because of this, true identity always 
eludes the grasp of identification.  Bhabha explains that for Fanon: 
The Other must be seen as the necessary negation of a primordial identity—cultural or 
psychic—that introduces the system of differentiation which enables the cultural to be 
signified as a linguistic, symbolic, historic reality.254 
So, this system of negation and splitting is thus inculcated into the subject‘s own 
self-identification.  The subject identifies him/herself within the system of identification 
given.  This leaves him/her with a sense of ambiguity because of his or her ‗not this/not 
that‘ status.  Thus, identification always points to ―a lack.‖255  In other words, 
identification always fails to completely do what it sets out to do.  The identified always 
eludes the grasp of the identifier, even if the identifier is oneself.  So, identification (and 
self-identification) is a process that is never complete because of this doubling or splitting 
the subject.
256
 
Thus, one is left in the aforementioned state of ‗hybridity‘: 
The subaltern or metonymic are neither empty nor full, neither part nor whole.  Their 
compensatory and vicarious processes of signification are a spur to social translation, the 
production of something else besides which is not only the cut or gap of the subject but 
also the intercut across social sites and disciplines.  This hybridity initiates the project of 
political thinking by continually facing it with the strategic and the contingent, with the 
countervailing thought of its own ‗unthought‘.257 
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Thus, in this experience of hybridity, there is an element of resistance.  Bhabha 
insists that the identity of the person living as a postcolonial citizen is somewhere 
between the oppressor and oppressed.  The oppressed has taken on the language, 
mannerisms, dress, and concepts of the oppressors and the neat categories of the 
identification of the past are no longer adequate, if they ever were.  Once this inadequacy 
of identification is uncovered, the oppressed must re-envision their identity.  However, 
this must be done with caution.  Bhabha insists, ―What must be left an open question is 
how we are to rethink ourselves once we have undermined the immediacy and autonomy 
of self-consciousness.‖258  This question must ‗remain open‘ in order to avoid setting up 
new and additional hegemonic structures that can become just as oppressive as the old 
ones. 
The question we must ask in order to bring Bhabha‘s ideas into dialogue those 
Panikkar is whether hybridity is a peculiar experience of the subaltern.  In a sense, we can 
say each individual, regardless of his or her context, has an identity that is not reducible 
to the prevailing categories of that context.  However, this identity is conditioned by 
those categories.  Consequently, each individual stands in a state of ‗hybridity‘, always 
eluding the confines of identification.  This form of hybridity, however, may not 
necessarily be the result of a condition of oppression and may not necessarily be a 
‗negative‘ experience. 
Bhabha‘s approach reflects a dynamic similar to the self/community dynamic of 
identity seen in Panikkar‘s reflections above.  For Bhabha, the postcolonial identity is 
characterized by the tension between hegemonic categories.  Panikkar, as we have seen, 
believes there is a similar tension between one‘s identification of oneself and the 
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community‘s assessment of one.  Bhabha‘s thought can enhance this understanding first 
by underscoring the ambiguity of identity, but also by demonstrating that this ambiguity 
is due to the inherent limitations of the categories being used.  Panikkar is quite 
comfortable in the world of ambiguity (or rather with the ambiguity of the world):  
Ecumenical ecumenism does not mean cloudy universalism or indiscriminate syncretism; 
nor a narrow, crude particularism or barren, fanatical individualism.  Instead it attempts a 
happy blending—which I would make bold to call androgynous before calling it 
theandric—of these two poles, the universal and the concrete, which set up the tension in 
every creature.259 
 Bhabha also adds an element to this tension articulated by Panikkar.  As we have 
mentioned, in the phenomenon of self-identification, one‘s identity, as one sees it, is 
conditioned by the categories one has at his/her disposal with which to identify oneself.  
So, one is either ‗this‘ or ‗that‘, ‗one of us‘ or ‗one of them‘.  The reality that is identity, 
Bhabha insists, transcends this categorization.  So, even one‘s own self-appraisal is a 
reflection of the structures imposed by the community, which could be the local 
community or the global community, oppressive or benign.  Regardless, in reality, neither 
the assessment of self, nor the assessment of others, nor some combination of the two 
takes place without an element of reduction.  Thus, it is necessary to acknowledge 
‗hybridity‘ to avoid further reduction.  This seems to reflect well Panikkar‘s emphasis on 
the ‗Eastern‘ approach to identity based on union over the ‗Western‘ approach to identity 
based upon non-contradiction. 
3.8 Conclusion 
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As we have seen, identity is an essential element of Panikkar‘s thought.  In this 
regard, he favors an ‗Eastern‘ conception of identity as based upon unity over a 
‗Western‘ conception of identity based upon differentiation.  Thus, identity, for Panikkar 
is clearest in that with which one unites oneself.  As we shall see, this gives direction to 
Panikkar‘s emphasis on cosmotheandrism.  We see a similar dipolar dynamic at work in 
Paul Ricoeur‘s reflections on identity.  Ricoeur notes the tension between what he calls 
idem identity (sameness) and ipse identity (selfhood; narrative identity).  By using these 
categories, Ricoeur helps us to see that both of these elements are necessary components 
of human identity.  While the categories of sameness and differentiation are important, 
there is also a unifying narrative identity that unites the subject over time and, we might 
add, allows one to be united to others. 
Panikkar also emphasizes the necessity of both individual self-designation and 
communal acceptance in the determination of identity.  Identity is neither found in 
isolation nor without one‘s presence.  In this regard, Homi K. Bhabha‘s reflections on 
‗hybridity‘ and identity help to show us that the distinction between these two poles may 
not be as easy to determine as one may at first think.  For Panikkar too, this phenomenon 
is more complex than it may at first appear.  The human person finds his or her true 
identity only at the deepest level of his or her subjectivity.  For Panikkar, this level of 
faith corresponds with mythos, which is fuller than and prior to logos.  Thus, whenever 
one attempts to clearly delineate identity (obviously using reason, logos), one is 
necessarily carrying out an exercise in which some of the ‗content‘ is lost. 
In our next chapter, we will continue our reflection upon ‗identity‘ in Raimon 
Panikkar‘s thought.  However, we will concretely apply this concept.  We will 
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particularly focus on the identity of Christ and Christian identity.  Through our 
examination of these two interrelated concepts, we will see how the concept of identity 
that we have just visited is applied in Panikkar‘s theology.  We will also examine the 
connection between Panikkar‘s reflections on identity, which we have examined in this 
chapter, and Panikkar‘s Christological reflections, which we examined in our previous 
chapter. 
     
 
160 
Chapter 4 
The Identity of Christ and Christian Identity 
Now that we have examined Panikkar‘s thoughts on identity, it is natural that we 
should seek to apply them concretely.  Let us now look at the connection of Christian 
identity and Christ‘s identity in Panikkar‘s thought.  After doing this, it is also important 
to examine how this Christian identity appears in the encounter between religions.  To do 
this, we will have to examine in detail Panikkar‘s thoughts on the dialogue between 
religions.  What is essential to Panikkar‘s vision here is that the other religious traditions 
that Christians encounter are not threats to Christian identity.  Rather, they provide an 
opportunity for growth. 
4.1 The Identity of Christ 
4.1.1 The Identity of Jesus of Nazareth 
As we have already begun to see in our second chapter, one of the most difficult 
components of Panikkar‘s theology to pinpoint is the relationship between ‗Christ‘ and 
Jesus of Nazareth.  Jyri Komulainen is critical of this ambiguous relationship between 
‗Christ‘ and Jesus.  Komulainen notes a distinction between Christ and Jesus based upon 
a distinction between ‗person‘ and ‗individual‘ in Panikkar‘s thought.  He points out: 
―Panikkar‘s cosmic Christology is based on a distinction between ‗person‘ and 
‗individual‘.  This enables him to detach the true meaning of Jesus, i.e. his personal 
mystery, from a particular historical being.‖1   We have already noted this distinction in 
our previous chapter as a distinction between identification and identity.
2
  Komulainen 
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explains that a ‗person‘ is always in relation.3  This relationality contextualizes the 
person.  Identification refers to the more ‗external‘ aspects of this relationality.  In this 
way, ―personal identification is based on empirical data, on the external signs of the 
person in question, thus not touching the person proper.‖4  However, as we have already 
mentioned, personal identity points to the center of the human being with which one 
engages in personal relationships.
5
  However, for Panikkar, Christ‘s identity is 
ambiguous.  Thus, Komulainen contends that because Christ‘s identity is ―ambivalent‖ 
and cannot be located and tied exclusively to any single historical manifestation, 
Panikkar can find Christ anywhere.‖6 
As we have mentioned, because it is conditioned by the law of noncontradiction, 
the Western mind tends towards ‗exclusive‘ statements, declaring that Jesus is Christ.  
However, ―the gist of his [Panikkar‘s] logical argument is that he does not consider ‗is‘ 
sentences to imply exclusiveness.‖7   According to Komulainen, Panikkar uses a ―rather 
idiosyncratic understanding of the resurrection‖ to support this logical openness in that 
Christ, as risen, ―is not limited by any geographical categories or historical parameters.‖8  
Consequently, Christ can be found everywhere. 
Komulainen sees Panikkar‘s Advaitic roots as influential in this regard.  He 
believes that Panikkar‘s Christology is dependent upon a definition of ‗person‘ that is 
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very similar to the manner in which ‗ātman‘ functions in Advaitic philosophy.9  In the 
Advaitic tradition, the ātman is the self, or better, the transcendent self, which is united to 
Brahman and the rest of reality in a non-dual relationship.  Komulainen sees two 
identifying features of ātman that feed Panikkar‘s Christology: ―First, ātman is very 
dynamic and extensive, transcending the universe.  Secondly, despite its infiniteness, 
ātman as such is the center of everything.‖10  Thus, ātman is the transcendent 
‗Supername‘ that extends beyond particular individuals.11  So, if Christ functions in the 
same manner as ātman for Panikkar, he can make a distinction (although not a 
separation) between Jesus of Nazareth and Christ: 
Thus Panikkar may, on the one hand, speak about Jesus of Nazareth who, through his 
kenosis, reveals the Supername.  On the other hand, Christ is for Panikkar a vital symbol 
of cosmotheandric reality, even the Being itself through the kenosis of the Father.12 
Therefore: 
Christology is not exhausted in the historical Jesus since the resurrected Christ is more 
than Jesus of Nazareth.13 
But, for Komulainen, Panikkar‘s Christology has the same problem as his 
theology of religions, in which he attempts to affirm concrete religions, while also 
attempting to transcend them.
14
  Christologically, Panikkar is attempting to affirm the 
particularities of Jesus of Nazareth, while also trying to distill a more universal ‗Christ-
ness‘ that Jesus of Nazareth manifests.  The central Christological question that 
Panikkar‘s Christophanic enterprise faces is whether, in this universalizing process, the 
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historical person of Jesus of Nazareth been completely left behind, and consequently, 
whether the Incarnation has any significance at all.  Jacques Dupuis‘ concern over 
Panikkar‘s thought is similar to that of Komulainen.  He sees this particularly as a 
problem in Panikkar‘s later thought, beginning with the significantly revised second 
edition of The Unknown Christ of Hinduism.
15
  Dupuis points out that in this later stage 
of Panikkar‘s Christological development the salvific significance of Jesus seems 
obscured.
16
  Thus, we are left to inquire: in what way is Jesus the way for adherents of 
other religions?
17
 
It is important to examine Panikkar‘s intentions in this regard.  Panikkar does not 
wish to mutate either the Christian tradition or the Hindu tradition.  Rather, he wishes to 
allow them to dialogue and enlighten each other.  He sets this forth at the outset of The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism, declaring: 
The goal of this study is not to obtain agreement at the cost of fundamental Christian or 
Hindu principles.  On the contrary, it is an attempt to arrive at a certain understanding 
without renouncing any of the specifically Christian or Hindu truths.18 
We can probably assume that the revelatory and salvific uniqueness of Jesus of 
Nazareth as the ‗Christ‘ lies among these ‗fundamental‘ Christian truths, although 
Panikkar does not spell these out.  Again, Panikkar describes the main intent of The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism: 
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It speaks to the bona fide Hindu and Christian who are no longer mutually 
unsympathetic, but who do not wish to dilute their own religiousness or to lose their own 
identity, in spite of being ready for openness and even change should such be required.19 
Thus, Panikkar does not intend to upset or scandalize bona fide (‗good faith‘) 
adherents of the traditions of Christianity and Hinduism, while, at the same time, he 
wishes to allow them to encounter each other in open dialogue.  While this may be 
Panikkar‘s intention, the question remains in the minds of many of his critics, like 
Komulainen, as to whether he actually accomplishes this.  Interestingly, in this regard, 
Panikkar‘s troublesome ambiguity which roots Komulainen‘s criticism may also be an 
asset.  S. Mark Heim points out that there remains in Panikkar‘s thought a special place 
for what he [Panikkar] would term the ‗christophany‘ of Jesus of Nazareth: 
Panikkar does not presuppose that Christ must always be identified with Jesus of 
Nazareth.  Christ, who links God and the world, does this linking in many places without 
association with Jesus of Nazareth.  And yet Panikkar does seem to claim that though the 
linking need not be done in the guise of Jesus, yet the one who does the linking is himself 
most fully revealed in Jesus.20 
After all, Panikkar utilizes the term ‗Christ‘, which for Christians is traditionally 
linked with Jesus of Nazareth to describe this salvific unity that underlies and comprises 
the goal of all reality.  And while he uses other terms, like Īśvara, Krishna, etc., 
somewhat interchangeably with ‗Christ‘, this Christian term seems to hold some sort of 
normative place for Panikkar.  Consequently, Jesus of Nazareth, with whom this title is 
historically linked, is irreplaceable. 
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The ambiguity of Panikkar‘s position can also leave room for a variety of 
interpretations and applications.  For example, Jacques Dupuis‘ insistence that there is a 
mutual, but asymmetrical relationship between Christianity and other religions based 
upon the ‗unique filial consciousness‘ of Jesus of Nazareth may work well in tandem 
with Panikkar‘s theology.  Although Panikkar prefers to avoid any statements that might 
be interpreted as Christian triumphalism, he also never explicitly denies such claims.  
Such an omission is telling. 
4.1.2 The Identity that the ‘Christophany’ Reveals 
 Christophanies, for Panikkar, reveal the identity of all because they show the 
communion at the root of all reality.  Thus, ‗Christ‘ reveals the Trinitarian, Advaitic 
structure of reality.
21
  So, the revelatory character of ‗Christ‘ extends beyond the 
particular revelation of Jesus of Nazareth.  However, as we have just mentioned, it is 
revealed (perhaps to a unique degree) in the Incarnation.  Panikkar‘s earlier writings 
connect the unity of all, as well as the existence of all, with the Trinitarian hypostasis of 
the Son, stating, ―Beings are in so far as they participate in the Son, are from, with and 
through him.  Every being is a christophany a showing forth of Christ.‖22  As we have 
already noted in detail in our second chapter, Panikkar makes use of this term 
(‗christophany‘) more frequently in his later theology, particularly in the book that 
employs it as its title.  But, a christophany is not simply a revelation of the identity of 
Jesus of Nazareth, although this revelation does take place in Jesus of Nazareth.  The 
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‗mystery‘ that Christ reveals ―is a disclosure of a reality that I am and you are.‖23  In 
other words, this mystery discloses the very essence of identity.  But, this identity is not 
completely ―objectifiable‖ nor is it simply ―subjective‖ either.24  It is a transcendent 
communion of all reality, which eludes the conceptual grasp of the mind. 
 Christians find this communion exemplified in a special way in Jesus of Nazareth.  
As he lays out the main thesis of The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, Panikkar explains 
that Christianity and Hinduism encounter each other in their grasp of a reality that 
communicates the union of the Divine and the Human, which Christians call ‗Christ‘.25  
For Panikkar, then, religious traditions meet not in the ‗essential‘, but in the ‗existential‘ 
sphere.
26
 That is, ―Religions meet in the heart rather than in the mind.‖27  For Panikkar, 
the ‗heart‘ here does not denote one‘s emotive potency, but rather the ―concrete reality of 
our lives.‖28  The meeting place of the religions is in human fulfillment, which can only 
be realized kenotically: 
Only when a Man is completely empty of himself, is in a state of kenosis, of renunciation 
and annihilation, will Christ fulfill his incarnation in him.  Only kenosis allows 
incarnation, and incarnation is the only way to redemption.  Only the naiskarmya attitude, 
the renunciation of the fruits of any good action, only the ego-less action in which the 
ahamkāra has been overcome, leads Man to his true Self and allows him to serve and 
liberate the whole World.29 
                                                        
23 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 24. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 37. 
26 Ibid., 43. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 61.  Panikkar adds this last sentence in the later edition. See original Raymond (Raimon) Panikkar,  
The Unknown Christ of Hinduism. (London, UK: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 1964), 28. 
     
 
167 
As we have seen, for Panikkar, all human beings have the ability to realize this 
‗Christic‘ union by virtue of the fact that cosmotheandric union is already present, 
undergirding all of reality, even though it often remains unrealized. As Panikkar points 
out in The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, speaking of an ‗Unknown Christ‘ is indicative, 
not of a monotheistic or polytheistic claim.  Rather, it is indicative of ‗something‘ that is 
within every human being that does not abandon humanity and leads humanity to its 
fulfillment.
30
  He simply contends, ―Our only point is that this cosmotheandric or 
Trinitarian, purushic or īśvaric principle exists.‖31  Furthermore, where this ‗principle‘ 
subsists, there is Christ. 
4.2 Christian Identity 
4.2.1 Christian Identity as Human Identity 
 This variety of religious experiences leads Panikkar to his discussion of tolerance.  
He describes tolerance not as a temporary acceptance of someone‘s self-designation for 
now until that can be later disputed, but rather as a ―mystical virtue.‖32  Thus, Panikkar 
sees identity ―in terms of function and not of content.‖33  This leads him to make an 
important distinction between ‗categorical‘ and ‗transcendental‘ identity.  Categorical 
identity is identity narrowly defined and consists of the profession of particular doctrines, 
e.g. the Nicene Creed, etc.
34
  By contrast, Panikkar points to the concept of 
transcendental identity, which is harder to ‗pin down‘.  Essentially, transcendental 
identity envisions Christian beliefs, or any other doctrinal suppositions for that matter, as 
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‗communicating‘ the truth, but not as ―identical with‖ the truth.35  This leaves room for 
both disagreement and self-identification.  Both of these positions can lead to their own 
brand of distortions (too narrow a view of identity that isolates or too broad a view of it 
that makes it meaningless), so Panikkar combines the two by locating the categorical 
within the transcendental. 
Panikkar defines a Christian as ―someone for whom the Christ symbol discloses 
or illumines or in one way or another touches the central mystery of one‘s own 
existence.‖36  And, as we saw in our previous chapter, the role of the community is to 
provide confirmation for one‘s self-identity.37  Thus, a Christian, for Panikkar, is one who 
finds meaning in the Christ ‗symbol‘.38  For Panikkar, the symbol participates in the 
reality that it mediates.  In the case of the symbol of Christ, what the symbol mediates is 
essential: all of reality and one‘s place in it (i.e. identity).  It is through the realization of 
cosmotheandric communion that one realizes one‘s basic human and Christian identity.  
Christian identity, then, is human identity.  Panikkar‘s project, then, is at one and the 
same time, completely concerned with Christian identity and unconcerned about 
Christian identity.  He does not care to distinguish the identity of Christians from that of 
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the rest of humanity.  Rather, he is intent on demonstrating that Christ reveals the true 
human identity that is found and realized in communion and mystical unity. 
Because Panikkar envisions identity as flowing from mystical unity, Panikkar‘s 
central message regarding identity consists of both a question and a suggestion: ―Why do 
we worry about christian identity?  Only by letting it go may it be bestowed upon us.‖39  
Ultimately, for Panikkar, Christian identity derives from the cosmotheandric experience 
mediated by the Spirit of Christ.  Because this can take a variety of forms, he lists five 
different kinds of Christian identity.  These are: ontic, ontological, historical, 
sociological, and catholic.
40
  These types of Christian identity form a continuum moving 
from a purely transcendental acceptance of Christ (ontic Christianity) to a full categorical 
acceptance of Christ as found in Catholic doctrine (catholic Christianity) with a few 
positions in between (ontological, historical, and sociological). 
What is interesting here is that his inclusion of the ―ontic‖ Christian seems to go 
against his general thesis, which we explored in our last chapter, that identity consists of 
the interplay between self-designation and communal acceptance.  Thus, it would seem 
that Christian identity for Panikkar seemingly requires some kind of explicit profession of 
faith.  However, he leaves this ‗ontic‘ option open in order to say that there could be such 
a thing as a ―non-conscious‖ identity (ironically similar to Rahner‘s ‗anonymous 
Christian‘), calling it his ―larger personal thesis.‖41  This, of course, further obfuscates 
our attempt to ‗pin down‘ what identity is and what makes a Christian ‗Christian‘ for 
Panikkar.   However, Panikkar‘s intent is precisely to introduce more complexity into that 
conversation. 
                                                        
39 Raimon Panikkar, "On Christian Identity: Who is a Christian?"139. 
40 Ibid., 140. 
41 Ibid. 
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As we have mentioned, Panikkar does not attempt to redact Christianity in order 
to make room for other religions.  He sees the connection as already present in the 
consciousness of mystical union.  He does not try to reinterpret the symbols of the 
Christian faith to promote a new form of ―orthodoxy,‖ as it seems that many others do.42  
Rather, he is trying to demonstrate that Christianity can be encountered through the 
religious consciousness of other traditions. 
 In this regard, Jesus’ Trinitarian consciousness, which Panikkar describes as an 
advaita experience (nonduality), is essential.  Because Christ mediates this 
cosmotheandric mystery, one can legitimately say that Christ is present in other religious 
traditions, albeit under a variety of names.  Many authors like Paul Knitter utilize a 
similar theme.
43
  Panikkar is set apart from such thinkers because he emphasizes the 
uniqueness of the experiences and myths that underlie each religious tradition.  Jyri 
Komulainen notes, ―Mythos seems to be first and foremost a collective category in 
Panikkar‘s thinking because he suggests that a culture or a religion shares one and the 
same mythos.‖44  These collective reflections of particular cultures and religions reveal 
the same ‗ultimate reality‘, but they reveal it differently.  Thus, various names for the 
divine may serve similar functions (homology) across traditional boundaries, yet they are 
not purely interchangeable. 
 For Panikkar, wherever one encounters cosmotheandric consciousness, one has 
found what the Christians call ‗Christ‘.  This leaves room for the experience of ‗multiple 
                                                        
42 See, for instance Roger Haight, Jesus Symbol of God, Paul F. Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names: 
Christian Mission and Global Responsibility, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), and John Hick, The 
Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age, Second Edition, (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). 
43 See, for instance Paul F. Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names: Christian Mission and Global 
Responsibility. 
44 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 78. 
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belonging‘ and, consequently, openness to a range of Christian identities.45  For Panikkar, 
what is central and universally salvific in Jesus Christ is his identity (Jesus as Christ), 
which can be understood as a Trinitarian-Advaitic experience.  However, the purpose of 
this identity is to become our identity.  In other words, Jesus reveals to us, as humans, 
who we are.  It is for this reason that the subtitle of Christophany is ―The Fullness of 
Man.‖46  Thus, for Panikkar, the ‗identity of Christ‘ and ‗Christian identity‘ are different 
aspects of the same reality.  Ultimately, that reality is cosmotheandric communion. 
 Here Panikkar‘s theology contrasts with that of several other ‗pluralist‘ 
theologians including Roger Haight and John Hick.  For these theologians, it is precisely 
Jesus‘ identity with the divine that is supposed to be averted.  It is for this reason that 
they use terms like ―symbol‖ (Haight) and ―metaphor‖ (Hick) to describe the Incarnation.  
Panikkar, on the other hand, does not shy away from mystical identity.  In fact, this 
identity is to be our own identity.  However, Panikkar does share with Haight and Hick 
the risk of making the Christ-event insignificant as one event or a single mediation 
among many similar ones.  They only ‗run the risk‘ of this because all of these authors 
insist that there is a special significance to Jesus of Nazareth. 
4.2.2 Panikkar’s Ontology of Perspectivism 
 Jyri Komulainen is critical of Panikkar in his treatment of religious experience.  
He even notes an ―elitist tone‖ to Panikkar‘s view of dialogue, which can be explained by 
the difficulty of attaining the ―principles of dialogue‖ given contemporary culture.47  He 
                                                        
45 For a clear assessment of ‗multiple belonging‘ see Peter C. Phan, Being Religious Interreligiously: Asian 
Perspectives on Interfaith Dialogue, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004). 
46 See Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, Transl. Alfred DiLascia, (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 2004). 
47 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 54. 
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asserts that Panikkar has a ―very normative understanding of religiosity as such, and ends 
up with a rather exclusivistic interpretation of religion at large.‖  Komulainen‘s point here 
is well-taken.  Panikkar‘s emphasis on mystical sensibility can seem rather exclusivistic, 
as if Panikkar envisions only those whose experiences are similar to his own.  Ironically, 
however, Komulainen finds: 
Given the significance that religious experience holds in his theology, it is surprising that 
nowhere does he describe his own experiences, although he gives the reader to 
understand that such experiences exist.
48
 
 However, Panikkar may avoid telling his own story because of the ultimate 
unutterability and of religious experience that makes it difficult, if not impossible to 
communicate without significant loss of meaning.
49
  Furthermore, from the outset of his 
theological project, Panikkar does not intend to become an overly individualized 
theologian who turns away from religious traditions to create some new ‗religion‘.50  
Rather, he envisions himself as standing within and handing on these religious 
traditions.
51
  Panikkar‘s respect for various religious traditions and the experiences 
embedded in them leads him to espouse his own brand of ―perspectivism.‖52  Thus, 
Panikkar‘s interpretation and explanation of the multiplicity of religious traditions begins 
with the idea that we all envision reality from our own unique perspectives.  Because we 
all envision and make sense of reality through our own perspectival lens that is 
conditioned by our unique set of experiences, Panikkar‘s epistemological outlook is 
                                                        
48 Ibid., 55-56. 
49 Ibid., 56. 
50 Ibid.  However, for Komulainen, this is exactly what Panikkar does. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 75. 
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intrinsically ‗perspectivistic‘.53  We may all have a view of part of the whole.  Human 
beings have an "open horizon" but also a "limited human perspective."
54
 
  In this way, religious experience and knowledge is analogically like looking out a 
window.  When looking out a window, we can only see what the parameters of the 
window allow us to see, even though the world outside the window is much larger than 
our perspective permits us to experience.
55
  However, perspectivism is not without certain 
logical problems for the enterprise of dialogue: 
Here is a dilemma that is inherent in Panikkar‘s work: if he aims at analyzing 
epistemological starting points or outlining the nature of reality, he inevitably has to 
speak, so to say, from a general perspective.56 
 Komulainen continues by insisting that:  
A certain tension prevails in Panikkar‘s thinking between his explicit refusal to speak 
about things in general and how he himself is obliged to do so when depicting reality.  He 
tries to solve this dilemma by emphasizing the need for intersubjectivity and mutual 
interaction.  It is also in this sense that the condition sine qua non of his vision is 
interreligious dialogue, since only through this can we widen our perspective and 
understand its limits.57 
This may be a necessary problem inherent to any effort at metaphysical reflection.  
Varghese Manimala explains this as he distinguishes the metaphysician from the 
scientist: 
What differentiates the metaphysician‘s yardstick from that of the scientist is that the 
latter‘s is adequate to what he is trying to describe (e.g., measurable aspect of things, 
                                                        
53 Ibid., 77. 
54 Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, ed. Scott 
Eastham  (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 3-4. 
55 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 75-76. 
56 Ibid., 76. 
57 Ibid. 
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ignoring what is not commensurable with it), whereas the metaphysician‘s yardstick is 
never adequate; it is always being broken.58 
 Nonetheless, Panikkar‘s ‗perspectivism‘ does not lead to amorphous chaos.  
Komulainen notes that Panikkar utilizes his perspectivism as a kind of ‗stepping-stone‘ 
that actually brings him to a radical ontological claim.
59
 This claim, of course, is his 
cosmotheandric worldview.   Through it Panikkar claims to avoid both the extremes of 
"rigid and deadly monism" and "ultimately anarchic and equally fatal plurality."
60
 
  For Panikkar, pluralism leads to two, interrelated, but distinct results that 
Komulainen describes as ―the dethronement of reason and the abandonment of the 
monotheistic paradigm.‖61  Reason is ‗dethroned‘, as we saw in our previous chapter, in 
favor of mythos, which is prior to and forms the foundation for reason.  The monotheistic 
paradigm is abandoned in favor of Trinitarian cosmotheandrism, which Panikkar, unlike 
‗traditional‘ Trinitarian theologians, envisions as a distinct development from 
monotheistic metaphysics.  Thus, for Panikkar, pluralism is not merely a reflection of our 
intellectual inability to integrate disparate threads of thought; rather, it is ontologically 
determinative and is something that actually lies at the ―very heart of reality.‖62  With this 
in mind, Komulainen notes that the general human ‗attitude‘ of pluralism (acceptance of 
multiplicity and openness to the other) is complemented by Panikkar‘s ontology of 
pluralism (Being consists of unity-in-diversity): 
                                                        
58 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, (New Delhi, India: Media House, 2009), 24-
25. 
59 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 79. 
60 Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 7. 
61 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 78. 
62 Ibid., 79. 
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It cannot be denied that both aspects—pluralism as attitude and pluralism as 
metaphysics—belong to Panikkar‘s thinking.  It is true that pluralism is an attitude of 
human consciousness.  For Panikkar, however, human consciousness does not stand, so 
to say, outside the realm of reality.  Instead, it participates authentically in the pluralistic 
reality and its processes.63 
 Because pluralism is metaphysically grounded, Panikkar does not subscribe to the 
approach of the ―many paths, one goal‖ simile that is common among pluralists.64  
Rather, Komulainen points out that a more accurate metaphor can be seen in that of a 
mountain peak with many slopes leading up to it.  The slopes of the mountain give the 
peak its shape.  In the same way the multiple religious traditions approach the same 
divine reality from the different facets of its contours.
65
  In true cosmotheandric form, 
Panikkar believes that perichoresis or circumincessio can and ought to be the overall tone 
and goal of the encounter between religious traditions.
66
 
4.2.3 Christian Worship Mediates Christian Identity 
For Panikkar, worship ―means that act by which we express in one way or another 
the fullness of the human person.‖67 Panikkar insists that worship is not ‗this-worldly‘ or 
‗other-worldly‘ but holistic, cosmotheandric, meaning that it provides a vision of the 
whole of reality through contemplation and meditation.
68
  He poignantly notes, ―Within 
this context the answer to the question of why we should worship at all would run along 
the following lines: because otherwise I could neither be myself nor could you be 
                                                        
63 Ibid., 81. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.  See Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, 
Revised and Enlarged Edition, 24. 
66 Ibid., 83. 
67 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 47. 
68 Ibid., 48.  Note that ‗theandrism‘ is the term Panikkar used before adopting ‗cosmotheandrism‘. 
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yourself.‖69  Worship, then, is liberating and salvific.  It leads to self-realization, identity.  
Thus, through worship one comes to know his/her true cosmotheandric identity.  And, 
conversely, when one comes to know this cosmotheandric identity, one also engages in 
worship. 
For Panikkar, then, worship is transformative.  He muses on its potential: 
It would be one of the most fascinating roles of real worship to transform the present 
technological age into a technicultural one.  By this word, as I have elaborated elsewhere, 
we do not mean a thorough and ruthless technification or an abandonment of ecological 
reality.  On the contrary, we mean, first of all, the discovery that the earth belongs to the 
human being, and vice-versa, that the human background today is neither agricultural nor 
technological, but technicultural: included in this word are of course, the earth and nature, 
for pure nature and untrodden earth are just as much an illusion as a purely mechanized 
man.70 
 This ‗technicultural‘ reality is a realization of the cosmotheandric union of all of 
reality resulting in a communion of humanity and its environment.  Because of this, 
worship leads to self-realization.  Panikkar explains that worship is not, in the end, an 
individual or a collective action.
 71
  Rather, it is a personal action.
72
  So, worship is ―the 
act by which the person cultivates his center and consequently that act by which the 
person participates in the core of all reality, shares on that deepest level with his fellow-
beings and is in communion with the entire universe.‖73  As we have said, this 
communion is salvation. 
                                                        
69 Ibid. 
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71 Ibid., 90. 
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For Panikkar, ―Christian worship should give expression to man‘s inner and 
constitutive urge towards something which remains for ever beyond him.‖74  Panikkar 
even insists that such worship should appeal to atheists, humanists, secularists because it 
expresses the deepest human urge.
75
  In this sense, Panikkar‘s cosmotheandrism functions 
in a manner not unlike the ‗natural law‘, which finds its most well-known and extensive 
expression in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the many schools of intellectual 
followers he spawned.
76
  It is for this reason, as we saw above, that praxis is an essential 
component of the realization of cosmotheandric union. 
Because he is confident in the existence of this ‗inner yearning‘ at the deepest 
level of the human, Panikkar is not convinced that religion is threatened by the increasing 
secularization of the present cultural climate of the West.  Quite to the contrary, he 
asserts, ―For me secularization represents the regaining of the sacramental structure of 
reality, the new awareness that real full human life is worship, because it is the very 
expression of the mystery of existence.‖77  Thus, worship should be ―the integration of all 
dimensions of life.‖78  Worship is not simply an act of the mind or an emotive act, etc.  
Rather it is an act of the whole self that enables one to realize the true self.  Therefore, 
worship is not theology, ―which is the conscious passage from mythos to logos.‖79 Rather 
it ―represents the espousal of mythos and logos.‖80  Worship unites and unity is salvation.  
That is, worship expresses and enacts communion by bringing together worshippers for a 
                                                        
74 Ibid., 92. 
75 Ibid. 
76 See Peter Gorday, ―Raimundo Panikkar: Pluralism Without Relativism,‖ Christian Century 106:37 
(December 6, 1989): 1147. 
77 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, 92. 
78 Ibid., 93. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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common existential purpose, namely the realization of identity.  Thus, worship is 
sacramental (a sacrament is an efficacious sign of God‘s grace); it is christophanic.  
4.2.4 A Universal Religious Experience? 
At the center of the application of Panikkar‘s reflections on identity and 
Christology is the insistence that there is a universal religious experience that cuts across 
cultures and is anthropologically rooted.  It seems that this may in fact not be too 
different from Karl Rahner‘s insistence on a universal pre-reflective encounter with the 
divine that provides the foundation for one‘s ‗fundamental option.  Both thinkers insist on 
a kind of religious experience that transcends the categorial and is at the root of human 
experience generally.  Rahner‘s ―Theology of Freedom‖ gives a detailed account of what 
fundamental option entails, particularly from an anthropological standpoint.  In this 
article, Rahner begins by pointing to the transcendental character of the fundamental 
freedom of the human being: 
Freedom, therefore, has a theological character not only when and where God is 
represented explicitly and side by side with other objects in the objectivity of categories, 
but always and everywhere by the nature of freedom itself, since God is present 
unthematically in every act of freedom as its supporting ground and ultimate 
orientation.81 
In this regard, human freedom is "freedom vis-à-vis God,‖ meaning that, in its 
most basic and primary form freedom represents a ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ to God, who is 
experienced as the condition of one‘s individual infinite horizon and as the object 
towards which this infinite horizon is oriented.  This infinite horizon of the human person 
is fundamentally experienced in the human ability to transcend by knowing (and loving).  
                                                        
81 Karl Rahner, ―Theology of Freedom,‖ Theological Investigations vol. 6. (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 
1969), 180. 
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Thus, there is an implicit "unthematic" ‗yes‘ to God in the very ―choice‖ to go beyond 
oneself in knowing (and loving) finite things.
82
 
 Because God is both the condition and the term of human transcendence, human 
freedom "can culpably deny the very condition of its own possibility [by orienting 
oneself away from God in teleological terms] in an act which necessarily reaffirms this 
condition."
83
  This can occur thus because it is God‘s infinitude that makes one‘s infinite 
horizon possible in the first place. 
Rahner elucidates this by defining freedom as ―the capacity to make oneself once and for 
all, the capacity which of its nature is directed towards the freely willed finality of the 
subject as such.‖84 He continues by positing this fundamental freedom in eschatological 
terms: 
This is obviously what is meant by the Christian statement about man and his salvation 
and damnation when he, the free person, must answer for himself and the totality of his 
life before the judgment seat of God, and when the eternally valid sentence about his 
salvation or damnation in accordance with his works is passed by a judge who does not 
regard merely the appearance of his life, the 'face', but the freely governed core of the 
person, the 'heart'.85 
Thus, just as we saw above, by one‘s freedom, one is able to determine who 
he/she will be.  This has eschatological import because through this decision, one is 
ultimately choosing life with God or life apart from God. 
                                                        
82 Ibid., 181-182. See Jean Porter, ―Moral Language and the Language of Grace: The Fundamental Option 
and the Virtue of Charity,‖ Philosophy and Theology: Marquette University Journal 10, (1996): 171.   Jean 
Porter describes this aspect of Rahner‘s thought: ―Through one's self-awareness as a being whose capacities 
are never satisfied by categorical objects, the human person is likewise aware at a pre-thematic level of an 
infinitely satisfying Object of knowledge and love, which forms the necessary horizon for every categorical 
act of knowledge or will.‖ 
83 Karl Rahner, ―Theology of Freedom,‖ 181. 
84 Ibid., 183. 
85 Ibid. 
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Ultimately, freedom comes from and has its goal in God.  Thus, Rahner maintains 
that, as was said above, in this freedom the human makes a fundamental decision for or 
against God at a pre-reflective level.  It is important in this regard to remember that when 
Rahner (and those that follow him) speak of a ―pre-reflective‖ exercise of human 
freedom, he does not necessarily mean to speak of temporal priority.  Rather, he is 
referring to the fact that one‘s fundamental option represents a disposition that conditions 
one‘s consciousness and consequently one‘s concrete decisions. 
To conclude his reflection on human freedom, Rahner shows that fundamental 
option is a grace-filled experience by pointing out that we would not have the ability even 
to say ‗no‘ to God if God had not previously said ‗yes‘ to communicating Godself to us.86  
Furthermore, in Christ, God has shown a "final, irrevocable decision to liberate 
freedom."
87
  This is achieved through the Incarnation, whereby God has become a 
categorical "object" of freedom, which, as seen above, contributes to the establishment of 
one‘s fundamental option.88 
 Panikkar has a similarly stratified view of the human person.  We saw this in our 
previous chapter when discussed the anthropological level of faith.  Faith is enabled by 
myth, which, as we also mentioned in our last chapter, is prior to and provides the 
foundation for reason, logos: 
Mythic faith is good faith, but good faith does not recognize itself as mythic, nor will it 
claim to be.  Myth is not and cannot be the object of faith because it is by its very 
constitution the vehicle of faith.  A demythologized faith is empty, it becomes reason, 
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changes into logos.  Undoubtedly, good faith is a myth, but it seems that without myth 
faith is not even possible.89 
It is here that Panikkar‘s similarity to Rahner‘s thought is clearest.  Both posit a 
mysterious level of the human that precedes rational reflection.  Rahner‘s conception of 
human fundamental freedom helps to bring Panikkar‘s thought on identity into relief in a 
key way.  For Rahner, as we have mentioned, at this pre-reflective level, humans make a 
choice of ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ to God.  For Panikkar, however, what occurs at this level is not a 
fundamental ‗option‘, but something more like a fundamental ‗identity‘.  It does not 
seem, for Panikkar, that there is any real ‗choice‘ involved.  Rather, one‘s identity is 
formed by mythic faith, and one‘s reason and will are informed by this basic encounter.  
So, the two are different, although Rahner would say that even a ‗no‘ to God involves an 
implicit ‗yes‘ in the very making of the choice.  Furthermore, while Rahner‘s treatment of 
fundamental freedom seems to point to a definite universal experience, Panikkar‘s 
treatment of mythic faith is more ambiguous because it is open to acknowledging a 
variety of myths rather than one universal myth underlying all human experience.  The 
closest he comes to a ‗universal myth‘ is his discussion of cosmotheandrism, which is 
itself a logical deduction that Panikkar makes based on a variety of myths. 
 Additionally, unlike that of Rahner, Panikkar‘s idea of a universal religious 
experience is not completely ‗pre-reflective‘.  Rather, myth is still communicated through 
language, via mythical stories, although the myth behind the story is only accessible to 
reason by some form of logical reduction.  While all humans share the anthropological 
level of faith and a basic openness to myth, there are a variety of particular myths that fill 
this experiential need. In this way, as we have seen, faith, for Panikkar, both transcends 
                                                        
89 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 217. 
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and anchors particular beliefs.  But, on the other hand, faith cannot exist without 
particular expression.  This is why the religious traditions of the world are so essential to 
human religious experience.  They communicate the myths that nourish and enlighten 
human faith.  Panikkar here distinguishes between relativity and relativism.
90
  The beliefs 
arising from the myths that express universal human faith are relative to the contexts in 
which they are formed as passed on.  However, for Panikkar, this does not lead to a 
complete relativization of truth.  Rather, these myths are often glimpses into the same 
ultimate reality, aspects of the same insight: cosmotheandric unity. 
4.2.5 The Impossibility of Religious Epoché: Christian Identity Cannot Be Denied 
 With this conception of Christian identity in mind, we shall now turn to 
Panikkar‘s discussion of dialogue in order to come an understanding of the application 
and enactment of Christian identity concretely.  It is important to keep in mind what we 
have just noted about Panikkar‘s conception of Christian identity, particularly that there 
are various manifestations of it, so that it may be more appropriate to speak of Christian 
identities.  For Panikkar, one‘s religious identity is essential and cannot be bracketed off 
through some form of ‗religious epoché‘ for the sake of dialogue.91  One cannot dispense 
with one‘s identity that easily.  This is why Panikkar is taken aback by the Western 
conception of identity based upon non-contradiction, which seems to reflect a concern 
that one‘s identity could be lost simply by finding commonality with others.  On the 
contrary, identity can hardly be lost even when we try to lose it, as in religious epoché. 
                                                        
90 See Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, (New York, NY, Paulist Press, 1978), 
21. 
91 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—
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With this noted, Panikkar also points out that due to the increasing consistency of 
encounters between people and cultures in our world, one cannot avoid interreligious 
dialogue of some kind today.
92
  One is bound to encounter persons and social groups that 
embrace a different religious tradition from one.    Toward this end, Panikkar stresses the 
need for an ―intrareligious dialogue‖ that accompanies and grounds interreligious 
dialogue.
93
  He describes this ‗intrareligious‘ dialogue as ―an inner dialogue within 
myself, an encounter in the depth of my personal religiousness, having met another 
religious experience on that very intimate level.‖94  This ‗intrareligious‘ dialogue 
involves intimate knowledge of the religious disposition of the other, which seeks to 
overcome the distance of alterity.  If interreligious dialogue must be accompanied by 
‗intrareligious dialogue‘, one must necessarily adopt a ―self-critical attitude‖ and be 
prepared and open to the views of others as if they were one‘s own, which they may well 
become.
95
  Panikkar explains, ―I shall never be able to meet the other as he meets and 
understands himself if I do not meet and understand him in and as myself.‖96 
Thus one ought to strive to encounter the other on his/her terms and to understand 
him/her as he/she understands him/herself.  Panikkar states, ―To understand the other as 
‗other‘ is, at the least, not to understand him as he understands him-self (which is 
certainly not as ‗other‘, but as self).‖97  It is important to understand that this 
‗intrareligious dialogue‘ must be a genuine encounter with the other, not a reduction of 
the other to oneself.
98
  In this way, one seeks one‘s own conversion as well as that of the 
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other because ―Real understanding transforms my ego as well as the alius.‖99  Therefore, 
one‘s faith plays an active role in one‘s dialogue.  The repression of faith through epoché 
is simply a task that cannot be accomplished.  One‘s fundamental disposition cannot be 
cast off like an old shirt.  Panikkar points out, ―The problem arises when we pretend to 
bracket not a formulation, a notion, but a fundamental conviction of the person at the 
existential level.‖100 
However, on the more concrete and less foundational level of the logos, in which 
faith convictions have manifested themselves as particular beliefs, epoché is possible.  
Thus there may be the possibility some kind of epoché of beliefs. Varghese Manimala 
encourages this by emphasizing that for true dialogue to take place, one may need to 
exercise a phenomenological epoché of beliefs that entail ‗exclusivist‘ elements.  But, he 
insists, one should not bracket one‘s existential faith, which lies at the heart of one‘s 
identity.
101
  In this regard Panikkar ―would prefer to call for transcending them altogether 
as long as we are engaged in a serious interreligious dialogue.‖102  Nonetheless, on the 
more foundational level of faith and myth, such disentanglement is not simple and, 
Panikkar insists, not even desirable. 
 For Panikkar, interreligious dialogue is not primarily an intellectual enterprise.  
Rather, it is an interpersonal encounter.  Furthermore, this interpersonal encounter is 
enabled by an intrapersonal encounter, through which one comes to intimately 
understand the other.  Panikkar insists, ―Obviously, before meaningful dialogue can take 
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place one must already know the religion of the partner.‖103  Because of this, dialogue is a 
―total human contrast and participation in deeper communication and fuller 
communion.‖104  To cut oneself out this communion in order to analyze it is 
―psychologically impracticable‖105 and ―phenomenologically inappropriate.‖106  Panikkar 
asserts that one cannot forget, even momentarily, one‘s deeply held convictions regarding 
ultimate truth.  One cannot even pretend that these convictions are briefly forgotten or put 
to the side.
107
  Rather, such conviction condition and shape one‘s knowledge of reality.  
Additionally, in religious dialogue, it is ―philosophically defective‖ to cut faith out the 
equation.
108
  Panikkar argues, ―You do not experiment with ultimate convictions.  You 
experience them.‖109  Thus, ―If I believe in God, for example, I cannot pretend that I do 
not believe in God or speak and act as if there were no God when—by definition if I 
believe in him—it is God who lets me speak and act.‖110 
 Furthermore, such an attitude of religious epoché is also ―theologically weak.‖111  
Panikkar explains: 
If I keep my faith in brackets it is doubtless because I think it does not foster religious 
understanding, probably because my partner is not enough advanced to bear the ‗sublime 
heights‘ of my particular brand of ‗faith‘, which I carefully try to withhold from his 
scrutiny.112 
 This problematically puts ―anthropological integrity‖ in question because:113 
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If faith is something Man can discard with impunity so that he can still meet his fellow 
beings religiously, meaningfully and humanly, this amounts to affirming that what I 
happen to believe is simply supererogatory to my being and has no fundamental 
relevance for my humanity.114 
 This epoché is also ―religiously barren‖ because, through its exercise, one loses 
his or her religious bonds.
115
  If dialogue is truly to be an encounter of religious 
traditions, one who takes such an approach to dialogue has already obfuscated this end at 
the outset.  By detaching oneself from one‘s religious convictions, one no longer has 
anything to contribute to such a dialogue.  Interreligious dialogue, then, becomes a 
fruitless endeavor.
116
  Such religious dialogue must be real dialogue.  Dialogue entails 
not just listening, but also correcting and being corrected.
117
  Furthermore, it must also be 
truly ―religious,‖ that is, not just about doctrines and beliefs, but about mutual 
understanding between two parties.
118
  Panikkar clarifies, ―In other words I understand 
him, or try to, both from and within my faith.‖119  Thus, in the interreligious encounter 
that is upheld by intrareligious dialogue, one encounters the other by extending oneself 
empathetically.  Thus, faith is not bracketed.  Rather, the encounter happens through 
faith.  This serves to avoid the reduction that pushing mythos into logos entails: 
I am saying that the phenomenon of religion does not exhaust the whole of religious 
reality; so that besides, not opposed to, phenomenology of religion there is yet room for 
philosophy and theology—and indeed for religion itself.120 
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 Panikkar adamantly insists that ―the religious pistema is different from and not 
reducible to the Husserlian noema.‖121  It is different because religious knowledge cannot 
be observed neutrally as a mere phenomenon.  To do so would be to reduce religion to a 
concept or set of concepts, rather than an existential commitment.  To be sure, 
phenomenological analysis has its place, but not in interreligious dialogue.  Such a 
dialogue must be honest and sincere, which entails sharing one‘s faith with the other. 
 In this respect, several other thinkers, including Jacques Dupuis, concur with 
Panikkar‘s sentiment.  Rather than a conversation between neutral observers, 
interreligious dialogue is an encounter between committed individuals who are sharing 
their identity with each other.  For Dupuis particularly, the dishonesty of taking the 
position of a neutral observer is counterproductive to dialogical progress.  He says, "On 
the contrary, honesty and sincerity in dialogue specifically require that the various 
partners enter it and commit themselves to it in the integrity of their faith."
122
  Thus, in 
dialogue, "Commitment to one's own faith and openness to the "other" must therefore be 
combined."
123
  Inspired by Panikkar's "intra-religious" dialogue, Dupuis underscores the 
need for ‗sym-pathy‘, ‗com-prehension‘, and ‗em-pathy‘ in the encounter between 
religions.
124
  One must strive to know the other 'from the inside'.
125
 
 Thus, Dupuis insists that openness to "double belonging," by which one may even 
become a "hyphenated Christian," is an essential aspect of the dialogical disposition.
126
  
Dupuis is not as optimistic as Panikkar that it is feasible to take the experiential place of 
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another.  He insists, nonetheless, that whether or not it is totally possible to fully engage 
both traditions, one must at least make the effort in dialogue to "enter into" the religious 
experience of the other.
127
  This allows any dialogue to begin from a disposition of 
mutual honor and respect.  Following Panikkar, Dupuis sees the potential here for "cross-
fertilization" of traditions and a positive form of ―syncretism‖ which does not destroy the 
religious traditions that encounter each other but rather builds them up.
128
  In this way, 
dialogue with other traditions can 'enrich' and 'purify' the Christian faith.
129
  However, 
this cannot be accomplished through a "universal theology" that ignores the differences 
between religious traditions.
130
  Thus, for both Panikkar and Dupuis, real dialogue is not 
a threat to identity, but rather identity is the channel through which real dialogue takes 
place.  Therefore, one‘s religious identity (one‘s Christian identity) cannot be bracketed 
off in order to facilitate dialogue. 
4.2.6 Intrareligious Dialogue 
It is for this reason that Panikkar has created his neologism ‗intrareligious 
dialogue‘.  This term emphasizes the fact that the true locus of interreligious dialogue is 
found in the human heart.
131
  Thus, real interreligious dialogue must be accompanied by 
‗intrareligious dialogue‘.  As we have mentioned already, intrareligious dialogue 
encompasses one‘s self-critical attitude, through which one is open to conversion.  This 
enables what Panikkar calls the ‗mutual fecundation‘ between religions.  It is for this 
reason that an epoché of one‘s faith in interreligious dialogue is impossible.132  Panikkar 
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insist that any ―authentic science of religions‖ must look not just at manifestations of 
religion(s) found in various sociological forms and permutations; rather, such an 
enterprise must gaze ―within‖ the religious traditions in question.133  It is for this reason 
that he insists that the self-criticism of intrareligious dialogue is the best attitude to bring 
to the ‗dialogical table‘.134 
As we have already mentioned, for Panikkar, one‘s encounter with a religion 
(even if it not one‘s own) must be a ‗truly religious‘ encounter.135  He explains, "If the 
encounter is to be an authentically religious one, it must be totally loyal to truth and open 
to reality."
136
  This means that: ―A religious Man is neither a fanatic nor someone who 
already has all the answers.  He also is a seeker, a pilgrim making his own uncharted 
way; the track ahead is yet virgin, inviolate."
137
  This seeker "trusts in truth."
138
  This trust 
entails total commitment.  Thus, the ‗religious man‘ "may lose his life—he may also be 
born again."
139
  Thus, the exploration of a religious tradition cannot be undertaken 
lightly.  It is a quest for truth; a religious quest. 
To use the categories we uncovered in our previous chapter, religious adherents 
are deeply committed to the divine at the level of faith.  Because of this, Panikkar insists 
that ―Religions are much more than doctrines.‖140  Because they transcend the 
conceptual, religious traditions cannot be analyzed exhaustively externally.  Panikkar 
insists that any external interpretation of a particular tradition must correspond to an 
                                                        
133 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—
Mystery, 1. 
134 Raimon Panikkar, ―Introduction,‖ in Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and 
Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 16. 
135 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, 26. 
136 Ibid., 27. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., 30. 
     
 
190 
internal interpretation, or an interpretation ‗from within‘ that tradition from the point of 
view of the believer.
141
  This religious encounter always has cosmotheandric communion 
on its horizon: 
The religious encounter is a religious, and hence sacred, act through which we are taken 
up by the truth and by loyalty to the ‗three worlds‘ with no further aim or intention.  In 
this creative religious act the very vitality of religion manifests itself.142 
With this in mind, the interreligious encounter must also be religious.  This 
entails openness and vulnerability.  This vulnerability leaves one open to finding God in 
the other, or rather, finding God as the other finds God.  This is an essential component of 
maintaining accord among religious traditions.  One must remember that one‘s 
commitment in dialogue is to the truth, not necessarily to one‘s particular religious 
tradition, although one is a participant in such a dialogue because one believes that he/she 
has already found truth in this tradition.  Therefore, according to Panikkar, in order to 
―coexist‖ religions must ―co-insist.‖143  So: 
‗Dialogue‘ is not just an external meeting with somebody who has other ideas than I 
have.  Dialogue in the real sense arises precisely where I (or we) discover the same 
currents and problems within the religion of the ‗other‘ as I (or we) find in my (or our) 
own religious world.144 
Toward this end, Panikkar encourages a ―dialogical dialogue‖ as opposed to a 
―dialectic dialogue.‖145  Such a dialogue is a genuine conversation, not a hostile 
confrontation (as a dialectical dialogue would be).  Furthermore, it is a dialogue of life 
                                                        
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., 37. 
143 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 43. 
144 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, 278. 
145 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 65. 
     
 
191 
and of sharing life.  It is not about proselytism.
146
  For Panikkar, ―Dialogue has its basis 
in both cosmology and anthropology.‖147  Thus, Panikkar‘s understanding of dialogue 
contains ‗ontological‘ overtones.148  Consequently, Panikkar frequently ―identifies 
method with ritual.‖149  Varghese Manimala explains, ―The dialectical dialogue is a 
dialogue about something whereas the dialogical dialogue is a dialogue about those who 
are engaged in dialogue.‖150  Thus, this dialogue is about an interpersonal encounter.  As 
such, it is an enactment of the communion at the root of all reality.  Unless the dialogue is 
genuine, this communion is not genuinely expressed.  Therefore, ―In dialogical dialogue 
no pretense will do.  Any ulterior motive—to convert, to dominate, and even to know the 
other for specific reasons—will destroy dialogical dialogue.‖151  For this reason one must 
possess a firm sense of identity to enter into dialogue.  One must be comfortable enough 
with him/herself in order to avoid the temptation reduce the identity of the other to 
oneself.
152
 
With this in mind, Panikkar is sure to point out that ‗dialogue‘ is not ‗dialectics‘.  
He explains, ―Dialogue does not seek to be primarily duo-logue, a duet of two logoi, 
which could still be dialectical; but a dia-logos, a piercing of the logos to attain a truth 
that transcends it.‖153 
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He continues, ―We call this dialogical dialogue and we add that the relational nature of 
all witnessing belongs to this dialogue.‖154  What is important for Panikkar is that such 
dialogue goes beyond the logos.  As Francis D‘Sa points out, for Panikkar, "The essence 
of dialogue is not grounded in the Logos but in the Mythos."
155
  Dialogue, then, takes 
place on a level different from reason; a less tangible level, a deeper level.  This level, 
where mythos is engaged, may be analogous to what we speak about when talk about 
‗resonance‘.  Musically speaking, a note does not become musical until it resonates, that 
is, until it permeates some body and emanates from it.  This is true for the singer as well 
as for the player of the crafted musical instrument. In much the same way, dialogical 
dialogue does not simply sound, it resonates, permeating somebody and emanating from 
him/her. 
Nonetheless, the main thrust of this dialogue is to realize that there is a deeper 
identity that the interlocutors already share.  Manimala explains: 
Another important assumption of dialogical dialogue is that the other is not just an other 
(alius), and much less an object of my knowledge (aliud), but another self (alter) who is a 
source of self-understanding, and also of understanding, not necessarily reducible to my 
own.156 
Thus, ―Thinking is not purely individualistic, but an intercourse, an act of 
language.‖157 
So, one‘s identity entails a communal aspect.158  After all, if true identity includes the 
‗identifying identity‘ that Panikkar connects with the Eastern perspective, as we 
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mentioned in our third chapter, then the communities to which we unite ourselves are just 
as important as or more important than the individuals and communities from which we 
differentiate ourselves.  This is important to remember, especially when we encounter the 
imperfections of ourselves and others.  This necessitates the virtue of ‗mystical 
tolerance‘: 
It presupposes that you may be capable of assuming what you tolerate.  You redeem, you 
raise up what you tolerate; you transform it, and this transformation purifies the active 
agent as well as the passive agent of the tolerance.  Tolerance here is experienced as the 
sublimation of a state of affairs by the power of tolerance itself.159 
 This tolerance is based upon Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric vision of reality.  He 
explains, ―The notion of tolerance implies that all reality is redeemable because it is 
never immutable.‖160  This represents a movement away from rigid ideology.  Panikkar 
insists, ―The more perfect an ideology, the less tolerant it is, but also the less it needs to 
tolerate tolerance.‖161  Therefore, tolerance is only necessary when speaking about 
someone or something that goes beyond the borders of one‘s ideology.162  For Panikkar, 
then, ―Tolerance is the very index of an ideology‘s weakness.‖163  And when dealing with 
divine mystery, a weak ideology is much safer than a strong one. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
158 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 61.  Panikkars points out, ―The religious encounter is in reality much more than the 
meeting of two friends, it is a communion in being, in the one Being which is much more intimate to both 
than they are to themselves.  It is a communion not only in Christ, but also of Christ.  No condescension, no 
paternalism or superiority is to be found in the true encounter.‖  See Raymond (Raimon) Panikkar, The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism, (London, UK: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 1964), 27.  In the revised 
edition, Panikkar has changed the phrase ‗Christian‘ encounter to ‗religious‘ encounter.  The 
interchangability of the terms implies that Panikkar believes authentic reliosity to be truly Christian. 
159 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, 23. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 25. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
     
 
194 
 Thus, mystical tolerance is best approached at the level of mythos rather than that 
of logos.  What is necessary is communion in a common myth.  However, Panikkar 
points out, ―communion in a myth‖ does not in itself yield a peaceful relationship.164  For 
instance, civil wars seem worse than international wars because of the competing 
ideologies that are so closely akin to each other and are borne by the same myth.
165
  Thus, 
this communion must be accompanied by weak ideology.  In this way, ―Communion in 
the same myth is what makes tolerance possible.  Love that loves without understanding 
could be an example.‖166  Myth can be tolerant because it can withstand contradiction, 
but logos cannot.  For Panikkar, this common myth is the possibility of communion itself.  
The common myth that is accessible to all is cosmotheandrism. 
Thus, in order to realize one‘s Christian identity, one must be be attuned to the 
identity of others.  Intrareligious dialogue enables one to understand others from ‗the 
inside‘.  But it also enables one to find Christ, the source of Christian identity, in new and 
unexpected places.  Finding Christ anew does not destroy one‘s identity.  Rather, it 
enhances Christian identity by drawing one closer to human fulfillment.  Christian 
identity is realized through love, as the ‗great commandment‘ implies (see Mk 12:28-34; 
Mt 22:34-40; Lk 10:25-28).  Intrareligious dialogue facilitates love; it enables the 
realization of Christian identity, that is, human identity.   
4.2.7 The Type of Pluralism that Christian Identity Must Embrace 
It is also important to distinguish Panikkar‘s pluralistic views from the pluralistic 
theologies of his contemporaries.  Many theologians, including Roger Haight, John Hick, 
and Paul Knitter insist that all religions mediate the same Ultimate Reality (or whatever 
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one prefers to call the Divine), but none of them really point to any specific instance that 
demonstrate this commonality.  Panikkar, by contrast, uses an experiential starting point, 
through which he is able to allow religious traditions to meet in a unique way: 
intrareligiously.  Based on his own intrareligious dialogue between Christianity, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism, Panikkar asserts that all authentic religious traditions exhibit a 
tendency toward cosmotheandrism. 
Joseph Prahbu explains the difference between Panikkar and other pluralist, 
saying that while many other pluralists view the variety of religious traditions as 
equivalent ways to salvation or as ―phenomenal manifestations of one transcendent 
noumenon,‖ Panikkar takes a different approach.167  He explains, ―Panikkar‘s view is 
almost the opposite.  He does not think that one can trump religious pluralism by 
metaphysical universalism, because there is as much diversity in metaphysics as there is 
in religion.‖168  Thus, for Panikkar, ―Each religion has unique features and presents 
insights that are mutually incommensurable.‖169  Consequently, ―there is no neutral 
tertium quid.‖170  Religious traditions are not simply translations of the same divine 
communication.  Rather, if they are authentic communications of the divine, they are 
distinct communications.  The multiplicity of these distinct communications reveals a 
richly textured mystery that is approached from different vantage points.  So, for 
Panikkar: 
Each culture or mythic context comes up with a unique formulation of truth, which, being 
unique, is irreducible to another.  Nevertheless, to the extent that each is a formulation of 
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truth and not just something purely subjective, that truth is universal, though not 
necessarily in that particular form.  This is Panikkar‘s notion of homeomorphic 
equivalents.171 
In the introduction to The Intrareligious Dialogue Panikkar describes the different 
attitudes taken toward the multiplicity of religious traditions.  These appear to be based 
on the three interreligious approaches classically identified by Alan Race.
172
  The first 
approach is exclusivism, in which ―the claim to truth has a certain built-in claim to 
exclusivity.  If a given statement is true, its contradictory cannot also be true.‖173  
Exclusivists claim that their religious tradition is the only true one and that all other are 
irreparably deficient.  However, Panikkar rightly points out, there are very few strict 
exclusivists, as is the case with many conceptual models.  He says, ―As a matter of fact, 
although there are many de facto remnants of an exclusivistic attitude today, it is hardly 
defended de jure.‖174 
The next approach that Panikkar describes is that of inclusivism.  The inclusivist 
claims that his/her religious tradition is the only true one, yet others may have partial 
truths that can only find their full realization in the inclusivist‘s tradition.  In the 
inclusivist model, ―You are tolerant in your own eyes, but not in the eyes of those who 
challenge your right to be on top.‖175  Many Christians take this approach.   In fact, it is 
often thought to be, more or less, the official position of the Catholic Church, although 
Panikkar would dispute this.
176
  A cursory glance at Panikkar‘s emphasis on the universal 
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presence of Christ would cause one to believe that this is Panikkar‘s position.  However, 
Panikkar insists that this position is problematic because of its one-sided dynamic.  In 
fact, he spends the latter decades of his career trying to overcome the overtones of 
Christian triumphalism found in his own earlier thought.  For Panikkar, the inclusivist 
position is simply a moderate version of exclusivism. 
 In contrast with these positions, Panikkar prefers an approach that affirms the 
various religious traditions in their respective quests for truth.  He calls this approach 
‗parallelism‘.  In parallelism, you encounter the diversity of religious traditions and 
―assume that all are different creeds which, in spite of meanderings and crossings, 
actually run parallel to meet only in the ultimate, in the eschaton, at the very end of 
human pilgrimages.‖177  Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen explains that Panikkar‘s prefers the term 
‗parallelism‘ over ‗pluralism‘ because, for Panikkar, ―all religions run parallel to meet 
only in the Ultimate, at the end of time.‖178  To Panikkar, this approach is an 
improvement over the others in that it affirms that there are ―parallel paths‖ of the 
religions.
179
  In this regard, John Cobb, Jr. concurs with Panikkar, pointing out, ―One 
cannot solve the pluralism of religions by claiming universality for one's own 
metaphysics.‖180 
4.2.8 Critical Evaluation: Parallelism 
Panikkar‘s analysis here is helpful.  But at this point, we should point out that 
there is a slight logical problem inherent in the imagery of ‗parallelism‘ espoused by 
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Panikkar.  The problem with this paradigm is that if one takes this approach, then, 
logically-speaking, one should not interfere with others and their religious traditions.  
After all, parallel lines never intersect.  However, the dialogical encounter between 
religions is itself a form of ‗interference‘ mutually exercised between religious traditions.  
Therefore, the espousal of parallelism seems to presume that dialogue is undesirable at 
best and impossible at worst.  Given the de facto encounter between religions in the 
world today (and throughout all of history), this position may be unrealistic.  Panikkar 
constantly walks a thin line here.  One may contend that by simply speaking of an 
unknown ‗Christ‘ in another religious tradition like Hinduism, he has crossed a line that 
should not be crossed (parallel lines never intersect) or cannot be crossed logically. 
On the other hand, the image of ‗parallelism‘ may also imply that elements are 
easily translated between traditions.  While, as we saw in our first chapter, homology is 
an important component of Panikkar‘s thought, homological equivalents cannot simply 
be substituted for one another.  Krishna cannot be simply substituted for Christ.  Rather, 
such concepts make sense within an overall system of thought.  But, once they are 
removed from that context, they lose meaning.  Even in the way that Panikkar speak of 
the unknown ‗Christ‘ present outside the Christian tradition, there is an element of 
caution.  What Christians call ‗Christ‘ represents the cosmotheandric insight that can be 
found in all authentic religions.  The term ‗Christ‘ still requires the Christian theological 
context in order to be understood.  
It seems, then, that the image of parallel pathways to the divine, while helpful and 
useful, is also too simplistic to describe the relationship between religious traditions, 
particularly as Panikkar sees it.  While this is a relatively minor point of contention, it is 
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nonetheless problematic that Panikkar‘s descriptive paradigm seems to logically 
undermine his overall theological project.  It may be for this reason that Panikkar is 
inconsistent in his preference of the term ‗parallelism‘ over ‗pluralism‘ and actually uses 
both terms to describe his own position.  Perhaps a better alternative would be to speak of 
something like ‗multidimensionalism‘, which adds complexity to such two-dimensional 
imagery and allows the rich texture of the Divine to shine through.  This would serve his 
purposes much better.  Nonetheless, Panikkar‘s point is well-taken and he is right to 
locate the ultimate convergence of religious traditions eschatologically.   
4.2.9 A Unique Brand of Pluralism 
Because of this ‗parallelistic‘ approach, Panikkar‘s vision can be distinguished 
from those of several of his pluralistic contemporaries. Kärkkäinen, while noting similar 
motives among Panikkar and other ‗pluralists‘, also highlights the distinction we have 
mentioned: 
Yet his pluralistic vision, based on the doctrine of the Trinity is radically different from 
the typical pluralistic idea of a ―rough parity‖ among religions.  Trinity speaks for 
diversity, not for uniformity or denial of differences.181 
Therefore, the Western drive towards universalization is alien to Panikkar‘s 
thought.
182
  And, as we have seen, Panikkar uses the idea of ―perichoresis‖ to articulate 
the ―diversity and complementarity‖ among religions.183 Kärkkäinen explains:  
 The goal of pluralistic theologies is not to water down or dismiss plurality but to enhance 
it.  Therefore dialogue matters; through interaction religions condition and enrich each 
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other.  Each religion comes out of the encounter with a deeper sense of its own identity, 
yet with the awareness of needing the others.184 
In this sense, Panikkar, although he uses the term pluralism (in tandem with 
‗parallelism‘), also provides ―a major critique of pluralism‖ as it is typically 
understood.
185
  As Rowan Williams notes, Panikkar is an ―uncomfortable ally‖ for those 
who hold the typical ―pluralist‖ view.186  This is due to the fact that ―he is not interested 
in the essence of religion as something that in principle might be tracked down and 
isolated, nor is he content with amiable mutual toleration.‖187  The difference is 
Panikkar‘s intra-religious dialogue.  Kärkkäinen explains that, in this regard, Panikkar‘s 
view amounts to saying ―understanding what a statement means is the same as 
acknowledging its truth.‖188  Kärkkäinen‘s explanation touches Panikkar‘s approach, 
although Panikkar‘s explanation is slightly more nuanced.  Panikkar insists that to 
understand another's position, one must share that person's view, so one must judge it to 
be "somewhat true."
189
  He explains, "Accordingly, to understand is to be converted to 
the truth one understands."
190
  As we have mentioned this leads to a dialogue within the 
self: 
The real religious or theological task, if you will, begins when the two views meet head-
on inside oneself, when dialogue prompts genuine religious pondering, and even a 
religious crisis, at the bottom of a Man's heart; when interpersonal dialogue turns into 
intrapersonal soliloquy.191 
                                                        
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid., 342. 
186 Rowan Williams, ―Trinity and Pluralism‖ in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a 
Pluralistic Theology of Religions, Ed. Gavin D‘Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 6. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid., 345. 
189 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, 9. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid., 10. 
     
 
201 
 Thus, dialogue is part of one‘s religious experience. So, dialogue is not simply an 
accidental addition to religiosity.  Rather, it is ―an essential part of the religious act par 
excellence.‖192 Thus, true Christian and religious identity is not based on claims to 
religious superiority. No one has a monopoly on the truth.
193
  It is part of living out the 
Gospel command to love God above all and to love one's neighbor as oneself.
194
  
Therefore: 
Understanding my neighbor means understanding him as he understands himself, which 
can be done only if I rise above the subject-object dichotomy, cease to know him as an 
object and come to know him as myself.  Only if there exists a Self in which we 
communicate does it become possible to know and love another as Oneself.195 
Toward this end, Panikkar insists, ―The aim of the intrareligious dialogue is 
understanding.‖196  This requires a real encounter between traditions and the adherents 
thereof.  Panikkar envisions pluralism as a middle way that mediates between extremes. 
―Pluralism stands between unrelated plurality and a monolithic unity.‖197  Thus, for 
Panikkar, pluralism is not uniformity, yet it also does not reduce to relativism because the 
pluralist, as Panikkar envisions him/her, acknowledges a shared unity, which Panikkar 
locates in cosmotheandric communion.  For Panikkar, the possibility of pluralism is 
opened up by the mystical sensibility that all have access to and the intellectual humility 
that goes along with realizing it.  Therefore, Panikkar emphasizes that one must 
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acknowledge relativity in order to avoid relativism.
198
  He has to do this with his own 
thought.  He explains that "the whole idea of belonging to a chosen people, of practicing 
the true religion, of being a privileged creature, struck me not as a grace but as 
disgrace."
199
  Thus, in order to avoid losing all grasp of truth, Panikkar had to re-envision 
truth as manifested in the world in a variety of ways.  It is of these manifestations that 
Panikkar‘s concept of the christophany, which we examined in our second chapter, 
speaks.  For Panikkar pluralism ―means being able to, so to say, accept another as the 
other.‖200 
Jyri Komulainen tersely explains, ―To sum up, Panikkar insists on more radical 
pluralism.‖201  He elaborates, ―Panikkar considers the diversity of religions to be so 
compelling that, in principle, it jeopardizes the legitimacy of comparative religion.‖202  It 
is for this reason that Panikkar is opposed to any kind of meta-language, which reduces 
the various traditions and robs them of their efficacy.
203
  He points out that ―according to 
Panikkar, pluralism as well as the dialogical dialogue are grounded in the pluralistic 
nature of reality itself, and that they are tantamount to participating in its essence.‖204  
Nonetheless, as we shall see below, there remains ‗a certain dissonance‘ in his 
pluralism.
205
  Komulainen summarizes Panikkar‘s movement as ―building bridges 
between positions that are, in principle, unbridgeable.‖206    He explains this tension: 
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The intrinsic tension between dialogue and pluralism existing in Panikkar‘s thinking 
could be summarized as follows.  ‗Dialogue‘ conceptualizes his endeavor to build bridges 
between different human positions, whereas ‗pluralism‘ describes the unbridgeable 
character of these positions.  On the other hand, the above analysis has shown that, 
despite the inherent tension, both of these concepts go, so to say, hand in hand.  Panikkar 
intends to advocate a middle way that could provide the basis for communication, 
although not for any single system.207 
For Panikkar this task is urgent.
208
  Komulainen here puts his finger on the most 
difficult aspect of Panikkar‘s thought to comprehend.  The attempt to find a connection 
and commonality between points of view that are ultimately incommensurable is the 
hallmark of Panikkar‘s theology.  Panikkar‘s stratified anthropology, which we discussed 
in our previous chapter, allows him to do this.  As Komulainen points out, Panikkar 
solves his dilemma by insisting on ―common anthropological foundation‖ that is the 
common ―root‖ to religious experience.209  This root is the humanum, which ultimately 
leads one to cosmotheandric sensibility if properly nurtured.  Komulainen summarizes 
Panikkar‘s position in this regard by stating that, for Panikkar: 
The diversity of religions is genuine on the doctrinal and phenomenological levels.  
Therefore, religions cannot be said to be one and the same.  Nevertheless, on the deep 
anthropological level, too—i.e., in the ―underground‖—where the roots of religions are to 
be found, there exists a profound tie between them.210 
 Varghese Manimala comments on the state of de facto pluralism today.  
Manimala insists that it is not possible for us to obtain absolute truth.  After all we are 
merely finite creatures.  Thus, we do not possess the epistemological capacity for 
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absolute truth.  We can only, at best, obtain a ―glimpse of truth.‖211 Manimala applies this 
insight to the dialogue between religions: 
Since our concern is with religion and the encounter of religions in various fields, what 
we wish to state is that religions need to restrain from a claim to the knowledge of 
absolute truths and also from a pretension of being dispensers of this absolute truth.212 
 Such an attitude presents a barrier to dialogue.  As we have mentioned, this leads 
to ‗relativity‘ not ‗relativism‘.  This relativity is the result of varying perspectives.  For 
Manimala, this underscores the importance of orthopraxis: 
The absolute quality of truth, if at all we may talk about it, has to be spelled out 
especially on the practical ethical level of liberating praxis; the relative felt on the 
reflexive level.  In what truth calls us to do, in the liberating praxis it generates, it can be 
‗absolute;‘ yet when we reflect on how we have known this truth and the limitation of 
knowing it, we feel the relative aspect of truth.213 
 Attaining truth is an important part of human existence.  Manimala insists that it 
is the ―greatest desire‖ of every person.214  However, in this enterprise, we lack certainty 
―as long as we live in this world.‖215  Thus, while we are ―groping in darkness‖ we need 
collaboration in order to ―reach as best an approximation to truth and certainty as 
possible.‖216  Such collaboration requires mutual trust because no one has an ―advantaged 
position‖ from which to know everything.217  Therefore, ―It is a ‗walking together,‘ 
where our identity is not lost and our underlying fellowship is not destroyed.  This means 
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that to be true to oneself is as important as to remain faithful to the other.‖218  In this way, 
as a human community, working together helps us to overcome our epistemological 
limitations.  To expound upon Manimala‘s imagery, if we all grope together in the dark, 
we will gain a fuller picture of the room.  If we do not work together, we may all be 
isolated to separate corners and never come to know what surrounds us. 
 Manimala discusses the problems that pluralism faces, saying, ―The present-day 
problem of pluralism stems from a genuine experience of disorientation and chaos, and 
not from a theoretical problematic.‖219 Therefore, the answer is not theoretical, but 
practical.
220
  He continues, ―Pluralism is today a human existential problem which raises 
acute questions about how we are going to live our lives in the midst of so many 
options.‖221   This means that pluralism cannot remain on the conceptual level.  It 
requires action because pluralism is not ‗plurality‘ or ‗pluriformity‘, the mere recognition 
of differences and varieties respectively.
222
  Genuine pluralism attempts to respect the 
―radical diversity‖ of these divergences.223  With this in mind, ―pluralism is irreducible to 
unity—even of a higher order.‖224  Yet, ―pluralism stands between unity and plurality—
without dialectically oscillating between them.‖225  Manimala explains that ‗dialectics‘, 
for Panikkar, refers to the Hegelian attempt to preserve rationality in the face of 
contradictions.
226
  Thus, the tension is maintained and not superficially resolved. 
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As we have mentioned above, because it differs from this dialectical attitude, 
pluralism does not consist of a religious epoché that awaits an eschatological resolution.  
Rather, ―Pluralism is an attitude which emerges when we acknowledge the limits of 
reason and do not identify them with the limits of Being; when we do not equate 
Thinking and Being, or assume a priori the total intelligibility of reality.‖227  Thus, 
pluralism requires a mystical sensibility, which can be attained through attention to the 
cosmotheandric character of reality.  This sensibility entails knowing the relativity of our 
knowledge.
228
 
This relativity involves an awareness of relationality.  As Manimala points out, 
faith is a personal experience lived out relationally.  Thus, interreligious dialogue is 
interpersonal (and is supported by intrareligious dialogue).  Manimala is sure to point out 
that religions do not form the ―locus of faith‖; rather ―the locus of faith is persons.‖229  
Therefore, it is important to remember that in interreligious dialogue, the religious 
traditions themselves are not the interlocutors.  Rather, the persons who are adherents to 
these traditions, in their various permutations, are the actual interlocutors.  So, dialogue 
does not actually take place between religions, properly speaking, but between persons. 
In contrast to the different kinds of ‗centrisms‘ prevalent in interreligious dialogue 
today, including the theocentrism and the regnocentrism of John Hick and Paul Knitter 
respectively, Manimala presents Panikkar as an alternative.  He states, ―In our case, we 
have to say that ‘truth has no centre.’‖230  Rather, true pluralism (as exemplified by 
Panikkar) recognizes that different ―ultimate beliefs‖ are ultimately incommensurable 
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and incompatible and takes this seriously.
231
  Truth, however, is not merely de-centered.  
For Panikkar, ―Truth is polar.‖232 It is a relation (between subject and object, etc.).  It is 
for this reason that humans cannot bracket themselves out of the equation.  So, religious 
epoché is further undesirable because truth itself always includes subjectivity.
233
 
4.2.10 Critique: Is Such a Pluralistic Outlook Possible? 
Thus the global encounter of religions is the theological locus of Panikkar‘s 
thought.  Komulainen explains, ―Although Panikkar‘s theological career is in many ways 
related to India, the proper context of his thinking, especially in the latter part of his 
work, is to be found in the contemporary situation characterized by the suspense of 
globalization and localization.‖234  Komulainen insists that in Panikkar‘s theological 
project, a ―new theological paradigm‖ is ―emerging.‖235  Komulainen classifies this new 
paradigm not as pluralism, but as ‗post-pluralism‘.236  In this line of thought, Panikkar 
proposes a ―new kind of inclusivism‖ which maintains an ―irreconcilable tension‖ 
between religious traditions.
237
  This is reflected in Panikkar‘s (albeit inconsistent) usage 
of the concept of ‗parallelism‘ that we examined above. 
 In this way, Panikkar‘s new paradigm opposes the tendencies exhibited by other 
theologians who classify themselves as pluralists and do so by establishing and utilizing a 
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‗meta-level‘ language to categorize these.  It is from this ‗post-pluralist‘ perspective that 
Komulainen analyzes Panikkar‘s theological project:238 
Post-pluralistic critique thus represents attempts to dig below the surface of rhetoric in 
order to see, for instance, whether the method utilized in the implementation of a 
pluralistic program is, in the final analysis, congruent with its explicated aim, in other 
words, proving all religions to be equally and autonomously salvific.239 
With this in mind, Komulainen‘s assessment of Panikkar‘s theology is that 
although he has tried to avoid the perils of other pluralists, his position is ―still rather 
ambiguous.‖240  Thus, Panikkar is not thoroughly ‗post-pluralist‘.  Furthermore, there are 
still ―some internal tensions‖ in his thought.241  These tensions are in part present because 
Panikkar attempts to access, as far as possible, the anthropological level of mythos not 
logos.
242
  Komulainen explains, ―Panikkar walks on a tightrope between holism and 
pluralism in a way that is not easy to articulate in terms of discursive rationality.‖243   As 
we have seen, Komulainen points out that, while Panikkar seeks to allow each tradition as 
irreducible to the others, by proposing his cosmotheandric vision he seems to violate this 
tenet: 
Anyone analyzing concepts such as ‗advaita‘ or ‗Trinity‘ in Panikkar‘s texts cannot avoid 
the impression that, despite his pluralistic rhetoric, he seems to be de facto very willing to 
interpret different religions as concrete embodiments of one and the same 
religiousness.244 
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 Komulainen calls this the ―holistic side‖ of Panikkar‘s thought, in which he 
describes the cosmotheandric character of all reality, ―constitutive spirituality‖ because, 
as we have seen, it entails a basic anthropological orientation.
245
  With regard to this 
element of Panikkar‘s theology, Komulainen rhetorically asks, ―Given that constitutive 
spirituality provides the basis for the communion of religions, does not this kind of 
spirituality have a normative role in regard to concrete religions?‖246  He explains, ―What 
I am trying to say is that, after closer examination, Panikkar‘s pluralism is not so 
pluralistic at all.‖247  In his project Komulainen sets out to demonstrate that there are both 
exclusivist and inclusivist tendencies in Panikkar‘s theology. The source of these is 
Panikkar‘s ‗cosmic confidence‘.248  The expression of this ‗cosmic confidence‘ becomes 
the Panikkar‘s norm for evaluating religious experience.  Komulainen uses a musical 
analogy to point to his main criticism of Panikkar.  The inconsistencies in Panikkar‘s 
thought arise when he takes on this ―normative tone‖ in order to eliminate 
‗cacophonies‘.249 
 Panikkar endorses a ―Copernican revolution‖ in Christian theology, ―a Jerusalem 
II.‖250  Komulainen explains, ―Panikkar uses his rhetoric to express the idea that 
Christianity should expand its horizon and admit the fundamental theological significance 
of other religions.‖251  For Panikkar, the Christian tradition itself plays a ―vital role‖ in 
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this process.
252
  However, according to Komulainen this process also involves a revision 
of Christology.
253
  Furthermore, Komulainen interprets Panikkar‘s revision as a major 
one because Panikkar ―suggests‖ that ‗Christophany‘ should completely replace 
traditional ‗Christology‘.254  Thus, Komulainen is concerned that Panikkar‘s 
christophanic theology is a complete replacement for traditional Christology.  He is not 
convinced that Panikkar accomplishes his stated goal: 
Even though he tries to avoid giving the impression that everyone should unconditionally 
endorse the substitution of Christology with Christophany, there is a strong normative 
tone in the above quotation: revising Christological thinking is associates with positive 
words such as ―contemporary,‖ ―ecumenical,‖ ―open,‖ and ―tolerant.‖  The point is clear: 
the new Christophany is proposed as a far better option than the predominant 
interpretations when facing the challenges of the contemporary world.255 
Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen is also critical of Panikkar‘s approach in this regard: 
Any kind of universal theory, in Panikkar‘s opinion, denies pluralism; he opts for the 
latter.  But, of course, Panikkar‘s own notion of pluralism cannot be a universal theory, 
and therefore truth itself is pluralistic.  Panikkar, however, no more than any other 
relativistically oriented thinker, cannot live up to his philosophical claims to relativism.  
His position, like that of many other pluralists, makes certain propositional claims and 
thus requires a propositional network and operates with truth-falsehood logic.256 
 This raises the titular question of Komulainen‘s book, a published version of his 
dissertation.  Is Panikkar establishing a new religion, a tertium quid?  Komulainen notes 
that Panikkar tries to foster dialogue ―on as transcendent a level as possible.‖257  He 
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points out, ―Since Panikkar strongly emphasizes the ultimate existential character of 
religion, his thinking betrays an obvious actualistic tinge: faith is rather an ―act‖ than a 
substance.‖258  In this way, Panikkar‘s thought is ―transcendental‖ and 
―metaontological.‖259  Thus, Panikkar‘s pluralism is defined against the backdrop of ―the 
ineffable‖ and ―the silent.‖260  It centers upon the mystery of the Divine.261  However, 
Komulainen points out, ―It seems that Panikkar himself is taking the precise bird‘s-eye 
perspective that he has vehemently repudiated.‖262  To Komulainen, this seems like a 
―fatal intrinsic flaw‖ in Panikkar‘s system.263  He argues: 
Even though he wishes to think in a radically pluralistic way, his search for a common 
ground for interreligious dialogue leads him to propose that such an element could be 
found on some deeper or higher level that unites different religions and, correspondingly, 
forms the inner core of any tradition.264 
 Although one could interpret Panikkar‘s perspective in this way, this may not be 
the only way to look at what Komulainen describes as Panikkar‘s ‗perspectivism‘.265  
After all, even though one may not possess a bird‘s eye perspective, one still knows that 
there is one and can thus speculate about what it is like based upon the  observations 
he/she can make.  To use a map analogy, early cartographers rarely had a bird‘s eye 
perspective.  Instead, they drew the best maps they could based on their own 
observations, but which depicted the areas they mapped from a bird‘s eye view.  In fact, 
they did this with more or less relative adequacy.  Nonetheless, their work was not 
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perfect.  They missed certain features because certain observations could not be made.  
For instance, geologists did not know that the entire Yellowstone region in the United 
States was one huge caldera until we had satellite imaging of the region. 
Alternately, to use the window analogy that Komulainen utilizes to describe this 
‗perspectivism‘, each perspective is limited by the frame of the window. 266  However, 
maybe we can describe Panikkar‘s project as something like leaning out the window and 
looking up, down, and side-to-side and even talking to one‘s neighbors.  Such an 
enterprise can be informative.  However, it is dangerous because one no longer has the 
sure footing that he/she previously had.    Thus, the level of certainty is diminished the 
farther one ‗leans‘ out the window.  Yet, the observations one makes and the information 
one collects from his/her neighbors still allow him/her to make conclusions about the 
reality glimpsed on the other side of the window. 
Nonetheless, for Komulainen, ―There is a distinct feeling that, with his 
cosmotheandrism, he is sketching out a kind of intellectual meta-religion expressing the 
universal human experience in a language that is as general as possible, if not 
universal.‖267  At first glance, based on his ‗cosmotheandrism‘, it might be easy to label 
Panikkar a ‗pantheist‘, one who equates the world and God.  One can hardly universalize 
to a greater degree than that.  But, such an appellation is ―too superficial.‖268  On the 
other hand, epistemologically, Panikkar ―wishes to reject the notion that knowing is an 
independent category alongside being, or an even more fundamental perspective on 
reality.‖269  Because of this intimacy between ‗knowing‘ and ‗being‘: 
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His cosmotheandrism seems to be more of an existentialist philosophy than a genuinely 
religious vision.   It provides a sort of analysis of human experience: the divine 
dimension of reality means only that every being transcends itself, whereas the human 
dimension is reduced to the knowability of being.  The cosmic dimension is tantamount 
to the intrinsic relationship of every entity with spatio-temporality.270 
Thus, Komulainen notes that Panikkar‘s thought could be considered a form of 
‗humanism‘, albeit a humanism that has ―religious and metaphysical underpinnings.‖271  
This ‗humanism‘ takes on a kind of normativity in Panikkar‘s thought.  Thus, 
Komulainen insists, ―In conclusion, when studied critically from a post-pluralistic 
perspective, Panikkar‘s radical pluralism reveals inherent problems analogous to those in 
many other pluralistic theologies of religions.‖272  These ‗problems‘ are based on the 
danger of cosmotheandrism becoming a normative meta-level of religion that violates the 
internal logic of Panikkar‘s epistemology of ‗perspectivism‘.273 
Similarly, Velti-Matti Kärkkäinen comments: ―Without really giving substantial 
answers, he [Panikkar] lets it suffice to insist on the continuity with Christian tradition.  
His version of Trinitarianism, however, certainly elicits serious questions.‖274  With this 
in mind, Kärkkäinen articulates a few questions for Panikkar: 
Panikkar postulates a coming convergence of religions:  Does that mean envisioning one 
single end for all?  Or different goals for different religions?  A related question, one that 
Panikkar has not really dealt with much in his writings, is the question of the relation of 
the Trinity to existing religions of the world.275 
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To a certain extent, this criticism articulated by both Kärkkäinen and Komulainen 
is not only valid, but cuts to the very heart of Panikkar‘s project.  This central 
inconsistency presents a major problem for Panikkar.  However, Panikkar‘s thought may 
be rehabilitated by its emphasis on mystery.   This ‗constitutive spirituality‘ that Panikkar 
posits is ultimately something intangible, or at least something of which we only catch 
incomplete glimpses.  Epistemologically then, Panikkar‘s analytical conclusions, under 
his own logic, can only have provisional character.  Thus, while this cosmotheandric 
sensibility is normative for Panikkar, no one, including Panikkar himself, has a complete 
grasp of cosmotheandric communion.  Thus, these objections may ‗weaken‘ the standing 
of Panikkar‘s position, but they do not negate it.  Panikkar can only propose his 
worldview with provisional certainty.  But, there is no reason to believe that this is 
problematic for him.  Quite to the contrary, it seems to be consistent with his 
epistemological leanings. 
Furthermore, Panikkar‘s epistemological sensibility would lead us to conclude 
that all positions and perspectives contain relativity.  This includes critical perspectives, 
which, by the very nature of critique, make a universal claim to validity (or at least some 
meta-level claim to validity in relation to that which is critiqued).  Thus, even when 
Panikkar posits some form of universal religious experience of cosmotheandrism, his 
position remains situated in his own perspective, shaped by his context.  The articulation 
of it in linguistic form betrays a Western predisposition (the terms that form the 
neologism ‗cosmotheandrism‘ are all of Greek origin).  Such a predisposition is 
unavoidable.  Without a prior intellectual and categorical matrix, it is impossible to make 
meaning out of experience.  Nonetheless, the linguistic matrix itself is finite and 
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functions precisely by relativity (concepts that are contrasted with each other).   Thus, 
relativity is a necessary component of meaningful discourse.  Yet, there is often, 
nonetheless, ‗something‘ beyond the relative that is communicated in such discourse.   It 
is along this line that Panikkar artfully walks. 
In his assessment of Panikkar, Komulainen is also critical of some aspects of 
Indian spirituality, especially those that tend toward monism.
276
  With these in mind, he 
calls Panikkar‘s position, ‗affirmative orientalism‘.277 He explains, ―This term refers to 
the kind of stereotypical attitude that highlights the difference between the East and the 
West, giving preference to Eastern values.‖278  Komulainen points out, then, that 
Panikkar‘s criticism seems rather one-sided.  Thus, ―The primary target of his criticism is 
the modern Western way of thinking and, as already seen, it seems that in his view, it is 
Christianity that needs transformation more than other religions.‖279  However, this seems 
out of step with Panikkar‘s concept of ‗mutual fecundation‘, which we will visit below.  
Ironically, however, this emphasis on critiquing Western Christianity can also lead to 
criticism from the opposite perspective.  One can declare that Panikkar is showing 
favoritism to Christianity by using it as the overall matrix within which to work out a 
theology of religions.  After all, Panikkar does not focus on ‗krishnaphany‘, but on 
christophany.  It is this Western Christian tradition that is receiving special treatment 
through revision because it is the one that Panikkar is plugging ‗new parts‘ into, so to 
speak, in order to keep it running.  He seems to be taking those ‗parts‘ from other 
religions and using them freely.  Furthermore, maybe it is not just Eastern spirituality, 
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but, as we mentioned in our first chapter, mysticism in general, that is the corrective for 
Panikkar.  This is the purpose that cosmotheandrism plays in Panikkar‘s thought: it is 
universally accessible. 
Komulainen is also critical of Panikkar‘s ‗christophanic‘ emphasis.  In 
Komulainen‘s estimation, ―Christophany seems to stand for religiosity of a higher level 
than traditional Christianity.‖280  However, Komulainen acknowledges that Panikkar 
envisions continuity between christophany and traditional Christology.  He continues, 
―Nevertheless, Panikkar sees Christophany as continuing the intentions of traditional 
Christology by providing it with new prospects.‖281  Thus, it gives traditional theology an 
opportunity for ―growth.‖282  The above-mentioned ‗cosmic confidence‘ demonstrates 
that ―For Panikkar, being Christian is existential, not essential.‖283  Komulainen 
categorizes Panikkar‘s ‗constitutive spirituality‘ as an anthropological stratum or level 
that is normative for all other levels, but also only reached through them.
284
  The 
christophany reveals this level of humanity.  As we have mentioned, Panikkar insists that 
christophany should not be interpreted as docetism.
285
  With this in mind, Komulainen 
discusses the difference between christophany and Christology: 
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Panikkar thus understands Christophany to be more mystical than traditional Christology, 
more cosmological, and also more universal in the respect that its purview extends 
outside the boundaries of Christendom.286 
 Komulainen is concerned that Panikkar has deserted traditional Christology in 
favor of a mystical interpretation of ‗Christ‘ that Panikkar himself has built.  However, 
while it does represent a distinct development of Christology, it is not at all clear that 
Panikkar‘s christophanic position is as extreme as Komulainen seems to presume.  
Nowhere does Panikkar challenge traditional Christological formulations.  Quite to the 
contrary, his christophanic position is a development of themes found in traditional 
Christology.  A prime example of this is Panikkar‘s universalization of the idea of 
‗Christ‘ (‗cosmic‘ Christology), which as we saw in our second chapter, is a development 
of the patristic theme of the activity of the Logos outside the incarnation.  Therefore, 
Panikkar envisions a ‗cosmic‘ Christ not because he is dissatisfied with traditional 
Christology but because he understands traditional Christology as demanding and 
supporting such a concept. 
Furthermore, by highlighting this idea of christophany, Panikkar emphasizes the 
―priority of spirituality and experience over rational reflection.‖287  Yet, his is not some 
kind of ―Laissez-Faire pluralism.‖288  Cosmotheandrism provides the norm by which 
religious experience is measured.  The christophany becomes the tool with which to 
measure such experiences.  Thus, for Komulainen, the problems inherent in Panikkar‘s 
pluralism are the typical problems found in pluralist thinkers.  The most difficult of these 
is the exclusivism that necessarily accompanies pluralism: 
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On the other hand, I have shown that similar post-pluralistic criticism can be leveled at 
Panikkar as at other pluralists.  Panikkar also seems to presume that it is ultimately 
possible to find at least some common ground that provides the Archimedean point  for 
grasping religious pluralism—although he untiringly points out that this common ground 
is to be found only on a very transcendental level, and it can never be reached outside 
concrete religious traditions.289 
 He continues: 
The discerning of epistemological and ontological principles in his thinking confirms that 
his pluralistic theology of religions rests upon particular metaphysics, and accordingly 
discloses an ideological quality that is not consistent with the basic idea of pluralism.290 
 Thus Komulainen‘s main concern is that in his disavowal of establishing a 
doctrinal norm based on the beliefs of a particular tradition, Panikkar instead establishes 
his own set of norms, which are just as limiting. Part of this ‗new norm‘ is the idea of 
christophany, which serves as a replacement of Christology.  However, as we have 
mentioned, perhaps we should take the epistemological humility that Panikkar endorses 
with regard to the particular beliefs of religious traditions seriously.  Thus, we could 
apply this even to Panikkar‘s conclusions, which are ‗logocizations‘ of mythic reality, 
which, as we mentioned in our third chapter, always lead to reduction and loss of content.  
Panikkar is attempting to put into words that which by definition cannot be put into 
words.  In this way, Panikkar‘s thought, like all theological expression will always 
necessarily be inadequate.  The question we must ask, then, is whether or not Panikkar 
provides an adequate analogy.  From a Christian perspective, because of his emphasis on 
cosmotheandrism, which is essentially an expression of communion (a concept dear to 
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the Christian tradition), the answer to this question is most likely affirmative.  However, 
this affirmation, like all theological affirmations, must be held humbly. 
4.2.11 Dialogue Fosters Growth 
As we have mentioned, for Panikkar, Christian identity is broader than those who 
explicitly identify themselves as ‗Christian‘.   Thus, there is an interrelation between the 
concepts of ‗christian‘ and ‗human‘ in Panikkar‘s thought.  Panikkar insists that the 
Christian must strip him/herself of the ―christian religion.‖291  By this he does not mean 
doing away with one‘s religious affiliation or even the beliefs thereof.  Rather, he means 
that the Christian must free him/herself from the merely sociological aspects of 
religion.
292
  Faith is deeper than this: 
On the contrary the faith that I still desire to call christian, though others may prefer to 
call it simply human, leads to the plenitude and hence to the conversion of all religion, 
even though up to date it has only succeeded, from a Judaic substructure in converting to 
a great or lesser extent helleno-latin-gothic-celtic ‗paganism‘.293 
Thus, Panikkar sees this faith commitment as part of, and even mediated by, one‘s 
religious tradition.  On this traditional identity, Panikkar says, ―As I have already 
indicated, every believer sees a tradition from the inside, so that for the believer it 
becomes a symbol of all that is true.‖294  Nonetheless, as we have seen, true dialogue 
seeks to see the religious tradition of another ‗from the inside‘ as well.  One may find that 
the faith that Panikkar connects with Christian commitment can also be found and 
expressed in a variety of traditions.  The encounter with these other forms of faith, 
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particularly as an ‗insider‘, leads to an opportunity for growth in one‘s own faith.  As 
Christopher Denny points out: 
What defines commitment to dialogue for Panikkar is growth. One must grow in 
dialogue. If the self has not been transcended in this engagement, the dialogue has failed. 
Hence, Panikkar's dialogue is properly called "dialogical dialogue," because it travels dia-
logos, through speech. In this model the other is not a problem to be solved. Nor is the 
other a minefield who has to be gingerly stepped through with the use of interreligious 
pleasantries dispensed only to maintain an uneasy peace. In Panikkar's idea of dialogue, 
the so-called other is absolutely necessary for the transcendence of the so-called self. 
Moreover, the alleged other is necessary because of its very otherness, not because of 
some propositional truth or phenomenon it can yield up.295 
Panikkar prefers to use organic growth language to describe this phenomenon.  
Among his preferred metaphors are ‗mutual fecundation‘, ‗cross-fertilization‘, and 
‗interpenetration‘.296  The choice of such terms is important to Panikkar‘s understanding: 
This kind of biological language is neither accidental, nor just a matter of rhetoric.  
Panikkar compares religious and cultural studies explicitly with botany.  Human 
traditions are dynamic like seeds, and they could be understood only in the light of the 
potentiality hidden in them.
297
 
Thus, for Panikkar, faith is something living.  It grows over time.  Komulainen 
points out that in Panikkar‘s theological schema change is an integral part of the religious 
disposition, and to demonstrate this, he uses these organic images like ‗evolution‘ and 
‗progression‘.298  Nonetheless, Panikkar is critical of envisioning evolution and 
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progression from an ‗outsider‘s point of view‘ where the goal is clearly seen.299  In this 
sense, we should not think of Panikkar‘s project as involving teleology in the strict 
sense.
300
  However, while it is not a well-defined teleology, it does seem that there is a 
general teleological thrust to Panikkar‘s worldview, in that all religious traditions are 
‗aimed‘ at the same ‗goal‘: cosmotheandric union. 
As we have mentioned, for Panikkar, the encounter of religions ―must be truly 
religious.‖301  ―Thus interreligious dialogue is not only a method, but also a religious act 
par excellence.‖302  Varghese Manimala interprets this to mean that the various religious 
traditions need each other to reach fulfillment.
303
  This is perhaps Manimala‘s grandest 
claim.  Yet, he insists that if there is to be a global civilization, it cannot be truly such if it 
destroys particular civilizations.
304
  Rather, the various civilizations throughout the world 
exist, subsist, and persist symbiotically. 
Religious traditions are subject to the same finitude as individual humans are.  
Therefore, ―Religions are seeking fulfillment because as long as they are on earth they 
continue to evolve and stand in need of completion.‖305  Furthermore, all the religions 
that seek this fulfillment are not ‗self-sufficient‘ and, consequently, need each other in 
order to reach their goal.
306
  Because of this, ―Religions all stand on the same level, in 
that each one is an approximation of the divine, trying to lead their followers to the 
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experience of the divine.‖307   This experience of the divine, which Manimala refers to as 
an ‗Abba experience‘, is an experience of the immanent-transcendence revealed in 
christophanies.
308
 
 In an attempt to address the dilemma of seeing other religions as a threat to 
Christian identity, Panikkar utilizes the imagery of religious traditions as separate rivers 
that give life.
309
 With this image, Panikkar: 
takes a courageous step toward a solution of this dilemma by showing that the rivers of 
the earth neither truly meet each other—even in the oceans—nor are dependent on such a 
merging in order to become life-giving rivers.  The rivers do not meet, not even in the 
ocean.  ―They‖ meet each other nevertheless, namely, in heaven.  ―They‖ meet in the 
form of clouds after their initial transformation into vapor, coming down eventually as 
rain into the valleys of the mortals and nurturing the rivers of the earth.310   
This imagery highlights the mutuality of the relationship between religious 
traditions.  They each independently give life, yet they meet ‗eschatologically‘ and this 
eschatological union, in turn, feeds those rivers of life.  Thus, because religious traditions 
need each other, we must accept pluralism as a ―blessing‖ not a ―curse‖.311   This means 
avoiding any forced proselytism in the interreligious encounter.  After all, Manimala 
contends, religious freedom is a basic human right.
312
 ―If this freedom be abused, it is an 
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offence against God, not against man.‖313  Thus, rather than seeking to turn others into 
copies of ourselves, we should seek communion between religions, which is true unity in 
distinction.
314
  As we have pointed out in our first chapter, the Trinity is the source of 
this, and all, communion: 
Here the Trinitarian dimension of relationship may be greatly helpful.  In the Trinity the 
analogous process is the radical immanence and the radical emptiness by which each 
divine person indwells the others and makes way for others to effect a reciprocal 
action.315 
The Trinitarian hypostases encounter each other as ‗others‘ and do not seek to 
reduce this life-giving diversity to deadly uniformity.
316
  The identity of Jesus of 
Nazareth here is an entryway into cosmotheandric communion.  Manimala points out, 
―The incarnation is the window into the Trinitarian communion, and the path to 
participate in it.‖317  In reflection on this union we find that ―The typical feature of 
communion is the discovery in ourselves of an openness or response to a third person 
which we can hardly credit as coming from us, except by virtue of the indwelling of a 
second in us.‖318  Perichoresis is not limited to the Divine. 
As we have mentioned in our first chapter and shall revisit in our final chapter, the 
Christian conception of salvation is based on this communion.  This is the theosis 
discussed in Christian theology since its early years.  Manimala explains, ―The Christian 
vision of salvation looks toward a condition in which relation with God is realized and in 
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which one shares that realization with others.‖319   This inspires Manimala to urge a 
metanoia in our attitudes toward religion.  He says, ―Today the world yearns for a new 
type of religiosity; a paradigm shift is called for in living the life as people of a new 
religion.‖320  But in contrast to Komulainen‘s concern regarding such paradigms, 
Manimala‘s conception of a ‗new religion‘ is not one that does away with ‗old religion‘.  
Rather it is one that reforms the current traditions to embrace a wider openness.  For 
instance, the Christian tradition requires authority, but this should not result in 
authoritarianism.
321
  That is, the one exercising authority must realize that he is bound by 
human limitations.
322
  Such a paradigm seeks unity rather than uniformity.
323
  Panikkar 
explains the importance of openness: 
Christian self-understanding must be open to other religious experiences and belief-forms 
(and systems).  It must be willing to listen to them, to learn from them, even to absorb all 
they have to offer that will enrich or deepen the Christian interpretation.  Christian self-
understanding must show willingness for mutual transformation in dialogue.  This 
interreligious enrichment could produce a new ability of perception and ultimately a new 
form of religious awareness and of religion in general.324 
Thus, for Panikkar, Christian identity must embrace pluralism because it must 
embrace reality.  Reality itself is pluralistic.  By embracing pluralism, Christian identity 
opens itself to growth through the encounter with Christ, wherever Christ might be found. 
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4.2.12 Unity is at the Root of Christian Identity 
While it pervades his entire theological corpus, Panikkar‘s clearest treatment of 
the theme of unity comes in his opus magnum Christophany.  In this work, he declares, ―I 
would like to stress that man‘s dignity lies precisely in his being conscious of the fact that 
he and the Father are one.‖325  Thus, for Panikkar, Jesus the Christ‘s identity, as 
articulated in John‘s Gospel is the fullness human identity (see Jn 10:30).  This mystical 
union is the key to humanity‘s true selfhood.  Panikkar sees the work of the Spirit in this 
union.  Thus, it is for this reason that Jesus leaves his apostles shortly after the 
resurrection: 
Jesus knew that it was good that he leave, that he had not come to remain but to remain in 
us in the most perfect form, not as a more or less welcome guest foreign to us but in our 
very being.  This is the meaning of the eucharist.  This is the work of the Spirit.326 
Otherwise, Jesus would become an idol.
327
  Thus, Jesus the Christ leaves with 
―total faith in us.‖328  Thus, trust in the Spirit implicitly implies trust in humanity.329  To 
give this theological articulation, Panikkar suggests the idea of an incarnatio continua 
through the continuation of Jesus‘ ministry in those who are united to him in the Spirit.  
Panikkar insists, ―This incarnation is in fact the trinitarian vision of creation.‖330  In other 
words, ―Creation does not exist outside (extra Deum) God.  Rather, it is a moment, a 
dimension of the radical Trinity.‖331 
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 What is essential for our purposes here is that, in Panikkar‘s vision, the identity of 
Jesus the Christ is Christian identity.  And that is not all.  Christian identity is the fullness 
of human identity.
332
  Thus, ―The inner life of Jesus reveals a universal experience.‖333  
He makes this emphasis even clearer, stating, ―I am not assuming a dialectical position 
when I assert that I have no hesitation in saying ‗I am God‘—because God has said ‗I am 
Man‘.‖334   He continues, ―What I am doing, rather, is describing my own experience in 
an intimate, personal way.‖335  Panikkar‘s emphasis is on communion and takes seriously 
the Eastern tradition of theosis, which finds its inspiration in the declaration of the Petrine 
corpus that through Christ we ―may become participants in the divine nature (2 Pt 1:4).‖  
This notion has found axiomatic expression through Athanasius, who famously who 
penned, ―He [the Logos of God], indeed, assumed humanity that we might become 
God.‖336  In other words, Panikkar‘s ideas here are nothing new, but rather a time-
honored element of the Christian tradition. 
Furthermore, here it is clear that Panikkar is not dismissing the uniqueness of 
Jesus the Christ.  Rather, he is saying that Jesus reveals a dimension that is found, though 
not necessarily realized, in all of us.  However, Panikkar is not necessarily affirming that 
uniqueness either.  Unlike many contemporary theologians, he is, quite simply, 
unconcerned with this issue.  Thus, he declares: 
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The mysticism of Jesus Christ is simply human mysticism.  What else could it be?  It is 
the ultimate experience of man as Man.  Sat-purușa signifies not only an individual or 
exemplar of the human species but also the plenitude of what we all are.337 
 Thus, ―To sum up, the mystery of Christ is the mystery of the whole of reality—
divine, human, cosmic, without confusion yet without separation.‖338  This union is 
extended throughout time and space.  It is continuous.
339
  For this reason, in the first of 
his nine sūtras in Christophany, he asserts that ―Christ Is the Christian Symbol for the 
Whole of Reality.‖  Thus, ―A nonreductive Christian vision should be able to assert that 
every being is a christophany, a manifestation of the christic adventure of the whole of 
reality on its way to the infinite mystery.‖340  In other words, if Christians truly believe 
that Jesus the Christ reveals true human identity, then it should not be scandalous to 
assert the possibility that this identity (‗Christ‘) may be revealed elsewhere as well.  In 
his treatment of Panikkar, Francis D‘Sa discusses Christ as the symbol of the 
cosmotheandric character of reality.
341
  He explains, "Symbol, for Panikkar, is the thing 
itself in as much as it manifests itself.  The manifestation of the thing is not identical with 
the thing, but it is not separate either."
342
  Furthermore, as we saw with Panikkar‘s 
Trinitarian relationship between Father and Son, "The symbolized reality cannot be 
known except through the symbol."
343
  Therefore, ―Christ as the symbol of the 
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cosmotheandric Reality, ‗contains‘ the two poles: the divine on the one hand and the 
cosmic on the other."
344
 
This is explained further in the ninth sūtra of Panikkar‘s Christophany, in which 
he asserts that ―Christophany Is the Symbol of the Mysterium Coniunctionis of the 
Divine, Human, and Cosmic Reality.‖  Thus, as we have already mentioned several 
times, the christophany is a revelation of ―cosmotheandric experience.‖345 In this short 
reflection, Panikkar clarifies, ―It is worth saying that the nondual advaita to which I refer 
is neither a dialectical negation of duality nor a secondary act of the intellect—or perhaps 
better, the human spirit.  Rather, it is the direct vision that transcends rationality (without 
denying it).‖346  This is because Christ is the conjunction between the three aspects of 
reality.
347
  Thus Jesus the Christ‘s identity has cosmic significance, or rather, 
cosmotheandric significance.  That is, Christ reveals the true identity of humanity, God, 
and the world.  Salvation, then, is attained through faith that ―Jesus is the Christ.‖348 
However, this is not a theory, but a ―confession‖ or ―an existential affirmation.‖349  This 
affirmation takes place at a deeper level than the human logos.  It is an affirmation of 
faith not of belief.  With this in mind we shall turn to the soteriological and 
ecclesiological implications of Panikkar‘s theological vision in our next chapter. 
4.3 True Christian Identity is Established Mystically 
Joseph Prahbu points out that Panikkar‘s ―theology, or a-theology, takes its point 
of departure not from scripture or philosophy but from spiritual experience, both his own 
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and that of others.‖350  Jyri Komulainen notes that ―for Panikkar, writing is 
meditation.‖351  This poses many difficulties for the readers of his thought.  For instance, 
―he often does not even pursue scientific accuracy, but rather allows himself the liberty of 
using words in his own way.‖352  However, this mystical emphasis is also central to theo-
logy, an in-itself impossible task of putting the transcendent into finite terms.  
Consequently, as we have seen, because of this experiential starting point, Panikkar 
particularly highlights the insights of mysticism.  In a sense, mysticism allows Panikkar 
to maintain the tensions between religious traditions, resolving them only in divine 
eternity.   Because of this, mysticism is also the lynchpin of Panikkar‘s soteriology and 
ecclesiology.  Varghese Manimala explains Panikkar‘s utilization of mysticism in his 
overall theological project: 
For Panikkar, as well as for other contemporary authors, the ultimate root of our personal 
and collective problems lies in the dualisms we have constructed: between the I and the 
world, subject and object, matter and spirit, secular and sacred, temporal and eternal, 
culture and nature, masculine and feminine, body and mind, reason and intuition.353 
Mysticism unifies and consequently combats these artificial fractures we 
construct.  It integrates where there is dis-integration.  The solutions to the struggles of 
humanity can be aided through mystical union.  Salvation itself is mystical.  Manimala 
explains, ―According to Panikkar in order to overcome the contemporary predicament we 
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have to regain the elusive dimension of mystery.‖354  Christopher Denny points out that in 
Panikkar‘s thought, ―The praxis of interreligious reading is tolerance. By tolerance 
Panikkar is not referring to political, theological, philosophical, or pragmatic tolerance 
but, rather, a mystical tolerance constituted by an experience that transcends theory.‖355  
He insists that, for Panikkar, tolerance is the essence of soteriology because it 
communicates hope.
356
 
In this way, mysticism is orthopraxis: 
In order to remedy this situation praxis must take precedence over theory, a reversal of 
the priorities of an ideology. From Panikkar's perspective, one should read texts from 
other religious traditions in order to be converted to a mythic communion within which 
one can see the threads of a common human experience operative in the myths people 
live.357 
Thus, as we have seen, Panikkar insists upon the identification of self and 
Brahman.
358
  Yet, he tries to avoid ―monistic terms‖ by discussing varying 
perspectives.
359
  In this way, he avoids the reduction of the multiplicity of religious 
experiences to one common experience and the absolute equation of such varying 
experiences.
360
  Komulainen explains, ―The ―transcendentals‖ of Panikkarian 
anthropology—if such a Kantian expression is appropriate here—are different from each 
other and not as universal as those of Kantian philosophy.‖361 But, while distancing 
himself from modernism in this way, Panikkar is not purely ‗postmodern ‗either, he is 
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also critical of some aspects of postmodernity.
362
  Rather, Panikkar‘s interpretation of 
mystical unity and identity causes him forge an intriguing synthesis: 
He wishes to attach himself to the classical tradition of contemplation, and to give a new 
interpretation of it that highlights the irreducibility of the person to any abstract principle, 
divinity, or the Absolute—notwithstanding that his understanding of the person differs 
from that of modern individualism.363 
 Thus the person is irreducible to others, yet the person is not solipsistic or isolated 
in any manner.  Rather, as we have seen, it is through unity (with the divine and the 
world) that the person finds his/her fulfillment.  As we mentioned in our third chapter, 
this yearning for cosmotheandric unity is the ‗monk‘ in each human person.  This 
‗monastic‘ longing has undergone various manifestations.  Panikkar contrasts the 
‗traditional‘ and ‗modern‘ monk, saying, ―While traditional monasticism tends toward 
simplicity (aplotēs) through simplification, with the accompanying danger of 
reductionism, contemporary ―monasticism‖ seeks simplicity through integration, with the 
consequent danger of an eclectic juxtaposition.‖364  For Panikkar, the ‗modern‘ monastic 
manifestation that seeks simplicity through integration demonstrates the universality of 
this anthropological characteristic.  Thus, monkhood is not exhibited by those who 
espouse complexity.  He explains ‗simplicity‘:  
Simplicity, as the etymology of the word suggests, indicates a single-fold, singleness, a 
one-without-a-second, without duplicity of any kind.  Sim-plicity on the ultimate level is 
only possible if the multi-plicity is but the fruit of a single reality unfolding.  Ultimately, 
the manifold character of reality is viewed as only secondary, contingent.  Simplicity as 
an ideal implies the belief that either the multiplicity is reducible to a unit or that there is 
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no way of salvaging all those ―inferior‖ elements, since they belong to a merely apparent 
world.365 
Panikkar explains that ―blessed‖ simplicity and ―harmonious‖ complexity are 
―two basic human options.‖366  He elaborates by explaining that in its rudimentary form 
the attitude of ‗blessed simplicity‘ rests on the belief in a perfect and simple God who, for 
monotheists, is at the root of reality.  One finds meaning, then, by returning to the source 
of life.
367
 And in its rudimentary form ‗harmonious complexity rests on pluralistic beliefs 
that are not, in the end, compatible with belief in the simple God of monotheism.
368
  Both 
of these approaches, however, have ―their respective insufficiencies.‖369  Yet these two 
ideals are two ‗moments‘ in the same timeline.  He insists, ―Complexity as an ideal 
implies the belief that there is a supereminent unity holding everything together.‖370  Yet, 
one cannot reduce reality to a single, all-consuming principle; rather, one must have ―a 
certain type of pluralism within the highest unity.‖371  Thus: 
In spite of all the differences and irreducibilities, the very awareness of plurality entails a 
higher unity.  There has also to be a certain relationship between the ultimate ingredients 
of reality.  This is, I submit, what the doctrine of the Trinity as well as that of Advaita 
stand for.  Here is where I speak of the cosmotheandric character of reality.372 
In much the same way, Panikkar holds that contemplation and praxis are not 
diametrically opposed.  Rather, one leads to the other. He insists, ―Being is one, or it can 
be unified.  Doing and having, on the other hand, entail multiplicity.‖373  This multiplicity 
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of ‗doing and having‘ is ultimately grounded in unity.  It is this unity that is sought by the 
monk (a category that is not limited to those in monasteries for Panikkar).  Panikkar says, 
―At any rate, the value of each being lies in its being what it is, not in what it does or has.  
The intuition of being thus stripped of all spurs or inducements—this is what the monk 
glimpses.‖374  He continues by insisting that monkhood does not focus on either doing or 
having something.  Rather, the purpose of monkhood is to allow the core of the person to 
reach its full potential.
375
 And the ‗multiplicity‘ of action finds a foundation in this ‗core‘ 
or ‗fullness‘. It is for this reason that in contemporary monasticism, praxis and theory are 
not polar opposites.
376
  Rather, praxis is rooted in theory and theory is often inspired by 
praxis.
377
  He deepens this insight into the union of unity and multiplicity, saying, ―the 
new monk stresses the unity of being and doing, but he underscores the distinction 
between being and having.  Having is not simply riches, it is also the power of the 
means.‖378   Thus, the ‗new‘ monk is engaged in the world.  In fact, the modern monk is 
frustrated by the isolation of traditional monk that relegated the monk to a sphere of 
‗social inaction‘ in order to center the self in such a way that saw these two goals as 
opposed to each other.
379
 
 Panikkar explains that the mystic life of the monk has always been intended to 
‗overcome spatio-temporal parameters‘.380  In discussing this, Panikkar asserts, 
―Monastic existence does not move solely or principally in time and space.  Interiority, 
on the one hand, and transcendence, on the other, are classical monastic categories.  The 
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spatio-temporal involvement is foreign to the monk.‖381  Monastics are a sign for others 
of the transcendent.   Thus, the monk give us a glimpse into that that which is beyond our 
human experience by revealing a set of concerns that extend beyond those of everyday 
life.
382
  Panikkar‘s ‗contemporary‘ monasticism sees this ―going beyond‖ as the 
uncovering of a dimension of life that does not negate the value of the ‗material‘ 
concerns of everyday life but that instead transforms them.
383
  In other words, it is not 
dualistic, setting ‗imperfect‘ matter against ‗perfect‘ spirit.  So, classic monasticism 
emphasizes transcendence while contemporary monasticism emphasizes immanence (or, 
better said, immanence in accord with transcendence).  Panikkar defines immanence: 
―Immanence is not something that is so interior to a thing that it has somehow already 
transcended the thing itself, but rather something which dwells in very marrow of the 
being in question and constitutes it, without thereby being totally identified with it.‖384  
The immanence that the monk seeks illuminates the tempiternity of which we spoke in 
our second chapter.  Panikkar explains: ―The lived experience of tempiternal awareness, 
for example, is not that of an existence faced with an atemporal and, in the last analysis, 
post-temporal eternity, but rather the experience of those tempiternal moments of this 
very existence in time and space.‖385  As we saw earlier, it is precisely Christ who is 
identified with this tempiternal awareness.  The tempiternal intuition that the monk 
strives for entails the union of transcendence and immanence that is only attainable 
through communion.  It is for this reason that the monk does not eschew the values that 
give shape to everyday human existence.  Rather, the monk tries to nourish and realize all 
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of these values.
386
  Thus, once again, we encounter Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric 
worldview: ―Reality is neither monistic nor dualistic, but advaitic, Trinitarian, and vital, 
that is, pluralistic (although) without separation.‖387 
 Panikkar discusses tempiternity in some more detail in one of his nine sutras in 
Blessed Simplicity, in which he discusses the ‗transhistorical consciousness‘ of the monk 
and its priority over ‗historical concern‘.388  He explains that it is neither a form of 
‗perfect‘ temporality nor a form of eternity that is completely shielded from temporality, 
but the harmonious integration of time and eternity, which seem to be disparate factors, 
into one holistic vision of reality.
389
  With regard to soteriology, this means that: 
Salvation, moksa, nirvāna, and other expressions of the ultimate end of human life are 
not projected into a future that has been somewhat purified or perfected, but are 
discovered in the very fullness that we are capable of experiencing in time and not 
―later.‖  This awareness discovers, in and through the temporal, the tempiternal nucleus 
of the plenitude of our being—or however else we would choose to describe this 
reality.390 
Panikkar uses the Transfiguration as an example of a manifestation of 
tempiternity.  He states, ―The Taboric experience is for me a paramount example of what 
I call sacred secularity.  The transfiguration of Jesus on the mountain—not in the 
temple—breaks down the separation between the profanum and the fanum, the profane 
and the sacred.‖391  In the transfiguration, Jesus is seen in a glorified state, yet he has not 
left the Earth or ceased to be Jesus of Nazareth.  This event is one of the many 
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christophanic events that are recorded in the Gospels.  It shows forth the union of the 
sacred and the secular that is the christophany of Jesus of Nazareth (and any christophany 
for that matter).  On this union of sacred and secular Panikkar notes: 
This seeing is the Kingdom of God—here, now.  The Buddhist symbol manifesting the 
same intuition is the Buddha-nature of all things, which only needs to be discovered as 
such.  The Māhāyanic tradition will express it by saying that samsāra is nirvāna and 
nirvāna, samsāra.  Vedāntic Hinduism will emphasize that we are already Brahman, 
even though we fail to notice it.  And Jainism together with Gnosticism will tell us that 
the ātman and the real are simply buried or enclosed in karma and matter, and that one 
need only be freed of these occultations.392 
This transhistorical ―intuition‖ or ―the—Taboric, if you wish—revelation that 
reality is nondualistic, Trinitarian, and simple, but with a simplicity that is at the same 
time multifaceted, and whose interpretation—perichoresis—is not always given to our 
experience.‖393  Thus, it needs to be sought.  For Panikkar, the basic human 
cosmotheandric intuition is at the heart of monkhood.  It is precisely for this reason that 
all are called to ‗monkhood‘, particularly in its ‗modern‘ holistic form.  The mystic will 
remark that once one catches a glimpse of the ‗beyond‘, or ―the other shore‖, as the 
Buddhist insight goes, all else seems dreadfully mundane and it is difficult to come back.  
All other cares and worries, no matter how essential, are suddenly (or only apparently 
suddenly for they have always been this way) unimportant and non-essential.  This is the 
essence of the Buddhist insistence on the non-reality of being.  Thus: 
Transhistorical consciousness lets us perceive that the meaning of life consists of 
reaching the greatest happiness that each of us can, at any and every given moment; 
freeing us in this way from the desire to chase after happiness where it cannot be found.  
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Salvation, says an immense majority of religious traditions, consists of joy, chara, 
ānanda, sukha, nirvāna, heaven, etc.  The fact that this happiness was not seen to be 
fulfilled in the lives of the majority of mortals during this life, as well as the fact of being 
steered by a certain cosmological interpretation of time and space, has deferred and 
transplanted happiness to another other-worldly sphere.  It is for this reason too that the 
majority of traditions believe that it is only the very few who are saved: very few reach 
complete happiness and peace in this life.394 
Because of this happiness, the monk is considered one who demonstrates that all 
of us can achieve the serenity and happiness of human fulfillment no matter what one‘s 
condition and context may be.
395
  Simply put, the monk exhibits hope because the monk 
‗sees‘ him/herself and the world as it really is.  Thus, it is not our riches, our political 
leaders, or even our friends and families per se, that give us hope; rather hope extends 
from the transhistorical consciousness exhibited by the monk, which can see all these 
things in their appropriate context.  This transhistorical consciousness is attuned to 
finding christophanies.  Thus, as Manimala points out, the cosmotheandric calling is also 
a call to find a lifestyle that transcends the historical.
396
  He continues by likening this 
transhistorical consciousness to ‗mystical awareness‘.397  Through this salvific awareness, 
one ―reaches the fullness of time‖398  And, ―Then my individuality touches everything 
and everybody and yet I am all the more: aham Brahman.‖399  Once again we see that 
salvation is the realization of one‘s true identity: 
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And this is the paradox: I become all the more my authentic self the more my ego has 
disappeared.  Transhistorical existence calls for sharing in the unfolding of life, the 
ability to share oneself with the whole of creation, the openness to the Divine and the 
World, the entrusting oneself to the macrocosm with the hope that explosion of the 
adventure of Be-ing will take place in due time.  This is reaching fullness: nirvā a or 
salvation (soteria).400 
This brings us to another insight expressed in a sutra in Blessed Simplicity, in 
which Panikkar locates the quest of the monk in the prioritization of ‗the fullness of the 
person over the individual‘.401   For Panikkar, the individual is a piece of the 
cosmotheandric whole that has been conceptually carved out.  Thus, ―The individual is an 
abstraction, in the precise sense of the word: all that would make Man too involved and 
unmanageable is abstracted from the human being.  An individual is a manageable entity 
with clear-cut boundaries.  It is an identifiable piece standing on its own, isolated.‖402  By 
contrast, the ‗person‘ extends beyond the limited parameters of the individual and finds 
him or herself in his or her context.  The ‗person‘ entails and includes the entire 
complicated ‗web‘ of interwoven human relationships that form one.403  After all, an I 
needs a Thou in order to be an I.
404
  For the monk, ―the person is the community, even if 
it is only a solitary monk.‖405 
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 This has ecclesiological consequences.  Panikkar states, ―The membership in the 
ecclesia, the umma, the matha is not with a view to doing anything special, but of 
being—and being (perfectly) what (I believe) I am supposed to be.‖406  Here, Panikkar 
connects the church with identity and self-realization, saying, ―I am not only a pars in 
toto, but also a pars pro toto.  I am unique and indispensible.‖407  Therefore: 
If I leave, I kill my very being and also do irreparable damage to the ecclesia, the 
samgha.  This is Hell for me, and an incurable wound to the organism.  The hand cannot 
live cut off from the body, nor can it be replaced by the eye—although in due time there 
may be regeneration (kalpas and the law of karma) and reconciliation (forgiveness and 
redemption).  The famous dictum extra ecclesiam nulla salus (outside the samgha, 
Nature, the buddhakāya, the dharmakāya, the Church…there is no salvation) is an 
essential feature of that communion of the saints.  When a particular group claims 
ownership of that ecclesia or knowledge of its boundaries, this is another matter 
altogether.  The community outside of which there is no salvation cannot, obviously, be 
an organization.  It has to be a sacrament, a samskāra, a mysterion.  By burning your 
passport you may renounce the State (and its protection or oppression of you).  But by 
this act you do not cancel your language or your nation.408 
 Thus Panikkar returns to the famous axiom often connected to Cyprian.  The 
Church is the place of the realization of identity.  Thus, to leave the Church is to leave the 
self.  Yet, at the same time, this ecclesial identity is not strictly identified with an 
institution, although it is not completely separate from the institution either.  As Panikkar 
points out, ―Now the monk discovers his roots within the entire reality.‖409 So, being a 
person entails a centered life center in which one locates him/herself within the context of 
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the totality of reality.
410
  Being a person is a cosmotheandric act.  For Panikkar, the monk 
favors the simplicity of the person over the complexity of the individual because it tends 
toward this integration. 
 This manifests itself variously.  For instance, ―The traditional monk is monachos 
because he is not a dipsychos, a being with a twofold soul, with a double end and a 
double life.‖411  And the contemporary monk does not seek to be one who is merely ‗set 
apart‘; rather he/she seeks to be one who is ultimately integrated within the whole of 
reality.
412
  Thus, integration is the key to Panikkar‘s ‗contemporary‘ monastic worldview.  
According to another of Panikkar‘s sutras in Blessed Simplicity, the monk gives primacy 
to the ‗holy‘.413 He explains that reality is complex and, consequently, human existence is 
complex as well.  The monk seeks to achieve unification with all that is by seeking union 
with the holy.
414
  Because of this, ―The monk endeavors to attain unqualified holiness.  
He strives for holiness only.  He seeks the Absolute; if God is the holy, he strives for 
God.‖415  Even those who, like Buddhists and Jainists, do not have a ‗Supreme Being‘ are 
still striving for ‗absolute holiness‘.416  They seek union with transcendent emptiness, that 
which cannot be described by human categories, including that of ‗emptiness‘. 
For Panikkar the monk (whether living in a monastery or in the ‗world‘) seeks the 
‗center‘: ―The sacred stands in relation to the profane, but the holy is the center of 
everything and of every activity.‖417  Panikkar points out that for ‗classical monasticism‘, 
this holy ‗center‘ is discovered in that which is transcendent, eternal, and other-worldly, 
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but in contemporary religiosity, this same holiness can be found in secularity.
418
  These 
two are actually united and ‗contemporary monasticism‘ demonstrates that ―the holy is 
also the center of the secular and acts at times as a catalyst.‖419  This yields a new 
appraisal of the ‗secular‘.  Secularity can be seen as expressing that all that is temporal, 
including embodiment, historicity, and materiality are included in the Ultimate, although 
they are not the only or total manifestation thereof.
420
  He continues, ―The secular is no 
longer that which is fleeting, provisional, perishable, contingent, and so forth, but is 
rather the very clothing of the permanent, the eternal, and the immutable—to continue 
using for a moment categories that must soon be superseded.‖421 
 Because of this, the monk who may be very involved in the world is nonetheless 
different from those around him/her: 
In his own eyes the monk is one segregated, set apart [the etymology of ‗holy‘], but in 
people‘s consciousness he is holy and thus by no means a marginal or peripheral being.  
The monk resides in the very center of society, and when they are faced by what appear 
to be technically insoluble problems the people approach their saints, their monks, 
hermits, and ascetics.422 
 The monk then, while united to the whole of reality, also represents ‗something 
different‘.  The monk, by living a centered life, provides others with information about 
their own lives.  The monk works christophanically to awaken the monastic element in 
the identity of each person, the monk within each of us.  Christ is the source, end, and 
content of the monastic life.  At the outset of The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, Panikkar 
comments: 
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The thesis of this book was and is that the Christian, in recognizing, believing in and 
loving Christ as the central symbol of Life and Ultimate Truth, is being drawn towards 
that selfsame Mystery that attracts all other human beings who are seeking to overcome 
their own present condition.423 
But, the approach toward Mystery is not separate from Mystery itself; ―The Way 
cannot be severed from the Goal.‖424  ‗How‘ we come to understand the Mystery maps 
out the contours of the Mystery.  Panikkar uses the image of an approach to a mountain 
peak to demonstrate this, saying, ―It is not simply that there are different ways leading to 
the peak, but that the summit itself would collapse if all the paths disappeared.  The peak 
is in a certain sense the result of the slopes leading to it.‖425  This does not mean, 
however, that the Mystery is no longer a Mystery: 
And yet, the goal cannot be identified with any of the ways or means to it.  Though Christ 
is the Mystery in the sense that to see Christ is to reach the Mystery, still the Mystery 
cannot be totally identified with Christ.  Christ is but one aspect of the Mystery as a 
whole, even though he is the Way when we are on that way.426 
Here, by way of introduction to his thesis, it appears that Panikkar is using Christ 
in the particular Christian sense.  Yet, even in the work where he universalizes the 
concept of Christ, Panikkar is pointing out that the divine constantly outstrips our 
apprehension of it.  Thus, the revelations of Christ, the christophanies that we experience, 
only allow us glimpses of the Mystery that encompasses all of reality.  Yet, they are, 
nonetheless, true glimpses.  It is this apprehension of Mystery and constant probing 
thereof that drives the mystic endlessly, even asymptotically, forward.  Panikkar notes, 
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―There are ex-Catholics, ex-Marxists, ex-Buddhists and so forth, but I know of no ex-
mystic.‖427  This could be taken in a couple of different manners.  Panikkar obviously 
intends to say that those who practice mysticism do not ‗lose‘ their faith.  Rather, they get 
lost in their faith.  But, as we saw in our third chapter, when we speak of faith, we are 
really speaking of a deep anthropological stratum.  In this sense, there is an element of 
the mystical in each of us, even though it often remains unrealized.  The mystic, then, 
cannot become an ex-mystic any more than a person can become an ex-person.  This 
allows Panikkar to find mystical commonality in that which Christians call ‗Christ‘.  In 
dialogue, ―There is an x which is unknown, qua Christ, to both parties and to which the 
name ‗Christ‘ could be applied once it is made clear that both sides can make a 
meaningful use of it.‖428 
Thus, ―authentic unity‖ is found on the mystical level.429  This allows for unity in 
diversity.  Panikkar contends: 
There is more difference between, for instance, Saint Francis and Saint Dominic, two 
Catholic saints of the same century, than between a lukewarm Roman Catholic and a 
lukewarm Methodist.  There is more unity, however, between the former pair, though 
there is less uniformity.430 
The same is true of the great divergences in Hinduism.  Despite these differences, 
there is great unity shared by all of the traditions.  This unity in diversity allows for the 
‗ecumenical ecumenism‘ we spoke of above.431 In this way, ―The true Christian (as also 
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the true Hindu) possesses nothing, not even the truth.‖432  The key here is epistemological 
humility.  In much the same way, in his fourth sūtra in Christophany, Panikkar asserts 
that ―Christians do not have a monopoly on the knowledge of Christ.‖433  With this in 
mind, he insists, ―No religion that is lived in depth will be content with representing a 
part of the whole.  It will rather yearn for the whole, even if in a limited and imperfect 
way.‖434  This can illustrate for us that relativity is not relativism.435  Despite the 
conditioned character of religious knowledge, the true person of faith is, nonetheless, 
confident that what he/she professes is the truth even if it is communicated in finite terms.  
Thus, even the Christian religion finds mystical yearning for the fullness of truth as the 
basis of its truth.  Christianity, then, is true because it does not claim to comprehend the 
truth; rather, it simply claims to receive it. 
 Panikkar tries to distance himself from triumphalism, insisting that the answer to 
whether the religious symbols of other traditions are ―the same unique Christ‖ depends 
on one‘s perspective.436  From perspective of other religious traditions, the answer is ‗no‘.  
They do not need Christian language and symbols.
437
  From the Christian perspective, 
however, the answer is ‗yes‘ because Christ is the ―symbol of reality‘s ultimate 
mystery.‖438  Here he is moderating his use of language from the titular phrasing of The 
Hidden Christ of Hinduism to something less offensive to the Hindu sensibility (and that 
of others).  Thus, the same mystery is sought by all, yet named alternately.  As we have 
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Longman and Todd Ltd., 1964), 41.  In the original edition, there is no parenthetical  mention of Hinduism. 
433Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 157. 
434 Ibid. 
435 See also Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, (New York, NY, Paulist Press, 
1978), 21. 
436 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 157. 
437 Ibid., 158. 
438 Ibid., 159. 
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mentioned, this does not result in simple relativism.  Rather, each description of the 
mystery brings out something different about that mystery.  As we saw in our first 
chapter, the names for the divine expressed differently by different traditions are 
homological (functional equivalents), but, they are not thereby interchangeable. 
How then does one account for the diversity of religious traditions?  Regarding 
the relationship between religious traditions, Panikkar states: 
If the analogy of static polar pairs was misleading, historically untrue, psychologically 
inadequate and theologically contradictory; and if the analogy of dynamic pairs was 
ambivalent by definition, psychologically disappointing and theologically misleading—
how then are we to define the and of Hinduism and Christianity?  It cannot be translated 
by an optimistic ‗towards‘ or a pessimistic ‗versus‘.  Simply to shift the alleged 
horizontal movement of the dynamic analogy and to turn it into a vertical movement 
within each tradition may be a valid observation of the real nature of this phenomenon of 
religion, but it sidesteps the present issue of the relationship between two very different 
concrete religious realities and tends to equalize or ignore their differences.  Differences 
are not by nature undesirable.439 
These differences are important as we approach the Divine because ―no single 
analogy‖ is adequate.440  In imagery reminiscent of a perichoretic, Trinitarian 
relationship, Panikkar theorizes, ―Perhaps each religion is a dimension of the other in a 
sui generis co-inherence or co-involvement, just as each human is potentially the whole 
of Mankind, though each one develops and actualizes only a finite number of possibilities 
                                                        
439 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 94-95. 
440 Ibid., 95. 
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in a limited way.‖441  In this way, he suggests that these traditions are something like 
―maps‖ to the divine that are useful, yet finite guides.442   
With this in mind, Varghese Manimala begins his treatment of Panikkar‘s work 
with an eye toward ‗something‘ beyond the particularities of religious traditions. He 
states, ―The earnest hope expressed in this book is that we all become capable of such 
transformation, and be endowed with the capacity of transcending our religion and reach 
out to others in true dialogue and sharing.‖443  In much the same way, Panikkar‘s efforts 
are aimed at establishing a transcendent horizon that allows one to deepen their particular 
faith.  As we saw in our previous chapter, this almost sounds like a form of synchronism 
that establishes a ‗new religion‘ that goes beyond the old ones.  Yet, this is not what 
Panikkar envisions.  It is precisely the inaccessibility of such a horizon that leaves it out 
of the reach of various religious traditions and individuals.  Thus, Panikkar urges us to 
―go beyond their religious practices and reach silence and dhyāna, the core of mystical 
experience.‖444  In this manner, ―Religions need to realize that they are only means; they 
are not an end in themselves.‖445  Thus, the human goal is mystical communion.  In the 
Epilogue of Christophany, Panikkar sums up this aspect of his thought by saying:  
The christophany from within which we are timidly suggesting constituted the deepest 
interiority of all of us, the abyss in which, in each one of us there is a meeting between 
the finite and the infinite, the material and spiritual, the cosmic and the divine.  The 
christophany of the third millennium is a summons to us to live this experience.446 
                                                        
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 10. 
444 Raimon Panikkar, ―Introduction,‖ in Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and 
Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, 19. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 189. 
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 For a time in late 1980s and 1990s, Panikkar distinguishes his expanded notion of 
Christian identity from a more narrow, traditional, ‗institutionalized‘ version of Christian 
identity by calling the former ‗christianness‘.447  He defines the traditional notion of the 
Christian in terms of the encounter with Christ in the Incarnation: 
The christian is a person of faith.  This faith has its basis in the person of Jesus.  
Therefore, theological discussions have to explain who Jesus is.  Yet the primary point 
here is less Jesus‘ nature than the reality of the Jesus-event, especially the event of the 
resurrection.  This event is, above all others, a historical fact in the life of Jesus: the 
condemnation of one man from Palestine by the judicial religious and lawful authorities 
of his time.  We are here firmly rooted in history and especially in the personal history of 
Jesus; hence, loyalty to his person is at the center.  The teachings of this young rabbi are 
fascinating, though most of his words may have been others before him.  His example 
exerts an irresistible magnetism.448 
 Even such a focus on the historically particular is pregnant with universal 
significance.  This particularized Christian identity fits into the broader notion of 
Christian identity that Panikkar promotes (in this case using the term ‗christianness‘): 
Christianness stands for the experience of Christ‘s life in us, for the insight that we are in 
communion with all of reality without losing out identity; it stands for the experience that 
―I and the Father are one,‖ that labels are not relevant, that certainty is hardly important, 
that even reflection is only a secondary source of knowledge (thought a primary tool).449  
                                                        
447 Raimon Panikkar, A Dwelling Place for Wisdom, 129ff.  Note that by the turn of the century, he has 
dropped this distinction.  What he calls ‗christianness‘ is the primary form of Christian identity that he 
espouses. 
448 Ibid., 124. 
449 Ibid., 152.  We should note that here Panikkar recognizes the limited usefulness of the term ‗mystical‘: 
―Only hesitantly am I using here the phrase ―mystical experience‖; but there is perhaps no better 
expression.‖ 
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 True Christian identity, then is found in the realization of communion.  It is found 
in cosmotheandric insight.  It is found in union with Christ.
450
  As we shall see in our next 
chapter, this conception of true Christian identity has significant ramifications for both 
soteriology and ecclesiology. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 As we have seen, Panikkar‘s Christological reflections focus on the universality 
of ‗Christ‘.  At the same time, Panikkar does not wish to discard the particularities of 
Jesus of Nazareth.  Because the category of ‗christophany‘ is not limited to Jesus the 
Christ, there can be many ‗christophanies‘.  What is significant about each 
‗christophany‘, particularly that of Jesus of Nazareth, is the revelatory character thereof.  
The ‗christophany‘ reveals the cosmotheandric unity that underlies all of reality and 
towards the fulfillment of which all of reality tends.  Christ, then, reveals identity to 
humanity and to all of reality.  Thus, Christian identity is human identity. 
 This identity is not threatened, but enhanced by dialogue with others.  Because of 
this, Panikkar insists real interreligious dialogue is supported and made possible by 
intrareligious dialogue.  Thus, de facto pluralism provides an opportunity for people of 
all traditions to come to know their own identity by opening themselves up to that of 
others.  The many religious traditions all approach the ineffable in irreducibly different, 
yet not necessarily incompatible ways.  Identity, at its deepest level is rooted in the divine 
mystery and the communion that flows from it.  Because of this, Christian identity is 
never in jeopardy as the Christian encounters the identity of others.  On the contrary, 
Christian identity is chiefly conditioned by union with Christ.  And, Christ can be found 
                                                        
450 Ibid., 113.  Panikkar notes, ―My contention is that neither is the christic principle a particular event nor 
is it universal in the sense of a universal religion.‖  Rather, ―It is the center of reality.‖  Here, Panikkar uses 
the generalized term ‗christic principle‘ in contradistinction from the particularity of Jesus of Nazareth.  
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both inside and outside the tradition bearing the name ‗Christian‘.  In our final chapter, 
we will draw out the ecclesiological and soteriological significance of these reflections. 
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Chapter 5 
Ecclesiological and Soteriological Implications 
Now that we have examined Panikkar‘s thoughts on Christology and identity and 
have related the two, let us attempt to apply these as we examine the ecclesiological and 
soteriological dimensions of Panikkar‘s thought.  As we have seen in our previous 
chapter, bound up with the identity of Jesus the Christ is the identity of those who follow 
him.  Therefore, ecclesiology and Christology are intimately connected.  As we have 
seen, Panikkar‘s Christology centers upon a ‗cosmic‘ notion of Christ.  Below we will 
argue that, because the church flows from Christ, a ‗cosmic‘ Christology demands a 
‗cosmic‘ ecclesiology. However, perhaps because of the exclusivist connotation, he does 
not use any such phrase.  In fact, in order to avoid triumphalism, Panikkar tends avoid an 
extended discussion of ‗church‘ in general.  Nonetheless, there are many places where he 
provides the ecclesiological fragments that we shall attempt to assemble below.  With 
regard to soteriology, we shall see that Panikkar‘s notions of identity and ‗cosmic‘ 
Christology and our reflections on a ‗cosmic‘ ecclesiology shall come into play.  
5.1 Ecclesiology 
Ecclesiologically, Panikkar points out that the mission of the church is to point to 
Christ not to itself.  In contrast to views that envision the centrality of the Church, 
Panikkar asserts, ―In actual fact the claim of the Church is not that she is the religion for 
the whole of mankind but that she is the place where Christ is fully revealed, the end and 
plenitude of every religion.‖1  Thus, the Church is the community that is united to Christ.  
                                                        
1 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—Mystery, 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 55. 
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As we have seen throughout this project, the human religious experience is that of 
cosmotheandric communion: 
The religious encounter is in reality much more than the meeting of two friends, it is a 
communion in being, in the one Being which is much more intimate to both than they are 
to themselves.  It is a communion not only in Christ, but also of Christ.  No 
condescension, no paternalism or superiority is to be found in the true encounter.2 
Because of this cosmotheandric unity, this communion is accessible to all beings.  
Thus Panikkar insists, ―Any Christ who is less than a Cosmic, Human and divine 
Manifestation will not do.‖3  Thus, Christ is communion.  A christophany, then, reveals 
this communion.  In this respect, Panikkar makes a rare mention of the concept of 
Church.  He states, ―Christian tradition is not doctrine alone; it is also ekklēsia in the 
deepest sense of the word.  It has to do not only with what Jesus said and did but with 
who he was and who we are.‖4  The Christian Church is an extension of the Christophany 
of Jesus of Nazareth.  What is extended is Jesus‘ Identity.  Thus, the Church is an 
extension of Christ‘s self-consciousness.5 
For Paul of Tarsus, Christians are ‗set apart‘.  They are the ‗holy ones‘, the 
‗saints‘.  Paul‘s usage of holiness to describe the Church finds its roots in the ‗Holy 
Assembly‘ of Israel, who are told in Leviticus: ―For I, the LORD, am your God; and you 
shall make and keep yourselves holy, because I am holy (Lev 11:44).‖  He tells the 
Thessalonians: ―For God did not call us to impurity but to holiness (agiasmo;         (1 
                                                        
2 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised and 
Enlarged Edition, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), 61. See also Raymond (Raimon) Panikkar, The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism, (London, UK: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 1964), 27.  In the later 
edition, Panikkar changes ‗Christian‘ encounter to ‗religious‘ encounter. 
3 Ibid., 27. 
4 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, Transl. Alfred DiLascia, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2004), 53. 
5 Ibid., 60. 
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Thes 4:7).‖  In Romans, he greets ―the beloved of God in Rome, called to be holy (agiois; 
  ίο ς) (Rom 1:7).‖  Paul tells the Phillippians to: 
Give my greetings to every holy one (agion;    ον) in Christ Jesus. The brothers who are 
with me send you their greetings; all the holy ones (agioi;    ο ) send you their greetings, 
especially those of Caesar's household (Phil 4:21). 
We also see Paul use this concept of the ‗holy ones‘ when referring to Christian 
communities other than the one with which he is corresponding.  For instance, when 
taking a collection for the Church in Jerusalem, he refers to it a ―collection for the holy 
ones (agious;   ίους) (1 Cor 16:1).‖  And he tells the Romans: ―Now, however, I am 
going to Jerusalem to minister to the holy ones (agiois;   ίο ς) (Rom 15:25).‖ 
God calls all Christians to holiness.  But, as is apparent in Paul‘s mission to the 
gentiles, God calls all to Christ.  Therefore, God calls all to holiness.  The ‗saints‘ are 
those that have been made ‗holy‘ by union with Christ; those who have responded to this 
universal call (see 1 Cor 1:1-2).
6
  They are united with Christ and made ‗holy‘ by baptism 
(see 1 Cor 6:11).
7
   So, ‗saints‘ for Paul are not simply the great figures to be admired.  
Rather, all members of the Church are ‗saints‘ because they are called to holiness.  And, 
all are called to holiness, so all are called to be admirable.  Therefore, for Paul, the saint, 
the ‗holy one‘, is the basic unit of the Church.  The saint is the ‗building block‘, so to 
speak, of the Church.  As we shall see momentarily, using Panikkar‘s notions of 
monasticism and mysticism as basic anthropological categories, we can propose a 
Panikkarian gloss on this important ecclesiological concept. 
                                                        
6 ―Paul, called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus by the will of God, and Sosthenes our brother, to the church 
of God that is in Corinth, to you who have been sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be holy, with all those 
everywhere who call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, their Lord and ours (1 Cor 1:1-2).‖ 
7 ―That is what some of you used to be; but now you have had yourselves washed, you were sanctified, you 
were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God (1 Cor 6:11).‖ 
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As we have seen, for Panikkar, cosmotheandrism is at the root of all reality and, 
consequently, is an important part of what it means to be human.  The human quest, then, 
is to realize this mystical union.  Therefore, ‗Christ‘ is present wherever this union is 
present.  Christ is everywhere; Christ has cosmic parameters.  Particular christophanies 
help to bring this mystical aspect of reality into explicit categories.  This helps us to act 
upon and live out this union. The chief among these, particularly for Christians, is the 
christophany found in Jesus of Nazareth.  By extending the ministry of Jesus of Nazareth, 
the Church too can be considered a christophany. 
When it comes to ecclesiology, however, Panikkar tends to remain rather muted.  
Like many of his colleagues in the field of the theology of religions, he (perhaps wisely) 
avoids emphasis on ecclesiology so as to avoid an overly-ecclesiastical tone.  Panikkar 
rightly puts the emphasis on Christ.  Ecclesiology, then, should follow Christology.  But, 
if we take seriously, Paul‘s image of the church as the ‗body of Christ‘, then we ought to 
give ecclesiology some thought.  And, if we do take this metaphor seriously, then we 
must conclude that a ‗cosmic Christology‘ demands some sort of ‗cosmic ecclesiology‘.  
After all, where there is real union with Christ, the Church is present. 
5.2 Critical Evaluation: A Cosmic Christology Demands a Cosmic Ecclesiology 
 The term ‗church‘ is somewhat polyvalent.  It can conjure up different images 
from ones of ecclesiastical hierarchy to those of the ‗people of God‘.  It has both broad 
and narrow connotations.  These can either be institutional, on the one hand, or mystical, 
on the other.  It is to the latter pole that we are appealing here.  In the 20
th
 century in 
Catholic theology, we saw an increasing emphasis on this ‗mystical‘ element of the 
Church.  In broad terms, this emphasis finds its way into ‗official‘ documents with 
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particular focus in Pius XII‘s Mystici Corporis Christi, although Pius is sure to identify 
this mystical element strictly with the Catholic Church, insisting that the mystical and 
institutional elements can be distinguished, but never separated.  However, Lumen 
Gentium of the Second Vatican Council left the matter a little more ambiguous declaring 
that the true Church of Christ ―subsists in [subsistit in] the Catholic Church.‖8 
 Following both Panikkar and Pius XII‘s emphasis on the ‗mystical‘ element of the 
Church, we can perhaps expand upon Paul of Tarsus‘ usage of the ‗holy ones‘ or ‗saints‘ 
to describe Christians.  What makes one holy is union with the Holy One, God.  This 
communion, which Panikkar calls ‗cosmotheandrism‘, is at the root of all reality.  It is 
already present, yet often unrealized.  Where this cosmotheandric union is present, Christ 
is present.  Taking cognizance of this aspect of the humanum brings one closer to human 
fulfillment.  Therefore, simply put, the holy ones are the ones united to the Holy One; the 
saint is the mystic. 
 We should point out that rather than narrowing the notions of ‗saint‘ or ‗church‘, 
we are appealing to Panikkar‘s broader notion of ‗mystic‘.  For Panikkar, the mystical is 
a dimension of any true anthropology.  Thus, all humans are capable of building on this 
anthropological foundation.  Those who do build on this foundation become the ‗holy 
ones‘, that is, they become the ‗Church.‘  Thus, the ecclesial ‗building blocks‘, the 
‗saints‘, are perhaps more numerous than we typically admit because where there is union 
with Christ, there is the Church. 
 This creates a dilemma for ecclesiological reflection.  ‗Church‘ moves from 
something easily identifiable, based on institutional allegiance to something non-
quantifiable.  ‗Church‘ cannot be completely extrinsically measured.  Rather, one‘s 
                                                        
8 Lumen Gentium, 8. 
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membership in the Church, the body of Christ, is a function of one‘s union with Christ, 
which entails both visible and invisible dimensions.  But, more than this, if we take 
Panikkar‘s christophanic reflections seriously, it also potentially entails a variety of 
manifestations, some of which may be difficult for Christians to recognize.  After all, if 
there is a ‗hidden Christ‘ of Hinduism, through whom the Hindu can find true 
communion with God (Ātman is Brahman), then there is a more or less ‗hidden Church 
of  Hinduism‘.  Superficial ecclesiology, then, based on institution bonds must yield to a 
deeper, more human ecclesiology based upon union with Christ, as envisioned by Paul of 
Tarsus.  This does not make the institutional element of ecclesiology meaningless, 
however.  It is, rather, a challenge to that institution to deeper evangelization.  True 
ecclesial identity cannot be quantified by enumerating who or what is ‗within the 
Church‘.  Such a description is too narrow to describe the body of Christ, who is present 
everywhere.  On the contrary, ecclesial identity can only be realized (but never 
completely quantified) by those who live in union with Christ, and thus possess the 
‗Church within‘. 
Varghese Manimala finds this characteristic within Panikkar‘s cosmotheandrism: 
―The Christian dogma of the Mystical Body affirms this: each of us is an integral part of 
a higher and more real unity, the Christus totus.‖9  As we recognize that others seek 
human fulfillment in cosmotheandric unity, we can begin to recognize the presence of the 
‗cosmic Church‘ in new and unexpected places.  However, we ought to temper these 
conclusions with Panikkar‘s vision of identity as found in our third chapter.  Identity is 
found on a continuum between the two poles of self-designation and communal 
                                                        
9 Varghese J. Manimala, Toward Mutual Fecundation and Fulfilment of Religions: An Invitation to 
Transcendence and Dialogue with a Cosmotheandric Vision, (New Delhi, India: Media House, 2009), 54. 
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recognition.  The very reason that Panikkar avoids discussing the term ‗church‘ on a 
cosmic level is because it would have little meaning for those who do not recognize this 
language.  Nonetheless, because there is union with Christ outside of those who would 
employ the term ‗Christ‘ to describe this unity, we also contend that there can be ecclesial 
unity outside of those who would employ such terminology.  Where there is union with 
Christ, there is the Church.  However, such designations are only useful to those who do 
employ these terms.  Thus, while the unity is real, the terms employed to describe it are 
only of secondary importance. 
As we saw through Dupuis‘ discussion of the Logos Asarkos in our second 
chapter, from a very early time in the history of Christianity, Christian theologians have 
acknowledged the presence of Christ outside of the traditional ecclesial ‗walls‘.  These 
encounters with Christ as the Logos have not taken place in ‗Christian terms‘.  Let us 
recall, for instance, that Justin Martyr acknowledged the presence of Christ, who sewed 
the ‗seeds‘ or truth, in the tradition of the pagan philosophers beloved by his Roman 
interlocutors.  In this extended economy, union with Christ (though not as developed as 
that which is found in the Christian community) is possible even to those outside of the 
narrowly-defined Christian economy (although Justin is precisely insisting that this 
Christian economy ought not to be narrowly defined at all). 
However, it may be contended that utilizing such cosmic language for the Church 
dilutes the term ‗church‘ itself.  After all, how can there be a ‗Church‘ where there is no 
one to designate it thusly?  And, if there can be such a ‗Church‘, does membership in the 
Church, in the conventional, institutional sense, lose all significance?  What difference 
does such membership make?   
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Let us once again recall our reflections on identity in our third chapter.  Identity is 
found somewhere between the two poles of self-designation and communal recognition.  
The Christian Church provides this communal aspect to Christians.  The community 
allows us to realize our identity because it provides one with a visible group with which 
one unites oneself.  And, for Panikkar, identity is most truly realized through that with 
which one unites oneself.  Far from becoming meaningless, then, in such a novel 
paradigm, the Church actually takes on greater significance.   However, membership in 
the Church is not to be worn as a mark of distinction that completely separates one from 
everyone else.  This represents the incomplete ‗Western‘ conception of identity based 
upon the law of non-contradiction that we also visited in our third chapter.  By contrast, 
membership in the Church points to the fact that one is called back to his/her neighbor.  
Thus, to be ‗holy‘ or ‗set apart‘ is not to be isolated, but to be set aside for a purpose.  
This purpose is to ‗make holy‘, that is, to bring others to Christ as well; to bring others to 
the realization of cosmotheandric union. 
This entails consequences for the concept of the mission of the Church.  The 
Church‘s mission is not simply to change the faith of others to that of Christianity by 
moving them away from something ‗other than Christianity‘.  Rather, the role of the 
visible, institutional Church is to feed, nourish, and encourage the cosmotheandric faith 
that is already present.  The missionary Church does not venture out in search of a ‗them‘ 
to make into an ‗us‘.  Rather, the Church finds that ‗they‘ already are part of ‗us‘ and 
seeks to bring this reality to fuller realization.  The Church is not a group of insiders who 
either shun or invite outsiders.  Rather, the Church is a group of those who have realized 
the identity that all of us already share, and it is a group of those who seek to share that 
     
 
258 
insight with others so that they too can lead a fuller and more meaningful life by coming 
to know their own identity. 
The new challenge we face as the Christian community is to recognize union with 
Christ where we encounter it.  Our eyes and ears must be appropriately attuned to find 
such unity.  This does not necessarily mean that we should uncritically presume that any 
person who professes even a modicum of religious faith has come to a deep realization of 
cosmotheandric unity. Yet, we should also be careful about making judgments regarding 
anyone‘s inner disposition.  We must, however, recognize that latent in many religious 
traditions is a notion of union with the transcendent, a mystical element, that provides the 
potential for an encounter with Christ, should it be pursued sincerely.   Thus, as Panikkar 
finds in examining the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, there is already some ‗common 
ground‘ that we share cross-culturally and cross-religiously.  This common ground is 
Christ. 
Extending back to the logic of ‗Baptism of desire‘ set out by Ambrose, the 
Christian church has insisted that where there is a desire for union with Christ, one has 
already united oneself with Christ and, in a mystical way, become part of the Church.  
Consequently, as we broaden our notion of Christ (and come to realize that Christ should 
never be limited by our notions in the first place), we must also recognize a broad (even 
universal) scope for the encounter with Christ.  ‗Church‘, then, can be found wherever 
this encounter takes place.  Where there is union with Christ, there is the Church.  This 
‗universal‘ presence of the Church, then, ought not to be seen as a threat to the members 
of the ‗institutional‘ Church.  Rather, it is a missionary opportunity and the ground of our 
hope for the future. 
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5.3 Soteriology 
The cosmotheandric identity mediated by Christ is the centerpiece of Panikkar‘s 
soteriology.  At the end of our fourth chapter, we mentioned that, like most Christians, 
Panikkar believes that salvation comes through affirming that ―Jesus is the Christ‖.10 
However, for Panikkar this is not a theory.  Rather, it is a ―confession‖ or ―an existential 
affirmation.‖11  Salvation is reached through faith, which enables one to live out the same 
cosmotheandric communion that Jesus the Christ reveals.  To make this point, Panikkar 
cites the letter to the Colossians, which says of Jesus, ―For in him the whole fullness of 
divinity dwells bodily (Col 2:9).‖  In response to this Christological assertion, Panikkar 
declares, ―This is the human vocation!‖12  Thus, the union with the divine that Christians 
find in Jesus of Nazareth is the key to human realization.  Thus, Panikkar insists that 
Christological questions are really soteriological questions.  So, to ask Jesus‘ identity is 
to enter into the ultimate purpose and meaning of life.
13
 
The key to understanding this is the nonduality of advaita.  Panikkar insists, 
―Christ is not an other.  Nor is it a question of monism—I am not Christ.  We are neither 
one nor two.  This is the nondual relation of the person, the experience of advaita that we 
tried to describe earlier.‖14  Because of this nondual relation with reality, Christ can be 
affirmed by Panikkar as the universal redeemer.
15
  Panikkar explains, ―This amounts to 
saying that Christ is present in one form or another in every human being as he journeys 
                                                        
10 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 149. 
11 Ibid., 149. 
12 Ibid.,  xi. 
13 Ibid., 75.  Note that for Panikkar, Jesus may not be the only historical figure who functions in this way. 
14 Ibid., 77. 
15 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 67-68. 
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towards God.‖16  As we have mentioned, this allows Panikkar to affirm other religious 
traditions as part of this same salvific economy: 
In Hindu terms, Christianity, like other major religions, will lead its faithful to liberation 
to the extent that it imparts to their hearts the three central truths of the sanātana dharma, 
the eternal religion: namely that God is, that he can be realized, and that the purpose of 
life is to realize him.17 
It is toward this salvific purpose that Panikkar develops his christophanic 
theology.  A christophany offers a glimpse into the cosmotheandric unity that is at the 
root of all reality.  It is the realization of this unity that comprises salvation, for Panikkar.  
Furthermore, these salvific opportunities are ubiquitous.  Panikkar points out, ―For almost 
half a century I have maintained the proposition that every being is a christophany.‖18  In 
this way, for Panikkar, there is a ―nondualist polarity between the transcendent and the 
immanent‖ in everything.19  Thus, the Trinity is the human (and cosmic) vocation.  We 
are called to realize and enact this nondualistic unity, which maintains real distinction 
without complete separation. 
Because of the closeness between human identity and fulfillment, Panikkar does 
not prefer to refer to salvation history in his writings.
20
  Jyri Komulainen points out, ―He 
rarely uses the concept of salvation.  As a matter of fact, he sees all soteriological 
expressions as tautologies—every human being is in any case pursuing the fullness of his 
being.‖21  He insists that for Panikkar ―man is rather an image of Reality than an image of 
                                                        
16 Ibid., 68. 
17 Ibid., 69. 
18 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 15. 
19 Ibid., 15. 
20 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, (Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 155. 
21 Ibid. 
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God.‖22  By this, Komulainen points to an important aspect of Panikkar‘s theological 
paradigm.  As we saw in our fourth chapter (and throughout this exploration), the human 
vocation is communion, namely cosmotheandric communion.  And, humanity, because it 
already possesses this cosmotheandric union, can be thought of as a kind of ‗microcosm‘.  
However, Komulainen here overstates his case in order to critique Panikkar.  Panikkar 
does not intend to say that because the human is a ‗microcosm‘, he/she is not in the image 
of God.  Rather, it is the possession of the image of the divine that enables the human to 
model reality in communion because, cosmotheandrically speaking, all of reality is 
suffused with the presence of God. 
This misinterpretation allows Komulainen to conclude, ―Due to the fact that 
everything is already ontologically ‗ultimate mediation‘ and ‗communion,‘ there is no 
need for epistemological mediation.  Being itself is thus ‗relation.‘‖23  Komulainen seems 
to insist here that there is no room in Panikkar‘s thought for the notion of soteriology.  
While Panikkar‘s thought may be interpreted in this way, this interpretation seems to 
ignore one of the major facets of Panikkar‘s theology: the christophany.  As we saw in 
our second chapter, christophanies are almost ubiquitous.  Yet, at the same time, the 
christophany is a ‗manifestation‘ of Christ, and a manifestation serves a purpose.  Despite 
the fact that our cosmotheandric union is ‗already there‘ in our identity, it is often 
forgotten or never even noticed at all.  We often lose or distort our identity through 
ignorance and through sin.  The christophany provides a revelation and a reminder that 
this union is present and urges one to act upon it.  Because of this, awareness and 
epistemology become the keys to understanding soteriology in Panikkarian terms.  
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Salvation is the knowledge of one‘s identity and the consequent acceptance of that 
identity. 
So, how then does one come to know and realize this salvation?  How does the 
process of divinization take place in the Church (particular and ‗cosmic‘)?  For Panikkar, 
worship ―means that act by which we express in one way or another the fulness of the 
human person.‖24  Worship is the act of the Church (again, both particular and ‗cosmic‘).  
For Panikkar, ―Christian worship should give expression to man‘s inner and constitutive 
urge towards something which remains for ever beyond him.‖25  It is a form of the 
manifestation of the cosmotheandric unity of all reality.  Worship is ‗christophanic‘ and, 
consequently, both ecclesial and salvific. 
However, simply because there is a closeness between what human beings are and 
what they are called to be (or, rather, nature and grace) in Panikkar‘s thought, that does 
not mean that soteriology is meaningless to him or that Jesus of Nazareth is insignificant 
or unnecessary soteriologically.  This becomes clear, for instance in Panikkar‘s 
comparison between the Christian and Buddhist views of human fulfillment.  To 
Panikkar, ―Both are convinced that Man is a being not yet finished, a reality unachieved, 
growing, becoming, on the way, a pilgrim.‖26  Thus, humanity is going ‗somewhere‘.  
But where is it going?  The difference between Christianity and Buddhism for Panikkar is 
found in the response that each offers.
27
  In this regard, Buddhism and Christianity offer 
the responses of nirvāna and sōtēria respectively.28  The distinction between these two is 
                                                        
24 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, Worship and Secular Man, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 47. 
25 Ibid., 92. 
26 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, (New York, NY, Paulist Press, 1978), 79-
80. 
27 Ibid., 80. 
28 Ibid.  Perhaps his identification of the term sōtēria exclusively with Christianity leads Panikkar to his 
general avoidance of the concept of soteriology, although he does speak of ‗salvation‘ or ‗liberation‘. 
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the distinction between Sunyata, or emptiness and Pleroma, or fullness.
29
  These ideas 
represent their respective traditions‘ ‗quintessence‘.30 
Panikkar explains the emptiness of Sunyata, saying, ―The ‗other shore‘ in 
recurring Buddhist metaphor is so totally transcendent that it does not exist; the very 
thought of it mystifies and negates it.‖31  Sunyata reveals the ultimate ‗emptiness‘ of all 
things.
32
  To know this emptiness is the defining characteristic of prajna, wisdom.
33
  This 
intuition, which uncovers the radical relativity of all things (pratityasamutpada) is the 
beginning of reaching nirvāna.34  In turn, the emphasis on the divine fullness in 
Christianity has its own unique corresponding dynamic.  This dynamic leads to the goal 
of Theosis, or divinization, by which humans reach this fullness.
35
 
Therefore, Panikkar contends that there has always been a particular concern with 
death and a hope to transcend it or eliminate in some way in religious and human 
history.
36
   He notes, ―One way or another, traditional religions want to overcome the 
human condition by reaching the unconditioned.‖37  Different religious traditions offer up 
varying means toward this common end.   The Christian approach is to posit a process of 
divinization that retains the distinction between God and humanity.
38
  However: 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 80-81. 
30 Ibid., 81. 
31 Ibid., 82. 
32 Ibid., 83. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  See also Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 
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everything is directly or indirectly related to everything else: the radical relativity or pratītyasamutpāda of 
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36 Ibid., 87. 
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38 Ibid., 88. 
     
 
264 
Buddhism offers a different attitude.  It does not want to uncondition but rather to 
decondition Man; it is not concerned with reaching transcendence but with overcoming 
immanence; it does not care as much about God as about deconditioning Man in a radical 
and ultimate way.  Man has to cease being what he is, not in order to become another 
thing, not even God, but in order to totally negate the human and worldly situation.  
Buddhism shatters the human dream of any imaginable or thinkable survival.39 
Panikkar contrasts these positions with secular humanism.  Secularism, by 
comparison, envisions time as something that is not to be transcended.
40
  Rather, human 
fulfillment is to be accomplished in the present: 
And Man, Humanism would say, should banish any fear of worldly or superworldly 
powers.  He has come of age, he need not fear being Man.  But having overcome his fear 
of nature, of God and the Gods, Man now begins to fear himself and his societal reality.  
So the entire problem crops up again.41 
While these three positions may at first sight seem irreconcilable, Panikkar does 
note some commonalities they share.  He points out that in all three, ―We may observe a 
double assumption: (1) Man is an unachieved being; (2) this achievement is the real 
Man.‖42  Thus, for all three, humanity is in process.  Not only is humanity in process, but 
humanity is also striving towards self-realization.  The human condition is that of an 
identity-crisis.  Therefore, Panikkar concludes, ―Man is an open being: he ‗ek-sists‘ by 
stretching out his being, along time and space.‖43  This openness is openness towards 
self-fulfillment; towards the realization of human identity. 
It seems that there is more in common between traditions than these distinctions 
may at first imply.  For instance, we have mentioned, in Buddhism, ultimately there is no 
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atman, that is, the human being is not.
44
  Yet, the Buddhist ethic is not one of libertinism 
or apathy as an outsider may expect: 
And yet this does not conflict with the central orthodox Buddhist attitude of universal 
compassion (karunā), unlimited friendliness.  You can embody a serene, joyful and even 
pragmatically effective loving attitude only if you have realized the śunyatā of all 
things.45 
 Christianity and secular humanism are both also noted for their altruism.  Because 
of this, these three traditions may find another meeting place in orthopraxis.  
Furthermore, a variety of anthropologies can help to uncover who the human being, who 
remains a mystery, truly is.  Because of the complexity of humanity, understanding what 
it means to be human cannot be done by a single anthropology.
46
  Thus, anthropology 
requires ―dialogical dialogue.‖47  Panikkar elaborates, ―It requires not a methodology but 
a methodic of its own, which makes its way in and through the mutual interaction and 
possible cross-fertilization of different religions and cultures.‖48  Therefore these three 
traditions can work together and even enrich each other.  From the contrast of these 
traditions, Panikkar finds that human fulfillment is ultimately the realization of human 
identity, that is, the discovery of what it means to identify oneself as a human being.  
Thus: 
Humanizing Man means to make him truly Man, but the expression is treacherous and 
ambivalent because this gerund is neither merely transitive nor merely intransitive.  It is 
not as if someone else were humanizing Man or as if Man himself could achieve what he 
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is not yet.  Humanizing Man means rather this plunge into reality and participation in the 
overall destiny of all that is, which takes place inside and outside Man.49 
 With this in mind, Panikkar points out that the purpose of religion is salvation.  
He notes: 
To call a religion a sinful religion or a vehicle of darkness (or damnation or falsehood) 
amounts to saying that in fact it is not a religion at all.  Every religion deals with the 
salvation or liberation of Man, which means union with God, divinization of our being, 
the acquisition of truth, sanctity, light, and of freedom from the bonds of injustice, 
slavery, the passions of worldly existence, and so on.50 
Elsewhere, he defines religion as ―the dynamism toward a terminus ad quem, 
originating in a disconformity with the status quo.‖51  At the same time, he insists that 
―Religion is a path to the humanum, be it called salvation, liberation, or by whatever 
generic name.‖52  What is noteworthy here is that he identifies the humanum with 
soteriology.  This humanum is something that must be fulfilled or fully realized.  This fits 
with the relational character of the human person, who ―is not a single entity but a set of 
relations.‖53  Thus, the human person can never be self-satisfied; he/she must always be 
directed towards transcendence, constantly attempting to extend the self towards new 
horizons. 
Because of this, the human is dissatisfied with the fleetingness, suffering, and 
plurality of existence.
54
   Consequently, he/she seeks to transcend this condition to realize 
and act upon the cosmotheandric unity that is already present.  In Blessed Simplicity, in 
                                                        
49 Ibid., 92-93. 
50 Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, Revised 
and Enlarged Edition, 71. 
51 Raimundo (Raimon) Panikkar,  The Intrareligious Dialogue, (New York, NY, Paulist Press, 1978), 80. 
52 Raimon Panikkar,  Blessed Simplicity: The Monk as Universal Archetype, (New York, NY: Seabury, 
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267 
which Panikkar discusses the monastic archetype as an anthropological characteristic 
shared by all humans, he describes this movement along the path of the via negativa, 
saying, ―If man has been defined as the only animal that knows how to say No, 
monkhood could similarly be described as the radical articulation of this No to the 
excruciating multiplicity of all that appears to be.‖55  The movement toward unity is a 
movement toward simplicity.  Panikkar explains, ―The monk is the one who tries to swim 
upstream, against the current, to the origin which one supposes to be simple.  God is 
simple.  Brahman is utter simplicity.  The monk believes the Absolute is simple and that 
the goal of his life is to attain that very simplicity.‖56  Furthermore, ―The simplicity that 
the monk stands for is not a singleness without discrimination.‖57  What then is it?  
Panikkar answers, ―It has to be a blessed simplicity, i.e., a simplicity conquered with 
blood (blessed) and then made holy, sanctified, set apart in the singlemindedness that has 
reduced everything to its quiescence and reached the ultimate transparency of truth.‖58  
Therefore, this ‗blessed simplicity‘ is not a violent severing from the world, but a respect 
for it, in which one seeks to penetrate ―the core of being‖ and find simple unity there.59 
 Thus, for Panikkar, all authentic religions are in one way or another concerned 
with salvation.  The salvific character of a variety of religious traditions is derived from 
God‘s universally salvific will, which Christians profess.  Panikkar explains: 
Two propositions are universally accepted by Christian theology: one, salvation comes 
exclusively through Christ; and two, God does not condemn anybody.  Now, this second 
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proposition amounts to saying that God provides every Man coming into existence with 
the means of salvation.60 
Elsewhere, he explains, ―God wills that all Men should reach salvation.  Here 
salvation is that which is considered to be the end, goal, destination, or destiny of Man, 
however this may be conceived.‖61  He continues by insisting that there cannot be 
salvation without some kind of faith.  But this faith is not the property of Christians or 
any other privileged group.
62
  Christians do not have exclusive access to salvific 
communion.  Rather, Panikkar elaborates, ―The means of salvation are to be found in any 
authentic religion (old or new) because a Man follows a particular religion because in it 
he believes he finds the ultimate fulfillment of his life.‖63  Panikkar‘s expansion of the 
concept of Christ beyond (but not apart from) Jesus of Nazareth, which we examined in 
our second chapter, enables him to profess universal access to salvific cosmotheandric 
unity.  Thus, he insists: 
Christ is the only mediator, but he is not the monopoly of christians and, in fact, he is 
present and effective in any authentic religion, whatever the form or the name.  Christ is 
the symbol, which Christians call by this name, of the ever-transcending but equally ever-
humanly immanent Mystery.64 
Thus, for Panikkar (and several others, including Jacques Dupuis), it is important 
to remember that it is Christ who saves, not Christianity per se.
65
  Thus, Panikkar 
contends, ―Christ opens us to the trinitarian mystery.  The divinization of man has 
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constituted a human theme since at least the beginning of historical consciousness.‖66  He 
continues, by reminding us that it is the awareness of the possibility of divinization, our 
grasping for infinity, which sets humans apart.
67
  We are different, that is, from the rest of 
the genus ‗animal‘.  This aspiration fuels the above-mentioned dynamism that 
characterizes the human quest for salvation.  Thus, ―True divinization is full 
humanization.‖68  For Panikkar, the mediation of the christophany is the means of 
salvation.  Toward this end, he points out, ―Christophany bears a double meaning: the 
humanization of God corresponds to the divinization of man.  Christ is the revelation of 
God (in man) as much as the revelation of Man (in God).‖69  He uses the transfiguration 
of Jesus of Nazareth to explain this meeting place of God and humanity: ―In a word, 
Christophany projects us into the taboric light that allows us to discover our infinite 
dimension and presents the divine in the same light that allows us to discover God in his 
human dimension.‖70 
This is a telling passage in Panikkar‘s theology.   For Panikkar, soteriology 
involves revelation.  Furthermore, what is revealed is the true identity of humanity, which 
can only be understood as cosmotheandric communion.  Thus, Christophany is about an 
experience of ‗seeing‘; it is not about a doctrine.71  This visual experience is one of 
―interpenetration‖, or perichōrēsis or circumincessio, of all reality.72  So, for Panikkar, it 
is essential for one to seek his/her identity, but to truly do this, he/she must open 
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him/herself up to transcendence and to the infinite.
73
  In this way, seeking God begins 
with a self-emptying; a ‗death to self‘, in which one seeks his/her true identity through 
orienting the self outward, toward the other.
74
  He explains the necessity of this receptive 
attitude by the finitude of humanity.  He points out, ―We cannot attain transcendence, but 
neither can we remain enclosed within immanence; we must open ourselves to 
transcendence—open ourselves only because we cannot cross the abyss without 
destroying it.‖75  This is the uniqueness of Panikkar‘s approach.  As Komulainen notes, 
―The adjoining of the cosmic dimension with the divine and anthropic dimensions is the 
novelty of Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric vision, given a certain tendency among religions to 
renounce the world, or at least to subordinate immanence to transcendence.‖76 
 In the same way, Varghese Manimala insists that the way to transcendence, for 
Panikkar, is necessarily the way of orthopraxis.
77
  He sees this as Panikkar‘s definition of 
religion because, for Panikkar, all religions aim at moksha, that is, liberation or 
salvation.
78
  He summarizes Panikkar‘s view of religion and its goal: 
Precisely because religion, in the best sense of the word, is the most profound human 
dimension that ―binds‖ (religa) us to the rest of reality through its most intimate 
constitutive bonds, it is not reducible to an exclusive belonging to any particular human 
group.  On the contrary, it is precisely the conscious belonging to reality through a very 
concrete bond by means of which we are not only fully human but also fully real, 
although in a contingent and limited way.  It is within and through this concreteness that 
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we are able to realize, to the extent of our limitations, the fullness of our being—as 
microcosm and mikrotheos.79 
Thus, for Panikkar, praxis is salvation because salvation involves enacting the 
cosmotheandric unity of all of reality.  Panikkar says, ―Every action that leads to the 
perfection of Man in his concrete existential situation, every action that leads Man to his 
realization, is authentic praxis, way to salvation.‖80  Therefore, religion is centered upon 
orthopraxis.  So, for Panikkar, it is orthopraxis and not orthodoxy that defines a religion 
as such.
81
  He explains that all authentic religions seek the salvation or freedom of 
humanity.  Although this liberation or salvation can be interpreted in a variety of ways, 
religions always seem to define themselves as a means to bring humanity to its 
fulfillment.
82
  What is also common is that there is way or a path that humanity must 
traverse to reach its goal.  Therefore, one must ‗do‘ something to achieve this final state.  
We are not simply saved by our doctrine or by apathy.
83
 
Komulainen points out that Panikkar‘s mystical, ―holistic‖ theology merges 
spirituality and theory.
84
  In this way, he insists, ―Praxis in Panikkar does not primarily 
mean the emancipating praxis of liberation theology but refers to a new spirituality with a 
new anthropology and cosmology: enduring solutions to contemporary problems are to 
be found only at the spiritual level.‖85  Toward this end, Panikkar criticizes globalization 
and technocracy.
86
  Thus, Panikkar demands both engagement with contemporary 
concerns as well as removal of oneself from the status quo.  Komulainen notes the 
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connection between contemplation and action, explaining, ―‗Contemplation‘ in his 
[Panikkar‘s] terms denotes a comprehensive attitude towards life and thereby amounts to 
an ontological act that participates in reality itself.‖87  Therefore, only by practicing 
contemplation can one transcend the limits of the variety of religious traditions.
88
 
Thus, ‗religion‘ refers to a path toward salvation, and any religion defines itself as 
a road to liberation.  This is Panikkar‘s ‗existential‘ definition of religion because this 
existential thrust determines and shapes the conceptual elements utilized by the 
tradition.
89
   The defining characteristic of a religion is that it is a way to reach the human 
goal.  However, there are many interpretations of this goal.  Panikkar explains that there 
are a variety of perspectives from which this goal can be explained.  These range from 
―perfect union with God to mere survival in society‖ or ―in an otherworldly heaven, 
individual annihilation, death, the absurd, or whatever.‖90  While distinct, all of these are 
nonetheless goals and give humanity a teleological character. 
 Because it is linked to an anthropological yearning, ‗religion‘ is not reducible to 
institutionalized religion.  Thus Panikkar argues: 
We should like only to say one thing and from it to suggest another: to say that Man‘s 
religious dimension is not indispensably bound to a predetermined concept of religion; 
and to suggest that the religious crisis of mankind today is not due to the disappearance of 
religion as a human dimension, but to the new reclamation of a sphere of the secular that 
in the last centuries of Western history seemed to have been removed from religion.91 
  This secular sphere has certainly increased.  Evidence for this can be seen all over 
Western culture.  ―But,‖ Panikkar insists, ―certainly separation of Church and State 
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should not be confused with divorce between religion and life.‖92  Even in secularized 
form, the human goal is always formulated as some form of freedom or liberation.
93
  So, 
as we have seen, ‗religion‘ is that which makes the claim to provide humanity with 
liberation and to bring humanity to its goal.
94
  Religion, then, can be thought of as part of 
human identity.  This religious component of one‘s identity longs for liberation.  
Panikkar describes this yearning: 
If religion has always promised to save Man, then what mankind today eagerly awaits is 
precisely freedom, liberation from the sufferings, fears, doubts, anxieties and insecurities 
of life.  Humanity today, especially in the West, feels imprisoned by its own inventions, 
enslaved by its own means of power.  Technology frees Man from so many of his 
traditional and endemic nightmares that for the first time he can truly forge his own 
destiny in a spectrum of possibilities unsuspected just a century ago.95 
Thus, freedom plays a central role in Panikkar‘s soteriology.96  But, Panikkar‘s 
soteriology is one of self-realization, the enactment or realization of a mystical reality 
that is always already present.  Thus, he points out, ―There is a domain where Man has a 
very special autonomy: himself.‖97  With regard to the various visions of human 
autonomy, Panikkar wishes to merge insights from East and West: 
The well-known distinction between freedom-from and freedom-to (which could 
moreover express the characteristic modes of Eastern and Western spirituality, 
respectively) may serve as well to express the two faces of freedom we have just 
                                                        
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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mentioned.  Freedom-to do what I will (West) would thus be counterbalanced by 
freedom-from willing what I do (East).98 
What is needed in the religious understanding of today is a ―synergy‖ of the 
internal and external aspects of freedom.
99
  Panikkar explains: 
Human freedom is not only, or basically, the capacity to make decisions about things, 
events or people.  Real freedom takes root in the core of Man, which possesses this power 
to become himself, in religious terms, to save himself.  The prerogative of human 
freedom is not limiter to the choice between given possibilities; it is not the power, either, 
to do or to make just anything, but to make oneself, to make oneself oneself.  In 
theological terms we may say: The salvation to which Man aspires is not an extrinsic gift, 
something superogatory, but a personal conquest—to realize oneself, to achieve one‘s 
being.  To put it in Christian terms: Christ does not save by a heteronomic act, offering an 
alien salvation foreign to Man, but by becoming flesh and blood so that he may be eaten, 
assimilated, and by this divine metabolism transform Man also into the son of God.  In 
the Christian conception salvation comes neither by hetero-redemption (through an other) 
[monotheism] nor through auto-redemption (by oneself) [Pelagianism], Christ being at 
once truly Man and truly God, an authentic Mediator.  Christian salvation comes neither 
as from an outside rope, nor as from an inside power, but as from an in-spiration (of—
and in—the entire Trinity), which links these two extremes together.100 
Thus, the purpose of human freedom is to enable the human being to realize 
his/her identity, who he/she is.
101
  The only way to realize this identity is through union 
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with Christ.  And, Christ functions not as an outsider, but as something we already find in 
ourselves.  The purpose of the Incarnation, then, is to awaken the cosmotheandric union 
that one already possesses.  Christ brings this characteristic of one‘s identity to our 
awareness.  Without such mediation, salvation is impossible and human identity can 
never be realized.  Therefore, Panikkar explains that his position is not one of 
Pelagianism: 
All this does not block the possibility of interpreting liberation via the grace of God, 
because this grace, precisely because it is divine, cannot be considered merely an external 
boost of some sort, but a divine—transcendent as well as immanent—force that 
transforms human nature without doing it violence, and so makes it possible for Man to 
attain the fullness of his being.102 
5.4 Critical Evaluation: The Freedom of Salvation and its Institutional Implications 
Thus, it is important for Panikkar to insist that grace is not something merely 
extrinsic or merely intrinsic.  It is for this reason that we insist that identity is the key to 
understanding Panikkar‘s soteriology.  This identity, revealed in Christ, generally, and 
Jesus the Christ, particularly, is the cosmotheandric unity of all reality.  Thus salvation, 
for Panikkar, involves the realization of what one already is.  But what one is also 
includes what one can be, the future.  This is where freedom intersects with identity.   For 
Panikkar, freedom refers to human creativity.
103
  In this sense, freedom is another 
component of Panikkar‘s way of speaking of salvation.   What the human being is is 
openness.  And, this openness is openness to self-realization and self-determination. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
form part of our supraindividual identity, so that her or his challenged will be no longer just a series of 
coercions of our freedom, but a higher form of freedom.  Without love, then, there is no freedom, as the 
wisdom of the ages knows so well.‖  Therefore, ―A culture of peace must be a culture of freedom.‖ 
102 Raimon Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, 449-450. 
103 Ibid., 450. 
     
 
276 
In this regard, Panikkar finds an example of what he calls ―transmythicization,‖ 
the appeal to the universal influence of mythos, in the grounding of religious freedom in 
human dignity at the Second Vatican Council.
104
  To illustrate the importance of freedom, 
Panikkar cites and reverses the Pauline saying that ―where the Spirit of the Lord is, there 
is freedom (2 Cor 3:17).‖  Thus, for Panikkar, where there is freedom, there is also the 
Spirit of the Lord.
105
  Thus, ―the Kingdom of freedom is built by the Spirit of the Lord.  
The Church, by definition, is the place of freedom.  Freedom is the Spirit of the Lord.  
The ecclesiastical calling, the vocation, the congregation that constitutes the Church, is a 
call to freedom: έπ’ έλεσθερια έκλήθηηε.‖106  So, the Church is the assembly of the free.  It 
is important to note that all are called to be free, thus all are called to be part of the 
‗Church‘ in this sense. 
But, if humanity is characterized by freedom, so is God.  Panikkar insists, ―Not 
only is the kingdom of God the kingdom of freedom, but God himself is absolute 
Freedom.‖107  For Panikkar, freedom is transcendence.  He insists that through freedom 
we come to know transcendence by coming to know what it means to be limit-less, 
barrier-less, restriction-less.  This is an experience of infinitude.
108
  Because it is an 
experience of the infinite, God is central to the true meaning of human freedom.  
Panikkar points out, ―God is the absence of every limit and Man is called to rejoin him by 
conquering his freedom, by stepping up from his creatureliness.  Man arrived, achieved, 
perfect, will have been a creature (and this fact remains): he no longer will be one: he 
                                                        
104 Ibid., 431. Also see Dignitatis Humanum. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid.  ―For you were called for freedom, brothers. But do not use this freedom as an opportunity for the 
flesh; rather, serve one another through love (Gal 5:13).‖ 
107Ibid., 450. 
108 Ibid. 
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simply is.‖109  In this way, Christ reveals the character of both God and humanity (while 
also revealing the union thereof): 
The message of Christ is a message of freedom; it carries the freedom requisite to 
perform the free act that saves.  It is clear, moreover, that only an interior Christ (which 
does not deny a historical Christ identified with him) can make possible the realization of 
an act that is truly free, spontaneous and fully human; otherwise it would just be a new 
imposition from outside.110 
The idea of an ―interior Christ‖ is important here.  This interior character is 
Panikkar‘s way of avoiding both extrinsicism, by which human beings have no influence 
on their salvation, and Pelagianism, by which human beings need no grace for salvation.  
For Panikkar, the grace is already there, yet human beings are works in progress and need 
to realize this grace of cosmotheandric identity.  Using the term ‗religion‘ in the 
institutional sense, Panikkar argues: ―To carry out this free and saving act, there is no 
strict need of any ‗religion‘, let alone Christianity.  Only the faith of the human person is 
required.  We have here the foundation of true pluralism.  What matters is freedom.‖111  
Therefore, Panikkar argues, ―The human right of ‗freedom of religion‘ appears to be a 
tautology, for without such freedom there is no religion, no religious act.‖112  Yet, even 
though religion, in the institutional sense, is not a prerequisite for salvation, religious 
traditions are not rendered meaningless.  If they are authentic religions, they are rooted in 
the anthropological sphere of the religious (the humanum), that is, the human yearning 
for liberation.  And, if they are rooted in the humanum, they mediate knowledge and 
awareness of ones true identity; they mediate Christ.  Furthermore, as we have seen, even 
                                                        
109 Ibid., 451. 
110 Ibid., 453. 
111 Ibid., 454. 
112 Ibid., 455. 
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though ‗Christianity‘ is not strictly necessary for salvation, Christ is necessary.  Thus, 
religion (in both the institutional and anthropological senses) involves the revelation of 
Christ.  Because the goal of religion (salvation) is the true realization of human identity, 
religion essentially has a ―self-revelatory character.‖113 
Freedom, the human longing and capacity for transcendence finds itself expressed 
institutionally.  Yet, the religious dimension of humanity is not strictly institutional.  
‗Religion‘ (understood institutionally) enables human beings to realize salvific self-
transcendence.  In Panikkar‘s vision, religious institutions point one towards 
cosmotheandric communion.  They pass on teachings that touch upon mystical unity and 
offer a community in which to begin to live this union out.  If such religious institutions 
are functioning properly, they help one to realize his or her true humanity, that is, his or 
her true identity as a human being. 
Because of his insight that sacred and secular are, in the final analysis, intimately 
united, Panikkar insists that salvation is immanent.
114
  He points out, ―Salvation is within 
reach of our hands, it is nearby and even within us, but we are in need of a revelation, a 
word, a redeemer, a gift of grace, a personal effort, a spontaneous decision, a teaching, a 
guru, or an awakening of the very best that is in us in order to attain it.‖115  Thus, 
salvation, one’s true identity is already present, yet one needs to cultivate this mystical 
intuition to realize it and make it effective.  Outside intervention is necessary to prompt 
this ‗awakening.‘  Salvation cannot be achieved by one‘s effort alone.  Thus, Panikkar is 
no Pelagian.  One does not simply realize one‘s identity in isolation.  Identity must be 
                                                        
113 Ibid. 
114 See Raimon Panikkar, Blessed Simplicity: The Monk as Universal Archetype, 85. 
115 Ibid., 86. 
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realized communally because, as we saw in our third chapter, it has a communal 
component. 
5.5 Realizing Salvific Identity 
To realize one‘s identity (salvation), one must fully give oneself to others.  This 
kenotic movement is the concretization of cosmotheandric communion.  Therefore, if I 
am to engage in this process of kenosis, I will see that ―the Other is not another but Me—
who is I.‖116  Thus, in Me there is a microcosm, that is, ―the world in small, 
miniaturized.‖117  It is the communion of all, the commonality shared by all beings that 
allows me to find all others in myself.  This union is the nondualism (advaita) which we 
visited in our first chapter.  It is important, then to remember that this non-dualism is also 
not monism either.  But, as we saw above in our assessment of Komulainen‘s critique of 
Panikkar, this nondual relationship between the self and the cosmos is not all there is to 
my identity.  In me there is also a ―mikrotheos,‖ by which Panikkar means ―God in 
human measure, an incarnate God.‖118  With both of these elements in mind, Panikkar 
explains, we do not merely find the world around us contained in our identity, but we also 
find ourselves to be active participants in this reality.  In this way we are ―images, icons, 
of the whole of reality.‖119  The relationship between God and the world plays out in the 
human religious sphere.  The drive for communion that humans seek in the religious 
gives expression and form to the primordial union of the entire cosmos with its creator.  
                                                        
116 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 30. 
117 Ibid.  See also Raimon Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 
ed. Scott Eastham  (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 26.  Here Panikkar depicts the human as 
microcosm, but he also depicts the cosmos as ‗macanthropos‘.  See Ibid., 31.  This lead one to seek holism. 
"Man is not isolated; even when he craves solitude, it is only in order to reestablish his proper bond with 
the whole, which might have been dislocated by disorderly affections or disrupted by entanglement in 
merely partial aspects of creation." 
118 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 30. 
119 Ibid., 31. 
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Humans are part of the cosmos, but, as intelligent creatures with linguistic potential, they 
occupy a unique place in it.  In the human, the world finds a voice with which to call out 
to God. 
As we have seen, humanity is intrinsically relational.  In fact, it is only in relation 
that one can find his/her identity.  For Panikkar, when I seek ―Me‖ in ―you‖ I find myself 
in relation.
120
  But, the communion goes deeper than that, I also find ―Me‖ in yourself as 
your ―I.‖121  This is true for Panikkar because in his epistemology ―knowing‖ is ―a certain 
ontological participation in reality.‖122  Thus, ‗knowledge‘ can only take place because 
there is a prior unity among all of reality.  In this way, Panikkar insists: 
The seek me cannot be divided from the seek thyself, for the me and the thou are 
correlative.  The metron is human and divine, theandric—indeed, cosmotheandric.  This 
is the third stage, the discovery of the I.  Here the Trinity or advaita is central.123 
He continues:  
I discover myself as the ―thou,‖ God‘s thou.  God is the I, and I am God‘s thou.  It is the I 
who speaks and to whom we listen—not as slaves, not as creatures but as children 
(children of the Son) in the Spirit.  This is the trinitarian life; this is the christophanic 
experience: neither the mere dualism of creatureliness, the worldly, nor the monistic 
simplification of divinization.124 
The interplay here of ―I‖ and ―Thou‖ here is very confusing to the reader.  
However, that is precisely Panikkar‘s point.  The cosmotheandric unity that underlies 
reality and that is to be realized in salvific communion has real consequences for the way 
one envisions the world.  Once one‘s ‗eyes are opened‘ by the christophanic revelation of 
                                                        
120 Ibid., 33. 
121 Ibid., 34 
122 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 162. 
123 Raimon Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man, 35. 
124 Ibid. 
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cosmotheandrism, the self, God, and the world will never ‗look‘ the same again.  In this 
sense, as we have mentioned, ‗salvation‘ is self-discovery for Panikkar.  In it, one 
discovers a union that is always already there at one‘s deepest level.  Thus, one discovers 
his or her true identity. 
This is a fine example of the Eastern influence in Panikkar‘s thought informing 
the Western mind.   Salvation for the vedānta is self-knowledge, which involves knowing 
the one in the self who knows.
125
  The non-dualistic (advaita) identity that one discovers 
is cosmotheandric communion.  As we have seen in our first chapter, this attitude is 
encapsulated in the profession of ahambrahmāsmi, that is, ―I am brahman.‖126  Enacting 
this ‗Ādhyātmic‘ (Pneumatic) way of ―mystical experience‖ and ―integration‖ ―consists 
in sharing not only ideas and ideals but Being itself.‖127  For Panikkar, as we have seen, 
East and West come together here because this saving revelation is that which Christians 
call ‗Christ‘. 
5.6 S. Mark Heim on Salvation and the Possibility of Multiple Religious Ends 
 We should take a moment to look at an alternative approach to the integration of 
varying religious traditions.  S. Mark Heim, who is inspired by Panikkar, argues that we 
should not confuse religious traditions and collapse them into each other.  In Heim‘s 
view, ―salvation is communion with God and God‘s creatures through Christ Jesus.  It is 
the Christian religious end, if you like.  This does not mean that there are not other 
religious ends, quite real ones.‖128  Thus, Heim wishes to retain a distinction between the 
religious end of Christians and those of other traditions.  On the common usage of the 
                                                        
125 Ibid., 70. 
126 Ibid., 71. 
127 Ibid., 67. 
128 S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 19. 
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term ‗salvation‘, Heim points out it tends to be used like it only has one meaning that 
encompasses all goodness and that the only alternative is to choose absolute evil.
129
  
However this is a simplification of the term and it ought not to be understood in such 
stark terms.  Thus, these diverse religious ends may in fact be compatible.  However, for 
Heim, Jesus the Christ plays a special role in salvation because salvation is communion 
with him: 
The proposition that Christ is the sole savior of the world is not adequately translated by 
saying that everyone must make use of Christ for at least one crucial moment, long 
enough to negotiate part of the passage to the promised land of ―salvation,‖ after which 
time Christ can be discarded or replaced.130 
 He continues: 
Jesus did not counsel his followers to go out and independently approach God as Jesus 
did.  He invited them to share in that relationship by virtue of their connection with him.  
There is nothing purely instrumental about this: the images and substance are all organic.  
Communion is the way Christ saves, and it is the salvation that results.131 
 Like Panikkar, Heim‘s soteriology is one of communion.  Thus, for Heim, 
salvation is defined as communion with the Trinity, a share in the divine life.
132
  This 
communion is rooted in the nature of God because, according to the doctrine of the 
Trinity, God is communion by nature.
133
  Ecclesiologically, the church is seen as ―a body 
called to live out this communion.‖134  Also, like Panikkar, this salvific relationship is not 
limited to the individual and God.  On the contrary, ―Communion with God that does not 
at the same time encompass concrete communion with other human beings is a 
                                                        
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., 53. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 63. 
133 Ibid., 62 
134 Ibid., 63. 
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contradiction.‖135  Therefore, ―Salvation is not an autonomous achievement.‖136  It must 
be accomplished communally, ecclesially. 
 Unlike Panikkar, however, Heim contends that, from the perspectives of both 
Advaitic Hinduism and Buddhism, what Christians call ‗salvation‘ is not the ultimate 
religious end.  He explains: 
Salvation is an intensification and fulfillment of a dimension that in many religious 
visions is regarded as penultimate at best: relationship between distinct persons with 
distinct identities.  From such perspectives, salvation is simply one of the things from 
which humans need to be delivered.  From the Christian perspective, such deliverance is 
one of the things from which we may finally hope to be saved.137 
 Thus, Heim questions the close connection of Advaita Vedanta and Christianity, 
which Panikkar holds so dear.  Heim points out that the goal of the Advaita Vedanta is 
moksha, that is, ―liberation or enlightenment.‖138  For Heim this is distinct from Christian 
‗salvation‘.  For instance, in the Advaitic tradition, ―in the attainment of the religious goal 
nothing changes except the understanding.‖139  One simply realizes what one already is.  
Therefore, Heim notes, ―The religious end, full liberation, is achieved in and through the 
world just as it is.‖140  Heim points out that the Advaitic worldview includes the idea of 
samsara, that is, the cycle of reincarnation based on karma.
141
  The religious end, then, is 
release from the cycle.  In this process, the―gross body‖ is what dies, while the ―subtle 
body‖ accrues karmic buildup.142  Underlying these is the self, Atman, which is more 
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specifically ―the self that is also Brahman.‖143  Through moksha, one comes to this 
realization and finds release from the cycle of samsara to which one is bound by karma.  
Thus, Heim explains, ―The word advaita means ‗not two.‘  Vedanta is non-dual because 
it rejects the icon relation of encounter between distinct entities (God with world, self 
with other selves), in favor of their ultimate identity.‖144 
 Like Panikkar, Heim uses Christian Trinitarian thought to discuss the relationship 
between divergent religious traditions, saying, ―We might say that Christianity is a ‗not 
three, not one‘ religion.‖145  In the Trinitarian view, the three ―dimensions of relation 
with God‖ are not alternatives to each other.146  He explains these ‗dimensions‘: 
These three are not three ultimates.  It is not right simply to say in sequence: there is no 
God, there is an impersonal God, there is a God of personal encounter, and there is a God 
of personal communion.  Each of these is true in the sense we have describes in our 
earlier analysis: there is one God about whom they can each be said truthfully, under the 
special Trinitarian grammar.147 
In such a paradigm, Advaita emphasizes impersonal union with an impersonal 
God.  Heim says, ―This is the infinite interchange among the divine persons, the 
―emptiness‖ in which each makes way for the other and immanence by which each shares 
perfectly in the life of the other.‖148  Much of this is given great attention in Panikkar‘s 
thought, as we have seen in our first chapter.  Yet, Heim differs from Panikkar in his 
emphasis that from the Christian point of view, this impersonal union is possible and real, 
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but only ―partial.‖149  He explains the divergence of Christianity and the Advaitic 
tradition: 
What is striking, and important, is that what from a Christian view is loss and limitation 
is quite the reverse from an advaitan view.  Leaving ―person‖ and relation behind is not 
loss but gain.  In the Advaitan view, it is Christians‘ attachment to such penultimate 
categories of understanding that restricts them to lower levels of spiritual attachment.150 
Thus, for Heim, the view of the Advaitans is the opposite view from that of 
Christians.  To Advaitans, then, communion, the ultimate end for Christians, can only be 
secondary because it retains elements of the ‗gross body‘ that are ultimately to be 
overcome as one comes to realize that Atman is Brahman.
151
  Of course, even within 
Hinduism itself, there are other traditions, which have other views of humanity‘s ultimate 
end.
152
  For instance, there is the ―Vishistadvaita‖ tradition, which agrees that this end is 
―identity with Brahman,‖ but yet ―there is some real distinction in Brahman itself, so that 
difference is not abolished completely even in moksha.‖153  There is also the tradition of 
dualism, which retains a complete distinction between Atman and Brahman.
154
 
Unlike Heim, for Panikkar, the impersonal/personal distinction is not what is 
central in the comparison of Hinduism and Christianity.  Even in the Christian tradition, 
God can be spoken of in both personal and impersonal terms.  Ultimately, the divine 
transcends even these categories.  What is central is that both traditions seek union with 
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the divine.  Regardless of how they describe it, adherents of both traditions seek this 
same divine-human unity. 
Nonetheless, for Heim (like Panikkar) all salvation relates to the Trinity.  He 
insists, ―The alternatives to salvation [the Christian term for humanity‘s ultimate end] are 
in fact constituents of salvation, standing alongside each other.‖155  He uses Dante‘s 
Divine Comedy as an illustration of multiple religious ends.
156
  Because in Dante‘s epic 
there are many individualized spheres of salvation (and damnation and purgation), one 
can understand how these religious ends fit together in Heim‘s estimation.  One must also 
note the hierarchical character of Dante‘s imagery.  The Divine Comedy involves descent 
into damnation of increasing severity followed by an ascent through purgation into 
beatitude proceeding by degrees of increasing intensity. The Christian religious end of 
salvation, in this image, is the more ‗complete‘ end compared with the others, yet all are 
‗salvific‘.  In this way, alternative religious ends are forms of participation in the 
Trinitarian life.  Heim asserts, ―They are not simply the actualization of innate human 
capacities; they are distinct relations with aspects of the triune life.‖157  He explains that 
one might say that each religious end represents ―heaven‖ for the one who reaches it, but 
only if we define ―heaven‖ that which he/she truly desires or the greatest good possible 
according to his/her disposition.
 158
  But, if we define ―heaven‖ as the realization of the 
fullness of communion with the Trinity, then he/she does not necessarily reach it.
159
 
 What is distinct for Panikkar, as compared with Heim is that, for Heim, 
communion is something that must be accomplished.  For Panikkar, using the Hindu 
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insight to inform Western Christianity, this communion already exists.  As we saw above, 
however, it must still be realized.  Lest Panikkar‘s soteriology seem facile, this realization 
is not merely a matter of objective knowledge.  It is knowledge in a deeper, more 
experiential sense.  This knowledge is then to be given flesh in praxis.  Praxis enables one 
to live out cosmotheandric communion.
160
  If such communion is to be authentic, it must 
be visible.  Only by putting it into action, can one achieve this visibility.  Furthermore, 
for Panikkar, this same communion is also implicit in the religious ends of other 
religions.  By enacting communion through praxis, adherents of various religious 
traditions can find common ground. 
 While both thinkers utilize the Trinity to explain the relationship between the 
various religious traditions of the world, it seems that Panikkar‘s theology takes the 
Trinity more seriously.  If this communion is offered to all, then it would only make 
sense that humanity‘s varying relations with the divine should in one way or another 
reflect this communion to a greater or lesser degree.  Furthermore, if one is to use the 
analogy of the Trinitarian relations to describe the relationship between religious 
traditions, as Heim does, it would be logical to follow the Trinitarian logic completely.  
In the Trinity, the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit equally reflect divinity.  Heim, on 
the other hand, seems to follow something more like a subordinationist analogy for the 
relationship between religious traditions, placing other, non-Christian traditions as lesser 
forms of relation with the divine.  The danger here, which Heim is seeking to avoid, is the 
                                                        
160 Raimon Panikkar, Cultural Disarmament: the Way to Peace, 41.  Here, Panikkar describes peace as 
enabling the praxis of realized cosmotheandrism: ―Peace is not to be identified with human perfection here.  
Peace is rather that relationship prevailing among human beings that enables perfection, felicity, or, to use 
another word whose denotation has been unduly narrowed in the common language, salvation (liberation, 
wholeness, fullness, sōtēria, mokșa, nirvāņa, tao).  Peace is cosmotheandric harmony.‖ 
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reduction of all traditions to functional equivalency, resulting in a radical relativism that 
robs all traditions of their distinct significance and salvific efficacy. 
Panikkar‘s approach, however, does not reflect this kind of relativism.  By 
contrast with Heim, Panikkar envisions communion as the basis of all true religious ends.  
But what of the distinction, seen above, between a personal communion, a non-personal 
communion, and a discovery of emptiness?  This may at first seem to be a real difficulty 
in the thought of Panikkar, and it  is in response to this difficulty that Heim posits his 
theory of multiple, compatible, religious ends.  However, if one considers the logic of 
transcendence explored in our first chapter, one finds that the via negativa and the via 
positiva are ultimately parts of the same process because ultimately the way of negation 
must negate negation itself.  It is this insight that many of the great mystics in the 
Christian tradition, such as John of the Cross, have heralded.  Thus, there is room for all 
of these expressions of the religious end within communion itself; and these expressions 
are equally valid (and equally limited). 
5.7 Critical Evaluation: Multiple Religious Ends or Multiple Human Conditions? 
While his work is widely appreciated, many theologians have also found a variety 
of problems in Heim‘s theory of multiple religious ends.  For instance, there is some 
confusion regarding Heim‘s description of the three aspects of the divine or the three 
ways of relating to God (impersonal, iconic, and communion), which he claims do not 
correspond to the three trinitarian hypostases.
161
  Kathryn Tanner inquires whether ―the 
three dimensions of the Trinity have the effect here of replacing the traditional 
importance of the three persons of the Trinity in Christian accounts of God's relations 
                                                        
161 See S. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends, 184ff. 
     
 
289 
with the world.‖ 162 They seem to be based on ―a general pattern‖ of relating to divinity 
rather than on ―anything distinctly Christian‖ or trinitarian.163  This, however, is not the 
only way of reading Heim‘s theory.  By connecting Heim‘s theology to Panikkar‘s 
Trinitarian paradigm (which we explored in our first chapter), Gavin D‘Costa, in fact, 
does see these three categories of the experience of God in Heim as rooted in the distinct 
persons of the Trinity.
164
  This assessment is a likely interpretation of Heim‘s thought 
because of the inspiration Heim draws from Panikkar. Thus, these patterns of relating to 
the divine need not be seen as an ‗alternative Trinity‘, but can be read as the fruits of 
sharing the divine life that are found in varying degrees among different religious 
traditions.  However, Heim attempts to avoid this because he envisions the last relation of 
communion (salvation) as the unique achievement of Christianity.  And, if one were to 
connect these ways of relating to God strictly with distinct Trinitarian persons and claim 
that one is present in a particular without the others, then one would be dividing the 
Trinity too strictly into separate powers/entities.  This is exactly what D‘Costa finds as he 
draws the logical conclusion from this proposition: 
The third relation, characterized by the Spirit, transforms external relations into internal 
communion, mutual indwelling, perichoresis. Heim, unlike Panikkar, fails actively to 
employ this category in relation to other religions, but sees it as the balancing function 
that establishes all three persons as equality in difference.165 
 This failure could lead to radical division of the Trinity, creating a form of tri-
theism, whereby different divine entities relate differently to humanity, creating distinct 
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religious traditions.  Only if one is to say that each manner of relating is possible in any 
authentic religion (as Panikkar does) can one avoid this tri-theistic danger.  Such as 
statement need not even say that each of these ways of relating to the divine is equally 
present in authentic religious traditions, but only that they are possible.  This is the 
extreme danger of interpreting Heim‘s relationships with the divine as corresponding to 
the divine persons of Father, Son, and Spirit.  This danger is much more serious than the 
opposite danger, which Tanner detects.  Nonetheless, Heim must remain between these 
extremes.  It could be helpful to discuss these relations as ‗appropriate‘ to particular 
divine hypostases because they pertain to characteristics that identify certain divine 
persons.  Yet, the key to utilizing the classical notion of appropriation is to point to and 
highlight particular hypostases without completely separating the three from each other.  
However, if one is to take this approach and locates the religious ends of various religious 
traditions within a Trinitarian worldview, then one must acknowledge the accessibility, 
albeit in a more or less ‗hidden‘ form, to all of these ways of relating to God in every 
authentic religion and wherever the Triune God is encountered.  Heim, however, seems 
unwilling to entertain this option because it would not enable him to exclusively identify 
communion with Christian soteriology. 
One could even take this line of criticism to the extreme that John G. Flett takes it.  
Flett sees Heim‘s theology as a ―classically modalist‖ view,  in which the real God stands 
above and beyond the ―three moments of Father, Son and Spirit‖ as ―a higher being‖ that 
―is not Father, Son and Spirit.‖166  He worries that the three divine hypostases as such 
―have no bearing in Heim‘s proposal‖ and consequently ―make no systematic 
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difference‖.167  Flett concludes, ―Given this distance from the trinitarian persons, it is 
difficult to understand how Heim‘s project qualifies as trinitarian.‖168  This is a serious 
charge, but not one that is completely unwarranted.  It is doubtful that Heim intends to 
present his theology modalistically, but nonetheless, this is an implicit danger that Heim 
has not completely avoided.  After all, one way to avoid the danger of tri-theism 
presented above is to hold a modalist interpretation of these distinct relations with God, 
whereby the distinctions in the Trinity simply become the product of our relations with 
God.  Interestingly, Flett also asserts, ―Ironically, this departure [from traditional 
Trinitarian thought] results in him [Heim] also failing to describe the world religions in 
their own particularity, that is, as they would describe themselves.‖169 
Thus, Heim‘s Trinitarian pluralism is charged not only with not being ‗trinitarian‘ 
in the final analysis, but also with not being sufficiently ‗pluralist‘.  In this vein, many 
critics question whether or not Heim accomplishes his goal, namely, to account for other 
religious traditions ―in terms of their own self-description.‖170  For instance, D‘Costa 
points out that ―Advaita, in terms of its own self-understanding, eschatologically 
radically negates the category of ‗relation‘.‖171 While Heim is aware of this, D‘Costa 
insists ―it is difficult to see the telos of Advaita being eternally preserved within a 
trinitarian framework.‖172  The question here is whether or not Heim‘s attempt to locate 
every religious end within a Trinitarian worldview is reductionist.  Terrance Tiessen 
laments the inconsistency he finds in Heim‘s thought, ―Sometimes, it appears to me that 
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Heim's position is simply another stimulating presentation of a ‗fulfillment‘ theory but at 
other times, I hear him wanting to not diminish or relativize the intrinsic value of the 
other religions.‖173 
Kärkkäinen also echoes this sentiment.  In fact, he argues that Heim is mistaken to 
appeal to both Panikkar and D‘Costa because Panikkar does not seek a solely Christian 
conception of the Trinity, but a more ‗generic‘ one, while D‘Costa is critical of pluralism 
and sees the activity of the Trinity as aimed toward the Church.
174
  Kärkkäinen is also 
critical of Heim‘s use of the Trinity as the ground of diversification because the original 
concern behind the development of the doctrine of the Trinity was not to discuss divine 
diversity, but actually to emphasize the divine unity, particularly between the Father and 
the Son.
175
  Furthermore, like Tiessen, Kärkkäinen ‗doubts‘ that Heim‘s theology is, in 
the final analysis, pluralistic at all.  Because he takes the Christian vision of God ‗for 
granted‘ as normative and seems to simply read other traditions into the Christian 
economy.
176
  This does not enable him analyze them on their own terms.  Kärkkäinen 
explains, ―At best, it is inclusivism in a new form.‖177  The point that Kärkkäinenn is 
making is that Heim cannot ignore questions about the nature of God, the answers to 
which seem to differ amongst the various religious traditions.  He thinks that Heim has 
gone ―too far‖, or concluded too much, about the multiplicity of religious ends.178  
Coming from a purely Christian perspective, one cannot conclude that another tradition‘s 
conception of a religious end is identical with any aspect of Christian theology.  For 
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instance, Heim is not on sure enough ground to conclude that Buddhist emptiness is the 
same as the emptiness referred to in apophatic Christian theology.
179
 
This critique may also be problematic for Panikkar as well.  However, Panikkar 
deftly avoids a sharp identification of the concepts found in different religious traditions.  
He does this, as we saw in our first chapter, by describing similar concepts across 
traditions as non-interchangeable, but functional, equivalents.  We discussed this earlier 
as ‗homology‘.  The advantage of such an approach is that it enables commonality to be 
discussed, but does not reduce differing theological systems to each other, preserving 
their integrity.  As we have seen, using this notion of homological equivalency allows 
Panikkar to find Trinitarian sentiments in both Hinduism and Buddhism.  Perhaps such a 
vision can enhance Heim‘s efforts. 
 However, not all of the problems with Heim‘s thought can be so easily reconciled. 
As Kärkkäinen points out, the hierarchical arrangement of religious ends in Heim‘s 
thought ―is problematic for the hope of the unity of humankind and the integrity of God‘s 
final victory.‖180  There are really two interrelated issues here.  First, one of the great 
Christian hopes is universal salvation.  However, as Heim points out, this has often been 
articulated as a hope, but rarely upheld dogmatically.
181
  Nonetheless, Heim‘s proposition 
of distinct religious ends dims the hope of a final, united destiny of all of humanity. 
 Closely allied to this criticism is the second point that Kärkkäinen makes here.  
The notion of distinct forms of human fulfillment could easily lead one to conclude that 
these ends fulfill some natural yearning in humanity.   And, since there are distinct ends, 
different humans may in fact have distinct natures that have these ends as their ‗final 
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cause‘ (to use an Aristotelian notion).  This leads to a natural division of humanity.  
Couple this with the fact that these ends are hierarchically stratified and it is not a huge 
stretch to conclude that some humans are by nature higher or more supreme than others 
because they possess the capacity for a higher or more supreme end than others do.  This 
is quite a problematic prospect.  Anticipating such a contention, after disavowing a de 
iure universalist (or apokatastasis) eschatology, Heim asserts: 
This also bears on the question of a common human nature.  If the possibility of eternal 
loss exists, then that loss must constitute a distortion and constraint of the potential in 
created human nature, or the complete annihilation of that nature.  This does not deny 
human solidarity, for without a common nature there would be no measure to allow talk 
of ―loss‖ or ―fulfillment‖ at all. To entertain a hypothesis that adds variety to this binary 
saved/not saved picture raises no new question in principle about our shared humanity.  
People who reach an ideal fulfillment of their humanity do not thereby become identical.  
And persons who do not realize the fullest potential of their created nature do not live less 
than human lives.  Belief in our common humanity does not require the belief that there 
is no human variety within salvation, or the belief that there can be only one, entirely 
negative alternative to salvation.182 
 Heim has not completely defused the issue, however.  He has in fact raised 
another problem.  If his account here is taken to its conclusion, namely that those who 
choose other religious ends besides communion are not realizing the ―fullest potential‖ of 
their humanity, then we must question in what sense other religious ends are in fact 
‗ends‘.  There is, then, only one true ‗end‘, and then there are a few other end-like aspects 
of other traditions; but it then becomes unclear how these relate to each other, if at all.   
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As Kärkkäinen argues, maintaining the ―radical differences‖ among religious ends winds 
up making interfaith dialogue ―fruitless‖ because ―the possibility of a few individuals, or 
even a few groups, changing their allegiance is afar too meagre a goal for interreligious 
dialogue.‖183  For this reason, it seems that Panikkar‘s approach (and the approach of 
other pluralists), which seeks to find commonalities among various soteriologies, is 
preferable.  Simply put, Heim is unable, in the end, to reconcile Christian soteriology 
with the multiplicity of religious ends and successfully maintain both unity and 
distinction.  At times, he discusses an underlying unity, but is unable to completely fit 
distinction within it. 
S. Mark Heim and Panikkar begin their respective projects similarly, that is, with 
an assessment of the variety of religious traditions found across geographical and cultural 
divides.  Heim, however, envisions greater distance between the various religious 
traditions in world than does Panikkar.  Heim formulates this distance in terms of a 
multiplicity of religious goals or ends.  These goals are not ultimately incompatible, yet 
they are also not ultimately the same either.  Both Panikkar and Heim insist that salvation 
consists of communion.  Heim claims that this is the Christian religious end, while 
Panikkar sees this same end as present in the religious aspirations of other traditions as 
well.  Both authors have the Eastern traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism in mind. 
With Panikkar, however we see that, despite the differences of expression, all 
three of these religious traditions envision union with the divine, that is, with that which 
is at the center of all reality.  Christianity, generally speaking, prefers to discuss this 
communion in interpersonal language.  Both Hinduism and Buddhism prefer to not 
ascribe personal attributes to the divine.  Buddhism prefers to not ascribe any attributes to 
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the divine (even divinity).   Nonetheless, both envision a way by which humanity can 
unite itself to the Ultimate (or ultimate emptiness).  Thus, the goal of humanity in these 
traditions can be thought of as a form of communion. 
So what accounts for this variety of formulations of the Ultimate human end?  
Perhaps the real diversity among religious traditions is not in their religious ends, but in 
their description of the human condition.  This conditions the way in which human 
liberation is spoken of.  For both the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, for instance, the 
central human problem is that of samsara, the beginning-less and endless cycle of death 
and rebirth.  Consequently, human liberation (moksha in Hinduism; nirvana in 
Buddhism) involves release from this cycle.  Yet both of these conceptions of liberation 
are (at least to some adherents of their respective traditions) formulated as forms of 
union, either the union of Ātman and Brahman (moksha) or as the union of the self (or the 
‗no-self‘, as it were) with Ultimate emptiness.  In all three traditions here (Christianity 
being the third), humanity is headed toward a goal and that goal includes the realization 
of one‘s true identity.  Panikkar brings this commonality among religious traditions out in 
his work.  Thus, the shared experiences  of communion that are expressed variously in 
the spiritualities of the religions point to a common primordial religious stratum of 
humanity that is not easy to define yet is certainly palpable. 
Another aspect where Panikkar‘s theology transcends that of Heim is with regard 
to the ethical implications of this communion.  Communion is not simply something to be 
pondered and thought about.  Rather, such meditation leads implicitly to action.  This 
action is praxis.  As we have seen, the realization of communion through praxis is the 
mark of authentic self-realization.  In this way, only through kenosis and self-giving can 
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one truly come to know oneself.  The self is only realized in relation.  However, wherever 
the praxis of communion is lived out, the reality of communion subsists.  This may 
certainly take imperfect forms.  Nonetheless, these forms are real manifestations of 
cosmotheandric unity.  Even the professed atheist may come to ‗know‘ God through 
praxis, not in an intellectual form which, as we have already mentioned in our third 
chapter, is a secondary abstraction from a more primordial encounter with the divine in 
mythic substratum of faith, but in a manner that is nonetheless real and efficaciously 
leads him/her to the realization of the fullness of human identity.  It is for this reason that 
there are many stories in the Christian tradition of atheists who have come to explicit 
faith through the persuasion of praxis.  Through praxis, they came to explicit knowledge 
of God, whom they already knew. 
5.8 Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus 
 One of the most (if not the most) famous ecclesiological axioms is Extra 
Ecclesiam Nulla Salus, that is, ‗outside the Church there is no salvation‘.  This axiom 
dates back to Ignatius of Antioch‘s second century condemnation of schismatics and was 
most famously taught by Cyprian of Carthage in the third century.
184
  In many places in 
the Christian tradition, this attitude has found ‗official‘ acceptance.  For instance, Canon 
1 of Lateran IV (1215) reads, "There is one Universal Church of the faithful, outside of 
which there is absolutely no salvation."
185
  It is also found in Pope Eugene IV‘s bull 
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Cantata Domino (February 4, 1441) from the Council of Florence (1438-1445).
186
  After 
listing several Christological heresies, Eugene IV states:  
It [the "sacrosanct Roman Church"] firmly believes, professes, and proclaims that those 
not living within the Catholic Church, not only pagans, but also Jews and heretics and 
schismatics cannot become participants in eternal life, but will depart "into everlasting 
fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels" [Matt. 25:41], unless before the end 
of life the same have been added to the flock; and that the unity of the ecclesiastical body 
is so strong that only to those remaining in it are the sacraments of the Church of benefit 
for salvation, and do fastings, almsgiving, and other functions of piety and exercises of 
Christian service produce eternal reward, and that no one, whatever almsgiving he has 
practiced, even if he has shed blood for the name of Christ can be saved, unless he has 
remained in the bosom and unity of the Catholic Church.187 
 The general thrust of the axiom is still present in more contemporary ‗official‘ 
documents.  For instance, in Lumen Gentium, we find: "They could not be saved who, 
knowing that the Catholic Church was founded as necessary by God through Christ, 
would refuse either to enter it, or to remain in it."
188
  It is notable that there is a change of 
tone here from previous incarnations of the axiom.  The notion that such and individual 
‗knowingly refuses‘ is a telling addendum to the axiom.  This qualifier leaves room for 
those who are ‗ignorant‘ or ‗improperly informed‘.  This represents an embrace of 
‗inclusivism‘ vis-à-vis the attitude of ‗exclusivism‘ that seems to be the tenor of the 
axiom itself. 
 Despite such inclusivist qualifiers, many contemporary theologians still condemn 
the axiom.  For instance, Jacques Dupuis insists upon the need for a "true purification of 
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the memory" because of all the hostilities between the religions, particularly in light of all 
of the evils of the past century.
189
  This includes a purification of our vocabulary.
190
  For 
example, the use of terms like ‗non-Christian‘ is condescending to those outside of 
Christianity.
191
  Dupuis explains, "What people are called should be based on how they 
understand themselves, not on a foreign and often prejudiced understanding."
192
  Dupuis 
points to the fact that the New Testament expanded the concept of ‗people of God‘ 
outside of Israel to potentially include all people.  Thus, the Church extends this 
assembly, it does not replace it.
193
  For Dupuis, this is the way to understand the Church, 
not extra ecclesiam nulla salus.
194
  Like Panikkar, Dupuis insists on the need for ‗mutual 
conversion‘, ‗sym-pathy‘, and ‗em-pathy‘ between Christians and others.195  Towards this 
end, the Church should accept others in their difference not condemn them based upon 
that difference.
196
  Thus, Dupuis insists that we must purify our theological language.  
For instance, there is a "certain ambiguity" that is discomforting in the documents of the 
Second Vatican Council.
197
  Thus, when rereading the work of the council in our present 
context we experience "a certain disillusionment and dissatisfaction."
198
  Dupuis insists 
that we must move even beyond the notion of one true religion that "subsists" in the 
Catholic Church, as found in Dignitatis Humanum:
199
 
First, the council professes its belief that God Himself has made known to mankind the 
way in which men are to serve Him, and thus be saved in Christ and come to blessedness. 
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We believe that this one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to 
which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men.200 
 But is exclusivism the intent behind the axiom?  This most famous proponent of 
this axiom is Cyprian of Carthage, who included it in his Letter to Jubaianus.  This letter 
was written in the context of dealing with schismatics.  For Cyprian, since the Novatians 
separated themselves from the Church, their baptism was invalid.  Just as the Novatians 
rebaptized Christians entering their sect, so Cyprian insists that Novatians (or any 
heretics) coming back into the Church should also be rebaptized.  While stating that even 
martyrs need to be in communion with the Church in order to be saved, Cyprian states: 
But if not even the baptism of a public confession and blood can profit a heretic to 
salvation, because there is no salvation out of the Church, how much less shall it be of 
advantage to him, if in a hiding-place and a cave of robbers, stained with the contagion of 
adulterous water, he has not only not put off his old sins, but rather heaped up still newer 
and greater ones!  Wherefore baptism cannot be common to us and to heretics, to whom 
neither God the Father, nor Christ the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, nor the faith, nor the 
Church itself, is common.201 
 Many commentators say that Cyprian‘s directive for rebaptism is one of 
discipline, not doctrine; Consequently, while it was influential to later generations, it did 
not gain widespread acceptance.
202
   For instance, Augustine argues the exact opposite.  
He takes up consideration of Cyprian‘s ideas in the context of the Donatist controversy.  
The Donatists were in the habit of re-baptizing those baptized by traditores (traitors), 
Christians who committed apostasy.  Augustine insists, contra Cyprian (although he 
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thought that, at least in intent, Cyprian was on his side), that what is shared among 
heretics is valid because it belongs to the Church.  However, one‘s baptism (by heretics) 
is not truly effective until one lives in union with the Church because one at one and the 
same time joins the Church, but persists in schism.  Thus, the Spirit which animates the 
Church, is in the heretics but is also lost because of schism.  Regarding Cyprian, 
Augustine states: 
"Salvation," he says, "is not without the Church."  Who says that it is?  And therefore, 
whatever men have that belongs to the Church, it profits them nothing towards salvation 
outside the Church.  But it is one thing not to have, another to have so as to be of no 
use.203 
 Thus, the imperfect union through baptism by a heretic can only find its 
perfection in the Church.  Yet, despite the imperfections, there is still real union.  Dupuis 
further explains that for Augustine, the Church exists where Christ‘s salvific influence 
exists.
204
  Thus, for Dupuis, with Augustine‘s broader notion of Church, the problems of 
the axiom, extra ecclesiam nulla salus are solved.  He points out that some (we are 
arguing here that Panikkar generally fits into this category) even suggest a broader notion 
of the Church, which identifies it with all humankind.
205
  However, he notes that what is 
meant by the axiom hinges upon what one means by the term ‗church‘.206 
 It is important to note that, for Panikkar, as for Dupuis, ecclesiological 
considerations are outcroppings of Christological considerations.  As we have already 
mentioned numerous times, in Panikkar‘s theological schema, Christ is the manifestation 
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or revelation of the cosmotheandric unity that already underlies all of reality.  Salvation 
consists, then, in accepting this identity and involves acting accordingly.  By living this 
salvific revelation out, the Christian him/herself becomes a christophany.  The Church, 
then, is the community of this revelation.  Thus, the Church is a christophany as well.  
This ‗church‘, however, is not limited to the institutional church.  As we have seen in our 
third chapter, for Panikkar identity is based upon unity and not distinction.  
Consequently, it may be acceptable for Panikkar to say that the Church of Christ is 
identical with the Catholic Church, although he would probably rather approach the topic 
from the opposite angle: the Catholic Church is identical with the Church of Christ.  It is 
the Church, in its earthly, human character that seeks identity.  However, this identity is 
not exclusive.  The Church then is a microcosm because the world as a whole seeks this 
cosmotheandric identity.
207
  Better said, the church is the world, insofar as the world has 
realized its identity, or experienced salvation. 
In his eighth sūtra of Christophany, Panikkar asserts that ―The Church Is 
Considered a Site of the Incarnation.‖208  This is one of Panikkar‘s clearest 
ecclesiological moments.  What is clear is that Christology and ecclesiology are pieces of 
the same whole.  Essentially, Panikkar argues that the Church is a continuation of the 
incarnation, a ‗making-present-of-Christ‘ in the world.  However, he does not reduce the 
Church to the visible institution.  Rather, he says that there is a ‗universal‘ [the true 
meaning of ‗catholic‘] Church that extends beyond this.209  Panikkar contends that 
―salvation consists in reaching our plenitude—that is, in sharing the divine nature, since 
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nothing finite can ever satisfy the being that is capax Dei.‖210  Panikkar insists that this 
process occurs in the church.
211
  Perhaps, however, it would be more consistent with 
Panikkar‘s general train of thought to say that those going through this process are the 
Church.  The Church is the locus of this cosmotheandric union.  The Church is a 
christophany.  Thus, the Church is present where Christ is present.  Thus, where Christ is, 
there is the Church.  In this way, to complement the oft-cited notion of creatio continua, 
Panikkar proposes an ecclesiology of incarnatio continua. 
 With this understanding of ‗Church‘ in mind, Panikkar insights on Cyprian‘s 
axiom are novel.  He argues, ―If it be true that ‗outside the Church there is no salvation‘, 
this ‗Church‘ should not be identified with a concrete organization, or even with 
adherence to Christianity.‖212 
He continues, ―Church, as the sociological dimension of religion, is the organism of 
salvation (by definition), but the Church is not coextensive with the visible christian 
church.‖213  Indeed, as we have proposed above, Panikkar‘s ‗cosmic Christology‘ 
demands a corresponding ‗cosmic ecclesiology‘.  Panikkar explains: 
The assertion that ―there is no salvation outside of Christ‖ is almost a tautology.  
Salvation means full realization, or, in traditional terms, divinization, and divinization 
occurs only in union with the divine—whose symbol in Christian language is Christ.214 
 Note that, in the way Panikkar utilizes the famous axiom, he provides an 
ecclesiological interpretation, substituting ‗Christ‘ for ‗Church‘.  This is no accident.  
Where there is union with Christ, there is the Church.  Thus, for Panikkar, extra 
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ecclesiam nulla salus is not problematic.  In fact, it is a statement that says very little, 
serving best as a definition of ‗Church‘.  The Church is the community of salvation.  
And, salvation is none other than the realization of cosmotheandric unity. 
5.9 Synthesis: Soteriology, Ecclesiology, and Identity 
Komulainen insists that Panikkar exhibits an ―existentialist‖ understanding of 
contemplation.
215
  Because contemplation leads to insight about human existence, 
contemplatives ―pave the way for dialogue.‖216  They can even up the door to 
―ecosophy,‖ a dialogical attitude toward the Earth, by which one finds union with the 
anima mundi.
217
  In this way, Panikkar‘s ―cosmotheandric vision,‖ the ―crystallization of 
his thinking,‖ brings varying elements together.218  So, the cosmotheandric vision 
involves a ‗new innocence‘ by which one comes to greater awareness of the present, that 
is, of the context in which he/she finds him/herself.
219
    He/she sees the world around 
him/her, perhaps for the first time.  Komulainen insists that this ‗new myth‘, which is 
based upon Panikkar‘s theological anthropology, discards Western individualism and 
proposes a conception of the person understood holistically and relationally.
220
  
Komulainen notes that this realization of mystical, cosmotheandric unity requires a 
certain ―mutation‖ of the traditions that lead one along the religious path.221  He explains: 
The mutation he envisioned thus seems to mean that human kind advances through a 
change of consciousness to a new innocence.  Historical consciousness will end, albeit 
through a catastrophe.  In any case, a new transhistorical consciousness will emerge on 
                                                        
215 Jyri Komulainen, An Emerging Cosmotheandric Religion? Raimon Panikkar’s Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions, 168. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid., 173. 
218 Ibid., 178. 
219 Ibid., 179. 
220 Ibid., 180. 
221 Ibid., 181. 
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the contemporary scene.  Panikkar understands this to be represented already in 
cosmotheandric spirituality, and in the lives of those committed to a spiritual life.222 
While Komulainen‘s assessment is mostly correct, he seems to miss the major 
point of Panikkar‘s theological project.  This ‗new myth‘ is not a ‗new myth‘ at all.  
Rather, it is the common ‗myth‘ that underlies all other true myths.  It is the truth about 
reality, which Panikkar has not simply posited, but which he has uncovered not despite, 
but through the authentic religious traditions that he has encountered.  In this process, 
Panikkar has highlighted the importance of mystical insight.  Thus, for Panikkar, 
mysticism is the key to soteriology.  Salvation is found in mystical union with all of 
reality, cosmotheandrism.  This also has ecclesiological ramifications.  For Panikkar, the 
saint, Paul of Tarsus‘ ecclesiological ‗building block‘, is the mystic, the one who has 
realized or is realizing this salvific cosmotheandric union.  In this way, as we have seen, 
Panikkar‘s ecclesiological outlook leads away from the emphasis on who or what is 
‗within the church‘ to a new emphasis on ‗the church within‘.  The Church is the 
community of salvation, those in union with Christ, finding its fulfillment in the 
realization of the Reign of God.  Those who find this mystical union have found Christ.  
And, where there is Christ, there is the Church. 
This account of ecclesial identity may seem somewhat glib and flippant.  At face 
value, to speak of the ‗church within‘ seems more like mystification than mystery.  The 
church, then, it seems, has no borders.  What then is the use of speaking of ‗church‘ at 
all?  However, we must point out that the purpose of such reflections is not to limit the 
usefulness of speaking of ‗church‘ at all, but rather to temper the confidence with which 
we speak of those ‗outside the church‘.  If there is an inward ecclesiology, then this does 
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not thwart the corresponding outward ecclesiology.  Such outward ecclesiology finds its 
clearest expression in the explicit Church of Christ which, as Lumen Gentium tells us, 
‗subsists in‘ the Catholic Church.223  However, this same paragraph of Lumen Gentium 
echoes Pius XII in his insistence that the mystical body of Christ and the institutional 
Church are not separate, distinct realities, but aspects of the same reality.  Thus, those 
who possess this inward ecclesial identity belong to the same body of Christ that those 
who profess membership in the Church outwardly.
224
  After all, it is the Church‘s mission 
to make visible the presence of Christ and so to inform all of their true identity as it 
awaits its fulfillment in the Reign of God.
225
  The visible Church is a herald of identity 
and, consequently, salvation. 
What consequence does such an understanding have for those who identify 
themselves explicitly as Christian?  How is this self-appellation different in light of such 
a vision of ecclesiology?  In a sense, such identity is radically modified.  The member of 
the church (the saint, the mystic) can no longer erroneously envision the ‗holiness‘ that is 
the hallmark of his or her identity as signifying a status ‗over and against‘ the world.  
Rather, holiness, in this new conception, involves solidarity with the rest of creation and 
brings with it a missionary call to manifest the holiness, that is, the union with the Holy 
One, which is already present in all of reality.  However, in another sense, there is 
nothing ‗different‘ about this ecclesial paradigm.  As we saw in our second chapter when 
we discussed the traditional roots of the concept of the activity of Christ outside the 
Incarnation, the presence of Christ has always been active in the world.  This logically 
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implies that there is some form of ecclesial identity that has always been operative in the 
world.  Where there is union with Christ, there is the Church. 
5.10 Conclusion 
  As we have seen, Panikkar‘s cosmotheandric theology leads to a soteriology of 
identity.  Human destiny is to realize the identity that is already present at the core of 
one‘s being.  This realization is that which Christians have traditionally called 
‗communion‘.  The principle of this communion is Christ.  Christ reveals the 
cosmotheandric unity of all of reality.  Salvation then is the actualization of this 
communion, which is reached through worship and praxis. In this sense, all humans are 
called to monasticism, that is, to the ‗blessed simplicity‘ of cosmotheandric communion.  
Only through such ‗single-minded‘ devotion can humans find their true identity, which is 
most properly defined by that to which the human unites him/herself.  By demonstrating 
this, we have brought together several of Panikkar‘s soteriological allusions to articulate 
Panikkar‘s soteriology systematically. 
Above, we have also brought out the ecclesiology implicit in Panikkar‘s thought, 
which shows us that the Church is the community of this communion.  It is the body of 
those united to Christ.  Christ, however, extends beyond institutional parameters.  This 
does not mean that the Church of Christ exists apart from the visible Church.  Rather, the 
two are united.  The visible Church makes this invisible reality present.  The Church is a 
sacrament.  To go a step further, utilizing Panikkar‘s language, the Church is a 
‗christophany‘, that is, the Church makes Christ present.  The clearest manifestation of 
this comes in our elaboration upon Panikkar‘s usage of the famous axiom extra ecclesiam 
nulla salus, which has been treated above in this chapter.  For Panikkar, who is devoted 
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to his own brand of pluralism, this axiom is not problematic.  Of course there is no 
salvation outside the Church because the Church is precisely the community that has 
realized and actualized cosmotheandric communion. 
One question that can be raised regarding Panikkar‘s vision of the confluence of 
soteriology and ecclesiology in identity is whether he has given due consideration to the 
distinction between nature and grace (supernature).  After all, it seems to be Panikkar‘s 
contention that human fulfillment consists in realizing the identity that is already present.  
This would seem to collapse grace into nature.  This is the root of questions regarding the 
significance of Jesus the Christ in the economy of salvation.  On the contrary, Panikkar 
would wonder about the motivation behind such a question and marvel at the need for 
such a clear demarcation.  He would criticize this as a peculiarly Western drive for 
clarity, rooted in the law of noncontradiction.  Panikkar would contend that if all of 
reality is called to fulfillment in Christ and the offer of salvation is ubiquitous, then grace 
too may be ubiquitous.  As we have seen, this grace is communicated through Christ, 
whose ‗parameters‘ extend beyond the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Furthermore, the question remains as to whether Panikkar‘s theology, filled as it 
is with idiosyncrasies, can be useful to Catholic theologians.  Panikkar‘s theology is very 
idiosyncratic in that he frequently coins new terms and amends the meaning of existing 
terms.  These idiosyncrasies are difficult to communicate and ‗translate‘, yet they often 
appeal to something that is central to, but often lost in, theological discourse: the Mystery 
of the Divine.  Panikkar‘s reworking of terms like ‗monk‘ or coinage of terms such as 
‗cosmotheandrism‘, ‗tempiternity‘, etc. have a common denominator.  This common 
denominator is their tendency toward unity.  This unity is the result Panikkar‘s mystical 
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intuition.  Ultimately, what Panikkar aims to communicate in these instances is the 
limitation of human reason.  Even the quite clear distinctions that we posit are not as 
absolute as we would like them to be.  Thus, human concepts are valuable yet finite and 
limited.  Not only does God surpass the concepts with which humans attempt to grasp the 
Divine, but so too does the rest of the world surpass the concepts with which it is grasped 
by the human.  This Mystery is more adequately grasped at a level prior to and presumed 
by reason: faith.  Faith finds its object in the Divine Mystery and its fulfillment in 
communion. 
Therefore, the concepts of identity and Christ are the hermeneutical keys to 
establishing the soteriological and ecclesiological implications of Panikkar‘s 
christophanic cosmotheandrism. While for the Christian theologian, Panikkar‘s 
soteriological and ecclesiological thrust may need to be contextualized in a fuller 
soteriological and ecclesiological vision, it is certainly not incompatible with this.  
Furthermore, as the many theologians, including Gavin D‘Costa, Peter Phan, and others, 
who have been inspired by Panikkar demonstrate, Panikkar‘s reflections provide fruitful 
soil for genuine interreligious dialogue that can transcend doctrinal impasses.  This soil is 
the soil of communion and identity.  Both the soteriological and ecclesiological 
implications that we have noted here may then best be paraphrased by Augustine‘s 
Eucharistic reflection: “Estote quod videtis, et accipite quod estis.‖226 
                                                        
226 Augustine, Sermo 272. ―Become what you see and receive what you are.‖ 
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Conclusion 
 Throughout the preceding pages, we have examined Raimon Panikkar‘s thought 
in detail.  In that space we have attempted to remain, for the most part, within his thought 
in order to systematize it and deduce some of the resulting theological consequences that 
it holds.  If we take his theological vision seriously, as we propose here, then we must 
seriously consider its effects on other theological concepts that are only glimpsed or 
given occasional attention within his literary corpus.  In this sense, our theological task in 
the preceding pages has been to systematize the thought of a mystic. 
 We began by introducing Panikkar‘s theological vision, which is best described 
with his own term, ‗cosmotheandrism‘.  As we saw, ‗cosmotheandrism‘ is essentially a 
Trinitarian paradigm that extends beyond the divine realm and penetrates all of reality.  
Thus, the three poles of reality, which Panikkar identifies as the cosmic (cosmic), the 
divine (Theos), and the human (Aner), are ultimately bound together in a unity that, at 
least for the cosmic and human poles of this relationship, permeate the very core of 
being.  This Trinitarian insight is further expounded upon by the notion of advaita (or 
non-dualism) found in the Hindu tradition.  Panikkar‘s metaphysical paradigm is the 
foundation for the rest of his theology and the soteriological and ecclesiological schema 
that we set forth in our fifth chapter. 
 In our second chapter, we defined the term ‗Christ‘ and discovered that, for 
Panikkar, ‗Christ‘ is the principle of this cosmotheandric union.  This principle is made 
know through ‗christophanies‘, that is, manifestations of the communion of all of reality.  
The Incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth is one such christophany, but not the only one.   In 
our examination, we found that Panikkar‘s insistence on the activity of Christ outside of 
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the Incarnation is not a concept that is alien to the Christian tradition.  Rather, it has been 
operative in Christianity from a very early time. 
 In our third chapter, we examined Panikkar‘s use of the concept of ‗identity‘.  We 
found that identity is a somewhat fluid term.  However, there are some particular 
elements that contribute to the formation of one‘s identity.  For instance, identity 
typically includes both self-designation, on the one hand, and communal acceptance, on 
the other.  Panikkar also prefers to discuss identity in terms of that to which one unites 
oneself (the ‗Eastern‘ view) rather than that from which one distinguishes oneself (the 
‗Western‘ view).  However, as we pointed out, both of these aspects are necessary to a 
holistic vision of identity, particularly one that is ultimately rooted in a Trinitarian 
(cosmotheandric) worldview. 
 In our fourth chapter, we synthesized the insights that we uncovered in the 
previous two chapters by examining the identity of Christ and Christian identity.  Along 
the way, we reinforced the insistence that ‗Christ‘ extends beyond Jesus of Nazareth, yet, 
Jesus of Nazareth is identical with Christ.  Christ‘s identity as the principle of 
cosmotheandric communion enables a broadened notion of ‗Christian identity‘.  The 
Christian is the one who is united with Christ, and, consequently, all of reality.  Christian 
identity is found in communion.  But, as we discovered in our first chapter, this 
communion is at the root of all reality.  It is a communion that is already present, 
although often lies dormant and unrealized.  Christian identity, then, is none other than 
the true human identity found in the union that Christ enables and that the christophany 
reveals. 
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 In our fifth and final chapter, we gathered the ecclesiological and soteriological 
fragments scattered throughout Panikkar‘s literary corpus and assembled them into a, 
more or less, coherent whole.  We then made key deductions as we systematized them.  
Panikkar‘s reflections on these topics are fragmentary because they are peculiarly 
Christian concepts.  He instead prefers to focus on those topics that intrigue the multiple 
audiences for which he is writing.  In this analytical and deductive process we discovered 
a soteriology that is based on identity.  Salvation consists, ultimately, of the realization of 
an identity that is ‗already there‘.  This identity, as we saw in chapter four, is the identity 
that is achieved through cosmotheandric communion.  Thus, the human goal is to realize 
the self.  This is not a purely hypothetical and conceptual exercise.  Neither is it sought in 
isolation (because the goal itself is not isolation).  It is realized communally (ecclesially) 
and exercised in praxis.  True communion, then, is not merely conceptualized, but lived 
out in reality. 
 We also discovered a new ecclesiological paradigm that can inform the spiritual 
and missionary practice of the Christian community.  If salvation is the realization of 
identity, and if this identity consists of the realization of cosmotheandric communion, of 
which Christ is the principle, then this ought to affect the way that we conceive of 
Church.  One of the central insights that Panikkar provides in this regard is the insight 
that the famous axiom extra ecclesiam nulla salus is really tautological.  That is, it really 
functions as a definition of the Church rather than a limitation on the parameters of the 
Church.  The Church is the community of salvation.  It is the community of those who 
have found their salvation in the identity that is cosmotheandric communion mediated by 
Christ and which reaches fulfillment in the coming Reign of God. 
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The Church, then, is the community of those united with Christ.  We must recall 
here the insight arrived at in our second chapter.  ‗Christ‘ extends beyond the Incarnation.  
Thus, we have concluded that if we are to take seriously Panikkar‘s insistence on a 
‗cosmic Christ‘, then we must be prepared to account for some form of a ‗cosmic 
Church‘.  A cosmic Christology demands a cosmic ecclesiology.  If the Church extends 
the presence of Christ in a visible manner throughout history, then the Church functions 
as a ‗christophany‘ and may appear in forms that we, as Christians are unaccustomed to 
acknowledging.  If those outside the traditional, institutional lines that we have become 
used to using to demarcate the ‗Church‘ act in accordance with and in union with 
‗Christ‘, then they too, perhaps in an undeveloped manner, are in some sense acting 
ecclesially. Where there is union with Christ, there is the Church. 
We may then, perhaps, be able to speak of some kind of ‗inward‘ ecclesial 
identity that is distinct from, yet never separate from, one‘s ‗outward‘ ecclesial 
affiliation.  This ‗inward‘ ecclesiology can be glimpsed in the single-mindedness of the 
monk, who, for Panikkar, is not necessarily the cloistered monk of the classical tradition, 
but any ‗centered‘ one who focuses on realizing true identity in cosmotheandric 
communion.  Thus, there is a monastic element in each of us that needs to be realized.  So 
too there is an ecclesial element in each of us that must also be realized. 
This cannot be overstated, however.  This ‗inward‘ ecclesiology cannot be 
understood as the mystification of the Church.  Rather, it ought to be seen as an 
enrichment of the Church.  In our missionary activity as Christians, we are not seeking to 
make allies where there were once enemies.  Rather, we are seeking to find the Church 
that is already present in the other, and so to realize the alliance that is already there so 
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that together we can come to the realization and actualization of who we truly are as 
humans.  Salvation is open to all and, so too, the Church is open to all.  This ecclesiology 
is not a threat to the institutional Church, but a reminder of our call to evangelization, that 
is, our call to act christophanically. 
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